We don't want to hear it: Pychology, literature and the narrative model of judging

University of Illinois Law Review

Volumn 2010, Issue 2, 2010, Pages 429-488

  Bilz, Kenworthey ^a  

^a NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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EID: 78650842381     PISSN: 02769948     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
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References (397)

1. Rob Atkinson, What Is It Like to Be Like That? The Progress of Law and Literature's "Other" Project, in 43 STUDIES IN LAW, POLITICS AND SOCIETY 21, 22 (Austin Sarat ed., 2008).
2. Atkinson's term is new and his own, but the movement is not, and is most closely associated with scholars' work such as MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, POETIC JUSTICE (1995);
3. RICHARD WEISBERG, POETHICS (1992);
4. and ROBIN WEST, NARRATIVE, AUTHORITY, AND LAW (1993). These scholars often focus explicitly on what lawyers ought to do, and how they ought to approach their clients. However, their points generalize, and indeed are most useful when used to describe how other actors in the legal world- especially those who render decisions that profoundly affect the lives of "others" by judging themought to behave.
5. Bah v. Ashcroft, 341 F.3d 348 (5th Cir. 2003).
6. Id. at 349-50.
7. See id. at 350 (evidence that he was punished for previous escapes); id. at 352 (evidence that "RUF members ordered the deaths of suspected RUF deserters on at least two occasions"). The court, however, believed that by the time Amadu's case came up, the danger had actually passed.
8. See id. at 352. As discussed below, even if the judge had believed Amadu still actively faced such a risk, Amadu would have lost his petition for asylum.
9. See id. at 350-51.
10. Id. at 350.
11. Id.
12. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(i) (2006) (disallowing the withholding of removal of an alien at risk of persecution if "the alien ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution of an individual because of the individual's race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion");
13. id. S 1158(b)(2)(A)(i) (disallowing the granting of an asylum application for the same).
14. Bah, 341 F.3d at 350.
15. See id. at 349;
16. Norimitsu Onishi, Children of War in Sierra Leone Try to Start Over, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2002, at A14.
17. Bah, 341 F.3d at 349.
18. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(B).
19. See Bah, 341 F.3d at 351.
20. But see Negusie v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1159, 1164 (2009).
21. Bah, 341 F.3d at 351.
22. See id.
23. See Singh v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 736, 740 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that an alien's personal motivation for actions is irrelevant).
24. But see Miranda Alvarado v. Gonzales, 449 F.3d 915, 927 (9th Cir. 2006) (determining assistance in persecution "requires a particularized evaluation of both personal involvement and purposeful assistance in order to ascertain culpability").
25. See Negusie, 129 S. Ct. 1159. The Court found that the statute is ambiguous regarding "whether coercion or duress is relevant in determining if an alien assisted or otherwise participated in persecution." Id. at 1164. Because the Court also found that the Board of Immigration Appeals had erroneously relied on a prior Supreme Court case in interpreting the statute to forbid persecutors from telling their own stories, the Court remanded the case for the agency to interpret the statue in the first instance.
26. Id. at 1162, 1167.
27. See id. at 1164.
28. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE 6 (1998).
29. See, e.g., WAYNE C. BOOTH, THE COMPANY WE KEEP: AN ETHICS OF FICTION (1988);
30. NUSSBAUM, supra note 1;
31. Robin West, Economic Man and Literary Woman: One Contrast, 39 MERCER L. REV. 867, 869-72 (1988) [hereinafter West, Economic Man and Literary Woman];
32. Robin West, Jurisprudence as Narrative: An Aesthetic Analysis of Modern Legal Theory, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 145, 146-47 (1985) [hereinafter West, Jurisprudence as Narrative].
33. See, e.g., Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, A Cognitive Theory of Juror Decision Making: The Story Model, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 519, 521 n.9 (1991).
34. See, e.g., id. at 545-50.
35. See Colin Howson, The Bayesian Approach, in 1 HANDBOOK OF DEFEASIBLE REASONING AND UNCERTAINTY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS 111, 111-12 (Philippe Smets ed., 1998).
36. See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, On the Psychology of Prediction, 80 PSYCHOL. REV. 237 (1973);
37. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and Probability, 5 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 207 (1973);
38. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Extensional Versus Intuitive Reasoning: The Conjunction Fallacy in Probability Judgment, 90 PSYCHOL. REV. 293 (1983).
39. See, e.g., Keith J. Holyoak & Dan Simon, Bidirectional Reasoning in Decision Making by Constraint Satisfaction, 128 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: GEN. 3, 24 (1999);
40. Pennington & Hastie, supra note 21, at 521-23;
41. Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, Evidence Evaluation in Complex Decision Making, 51 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 242, 243 (1986);
42. Dan Simon, A Third View of the Black Box: Cognitive Coherence in Legal Decision Making, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 511, 513 (2004).
43. ANTONIO R. DAMÁSIO, DESCARTES' ERROR: EMOTION, REASON, AND THE HUMAN BRAIN 191-96 (1994).
44. See Mark D. Alicke, Culpable Control and the Psychology of Blame, 126 PSYCHOL. BULL. 556 (2000);
45. Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 269,296-97 (1996).
46. See Pennington & Hastie, supra note 25, at 243;
47. Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, Explaining the Evidence: Tests of the Story Model for Juror Decision Making, 62 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 189,189-90 (1992);
48. Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, Explanation-Based Decision Making: Effects of Memory Structure on Judgment, 14 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: LEARNING, MEMORY & COGNITION 521, 522 (1988) [hereinafter Pennington & Hastie, Explanation-Based Decision Making].
49. See Pennington & Hastie, supra note 21, at 520-29.
50. See id. at 524-28, 542;
51. Pennington & Hastie, Explanation-Based Decision Making, supra note 28, at 529-30;
52. see also Regina A. Schuller, Vicki L. Smith & James M. Olson, Jurors' Decisions in Trials of Battered Women Who Kill: The Role of Prior Beliefs and Expert Testimony, 24 J. APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL. 316, 332-33 (1994);
53. Vicki L. Smith, Prototypes in the Courtroom: Lay Representations of Legal Concepts, 61 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 857, 858 (1991);
54. Vicki L. Smith, When Prior Knowledge and Law Collide: Helping Jurors Use the Law, 17 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 507, 532-33 (1993).
