Quantum Cryptography Protocols Robust against Photon Number Splitting Attacks for Weak Laser Pulse Implementations

Physical Review Letters

Volumn 92, Issue 5, 2004, Pages 579011-579014

  Scarani, Valerio ^a   Acín, Antonio ^a   Ribordy, Grégoire ^b   Gisin, Nicolas ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF GENEVA   (Switzerland)

^b ID QUANTIQUE SA   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

BIT ERROR RATE; CORRELATION METHODS; EIGENVALUES AND EIGENFUNCTIONS; LASER PULSES; OPTICAL FIBERS; PHOTONS; POISSON DISTRIBUTION; PROBABILITY; QUANTUM THEORY; STATISTICAL METHODS; THEOREM PROVING;

PHOTON NUMBER SPLITTING (PNS) ATTACKS; QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTIONS;

QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY;

EID: 1642383816     PISSN: 00319007     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

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