Who to lobby and when: Institutional determinants of interest group strategies in european parliament committees

European Union Politics

Volumn 11, Issue 4, 2010, Pages 553-575

  Marshall, David ^a  

^a LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

committee organization; European Parliament; influence; lobbying

Indexed keywords

EID: 78649926532     PISSN: 14651165     EISSN: 17412757     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/1465116510382462     Document Type: Article

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