55. See Simon, supra note 25, at 530-31, 583-84.
56. See id. at 512-13.
57. See id. at 561 n.167
58. (citing Pennington & Hastie, Explanation-Based Decision Making, supra note 28)
59. Barbara O'Brien & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Confirmation Bias in Criminal Investigations 22 (Sept. 19, 2006) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=913357.
60. See id. at 3, 5.
61. See id. at 6.
62. See Pennington & Hastie, supra note 21, at 523-24. Such presentation can also impede memory, though, in the sense of leading subjects to fill in gaps with false information that is consistent with the story.
63. JOHN D. BRANSFORD, HUMAN COGNITION: LEARNING, UNDERSTANDING AND REMEMBERING 156 (1979).
64. See Pennington & Hastie, supra note 21, at 523-25;
65. Cynthia S. Symons & Blair T. Johnson, The Self-Reference Effect in Memory: A Meta-Analysis, 121 PSYCHOL. BULL. 371, 372, 392 (1997).
66. D. Michael Risinger, John Henry Wigmore, Johnny Lynn Old Chief, and "Legitimate Moral Force"-Keeping the Courtroom Safe for Heartstrings and Gore, 49 HASTINGS LJ. 403, 429-31 (1998).
67. 519 U.S. 172, 187 (1997).
68. See Lawrence Kohlberg, Moral Stages and Moralization: The Cognitive-Developmental Approach, in MORAL DEVELOPMENT AND BEHAVIOR 31, 32, 49 (Thomas Lickona ed., 1976).
69. See C. DANIEL BATSON, THE ALTRUISM QUESTION: TOWARD A SOCIAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL ANSWER 83-84, 89 (1991);
70. Nancy Eisenberg & Paul A. Miller, The Relation of Empathy to Prosocial and Related Behaviors, 101 PSYCHOL. BULL. 91, 91-92 (1987).
71. See Norma Deitch Feshbach, Studies of Empathtic Behavior in Children, in 8 PROGRESS IN EXPERIMENTAL PERSONALITY RESEARCH 1, 29-31 (Brendan A. Mäher ed., 1978);
72. Deborah R. Richardson et al., Empathy as a Cognitive Inhibitor of Interpersonal Aggression, 20 AGGRESSIVE BEHAV. 275, 287(1994).
73. See Adam D. Galinsky & Gordon B. Moskowitz, Perspective-Taking: Decreasing Stereotype Expression, Stereotype Accessibility, and In-Group Favoritism, 78 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 708, 708 (2000).
74. See Kenworthey Bilz & John M. Darley, What's Wrong with Harmless Theories of Punishment, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1215, 1246-48 (2004) (describing the different formats that restorative justice "mediations" have taken).
75. See id. at 1246-51.
76. See, e.g., INTERPRETING LAW AND LITERATURE: A HERMENEUTIC READER 37-42 (Sanford Levinson & Steven Mailloux eds., 1988);
77. STANLEY FISH, Is THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS? 277-81 (1980);
78. Stanley Fish, Working on the Chain Gang: Interpretation in Law and Literature, 60 TEX. L. REV. 551, 551-52 (1982);
79. Owen M. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739, 739-40 (1982).
80. See, e.g., BROOK THOMAS, CROSS-EXAMINATIONS OF LAW AND LITERATURE: COOPER, HAWTHORNE, STOWE, AND MELVILLE 4-7 (1987);
81. RICHARD H. WEISBERG, THE FAILURE OF THE WORD: THE PROTAGONIST AS LAWYER IN MODERN FICTION xi-xiv (1984);
82. JAMES B. WHITE, THE LEGAL IMAGINATION: STUDIES IN THE NATURE OF LEGAL THOUGHT AND EXPRESSION (1973);
83. JAMES BOYD WHITE, WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING: CONSTITUTIONS AND RECONSTITUTIONS OF LANGUAGE, CHARACTER, AND COMMUNITY 8-10 (1984).
84. West, Economic Man and Literary Woman, supra note 20, at 874.
85. See, e.g., LAW'S STORIES: NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN THE LAW (Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz eds., 1996);
86. NUSSBAUM, supra note 1;
87. WEST, supra note 1;
88. Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 79 CAL. L. REV. 971 (1991);
89. Jane B. Baron, Resistance to Stories, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 255 (1994);
90. Marc A. Fajer, Can Two Real Men Eat Quiche Together? Storytelling, Gender-Role Stereotypes, and Legal Protection for Lesbians and Gay Men, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 511 (1992);
91. Daniel A. Färber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories Out of School: An Essay on Legal Narratives, 45 STAN. L. REV. 807 (1993);
92. Richard O. Lempert, Narrative Relevance, Imagined Juries, and a Supreme Court Inspired Agenda for Jury Research, 21 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 15 (2002);
93. Symposium, Legal Storytelling, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2073 (1989). The movement is also recognizable in Foundation Press's popular "Law Stories" series, now thirty-two volumes strong, which tells the behind-the-law details of famous legal cases (in fields as diverse and surprising as business tax, legal ethics, and antitrust), with the ambition of supplementing the usual, more narrow pedagogy of the case method.
94. Paul L. Caron, Back to the Future: Teaching Law Through Stories, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 405, 406-08 (2002).
95. See POSNER, supra note 19, at 345-77. To be fair, Posner offers a far more sophisticated challenge to the law and literature movement at 305-44.
96. See M. Todd Henderson, Citing Fiction, 11 GREEN BAG 2D 171, 171-72 (2008).
97. See Charles Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proof and the Acceptability of Verdicts, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1357, 1390-91 (1985).
