Thermal blinding of gated detectors in quantum cryptography

Optics Express

Volumn 18, Issue 26, 2010, Pages 27938-27954

  Lydersen, Lars ^a,b   Wiechers, Carlos ^c,d,e   Wittmann, Christoffer ^c,d   Elser, Dominique ^c,d   Skaar, Johannes ^a,b   Makarov, Vadim ^a  

^a NORWEGIAN UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY   (Norway)

^b UNIVERSITY OF OSLO   (Norway)

^c MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR THE SCIENCE OF LIGHT   (Germany)

^d UNIVERSITY OF ERLANGEN NUREMBERG   (Germany)

^e UNIVERSITY OF GUANAJUATO   (Mexico)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

AVALANCHE DIODES; BIT ERROR RATE; DETECTORS; OPTICAL COMMUNICATION; QUANTUM CHEMISTRY; SECURITY SYSTEMS;

BRIGHT PULSE; CONTINUOUS WAVES; PACKET TRANSMISSIONS; PLUG-AND-PLAY SYSTEMS; QUANTUM BIT ERROR RATE; QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION; SECRET KEY; THERMAL INERTIA; TRIGGER PULSE;

QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY;

ARTICLE; COMPUTER AIDED DESIGN; EQUIPMENT; EQUIPMENT DESIGN; ILLUMINATION; INSTRUMENTATION; METHODOLOGY; QUANTUM THEORY; TEMPERATURE; TRANSDUCER;

COMPUTER-AIDED DESIGN; EQUIPMENT DESIGN; EQUIPMENT FAILURE ANALYSIS; LIGHTING; QUANTUM THEORY; TEMPERATURE; TRANSDUCERS;

EID: 78650558879     PISSN: None     EISSN: 10944087     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1364/OE.18.027938     Document Type: Article

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