Beyond the copyright crisis: Principles for change

Journal of the Copyright Society of the U.S.A.

Volumn 55, Issue 2-3, 2008, Pages 165-199

  Geller, Paul Edward ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 42149158364     PISSN: 08863520     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (207)

1. See generally Paul Edward Geller, Dissolving Intellectual Property, 28 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 139 (2006) (tracing the crisis in intellectual property from the eighteenth century to the present).
2. For analysis of relative public goods and cites to further sources, see Christopher Yoo, Copyright and Public Good Economics: A Misunderstood Relation, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 635 (2007).
3. See ROBERT DARNTON, THE BUSINESS OF ENLIGHTENMENT: PUBLISHING HISTORY OF THE ENCYCLOPÉDIE, 1775-1800 ch. 4 (1979).
4. For historical analysis, with cites to further sources, see Paul Edward Geller, Copyright History and the Future: What's Culture Got to Do with It?, 47 J. COPR. SOC'Y 209, 210-35 (2000).
5. Statute of Anne, 8 Anne, ch. 19, § 1 (1710) (Eng.).
6. Id. Preamble; U.S. CONST, art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
7. See generally BRAD SHERMAN & LIONEL BENTLY, THE MAKING OF MODERN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: THE BRITISH EXPERIENCE, 1760-1911 chs. 1-2 passim (1999) (analyzing how the labor theory of property influenced early copyright law).
8. Law of January 13/19, 1791, art. 3, and Law of June 19/24, 1793, arts. 1, 7, accompanied respectively by the Reports of Le Chapelier and of Lakanal, in original texts and translated in J.A.L. STERLING, WORLD COPYRIGHT LAW 1002-07 (1998).
9. For background, see BERNARD EDELMAN, LE SACRE DE L'AUTEUR pt. 4 (2004).
10. See generally I:1 STIG STRÖMHOLM, LE DROIT MORAL DE L'AUTEUR 196 (1966) ("It was by the detour of the theoretical elaboration of the concept of 'rights of personality' . . . that German doctrine, so to speak, 'discovered' moral right while French law, coping with the facts, found it in equitable solutions in the cases.").
11. For the debates on the Berne translation right, see Records of the First International Conference for the Protection of Author's Rights Convened in Berne, 1884, in WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, 1886 - BERNE CONVENTION CENTENARY - 1986, at 83-135 passim (1986).
12. For background on the rise of derivative-work rights, see Paul Goldstein, Adaptation Rights and Moral Rights in the United Kingdom, the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany, 14 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 43 (1983).
13. Compare Adolf Dietz, Transformation of Authors Rights, Change of Paradigm, 138 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DU DROIT D'AUTEUR [R.I.D.A.] 22 (1988) (justifying, beyond authors' rights, neighboring rights to prompt investment in media productions),
14. with Jerome H. Reichman & Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property Rights in Data?, 50 VAND. L. REV. 51 (1997) (critiquing copyright-related rights in database contents as restricting access to facts that copyright law leaves free for research and creative purposes).
15. See LYMAN RAY PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 29 (1968);
16. LUCIEN FEBVRE & HENRI-JEAN MARTIN, THE COMING OF THE BOOK: THE IMPACT OF PRINTING 1450-1800, at 239-47 (Geoffrey Nowell-Smith & David Wootton eds.; David Gerard trans., 1976).
17. See supra text accompanying note 10.
18. See PATTERSON, supra note 12, ch. 3;
19. ADRIAN JOHNS, THE NATURE OF THE BOOK: PRINT AND KNOWLEDGE IN THE MAKING 128-36 (1998).
20. For background, see JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE: AN INQUIRY INTO A CATEGORY OF BOURGEOIS SOCIETY chs. 2-3 (Thomas Burger trans., 1989);
21. MICHAEL MCKEON, THE SECRET HISTORY OF DOMESTICITY: PUBLIC, PRIVATE, AND THE DIVISION OF KNOWLEDGE chs. 4-5 (2005).
22. See, e.g., EUGÈNE POUILLET, TRAITÉ THÉORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE LA PROPRIÉTÉ LITTÉRAIRE ET ARTISTIQUE ET DU DROIT DE REPRÉSENTATION 601 (3d ed. 1908) ("A copy made as a [private] study is exempt from remedies for infringement.").
23. But cf. Samuel Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 198-207 (1890) (finding, in authors' common-law copyright, clues to a general right of privacy).