98. See Mark H. Davis et al, Effect of Perspective Taking on the Cognitive Representation of Persons: A Merging of Self and Other, 70 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 713, 721-22 (1996);
99. Nancy Eisenberg et al., Empathy-Related Responding and Cognition: A "Chicken and the Egg" Dilemma, in 2 HANDBOOK OF MORAL BEHAVIOR AND DEVELOPMENT: RESEARCH 63, 65-70 (William M. Kurtines & Jacob L. Gewirtz eds., 1991);
100. Martin L. Hoffman, Interaction of Affect and Cognition in Empathy, in EMOTIONS, COGNITION, AND BEHAVIOR 103, 104-07 (Carroll E. Izard, Jerome Kagan & Robert B. Zajonc eds., 1984).
101. For a brief overview of the "Other project" in law and literature, see Atkinson, supra note 1.
102. FED. R. EVID. 401.
103. Id. 407 advisory committee's note.
104. Id. 412 advisory committee's note.
105. Id. 403.
106. Indeed, the generosity of Rule 401 is something of an illusion, because even if no other rule existed, vast swaths of germane evidence would still be excluded on its own terms. Rule 401 only considers evidence "relevant" if it is "of consequence to the determination of the action," which means that the evidence must either build up or tear down the legal elements of a cause of action or criminal charge.
107. Id. 401. If it does not, the evidence will fail Rule 401's test and be excluded in court, no matter how pertinent it might be to a dinner-conversation evaluation of the blameworthiness or liability of the defendant.
108. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 656 (2003) (noting that the "traditional approach . . . has been to view the crime of statutory rape as of the strict liability variety with respect to [the age of the victim], so that the defendant had no defense because of his mistaken belief as to age").
109. See, e.g., State v. Reed, 479 A.2d 1291,1295-96 (Me. 1984);
110. Commonwealth v. Ascolillo, 541 N.E.2d 570, 574-75 (Mass. 1989);
111. Commonwealth v. Simcock, 575 N.E.2d 1137, 1140-42 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991).
112. See MODEL PENAL CODE S 223.2 (1980).
113. West, Economic Man and Literary Woman, supra note 20, at 874;
114. see also supra note 49 and accompanying text.
115. THOMAS KENEALLY, SCHINDLERN LIST (1982);
116. see abo SCHINDLERN LIST (Universal Pictures 1993).
117. The film won Oscars for Best Film, Best Director, and Best Adapted Screenplay, among others. The 1994 Oscar Winners, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 1994, at C18.
118. BOOTH, supra note 20, at 203.
119. Goeth, in fact, was not just "human" in the sense that he was a fictional character whom we are told is human. As the reader most likely knows, Schindlers List is a true story; Goeth was a living, breathing person and the atrocities he performed, as detailed by Keneally, really happened.
120. See KENEALLY, supra note 65, at 10 (explaining that the author chose to "use the texture and devices of a novel to tell a true story").
121. See id. at 9-11.
122. West, Economic Man and Literary Woman, supra note 20, at 869.
123. Id. at 872.
124. NUSSBAUM, supra note 1, at 96.
125. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, OTHELLO;
126. see also John Dover Wilson, Introduction to WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, OTHELLO i, xxiv-xxx (Alice Walker & John Dover Wilson eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 1960).
127. HERMAN MELVILLE, BILLY BUDD (Wash. Square Press 1972) (1924).
128. NORMAN MAILER, THE EXECUTIONER'S SONG (Little, Brown & Co. 4th prtg. 1979).
129. See POSNER, supra note 19, at 214 ("Literature ... is not even trying to convey concepts in the most economical manner possible (in contrast, say, to an 'executive summary')." (emphasis omitted)).
130. See BOOTH, supra note 20, at 61.
131. See id.
132. Id. at 62-65.
133. Id. at 62.
134. Id. at 65.
135. The stronger view of this is that one adds detail not only out of fear that important bits might be left out, but because everything actually Is important to a full and rich telling of the story.
136. MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, LOVE'S KNOWLEDGE: ESSAYS ON PHILOSOPHY AND LITERATURE 47-48 (1990).
137. Id.
138. See, e.g., Daniel R. Cahoy & Min Ding, Using Experimental Economics to Peek into the "Black Box" of Jury Behavior: A Proposal for Jury Research Reform, 14 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 31, 53 (2004) (indicating that fields that study jury behavior, particularly psychology, view "economic models used to predict and define human cognition [as] overly simplistic and incomplete in view of the complex behavior that is known to underlie real human decisionmaking").
139. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Are Values Incommensurable, or Is Utility the Ruler of the World?, 1995 UTAH L. REV. 683, 715 ("The constant effort to bring to the fore every bit of psychological and behavioral ambiguity results in the use of models that are too nuanced and too complex for their own good.");
140. Eric A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Contract Law After Three Decades: Success or Failure?, 112 YALE LJ. 829, 853 (2003) (critiquing overly complex economic models in the context of contract law).
141. Eventually, the characters simply begin to "use the country itself, as its own map," assuring us that "it does nearly as well." LEWIS CARROLL, SYLVIE AND BRUNO CONCLUDED 169 (London, MacMillan 1893).
142. See BOOTH, supra note 20, at 202-04;
143. see abo PETER BENCHLEY, JAWS (1974).
144. See BOOTH, supra note 20, at 202-04.
145. See id.
146. Id. at 202-03.
147. See id. at 202-04.
148. See id. at 202-03.
149. See id. ("I am both fearing spectacular bloodshed and desiring it, enjoying the prospect of death for those who don't matter, hoping for (and fully expecting) final safety for the good guys (who don't matter much more)....").
150. I recognize that the two are usually related in practice. For instance, if we were to exclude a character's point of view for moral reasons, we are not likely to find that his or her inclusion nevertheless would have been structurally desirable. The concepts, however, are analytically, and importantly, distinct.
151. In fact, to the extent its "cast of thousands" did limit our ability to become entangled more completely with a subset of the Schindlerjuden, his novel was not as morally effective as it could have been. Cf. KENEALLY, supra note 65, at 196-97;
152. Bernard Weinraub, Steven Spielberg Faces the Holocaust, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 1993, at 1 (describing the film as having "a cast of thousands").
