Testing the TASP: An experimental investigation of learning in games with unstable equilibria

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 145, Issue 6, 2010, Pages 2309-2331

  Cason, Timothy N ^a   Friedman, Daniel ^b   Hopkins, Ed ^c  

^a PURDUE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Experiments; Fictitious play; Games; Learning; Mixed equilibrium; TASP; Unstable

Indexed keywords

EID: 78649728378     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: 10957235     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2010.08.011     Document Type: Article

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