Canon shortfalls and the virtues of political branch interpretive assets

California Law Review

Volumn 98, Issue 4, 2010, Pages 1199-1233

  Brudney, James J ^a  

^a OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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EID: 78649530783     PISSN: 00081221     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

References (393)

1. See JOHN BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 128 (14th ed. 1968) ("Had I been present at the creation, I would have given some useful hints for the better ordering of the universe." Alfonso X (The Wise) (1221-1284)).
2. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION (1988) [hereinafter CASEBOOK]. The Casebook is now in its fourth edition, with Elizabeth Garrett as an additional coauthor. Page references in this Essay are to the fourth edition, published in 2007.
3. Richard A. Posner, Book Review, 74 VA. L. REV. 1567, 1571 (1988). Posner's glowing review also described the casebook as "far and away the best set of teaching materials on the subject of legislation that has ever been published" and as having "the potential to alter the law school curriculum."
4. Id. at 1567. Posner did express mild disappointment at the authors' omission of certain passages from Aristotle, Nietzsche, and Wittgenstein, among others, notwithstanding the laudable overall treatment of theoretical approaches to interpretation.
5. Id. at 1570 & n. 4.
6. See, e.g., Philip P. Frickey, Interpretive-Regime Change, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1971 (2005) [hereinafter Frickey, Interpretive-Regime Change];
7. Philip P. Frickey, Revisiting the Revival of Theory in Statutory Interpretation: A Lecture in Honor of Irving Younger, 84 MINN. L. REV. 199 (1999) [hereinafter, Frickey, Revisiting the Revival];
8. Philip P. Frickey, From the Big Sleep to the Big Heat: The Revival of Theory in Statutory Interpretation, 77 MINN. L. REV. 241 (1992).
9. See, e.g., supra note 4;
10. Philip P. Frickey, Getting from Joe to Gene (McCarthy): The Avoidance Canon, Legal Process Theory, and Narrowing Statutory Interpretation in the Early Warren Court, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 397 (2005) [hereinafter Frickey, Getting from Joe to Gene];
11. Philip P. Frickey & Steven S. Smith, Judicial Review, The Congressional Process, and the Federalism Cases: An Interdisciplinary Critique, 111 YALE L.J. 1707 (2002);
12. Philip P. Frickey, Faithful Interpretation, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1085 (1995) [hereinafter Frickey, Faithful Interpretation]; see also Frickey, infra notes 16, 37, 50, 52, 100, 102, and 103.
13. See generally ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 25-29 (1997);
14. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY STATE 147-57 (1990);
15. David L. Shapiro, Continuity and Change in Statutory Interpretation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 921, 943-45 (1992).
16. See, e.g., FRANK B. CROSS, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 3 (2009);
17. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865-66 (1984);
18. W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 112-16 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
19. See U.S. CONST, art. I, § 5, cl. 2 ("Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings . . . .").
20. See U.S. CONST, art. I, § 5, cl. 3 ("Each House shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and from time to time publish the same . . . .").
21. See infra, Part II. B. 1-2.
22. See infra, Part II. B.4.
23. Cf. EINER ELHAUGE, STATUTORY DEFAULT RULES 151-67 (2008) (discussing why canons are a third-order resource, to be invoked only when enactable preferences cannot be inferred and enactor preferences cannot be estimated). Given assigned word limitations, this Essay does not explore comparable ways in which interpretive resources produced by the executive branch may also be constitutionally grounded in the lawmaking process. For a preliminary suggestion that the Founders anticipated an interpretive role for agency officials, see infra note 160. For in-depth discussion of agency approaches to statutory interpretation between 1787 and the Civil War,
24. see Jerry L. Mashaw & Avi Perry, Administrative Statutory Interpretation in the Antebellum Republic, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 7 (2009)
25. and Jerry L. Mashaw, Recovering American Administrative Law: Federalist Foundations, 1787-1801,115 YALE L.J. 1256(2006).
