Rational Irrationality and Group Size: The Effect of Biased Beliefs on Individual Contributions Towards Collective Goods

American Journal of Economics and Sociology

Volumn 70, Issue 1, 2011, Pages 109-130

  Kyriacou, Andreas P ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF GIRONA   (Spain)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 78650858784     PISSN: 00029246     EISSN: 15367150     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1536-7150.2010.00765.x     Document Type: Article

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