24. See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, Overcoming Property (Does Copyright Trump Privacy?), 2003 U. III. J.L. & TECH. POL'Y 375 (critiquing the widespread opinion that copyright claims may often support intrusions into privacy);
25. Sonia K. Katyal, Privacy vs. Piracy, 7 YALE J.L. & TECH. 222, 263-335 passim (2004-5) (analyzing legislation, self-help, and case law on point).
26. For critical analysis of this argument in sophisticated form, see Brett M. Frischmann, Evaluating the Demsetzian Trend in Copyright Law, 3 REV. L. & ECON. (Dec. 2007), available at http://www.bepress.com/rle/vol3/iss3/art2.
27. For empirical analysis, with cites to further sources, see Julie E. Cohen, Creativity and Culture in Copyright Theory, 40 UC DAVIS L. REV. 1151, 1177-92 (2007).
28. See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, Coase's Penguin, or, Linux and the Nature of the Firm, 111 YALE L.J. 369, 423-36 (2002) (approaching variable incentives by contemplating legal frameworks to facilitate networking creators).
29. Locke only implicitly applied his theories to copyright. See Justin Hughes, Locke's 1694 Memorandum (and More Incomplete Copyright Historiographies), Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Jacob Burns Institute (Oct. 2006), Cardozo Legal Studies Research Paper No. 167, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=936353.
30. But Kant did expressly treat authors' rights. See Immanuel Kant, On the Wrongfulness of Unauthorized Publication of Books (1785), in PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY 29 (Mary J. Gregor ed. & trans., 1996).
31. JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 21 (C B. Macpherson ed., Hackett Publ. Co. 1980) (1698/1764).
32. IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (1797), in PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY, supra note 21, at 387.
33. For further analysis, see Paul Edward Geller, Must Copyright Be For Ever Caught Between Marketplace and Authorship Norms?, in OF AUTHORS AND ORIGINS: ESSAYS ON COPYRIGHT LAW 159 (Brad Sherman & Alain Strowel eds., 1994),
34. revised as Paul Edward Geller, Toward an Overriding Norm in Copyright: Sign Wealth, 159 R.I.D.A. 2 (1994).
35. For another analysis, see Jed Rubenfeld, Freedom of Imagination: Copyright's Constitutionality, 112 YALE L.J. 1, 30-46 passim (2002).
36. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D. Mass 1841) (No. 4901).
37. See generally IVAN CHERPILLOD, L'OBIET DU DROIT D'AUTEUR 143-81 passim (1985) (comparing U.S. idea-expression and French idea-form distinctions to the German doctrine of free utilization).
38. Compare Jerome H. Reichman, Design Protection and the New Technologies: The United States Experience in a Transnational Perspective, 30 INDUS. PROP. (Part I) 220, (Part II) 257 (1991) (comparing the separability doctrine in U.S. and other laws),
39. and Pamela Samuelson, Why Copyright Law Excludes Systems and Processes from the Scope of Its Protection, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1921 (2007) (focusing on the U.S. statutory exclusion of ideas, methods, systems, etc.).
40. For examples, see national chapters § 7, in INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE (Paul Edward Geller ed., 2007).
41. For examples, see national chapters § 8[2], in id.
42. For further analysis, see Geller, Between Marketplace and Authorship Norms, supra note 24, at 170-74, 191-99;
43. Geller, Overriding Norm in Copyright, supra note 24, at 24-29, 64-93.
44. See, e.g., David Nimmer, "Fairest of Them All" and Other Fairy Tales of Fair Use, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 263 (2003) (illustrating vacillations in fairuse case law).
45. See supra text accompanying notes 2-3.
46. Cf. James Boyle, A Politics of Intellectual Property: Environmentalism for the Net?, 47 DUKE L.J. 87 (1997) (arguing that making a cultural opportunity of the Internet turns on rebalancing rights and limitations within copyright law).
47. Cf Eben Moglen, Anarchism Triumphant: Free Software and the Death of Copyright, in THE COMMODIFICATION OF INFORMATION 107 (Niva ElkinKoren & Neil Weinstock Netanel eds., 2002),
48. also in 4 FIRST MONDAY 1 (Aug. 2, 1999), available at http://firstmonday.org/issues/issue4_8/moglen/index.html (arguing that networked media enhance creativity but undercut any copyright regime).