26. See infra Parts II.C. 1-2.
27. See id.
28. See CASEBOOK, supra note 2, at app. B (listing more than one hundred substantive canons used by Rehnquist Court); infra Part II.C.3 (discussing absence of hierarchy among the canons).
29. See William N. Eskridge & Philip Frickey, The Supreme Court, 1993 Term Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 27, 65-67 (1994);
30. Frickey, Faithful Interpretation, supra note 5, at 1090-91 ;
31. Frickey, Revisiting the Revival, supra note 4, at 206-07.
32. See Frickey & Smith, supra note 5, at 1714-16; Frickey, Interpretative-Regime Change, supra note 4, at 1986-92;
33. Frickey, Getting from Joe to Gene, supra note 5, at 450-61. 18. SUNSTEIN, supra note 6, at 150.
34. See generally CASEBOOK, supra note 2, app. B at 19-23 (discussing inter alia the canons of noscitur a sociis and expressio unius, the Whole Act rule, the presumption against redundancy, and the presumption of statutory consistency with respect to the same or similar terms).
35. See Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 528 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (interpreting inconclusive text by looking for "which meaning is [the] most in accord with context and ordinary usage, and thus most likely to have been understood by the whole Congress which voted on the words of the statute") (emphasis in original).
36. See Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y. 59, 65 (1988) (concluding that court's role is to "look at the statutory structure and hear the words as they would sound in the mind of a skilled, objectively reasonable user of words");
37. see generally, Nix v. Heddon, 149 U.S. 304, 306-07 (1893) (concluding that "in the common language of the people," tomatoes were a covered vegetable, not an exempt fruit, under 1883 Tariff Act).
38. See Frickey, Faithful Interpretation, supra note 5.
39. See id.
40. Id. at 1089.
41. Id.
42. See generally Robert K. Rasmussen, Why Linguistics?, 73 WASH U. L.Q. 1047, 1051-54 (1995);
43. Stephen F. Ross, The Limited Relevance of Plain Meaning, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1057, 1057-58 (1995).
44. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (2006).
45. See THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 171-73 (John E. Higgins Jr. ed., 5th ed. 2006) (discussing NLRB's totality-of-the-circumstances approach when reviewing employer interrogation of individual employees).
46. See Livingston Shirt Corp., 107 N.L.R.B 400, 405-06 (1953) (allowing employer captive audience speeches);
47. see also NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 315 U.S. 595, 618 (1969) (allowing employer predictions but not threats);
48. Midland Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 263 N.L.R.B. 127, 133 (1982) (allowing employer misrepresentations).
49. See Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 537-38 (1945) (discussing difference between employer persuasion and coercion as First Amendment matter); 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (2006) (identifying difference as statutory matter).
50. The severity of punishment attached to criminal statutes leaves citizens more vulnerable if the prohibitions of the law are not adequately clear and understandable. See Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125,148-50 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
51. See generally Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135 (1994).
52. See Ross, supra note 26, at 1057;
53. Edward L. Rubin, Law and Legislation in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 369, 381, 383 (1989).
54. See Frickey, Faithful Interpretation, supra note 5, at 1085; text accompanying supra notes 24-25.
55. See Frickey, Faithful Interpretation, supra note 5, at 1094.
56. See id.;
57. RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 193 (2008).
58. See generally Philip P. Frickey, Legislative Processes and Products, 46 J. LEGAL EDUC. 469, 473-74 (1996).
59. See James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Canons of Construction and the Elusive Quest for Neutral Reasoning, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1, 93-102 (2005).
60. See CASEBOOK, supra note 2, app. B at 29-33 (discussing inter alia the presumption against federal preemption of traditional state regulation, the presumption against interpretations that would jeopardize a statute's constitutionality, and the rule of lenity).
61. See id. at 36-41 (discussing inter alia the presumption against repeals by implication, the strict construction of statutes authorizing appeals, and the presumption that each side bears its own costs in adjudications).
62. See id. at 34-35 (discussing inter alia the presumption against extraterritorial application of U.S. law, the rule against implied waivers of U.S. sovereign immunity, and the presumption favoring common law usage where Congress employs words or concepts with wellsettled common law traditions).
63. Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 528 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
64. See United States v. Wells Fargo Bank, 485 U.S. 351, 354, 356 (1988).
65. See Nolde Bros. v. Local 358 Bakery Workers, 430 U.S. 243, 254-55 (1977).
66. See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460-67 (1991) (holding that Congress failed to subject appointed state judges to mandatory retirement under Age Discrimination in Employment Act);
67. Will v. Mich. Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65-68 (1989) (holding that Congress failed to subject states to liability as "persons" under section 1983 of the 1871 Civil Rights Act).
68. See KENT GREENAWALT, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: 20 QUESTIONS 211 (1999);
69. Richard L. Hasen, The Democracy Canon, 62 STAN. L. REV. 69, 92-94 (2009).
70. See CASEBOOK, supra note 2, app. B at 19-23 (listing language canons with case citations); id. at 29-41 (listing substantive canons with case citations). In addition to these 105 separate substantive canons, the Casebook lists 21 more Rehnquist Court policy canons derived from statutory sources: 12 related to considerations of statutory continuity and 9 referring to extrinsic legislative sources, principally legislative history.
71. See id. at 25-28.
72. See Frickey, Interpretive-Regime Change, supra note 4, at 1990-91 (describing the Court's two-step creation of a canon that "a party contending that legislative action changed settled law has the burden of showing that the legislature intended such a change,"
73. quoting Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 521 (1989)).
74. See also CASEBOOK, supra note 2, at 1213 (suggesting that Court is in process of canonizing a presumption against reading statutory delegations broadly, based on decisions in 1994 and 2000).
75. See, e.g., Raygor v. Regents of Univ. of Minn. 534 U.S. 533, 543-44 (2002);
76. BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 543-45 (1994);
77. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460-64 (1991).
78. See, e.g., Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 190-92 (1993);
79. Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 800-01 (1991);
80. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 642-44 (1992).
81. See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T, 550 U.S. 437, 454-56 (2007);
82. F. Hoffman-LaRoche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 164 (2004);
83. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991).
84. See Philip P. Frickey, Interpretation on the Borderline: Constitution, Canons, Direct Democracy, 1 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 105, 128-31 (1997) [hereinafter Frickey, Interpretation on the Borderline];
85. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 50, at 619-28.
86. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 50, at 640-44.
87. Frickey, Interpretive-Regime Change, supra note 4, at 1988.
88. See James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, The Warp and Woof of Statutory Interpretation: Comparing Supreme Court Approaches in Tax Law and Workplace Law, 58 DUKE L.J. 1231, 1295-98 (2009) (discussing Court's use of tax-based substantive canons to frame and simplify judicial analysis).
89. Congress amended Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act in 1972, 1978, and 1991, and it has modified the 1933 and 1934 securities laws on several recent occasions as well. See generally Michael A. Perrino, Fraud and Federalism: Preempting Private State Securities Fraud Causes of Action, 50 STAN. L. REV. 273 (1998) (discussing 1995 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act);
90. David M. Levine & Adam C. Pritchard, The Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998: The Sun Sets on California's Blue Sky Laws, 54 Bus. LAW. 1 (1998). Amendments to the Internal Revenue code are even more frequent.
91. See RICHARD GERSHON, A STUDENT'S GUIDE TO THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE § 1.02 (4th ed. 1999) (discussing Congress's regular amendments to the 1986 code, including "fairly major changes" in 1991, 1993, and 1996).
92. See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 477-78 (1991) (White, J., dissenting in part) (criticizing majority's use of super strong clear statement rule protecting state's sovereign authority as a way to limit the development of Court's constitutional precedent in this area);
93. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 260-66, 278 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority's use of presumption against extraterritoriality as a barrier to considering legislative history sources that indicate how Congress meant to protect employee interests).
94. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 16, at 66-67.
95. Frickey, Interpretive-Regime Change, supra note 4, at 1981.
96. See id. at 1983-84,1989-90; Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 50, at 635-36.
97. See, e.g., Arthur Anderson LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 703-06 (2005);
98. Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 12, 24-25 (2000);
99. United States v. Kominski, 487 U.S. 931, 949-52 (1988).
100. See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T, 550 U.S. 437, 454-56 (2007);
101. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244,248 (1991);
102. Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 440-41 (1989).
