Small business groups enhance performance and promote stability, not expropriation. Evidence from French SMEs

Journal of Banking and Finance

Volumn 35, Issue 3, 2011, Pages 613-626

  Hamelin, Anaïs ^a  

^a UNIVERSITÉ DE STRASBOURG   (France)

Author keywords

Control; G32; G34; Ownership; Performance; Small business; Tunneling

Indexed keywords

EID: 78651442112     PISSN: 03784266     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2010.07.025     Document Type: Article

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