49. See ROBERT REDFIELD, THE PRIMITIVE WORLD AND ITS TRANSFORMATIONS ch. 1 (1953).
50. For a pioneer analysis, see HAROLD A. INNIS, EMPIRE AND COMMUNICATION 12-16, 32-36, 59-106 passim, 143-166 passim (David Godfrey ed., Press Porcépic 1986) (1950).
51. For a pioneer analysis, see Paul Baran, History, Alternative Approaches, and Comparisons, Paper No. RM-3097-PR, in RAND CORPORATION, ON DISTRIBUTED COMMUNICATIONS SERIES (1964), available at http://www.rand.org/publications/RM/ baran.list.html.
52. For further analysis, see Geller, Copyright History, supra note 4, at 236-40.
53. For a pioneer analysis, see Peter Biddle et al., The Darknet and the Future of Content Distribution, in DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT WORKSHOP 2002, 155 (Joan Feigenbaum ed., 2003), available at http://www.dklevine.com/archive/darknet.pdf.
54. WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, WIPO GLOSSARY OF TERMS OF THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBORING RIGHTS 228 (1980).
55. See supra text accompanying note 14.
56. See, e.g., Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonization of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society, art. 5, 2001 O.J. (L 167), 10, 16-17 (imposing exceptions for private copying, transient reproductions, etc.);
57. Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the enforcement of intellectual property rights, art. 9, 2004 O.J. (L 195), 16, 22 (expanding remedies of seizure that may be imposed ex parte in some cases).
58. Compare Tom W. Bell, Escape from Copyright: Market Success vs. Statutory Failure in the Protection of Expressive Works, 69 U. CINCINNATI L. REV. 741 (2001) (contemplating the eclipse of copyright law by technological safeguards),
59. with Alexander Peukert, A Bipolar Copyright System for the Digital Network Environment, 28 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 1 (2005) (contemplating parallel systems of copyright and of technological safeguards).
60. See, e.g., Jerome H. Reichman, Pamela Samuelson, & Graeme B. Dinwoodie, A Reverse Notice and Takedown Regime to Enable Public Interest Uses of Technically Protected Copyright Works, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 981 (2007) (proposing an overriding judicial procedure to hear demands to have permissible uses, otherwise prevented by technological safeguards, enabled by copyright claimants or third parties).
61. For further analysis, see Diane L. Zimmerman, Living Without Copyright in a Digital World, 70 ALB. L. REV. 1375 (2007).
62. See generally Julie E. Cohen, Pervasively Distributed Copyright Enforcement, 95 GEO. L.J. 1 (2006) (explaining how technological self-help can bring with it the invasion of privacy).
63. See supra text accompanying notes 31-32 & 41-45 passim.
64. Compare H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW ch. 7 & Postscript passim (2d ed. 1994) (stressing discretion),
65. with RONALD DWORKIN, Hard Cases, in TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 81 (1978),
66. and Ronald Dworkin, Hart's Postscript and the Character of Political Philosophy, 24 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2004) (stressing principles).
67. See Jean-Étienne-Marie Portalis et al., Discours préliminaire prononcé lors de la présentation du projet de la commission du gouvernement (1804), in NAISSANCE DU CODE CIVIL, LA RAISON DU LÉGISLATEUR 35, 41-43 (P. Antoine Fenet & François Ewald eds., 1989).
68. See generally Ejan Mackaay, Les notions floues en droit ou l'économie de l'imprécision, 53 LANGAGES 33 (1979) (arguing that open-ended statutory notions effectively delegate lawmaking powers to judges).
69. Portalis et al., supra note 50, at 42.
70. Compare GUIDO CALABRESE, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES ch. 9 (1982) (favoring the judicial revision of statutes to fit them within the law as a whole),
71. with JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY ch. 6. (William Rehg trans., 1996) (contemplating judicial review in both more and less constitutional terms).
72. See supra text accompanying notes 4-11 & 18-25.
73. For another analysis, see YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM 154-75 passim (2006).
74. See supra text accompanying notes 5-8.
75. Cf. BERNARD EDELMAN, DROITS D'AUTEUR DROITS VOISINS: DROIT D'AUTEUR ET MARCHÉ 76-77 (1993) (noting that it becomes increasingly difficult to distinguish the right of reproduction as a conceptually self-standing right to the extent that what started as the performance right is extended to ever-more media).
76. WIPO Copyright Treaty, art. 8 (adopted Dec. 20, 1996, effective Mar. 6, 2002), available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wct/trtdocs_wo033. html.