153. contrast it in my own mind with ANNE FRANK, THE DIARY OF A YOUNG GlRL (1952), which did not display as vividly the horrors of the extermination of the Jews by Nazi Germany, yet nevertheless is a far more moving and powerful work. I attribute its success to completely immersing us in the thoughts and lives of Anne and her family, so that our relationship with her was far more personal and connected than with Keneally's Schindlerjuden
154. KENEALLY, supra note 65, at 192.
155. BOOTH, supra note 20, at 170.
156. Hitler: The Rae of Evil (CBS television broadcast May 18, 2003, May 20, 2003).
157. Jewish Leader Praises CBS Series on Hitler, CHI. TRIB. (Redeye Edition), May 6, 2003, at 29.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Bernard Weinraub, Planned Mini-Series on Hitler's Early Life Brings Criticism, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 2002, at E1.
161. See Rob Owen, Hitler Miniseries Better than Average, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, May 18, 2003, at TV-5.
162. Debra Neff Nathans, Hitler Miniseries Cautious, CAP. TIMES (Madison, Wis.), May 20, 2003, at ID.
163. Press Release, Anti-Defamation League, ADL Statement on the CBS Miniseries "Hitler: The Rise of Evil" (May 5, 2003), available at www.adl.org/PresRele/HolNa-52/4258-52.asp.
164. STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY: CHANGE, RHETORIC, AND THE PRACTICE OF THEORY IN LITERARY AND LEGAL STUDIES 295 (1989).
165. The point has been equally forcefully made, throughout the twentieth century, about equal inability of the structures of the law to be truly value neutral. See, e.g., Fiss, supra note 47;
166. Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. SCI. Q. 470 (1923);
167. Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976);
168. Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism-Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1222 (1931).
169. But see Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959).
170. VLADIMIR NABOKOV, LOLITA (Random House, Inc. 1997) (1955).
171. Id. at 5.
172. Id. at 5-6.
173. Id. at S.
174. See id. at 5-6.
175. It is this very forced complicity that has led many readers-myself included-to find the novel repellent.
176. Jean Hampton, Forgiveness, Resentment and Hatred, in FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 35, 43-44 (Jeffrie G. Murphy & Jean Hampton eds., 1988);
177. see also FRITZ HEIDER, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS 164-73 (1958).
178. Jeffrie Murphy, Forgiveness and Resentment, in FORGIVENESS AND MERCY, supra note 114, at 14, 25.
179. See Kenworthey Bilz, The Puzzle of Delegated Revenge, 87 B.U. L. REV. 1059, 1088 (2007) ("A failure to punish indicates something less-perhaps indifference toward the victim, perhaps even disdain.").
180. Piaget showed that children understand the meaning, and the import, of intent very early in their development. See generally JEAN PlAGET, THE MORAL JUDGMENT OF THE CHILD (1932). For a review of the voluminous experimental literature on the developmental trajectory of moral sensibilities,
181. see John M. Darley & Thomas R. Shultz, Moral Rules: Their Content and Acquisition, 41 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 525 (1990).
182. See Bilz, supra note 116, at 1089.
183. NABOKOV, supra note 108, at 6.
184. Assuming, of course, that the inclusion would make stylistic sense. Again, omission of points of view for structural reasons is not controversial. Yet I should think that blaming Goeth's parents for the horrors of the Holocaust would stylistically, as well as morally, necessitate an explanation. It is important not to let moral exclusions hide behind structural ones-this is easy to do.
185. See, e.g., WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MACBETH.
186. BRET EASTON ELLIS, AMERICAN PSYCHO (1991) (chronicling the criminal acts of a fictitious serial killer in Manhattan).
187. MAILER, supra note 74.
188. Press Release, supra note 105.
189. KURT VONNEGUT, SLAUGHTERHOUSE-FIVE 8 (Dell Publ'g 1991) (1969).
190. EMILY BRONTE, WUTHERING HEIGHTS (Doubleday, Page & Co. 1907) (1847).
191. PATRICIA HIGHSMITH, THE TALENTED MR. RIPLEY (1955).
192. MARY WOLLSTONECRAFT SHELLEY, FRANKENSTEIN: OR, THE MODERN PROMETHEUS (James Rieger ed., Univ. of Chi. Press 1982) (1818).
193. SHAKESPEARE, supra note 121.
194. Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 187 (1997).
195. RICHARD WRIGHT, NATIVE SON (HarperCollins Publishers 1998) (1940). I do not mean to imply that Wright tried to hamhandedly produce some sort of blunt, moral cautionary tale to White America-the book would not be worthy of its status as a great work of literature if so. For the complex motivations and ambitions of Wright in producing the novel
196. , see his essay, How Bigger Was Born, id. at 431-62.
197. Id. at 85-87, 234-37.
198. See id. at 264-430.
199. Id. at 429.
200. Id. at 85-87.
201. Id. at 234-37.
202. Id. at 85-87.
203. Id. at 85.
204. Id. at 81-87.
205. Id. at 87.
206. Id. at 85-93.
207. Id. at 66-71.
208. Id. at 218-21.
209. Id. at 233-39.
210. Of course another reason Wright leaves out much mention of Bessie at the trial is to reflect the social reality that an impoverished, black rape-murder victim simply will not get the criminal justice system's attention in the way a wealthy, white victim will. Cf. DAVID C. BALDUS, GEORGE WOODWORTH & CHARLES A. PULASKI, EOUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY 140-87 (1990).
211. I am not the first to note that Wright's novel exploits emotional vacillation to make its point. As Harold Bloom wrote, "Either Bigger Thomas is a responsible consciousness, and so profoundly culpable, or else only the white world is responsible and culpable...Wright... was not able to choose..." Harold Bloom, Introduction to MODERN CRITICAL INTERPRETATIONS: RICHARD WRIGHT'S NATIVE SON 4 (Harold Bloom ed., 1988).
212. MOHANDAS K. GANDHI, AUTOBIOGRAPHY: THE STORY OF MY EXPERIMENTS WITH TRUTH 242 (1983) ('"Hate the sin and not the sinner' is a precept which, though easy to understand, is rarely practised....").
213. Alice H. Eagly & Shelly Chaiken, Attitude Structure and Function, in 1 THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 269, 269 (Daniel T. Gilbert et al. eds., 4th ed. 1998).
