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Volumn 78, Issue 4, 2010, Pages 1413-1434

What happens in the field stays in the field: Exploring whether professionals play minimax in laboratory experiments

Author keywords

Laboratory experiments; Minimax; Mixed strategy

Indexed keywords


EID: 77955149481     PISSN: 00129682     EISSN: 14680262     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.3982/ECTA7405     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (62)

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* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.