77. But cf. MIHALY FICSOR, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND THE INTERNET: THE 1996 WIPO TREATIES, THEIR INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION 493-510 passim (2002) (noting that this "umbrella" right of communication may, but need not, include the distribution right).
78. For another proposal, see JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 176-95 passim (2001).
79. For the doctrinal blindspot in this regard, see supra text accompanying notes 14-17.
80. For another analysis, see Abraham Drassinower, Authorship as Public Address: On the Specificity of Copyright vis-à-vis Patent and Trademark, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008) (draft on file with author).
81. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights [TRIPs], art. 13 (Annex IC of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, signed April 15, 1994), available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips_01_e.htm. Note that the TRIPs Agreement here addresses only legislators who, in incorporating its article 13 without change into statutory terms, would not seem to carry their burden of specifying rights and duties in language comprehensible to citizens.
82. For critical analyses of derivative E.C provisions, see Thomas Heide, The Berne Three-Step Test and the Proposed Copyright Directive, 21 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 105 (1999);
83. Christophe Geiger, The Three-Step Test, a Threat to a Balanced Copyright Law?, 37 INT'L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 683 (2006).
84. Note that this TRIPs test presupposes some standard reflecting a minimally stable media marketplace. Such a standard was perhaps easy to imagine a century ago, but it has become increasingly problematic as media progress has accelerated. Copyright law may well govern content-providers in dynamic media markets, but it is not necessarily adapted to govern cross-industry tensions, for example, between content- and equipment- or service-providers. Cross-industry tensions inevitably arise upon the creative destruction wrought by technological and entrepreneurial innovation.
85. For background, see JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY ch. 7 (Harper Torchbooks 1962) (3d ed. 1950).
86. For another analysis, see Ejan Mackaay, Intellectual Property and the Internet: The Share of Sharing, in COMMODIFICATION OF INFORMATION, supra note 35, at 133.
87. For another analysis, see Julie E. Cohen, Copyright and the Jurisprudence of Self-Help, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1089 (1998).
88. To the extent that principles enable courts to fashion much the same relief in similar cases, no matter what the legislation technically applicable, they may help to moot conflicts of laws as false, notably in Internet cases potentially subject to laws worldwide. For further analysis, see Paul Edward Geller, Conflicts of Laws in Copyright Cases: Infringement and Ownership Issues, 51 J. COPR. SOC'Y 315 (2004);
89. Graeme B. Dinwoodie, A New Copyright Order: Why National Courts Should Create Global Norms, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 469 (2000).
90. We here argue that, if correctly principled, case-specific relief not only suffices for resolving, but best resolves, most copyright issues brought before the courts. Furthermore, legislation that leaves lay people little choice but to engage counsel at almost every turn in disseminating information does them, and society, no good.
91. For a different challenge to copyright legislation, see DAVID LANGE & H. JEFFERSON POWELL, NO LAW: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE IMAGE OF AN ABSOLUTE FIRST AMENDMENT pt. 5 (forth-coming) (draft on file with author).
92. See supra text accompanying notes 18-30 & 51-64 passim.
93. See supra text accompanying notes 4-11 & 54-55.
94. For side-by-side reproductions of these works, see Hiroshige.org.uk, Ando Hiroshige [&] Van Gogh, http://www.hiroshige.org.uk/hiroshige/influences/ VanGogh.htm (last visited Dec. 7, 2007).
95. See supra text accompanying note 66.
96. See, e.g., Bridgeman Art Library, Ltd. v. Corel Corp., 36 F. Supp. 2d 191, 195-99 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (finding no creativity in "exact photographic copies" of art works).
97. For further analysis, see Paul Edward Geller, Hiroshige v. Van Gogh: Resolving the Dilemma of Copyright Scope in Remedying Infringement, 46 J. COPR. SOC'Y 39 (1998),
98. reprinted in DEAR IMAGES: ART, COPYRIGHT AND CULTURE 421 (Daniel McLean & Karsten Schubert eds., 2002).
99. See supra text accompanying note 10.
100. See infra text accompanying notes 84-107 passim.
101. For a photograph of one of their chairs, see Thinkquest.org, Alvar Aalto, http://library.thinkquest.org/C005594/Architects/aalto.htm (last visited Dec. 7, 2007).
102. For photographs of their furniture and an explanation of their techniques, see Library of Congress, The Work of Charles & Ray Eames, Aug. 20, 2004, http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/eames/furniture.html.
103. Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879). The Supreme Court refused to apply copyright to accounting forms which followed "a similar plan" of "ruled lines and headings" as found in claimant's forms. Reasoning that the overall effect of providing remedies for such copying would have been to preclude use, it declared that the matter fell into "the province of letters-patent, not of copyright." Id. at 100-02.
104. For further analysis, see Pamela Samuelson, 77îe Story of Baker v. Selden: Sharpening the Distinction Between Authorship and Invention, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STORIES 159 (Jane C. Ginsburg & Rochelle C. Dreyfuss eds., 2005).
105. See, e.g., the Lounge Chair decision, OLG (Intermediate Court) Frankfurt a.M. (F.R.G.), Mar. 19, 1981, 1981 GEWERBLICHER RECHTSSCHUTZ UND URHEBERRECHT [GRUR] 739,
106. translated in 13 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 777 (1982) (protecting an Eames chair with copyright, while invoking the fact that the New York Museum of Modern Art had it on display).
107. For examples, see national chapters § 2[4][c], in INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW & PRACTICE, supra note 29.
108. For further analysis, see Jerome H. Reichman, Legal Hybrids Between the Patent and Copyright Paradigms, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2432, 2448-504 passim (1994).
109. For texts, see Poet's Corner, Gerald Manley Hopkins, http://www. theotherpages.org/poems/hopkinsl.html (last visited Dec. 7, 2007).
110. For a reproduction, see The Art Institute of Chicago, A Sunday on La Grande Jatte, http://www.artic.edu/artaccess/AA_Impressionist/pages/IMP_7_lg. shtml (last visited Dec. 7, 2007).
111. For further analysis, see Paul Edward Geller, US Supreme Court Decides the Feist Case, 22 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 802 (1991).
112. For a proposal to reform this regime, see Paul Edward Geller, An International Patent Utopia?, 25 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 515 (2003).
113. See supra text accompanying note 66.
114. See infra text accompanying notes 133-135.
115. For stills and brief information, see Dark City: Film Noir and Fiction, The Asphalt Jungle, http://www.eskimo.com/~noir/ftitles/asphalt/index.shtml (last visited Dec. 7, 2007).
116. Huston c. Société Turner, Cass. civ. I, May 28, 1991, 149 R.I.D.A. 197 (1991). Upon suing, the Hustons and Maddow had obtained an order to stop the televising of the colorized version of the film. The Paris Court of Appeal ultimately reversed the ruling on which this order was based, and the colorized version was then released to the public. After the Supreme Court overturned that reversal, the court on remand awarded damages for the fait accompli of this release.
117. See supra text accompanying notes 67-70.
118. Compare Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, art. 6bis (Paris Act, adopted July 24, 1971, and amended on September 28, 1979), available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/ berne/trtdocs_wo001. html#P123_20726 (setting out criteria of "derogatory action . . . which would be prejudicial to [the author's] honor or reputation"),
119. with HENRI DESBOIS, ANDRÉ FRANÇON & ANDRÉ KÉRÉ VER, LES CONVENTIONS INTERNATIONALES DU DROIT D'AUTEUR ET DES DROITS VOISINS 40-41 (1976) (contrasting this language with purist criteria of "integrity"),
120. and BERNARD EDELMAN, LA PROPRIÉ TÉ LITTÉRAIRE ET ARTISTIQUE 35-53 passim (3d ed. 1999) (explaining this purist approach in French law).
121. For background, see Wolfgang Stähr, When the Masks Are Off- The Marriage of Figaro: Mozart Follows Beaumarchais, FRIENDS' MAG. FOR FRIENDS AND PATRONS OF THE SALZBURG FESTIVAL, available at http://www.festspiel-freunde.com/ english/frames/200012/ef_200012_08.htm (last visited Dec. 7, 2007).
122. For the original formulation of this proposal, see Paul Edward Geller, The Universal Electronic Archive: Issues in International Copyright, 25 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 54, 65-66 (1994);
123. Geller, Overriding Norm in Copyright, supra note 24, at 74-83.
124. See, e.g., NEIL BOWERS, WORDS FOR THE TAKING: THE HUNT FOR A PLAGIARIST (new ed. 2007) (recounting harm, well beyond mere loss of reputation, resulting from plagiarism).