214. Richard E. Petty & Duane T. Wegener, Attitude Change: Multiple Roles for Persuasion Variables, in 1 THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 148, at 323,323.
215. For excellent reviews, see Eagly & Chaiken, supra note 148, and
216. Petty & Wegener, supra note 149.
217. See Klaus Jonas, Philip Broemer & Michael Diehl, Attitudinal Ambivalence, 11 EUR. REV. Soc. PSYCHOL. 35,35-36 (2000).
218. See id. at 41.
219. See id. at 41-42.
220. See Susan T. Fiske & Amy J.C. Cuddy, Stereotype Content Across Cultures as a Function of Group Status, in SOCIAL COMPARISON AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: UNDERSTANDING COGNITION, INTERGROUP RELATIONS, AND CULTURE 249 (Serge Guimond ed., 2006).
221. For instance, people often have ambivalent attitudes toward particular racial or ethnic groups. Irwin Katz & R. Glen Hass, Racial Ambivalence and American Value Conflict: Correlational and Priming Studies of Dual Cognitive Structures, 55 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 893, 902-04 (1988).
222. Men often have welldocumented ambivalent attitudes toward women. Peter Glick & Susan T. Fiske, The Ambivalent Sexism Inventory: Differentiating Hostile and Benevolent Sexism, 70 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 491,494-95 (1996).
223. People generally have ambivalent attitudes toward the elderly, Amy J.C. Cuddy & Susan T. Fiske, Doddering but Dear: Process, Content, and Function in Stereotyping of Older Persons, in AGEISM: STEREOTYPING AND PREJUDICE AGAINST OLDER PERSONS 3,17 (Todd D. Nelson ed., 2002);
224. working mothers, Amy J.C. Cuddy et al., When Professionals Become Mothers, Warmth Doesn't Cut the Ice, 60 J. Soc. ISSUES 701, 705-07, 714-15 (2004);
225. the disabled, Irwin Katz, R. Glen Hass & Joan Bailey, Attitudinal Ambivalence and Behavior Toward People with Disabilities, in ATTITUDES TOWARD PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES 47, 47-57 (Harold E. Yuker ed., 1988); and others.
226. Some individuals, however, are more likely to feel ambivalent attitudes more strongly and more often than others. See Megan M. Thompson & Mark P. Zanna, The Conflicted Individual: Personality-Based and Domain-Specific Antecedents of Ambivalent Social Attitudes, 63 J. PERSONALITY 259, 278-79 (1995).
227. And, some may be more bothered by the feelings than others. See Ian R. Newby-Clark, Ian McGregor & Mark P. Zanna, Thinking and Caring About Cognitive Inconsistency: When and for Whom Does Attitudinal Ambivalence Feel Uncomfortable?, 82 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 157, 163-65 (2002).
228. It is still possible to measure ambivalent attitudes that are below the surface of awareness. See Bertram Gawronski & Galen V. Bodenhausen, What Do We Know About Implicit Attitude Measures and What Do We Have to Learn?, in IMPLICIT MEASURES OF ATTITUDES 265 (Bernd Wittenbrink & Norbert Schwarz eds., 2007).
229. One such technique to measure them that has received considerable attention is the Implicit Association Test, which measures the speed with which one associates groups (say, women versus men) with particular positive versus negative terms. See Kristin A. Lane et al., Understanding and Using the Implicit Association Test: IV-What We Know (So Far) About the Method, in IMPLICIT MEASURES OF ATTITUDES, supra, at 59, 59-61.
230. Though the techniques for measuring implicit attitudes, and opinions about what, exactly, they are measuring, remain somewhat controversial. See Brian A. Nosek et al., The Implicit Association Test at Age 7: A Methodological and Conceptual Review, in SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY AND THE UNCONSCIOUS 265, 266 (John A. Bargh ed., 2007);
231. Gregory Mitchell & Philip E. Tetlock, Antidiscrimination Law and the Perils of Mindreading, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1023,1030-34 (2006). The existence of implicit attitudes themselves is not.
232. West, Economic Man and Literary Woman, supra note 20, at 872.
233. NUSSBAUM, supra note 1, at 96.
234. Jonas, Broemer & Diehl, supra note 151, at 55.
235. I am skipping the third category for now: behavior. It is true that behaviors toward an attitude object can make up part of one's composite attitude, but in the context of the inclusionary approach in law, normally one does not consider how one has behaved in the past toward a person being judged in assessing how one feels toward the person as a whole. Judgers typically have never met those they are judging, let alone behave in any particular way towards them. That one's own behavior can shape one's attitude, though, is the main insight of Bern's "self-perception theory," which shows that sometimes we look to our behaviors to assess our attitudes because our cognitions might be opaque even to ourselves. Daryl J. Bern, Self-Perception Theory, in 6 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 1, 2 (Leonard Berkowitz ed., 1972). Behavior does come into play with the inclusionary approach- but as a response to the attitude, not, primarily, a component of it. That is, judgers must render a decision-such as a verdict or a sentence.
236. This process is described in part by Ajzen's classic expectancy-value model, which describes attitudes as a composite function of the various subjective values for the attributes a person associates with an attitude object, multiplied by the strength of those associations. Icek Ajzen, Nature and Operation of Attitudes, 52 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 27, 30-32 (2001).
237. See James A. Russell, Core Affect and the Psychological Construction of Emotion, 110 PSYCHOL. REV. 145, 148 (2003);
238. James A. Russell & James M. Carroll, On the Bipolarity of Positive and Negative Affect, 125 PSYCHOL. BULL. 3,25 (1999).
239. Jeff T. Larsen, A. Peter McGraw & John T. Cacioppo, Can People Feel Happy and Sad at the Same Time?, 81 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 684, 692-95 (2001).
240. See, e.g., id. at 684.
241. Id. at 692;
242. see also John T. Cacioppo & Gary G. Berntson, Relationship Between Attitudes and Evaluative Space: A Critical Review, with Emphasis on the Separability of Positive and Negative Substrates, 115 PSYCHOL. BULL. 401, 403 (1994).
243. See LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE 2 (1957);
244. HEIDER, supra note 114, at 204.
245. Some have argued that it is not the dissonance itself that is aversive, but the implications of it (such as to one's self-concept). See, e.g., Claude M. Steele, The Psychology of Self-Affirmation: Sustaining the Integrity of the Self, in 21 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 261, 262 (Leonard Berkowitz ed., 1988). For my purposes, however, this is a distinction without a difference, because for whatever the reason, the experience of dissonance motivates the one experiencing it to reduce it.
246. Jonas, Broemer & Diehl, supra note 151, at 59-60;
247. Klaus Jonas, Philip Broemer & Michael Diehl, Experienced Ambivalence as a Moderator of the Consistency Between Attitudes and Behaviors, 31 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR SOZIALPSYCHOLOGIE 153,162 (2000).
248. See Philip Broemer et al., Effects of Evaluative (In-)Consistency and Perceived Self-Efficacy on Attitude Formation, 59 SWISS J. PSYCHOL. 183,191-92 (2000);
249. Gregory R. Maio et al., Ambivalence and Persuasion: The Processing of Messages About Immigrant Groups, 32 J. EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL. 513,514,528 (1996).
250. Maio et al., supra note 167, at 515,528-31.
251. See R. Glen Hass et al., Cross-Racial Appraisal as Related to Attitude Ambivalence and Cognitive Complexity, 17 PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. BULL. 83, 89-91 (1991);
252. Patricia W. Linville & Edward E. Jones, Polarized Apprabals of Out-Group Members, 38 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 689,689-90,701(1980).
253. David W. Bell & Victoria M. Esses, Ambivalence and Response Amplification: A Motivational Perspective, 28 PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1143,1144-45 (2002).
254. Id. at 1143;
255. see also Irwin Katz, Joyce Wackenhut & R. Glen Hass, Racial Ambivalence, Value Duality, and Behavior, in PREJUDICE, DISCRIMINATION, AND RACISM 35, 44-45 (John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner eds., 1986);
256. Katz & Hass, supra note 154, at 903.
257. For the classic treatise on the phenomenon, see FESTINGER, supra note 165.
258. For a brief, and relatively recent, review of the phenomenon, see Petty & Wegener, supra note 149, at 335-37.
259. Where one's beliefs are inconsistent with one's actions, one can eliminate the inconsistency by changing either the belief or the behavior. Id. at 336.
260. Gordon Hodson, Gregory R. Maio & Victoria M. Esses, The Role of Attitudinal Ambivalence in Susceptibility to Consensus Information, 23 BASIC & APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL. 197,204 (2001).
261. Mark Conner et al., Moderating Role of Attitudinal Ambivalence Within the Theory of Planned Behaviour, 42 BRIT. J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 75,87-90 (2003).
262. C. Daniel Batson et al., Negative-State Relief and the Empathy-Altruism Hypothesis, 56 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 922, 924, 931 (1989);
263. Mark H. Davis, Measuring Individual Differences in Empathy: Evidence for a Multidimensional Approach, 44 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 113, 113-14 (1983).
264. See Davis, supra note 175, at 120-21.
265. C. Daniel Batson, Shannon Early & Giovanni Salvarani, Perspective Taking: Imagining How Another Feels Versus Imagining How You Would Feel, 23 PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. BULL. 751, 753 (1997) (emphasis omitted).
266. Galinsky & Moskowitz, supra note 44, at 711 (internal quotation marks omitted).
267. Cf. Pennington & Hastie, supra note 21, at 521-23;
268. Pennington & Hastie, supra note 25, at 243-44.
269. See Batson, Early & Salvarani, supra note 177, at 757.
270. Antoine Lutz et al., Regulation of the Neural Circuitry of Emotion by Compassion Meditation: Effects of Meditative Expertise, PLoS ONE, Mar. 2008, at 4-7, available at http://www.plosone. org/article/fetchArticle.action? articleURI=info:doi/10.1371/journal.pone.0001897.
271. Davis, supra note 175, at 119.
272. C. Daniel Batson et al., Empathy and the Collective Good: Caring for One of the Others in a Social Dilemma, 68 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 619, 626 (1995).
273. C. Daniel Batson et al., Immorality from Empathy-Induced Altruism: When Compassion and Justice Conflict, 68 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 1042,1045 (1995).
274. Patricia A. Oswald, Does the Interpersonal Reactivity Index Perspective-Taking Scale Predict Who Will Volunteer Time to Counsel Adults Entering College?, 97 PERCEPTUAL & MOTOR SKILLS 1184,1185-86 (2003).
275. BATSON, supra note 42, at 89;
276. Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 42, at 91-92.
277. This benevolence is particularly acute when the target is individuated, rather than a member of an abstract class. Deborah A. Small & George Loewenstein, Helping a Victim or Helping the Victim: Altruism and Identifiability, 26 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 5, 5-6 (2003).
278. Kaj Björkqvist, Karin Österman & Ari Kaukiainen, Social Intelligence - Empathy = Aggression?, 5 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV. 191,196-97 (2000);
279. Erratum, 5 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV. 429 (2000) (including corrected table for Björkqvist et al. article);
280. Richardson et al., supra note 43, at 287.
281. Deborah R. Richardson et al., The Relationship Between Perspective-Taking and Nonaggressive Responding in the Face of an Attack, 66 J. PERSONALITY 235, 252 (1998).
282. See Galinsky & Moskowitz, supra note 44, at 721-22. In contrast, admonishing the perceiver not to stereotype results in "rebound effects," where post-task, the perceiver stereotypes the target more than if given no instructions at all.
283. Id. at 710, 721;
284. see also Adam D. Galinsky & Gordon B. Moskowitz, Further Ironies of Suppression: Stereotype and Counterstereotype Accessibility, 43 J. EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL. 833, 834, 839 (2007).
285. Daniel T. Gilbert, Ordinary Personology, in 2 THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 148, at 89, 131-34.