125. For another analysis, see Leslie Kim Treiger-Bar-Am, Adaptations with Integrity, in COPYRIGHT AND OTHER FAIRY TALES: HANS CHRISTIAN ANDERSEN AND THE COMMODIFICATION OF CREATIVITY 61 (Helle Porsdam ed., 2006).
126. See, e.g., Germi c. Rizzoli e Reteitalia (the Serafino case), Tribunale, Rome (Italy), May 30, 1984, 56 IL DIRITTO DI AUTORE 68 (1985) (directing broadcasters to keep from interrupting televised films with spot commercials too often, at crucial points in plots, etc.),
127. rev'd, Corte di Appello, Rome, Oct. 16, 1989, 61 IL DIRITTO DI AUTORE 98 (1990) (purist approach).
128. William Eden c. Whistler, Cass, civ., Mar. 14, 1900, D.P. 1900, 1, 497. The artist had to pay damages for non-delivery, to make restitution of all payments received, and to make the model unrecognizable for purposes of future displays.
129. For photographs and background, see Culture Shock, Richard Serra's Tilted Arc, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/cultureshock/flashpoints/visualarts/tiltedarc_a. html (last visited Dec. 7, 2007).
130. For reproductions, respectively, see Scientists Retrace Parthenon's Brilliant Hues, MSNBC, Mar. 21, 2006, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/11945940;
131. China the Beautiful, Dun Huang Grottoes: West Wall of Cave 285, http://www.chinapage.com/images/C285w-F.jpg (last visited Dec. 7, 2007).
132. See ADOLF DIETZ, DAS DROIT MORAL DES URHEBERS IM NEUEN FRANZÖSISCHEN UND DEUTSCHEN URHEBERRECHT: EINE RECHTSVERGLEICHENDE UNTERSUCHUNG 188-93 (1968).
133. For other analyses, see Rubenfeld, supra note 25, at 48-59;
134. Tim Wu, Intellectual Property, Innovation, and Decentralized Decisions, 92 VA. L. REV. 123, 144-46 (2006).
135. See generally Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578 n.10 (1994) (opining that "the goals of the copyright law, 'to stimulate the creation and publication of edifying matter,' [citation omitted], are not always best served by automatically granting injunctive relief" but that courts may well limit themselves to "an award . . . for whatever infringement is found").
136. Cf. eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1840 (2006) (confirming this approach).
137. For the notion of public goods, see supra text accompanying note 2.
138. Cf. BMG Canada, Inc. v. John Doe, (2005) 39 CP.R.4th 97 (Fed. C.A.) (Can.) (declining to order the identification of file-sharers without sufficient evidence of widespread infringement).
139. See supra text accompanying notes 67-70.
140. For analysis and examples, see C. John Holcombe, Translating Mallarmé, http://textetc.com/workshop/wt-mallarme-1.html (last visited Dec. 7, 2007).
141. For further analysis, of both injunctive and monetary remedies, see Geller, Dilemma of Copyright Scope, supra note 70, at 59-70.
142. Compare Wendy J. Gordon, Of Harms and Benefits: Torts, Restitution, and Intellectual Property, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 449 (1992),
143. reprinted in 34 MCGEORGE L. REV. 541 (2003) (arguing for the restitution of benefits taken from one creator, even by another, to minimize externalities),
144. with Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031 (2005) (arguing it to be unworkable to try to eliminate all such externalities).
145. For stills and brief information, see Dark City: Film Noir and Fiction, The Maltese Falcon, http://www.eskimo.com/~noir/ftitles/maltese/index.shtml (last visited Dec. 7, 2007).
146. Hammett's authorization had been contractually obtained. See Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 216 F.2d 945 (9th Cir. 1954), cert, denied, 348 U.S. 971 (1955). Note that our second principle moots the issue of whether to enjoin any sequel in this case, and our seventh principle would compel restrictive construction of any contractual transfer.
147. Cf. Dan L. Burk, Muddy Rules for Cyberspace, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 121 (1999) (analyzing how liability rules can lead to bargaining).
148. See supra text accompanying notes 82-107 passim.
149. For the notion of the darknet, see supra text accompanying note 40.
150. See, e.g., Neil W. Netanel, Impose a Noncommercial Use Levy to Allow Free Peer-to-Peer File Sharing, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2003) (outlining such a scheme in some detail).
151. See infra text accompanying notes 131-42 passim.
152. For further analysis, see Pamela Samuelson, Enriching Discourse on Public Domains, 55 DUKE L.J. 783 (2006).
153. Plön SA. c. Pierre Hugo, Cass. civ. I, Jan. 30, 2007, 212 R.I.D.A. 248 (2007). The Paris Court of Appeal had ruled that moral rights were violated by any sequel to this finalized "monument of world literature." The Supreme Court reversed this holding and remanded the case to a trial court for inquiry into actual confusion regarding authorship or actual distortion of the work. The Supreme Court invoked "freedom of creation" as an overriding consideration in the case.
154. See Justin Hughes, Fair Use Across Time, 50 UCLA L. REV. 775 (2003).
155. See, e.g., EDELMAN, DROITS D'AUTEUR DROITS VOISINS, supra note 54, at 66-71 (explaining how French copyright law authorizes judges equitably to prevent an author's post mortem representatives from withholding works from the marketplace either by abusing the moral right of divulgation or by abusing economic rights of exploitation in already disclosed works).
156. For further analysis, see Wendy Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600 (1982).
157. For images from the comics and a short history of the case, see Harlequin Comics Page, Disney vs. the Air Pirates, http://home.freeuk.net/moondog/air.htm (last visited Dec. 7, 2007).
158. Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978), cert, denied, 439 U.S. 1132 (1979). The U.S. Circuit Court rejected appeals to freedom of expression, while it gave the parodist artistic directives: "very little would have been necessary to place Mickey Mouse and his image in the minds of the readers."
159. Id. at 757-58.
160. For illustrations from U.S. law, see KEITH AOKI, JAMES BOYLE, & JENNIFER JENKINS, TALES FROM THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: BOUND BY LAW? (2006), available at http://www.law.duke.edu/cspd/ comics. A rich case law in the United States interprets the doctrine of "fair use" which limits copyright. Lawyers versed in this case law might assess how this doctrine may allow certain uses in hard cases.
161. For examples, see Nimmer, supra note 32. In addition, other copyright laws tend to codify exceptions in complex and cumbersome statutory provisions.
162. For examples, see national chapters § 8[2], in INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW & PRACTICE, supra note 29. Rather than falling under one doctrine, hard cases then collect in the nooks and crannies of these provisions, themselves hard to grasp together.
163. See TRIPs Agreement, art. 13, quoted supra text accompanying note 59.
164. See supra text accompanying notes 86-90. Since exceptions apply only to economic rights, in principle they leave intact moral rights, notably, to reference. Nonetheless, common sense would still govern the adequacy of references in the context of exempted uses.
165. See supra text accompanying notes 67-70.
166. See, e.g., Queneau c. Boue, TGI (First-Instance Court) Paris (Fr.), June 10, 1997, J.C.P. 1997, II, 22974,
167. translated in 2000 EUR. COPYRIGHT DESIGN REP. 343 (not holding liable a research team at the French National Center for Scientific Research for making protected poetry available to its members on an intranet walled off from the Internet).
168. Under most laws, our hypothetical musicians could assert performers' neighboring rights. See supra text accompanying note 11. The principles proposed here would moot the need for such rights by justifying relief for the redissemination of routine copies of performances that displayed the least creativity, for example, in interpretation, styling, etc. But these principles would not justify enjoining performances by other artists who vary interpretations, styles, etc., with minimal creativity.
169. See supra text accompanying notes 67-70. Moral rights, with appropriately hedged remedies, could also apply, as could monetary awards and informational exceptions.
170. See supra text accompanying notes 86-92, 104-07 & 115-122.
171. For examples, see national chapters § 4[l][b], in INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW & PRACTICE, supra note 29.
172. For further analysis, see Dan Hunter & F. Gregory Lastowka, Amateur-to-Amateur, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 951 (2004).
173. For example, copyright claims have rarely been brought for the remarketing of fashion designs, but they might be raised if market conditions changed. For analysis, with visual instances, see Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, Where IP Isn't;
174. Randal C. Picker, Of Pirates and Puffy Shirts;
175. Rochelle Dreyfuss, Fragile Equilibria, all in VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF, Jan. 22, 2007, http://www.virginialawreview. org/inbrief.php?s=inbrief&p=2007/01/22/index. For examples of specific waivers toward third parties, that let "others know exactly what they can and can't do with your work,"
176. see Creative Commons, License Your Work, http://creativecommons.org/ license (last visited Dec. 7, 2007).