286. This is also known as the "fundamental attribution error." Lee Ross, The Intuitive Psychologist and His Shortcomings: Distortions in the Attribution Process, in 10 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 173,184 (Leonard Berkowitz ed., 1977).
287. Ruth Ellen Galper, Turning Observers into Actors: Differential Causal Attributions as a Function of "Empathy," 10 J. RESEARCH PERSONALITY 328, 330-35 (1976);
288. Dennis T. Regan & Judith Totten, Empathy and Attribution: Turning Observers into Actors, 32 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 850, 856 (1975).
289. C. Daniel Batson & Nadia Ahmad, Empathy-Induced Altruism in a Prisoner's Dilemma II: What if the Target of Empathy Has Defected?, 31 EUR. J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 25, 34 (2001).
290. Batson et al., supra note 183, at 626, 628-29. In these experiments, the sympathetic "other" was a fellow group member.
291. Batson et al., supra note 184, at 1046-47, 1050-51.
292. Id. at 1043.
293. Bilz, supra note 116, at 1086-91.
294. Batson et al., supra note 184, at 1043.
295. See Davis et al., supra note 54, at 713, 725.
296. See id. at 713-14;
297. Galinsky & Moskowitz, supra note 44, at 715-16.
298. But see C. Daniel Batson et al., Is Empathy-Induced Helping Due to Self-Other Merging?, 73 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 495, 497, 508 (1997) (arguing that true altruism, which is not egoistically motivated to reduce the giver's own distress, requires cognitive separation with the object of empathy).
299. John A. Bargh, Mark Chen & Lara Burrows, Automaticity of Social Behavior: Direct Effects of Trait Construct and Stereotype Activation on Action, 71 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 230, 232-33 (1996);
300. Davis et al., supra note 54, at 713-14;
301. Galinsky & Moskowitz, supra note 44, at 709.
302. Derek Chadee, Race, Trial Evidence and Jury Decision Making, CARIBBEAN J. CRIMINOLOGY & SOC. PSYCHOL., Jan. 1996, at 59, 77;
303. Howard C. Daudistel et al., Effects of Defendant Ethnicity on Juries' Dispositions of Felony Cases, 29 J. APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL. 317, 317-22, 331 (1999);
304. Nancy J. King, Postconviction Review of Jury Discrimination: Measuring the Effects of Juror Race on Jury Decisions, 92 MICH. L. REV. 63, 82-85 (1993);
305. Ramsey McGowen & Glen D. King, Effects of Authoritarian, Anti-Authoritarian, and Egalitarian Legal Attitudes on Mock Juror and Jury Decisions, 51 PSYCHOL. REPS. 1067,1072-73 (1982).
306. See Gloria J. Fischer, Gender Effects on Individual Verdicts and on Mock Jury Verdicts in a Simulated Acquaintance Rape Trial, 36 SEX ROLES 491, 499 (1997);
307. Stuart Nagel & Lenore J. Weitzman, Double Standard of American Justice, SOCIETY, Mar. 1972, at 18, 25, 62.
308. Freda Adler, Socioeconomic Factors Influencing Jury Verdicts, 3 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 1, 4-5,10 (1973).
309. Chadee, supra note 201, at 74-75;
310. Norbert L. Kerr et al., Defendant-Juror Similarity and Mock Juror Judgments, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 545, 561-62 (1995).
311. See José M. Marques, Vincent Y. Yzerbyt & Jacques-Philippe Leyens, The 'Black Sheep Effect': Extremity of Judgments Towards Ingroup Members as a Function of Group Identification, 18 EUR. J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 1,4-5 (1988).
312. Davis et al., supra note 54, at 713-14;
313. Galinsky & Moskowitz, supra note 44, at 709.
314. Davis et al., supra note 54, at 723;
315. Galinsky & Moskowitz, supra note 44, at 709.
316. Arthur Aron et al., Close Relationships as Including Other in the Self, 60 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 241, 242 (1991);
317. cf. Bargh, Chen & Burrows, supra note 200, at 239-40.
318. Some guesses have been made; namely, the longer one knows the other and the more integrated into one's life the "other" is, the more merging should result. Aron et al., supra note 208, at 246-47;
319. Davis et al., supra note 54, at 714.
320. Davis et al., supra note 54, at 722.
321. People are generally biased toward positive traits when describing themselves. See Mark D. Alicke, Global Self-Evaluation as Determined by the Desirability and Controllability of Trait Adjectives, 49 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 1621, 1626 (1985);
322. Vera Hoorens, Self-Favoring Biases, Self-Presentation, and the Self-Other Asymmetry in Social Comparisons, 63 J. PERSONALITY 793,810 (1995).
323. Galinsky & Moskowitz, supra note 44, at 716.
324. Adam D. Galinsky, Cynthia S. Wang & Gillian Ku, Perspective-Takers Behave More Stereotypically, 95 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 404 (2008).
325. Id. at 406-08.
326. Id. at 411-12.
327. Id. at 413-14.
328. Id. at 415-16.
329. For additional theoretical explanations for why perceivers might do this, see Adam D. Galinsky, Gillian Ku & Cynthia S. Wang, Perspective-Taking and Self-Other Overlap: Fostering Social Bonds and Facilitating Social Coordination, 8 GROUP PROCESSES & INTERGROUP REL. 109 (2005).
330. Dan M. Kahan, The Logic of Reciprocity: Trust, Collective Action, and Law, 102 MlCH. L. REV. 71,103 (2003).
331. Id. at 85.
332. See Marsha Blumenthal, Charles Christian & Joel Slemrod, Do Normative Appeals Affect Tax Compliance? Evidence from a Controlled Experiment in Minnesota, 54 NAT'L TAX J. 125, 130-35 (2001);
333. Joel Slemrod, Marsha Blumenthal & Charles Christian, Taxpayer Response to an Increased Probability of Audit: Evidence From a Controlled Experiment in Minnesota, 79 J. PUB. ECON. 455, 464-65, 474-81 (2001);
334. see also STEPHEN COLEMAN, MINN. DEP'T OF REVENUE, THE MINNESOTA INCOME TAX COMPLIANCE EXPERIMENT: STATE TAX RESULTS 18-19,25 (1996), http://www.taxes.state.mn.us/legal-policy/research-reports/content/complnce.pdf.