177. See supra text accompanying notes 90 & 104-07.
178. See, e.g., R. Griggs Group, Ltd. v. Evans, [2004] EWCA 1088 (Ch.), aff'd, [2005] EWCA 11 (CA. Civ. Div.) (applying a rule found current in most jurisdictions, that is, the first and noticed agreement has priority over the second one, where an author agreed to transfer copyright worldwide to one party and later transferred it to another, who had notice of the initial agreement).
179. See, e.g., P.R.T.E. v. Comm'n and I.T.P. v. Comm'n (the Magill case), Joined Cases C-241/91 P and C-242/91, E.C Court of Justice (E.U.), Apr. 6, 1995, 1995 E.C.R. 1-743 (compelling television stations to license, on reasonable terms, program listings in which they claimed copyright, after finding that, in refusing to do so, they had abused their market positions).
180. See supra text accompanying notes 106-107.
181. See supra text accompanying notes 97-103.
182. See supra text accompanying notes 112-122 and infra text accompanying notes 136-142.
183. Stevens v. Kabushiki Kaisha Sony Computer Entm't, 2005 HCA 58. This decision illustrated, but did not expressly apply, the principle proposed here. Rather, confined within a problematic statutory scheme, the High Court stressed the need "to avoid an overbroad construction which would extend the copyright monopoly rather than match it." It was especially concerned to avoid this consequence because of the "penal character" of the statutory scheme.
184. Id. paras. 45-47.
185. See supra text accompanying notes 99-103.
186. Cf Fox c. Aurélien, Cour d'appel (Court of Appeal), 3e ch. cor., Montpellier (Fr.), Mar. 10, 2005, available at http://www.juriscom. net/jpt/visu.php?ID= 650 (refusing to convict a user of criminal infringement, given evidence that his sharing recordings with a "few buddies" was "private"),
187. rev'd, Cass, crim. (Supreme Court), May 30, 2006, 210 R.I.D.A. 326 (2006) (requiring inquiry into possibly infringing sources).
188. For images from the parody comics, see Asterix-Fan.de, Parodien, http://www.asterix-fan.de/cb/pa/parodie.htm (last visited Dec. 7, 2007).
189. The Alcolix decision, BGH, Mar. 11, 1993, 1994 GRUR 206,
190. translated in 25 INT'L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 605 (1994). In this case, protected cartoon characters were parodied, and the German defense of freie Benutzung was raised. The Federal Court asked: were the traits of the characters, although closely copied, sufficiently attenuated or faded away, in the context of the parody, for this defense to apply? To assure freedom of art, which the German Constitution expressly protects, the Court adjusted the viewpoint of the observer applying this attenuation criterion.
191. See also the Germania 3 decision, BVerfG (Federal Constitutional Court) (F.R.G.), June 29, 2000, 2001 GRUR 149 (reasoning that the constitutionally-based freedom of art required a broad reading of the exception that would allow a dramatist to quote passages from Brecht's plays extensively in his own plays).
192. See supra text accompanying notes 84-107 passim.
193. See supra text accompanying notes 131-133.
194. For proposed guidelines for such filtering, see the Electronic Frontier Foundation et al., Fair Use Principles for User Generated Video Content, available at, http://www.eff.org/files/UGC_Fair_Use_Best_Practices_O.pdf (last visited Dec. 7, 2007).
195. For constitutional analyses and cites to further sources, see Rubenfeld, supra note 25, at 5-36 passim, 53-59;
196. LANGE & POWELL, supra note 64, pts. 4-5 passim;
197. P. Bernt Hugenholtz, Copyright and Freedom of Expression in Europe, in COMMODIFICATION OF INFORMATION, supra note 35, at 239.
198. For analysis of emerging network norms, see Lawrence Solum & Minn Chung, The Layers Principle: Internet Architecture and the Law, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 815 (2004);
199. Thomas Hoeren, Tractatus Germanico-Informaticus - Some Fragmentary Ideas on DRM and Information Law, in IT LAW - THE GLOBAL FUTURE: ACHIEVEMENTS, PLANS AND AMBITIONS 149 (A.R. Lodder et al. eds., 2006).
200. See supra text accompanying notes 86-96.
201. See supra text accompanying notes 97-107.
202. See supra text accompanying notes 112-114.
203. See supra text accompanying notes 115-122 & 136-138.
204. See supra text accompanying notes 123-126.
205. See supra text accompanying notes 127-130.
206. See supra text accompanying notes 131-135.
207. See supra text accompanying notes 140-142.