335. Davis et al., supra note 54, at 713, 724;
336. Galinsky & Moskowitz, supra note 44, at 709.
337. The idea of reading as forming a sort of friendship with the implied author comes from Wayne Booth. But as already mentioned, Booth focuses on why we should invite such friendships, with some minor qualifications suggesting there might be times we reject them - but seemingly not without giving them a try first. This is consistent with the inclusionary approach, in which camp Booth is solidly at home. BOOTH, supra note 20, at 201-23.
338. FED. R. EVID. 412.
339. Id. 404 (codifying an old common-law rule).
340. Again, the point of exclusion is not plausibly to improve accuracy; if one were laying bets on the likelihood that a bank robber who had committed fifteen bank robberies in the past was likely the real culprit in a trial for a sixteenth, one would certainly as a matter of simple probabilities like to know his history. See Susan Marlene Davies, Evidence of Character to Prove Conduct: A Reassessment of Relevancy, 27 CRIM. L. BULL. 504, 526-33 (1991);
341. cf. United States v. Danzey, 594 F.2d 905, 910-15 (2d Cir. 1979);
342. Rex v. Smith, (1915) 11 Crim. App. 229, 229-30, 236-37.
343. Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1329,1376 (1971) (footnote omitted).
344. Nesson, supra note 53, at 1378 (footnote omitted).
345. Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 27, at 272
346. (discussing Commonwealth v. Carr, 580 A.2d 1362 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990)).
347. Carr, 580 A.2d at 1363-64;
348. Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 27, at 272.
349. Carr, 580 A.2d at 1363-65.
350. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2503(a) (West 1998).
351. Carr, 580 A.2d at 1364.
352. See Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 27, at 310.
353. Id. at 311.
354. Commonwealth v. McCusker, 292 A.2d 286, 289-90, 293 (Pa. 1972).
355. Commonwealth v. Stonehouse, 555 A.2d 772, 774-80, 782 (Pa. 1989).
356. Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 27, at 306-12, 361-62.
357. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 19. Indeed, he argues that as much as possible neither law nor literature should "moralize."
358. Id. at 305-07.
359. See, e.g., Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809 (1935);
360. Hale, supra note 107;
361. Llewellyn, supra note 107.
362. Commonwealth v. Carr, 580 A.2d 1362, 1363-64 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990).
363. For instance, because an employee is an agent of the employer but not vice-versa, a jury may be instructed that an employer's hearsay admission that his employee was negligent can be used to prove the employer s vicarious liability, but not the employee s own negligence that triggers the vicarious liability. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2);
364. Mahlandt v. Wild Canid Survival & Research Ctr., Inc., 588 F.2d 626, 631 (8th Cir. 1978).
365. See, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/7-1(a) (2008);
366. LAFAVE, supra note 61, at 407.
367. Consider, for example, a Southern juror's words during deliberations for a man who was tried for murder after shooting three other men who had verbally taunted him: "Good God Almighty, bub....He ain't guilty. He wouldn't of been much of a man if he hadn't shot them fellows." HODDING CARTER, SOUTHERN LEGACY 50 (1950).
368. Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 27, at 362.
369. See Carr, 580 A.2d at 1364-65.
370. See id.
371. Kahan and Nussbaum give a telling example of exactly this happening. In Texas in 1988, a state judge gave only a slap on the wrist to a murderer whose victims were two homosexual men who had solicited the defendant for sex, saying "I put prostitutes and gays at about the same level, and I'd be hard put to give somebody life for killing a prostitute." Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 27, at 364 (citation omitted). In response to a public outcry, three things happened, each more remarkable than the last: first, the judge was censured; second, citizens voted him out of office; and third, the legislature passed a law increasing the penalties for crimes motivated by hate. In Texas! See id.
372. Kenworthey Bilz & Janice Nadler, Law, Psychology, and Morality, in 50 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF LEARNING AND MOTIVATION 101,119-23 (Daniel M. Bartels et al. eds., 2009).
373. See Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 27, at 362, 364.
374. Simon, supra note 25, at 511.
375. Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 27, at 365.
376. See id. at 364-65.
377. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 822, 826-27 (1991).
378. See Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 27, at 364-65.
379. As "procedural" rules go, the process for amending rules of evidence "has become increasingly removed from the judicial sphere and into the hurly-burly of the political process"-a result unsurprising given that these rules determine the fraught questions whose narratives will be heard, and whose not. Eileen A. Scallen, Analyzing "The Politics of [Evidence] Rulemaking," 53 HASTINGS L.J. 843, 854 (2002).
380. Bilz & Nadler, supra note 247, at 119-20.
381. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 103-489 (1994), as reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1820 (citing testimony including expert reports and personal stories).
382. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006).
383. Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 27, at 368.
384. Id. at 369 (noting that "mercy (like forgiveness) is a kind of leniency that presupposes fault").
385. Id.
386. Id. at 368 (citing Murphy, supra note 115, at 14, 20-25).
387. Id. at 367.
388. Id.
389. Id. at 371.
390. Indeed, with the publication of his article, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, Professor Kahan seems to have abandoned the idea that the line between condemnation and punishment can reliably be drawn. That entire article is an elaboration of the notion "that when society deliberately forgoes answering the wrongdoer through punishment, it risks being perceived as endorsing his valuations; hence the complaint that unduly lenient punishment reveals that the victim is worthless in the eyes of the law." Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 598 (1996).
391. See Scott Kraft, Some Cut Penalties: Rural States Chafe at 55 Speed Limit, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 14,1986, at B1.
392. In California, for instance, one judge even ordered the police to return sixty pounds of marijuana confiscated during a traffic stop, on the defendant's objection that California's "medical marijuana" law allowed him to transport his ware. Gerrick Kennedy, CHP Told to Return 60 Pounds of Pot, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2010, at A4.
393. Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 27, at 364, 371.
394. Kahan, supra note 264, at 598-99 n.28.
395. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
396. Id. at 605.
397. Id. at 604 (citation omitted).