103. See, e.g., Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 449 (2005);
104. Hawaiian Airlines v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246, 252 (1994);
105. California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 100-01 (1989).
106. See Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 138-39 (1998) (Breyer, J.) (using the rule of lenity as a tiebreaker);
107. id. at 148-50 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (concluding it is a front-end presumption);
108. Frickey, Interpretive-Regime Change, supra note 4, at 1990. This divergence in views may be expressed within the opinions of a single Justice. Compare Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 148-50 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting), with United States v. Hayes, 129 S.Ct. 1079,1088-89 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., majority).
109. See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 260-66, 278 (1991) (Rehnquist, J., majority, concluding it is a clear statement rule);
110. id. at 260-66 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (concluding it is a presumption).
111. See, e.g.. Note, New Evidence on the Presumption Against Preemption: An Empirical Study of Congressional Responses to Supreme Court Preemption Decisions, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1604, 1612-13 (2007) (reporting that from 1983 to 2004, the "Court decided 127 cases involving federal preemption of state law": state law held not preempted 59 times, fully preempted 59 times, and partly preempted 9 times);
112. Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 38, at 106 & nn.438-39 (listing ERISA decisions between 1989 and 2002 in which anti-preemption rule was relied on and others in which it was distinguished or disregarded).
113. See, e.g., Victoria F. Nourse & Jane S. Schacter, The Politics of Legislative Drafting: A Congressional Case Study, 11 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 600-05, 614-16 (2002);
114. Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845, 870-71 (1992);
115. see also Cheryl Boudreau et al., What Statutes Mean: Interpretive Lessons from Positive Theories of Communication and Legislation, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 957, 967-73 (2007) (contending that statutory text is a form of compressed policy instruction and legislative history enables courts to expand that instruction based on the meanings contemplated by those who transmitted the instructions).
116. See Frickey, Interpretive-Regime Change, supra note 4, at 1990.
117. See generally Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 38, at 106-07.
118. See Frickey, supra note 37, at 474 n.29;
119. CASEBOOK, supra note 2, at 939-41.
120. See Frickey, Interpretive-Regime Change, supra note 4, at 1983-84.
121. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991) (thwarting Congress's 1974 determination to regulate states' sovereign authority);
122. see also Solid Waste Agency v. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 172-74 (2001) (thwarting Congress's determination to regulate certain intrastate activities).
123. See generally Ruth Colker & James J. Brudney, Dissing Congress, 100 MICH. L. REV. 80 (2001).
124. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 50, at 635-39 (discussing four cases, decided during Republican presidencies, construing Fair Labor Standards Act, Civil Rights Act, and Education of the Handicapped Act).
125. See id. at 639.
126. See Elizabeth Garrett, Preferences, Laws, and Default Rules, 122 HARV. L. REV. 2104, 2132 (2009) (book review).
127. See, e.g.. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 2, 86 Stat. 103, 103 (1972) (conference report approved 62 to 10 in Senate, and 303 to 110 in House, 118 Cong. Rec. 7170, 7572-73 (1972));
128. Fair Labor Standards Amendment of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 28, 88 Stat. 55, 74 (1974) (conference report approved 345 to 50 in House, and 71 to 19 in Senate, 120 Cong. Rec. 8605, 8769 (1974));
129. see also Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, § 101, 104 Stat. 327, 330 (1990) (conference report approved 377 to 28 in House, and 91 to 6 in Senate, 136 Cong. Rec. 17296-97, 17376 (1990)).
130. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 16, at 65-71.
131. See id. at 67.
132. See id.
133. See id. But cf. Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation-in the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 811 (1983) (arguing that lack of omniscience cannot be addressed, much less cured, through greater attention to rules of drafting, because the core reason behind this lack of omniscience is that text "necessarily is drafted in advance of, and with imperfect appreciation for the problems that will be encountered in, its application").
134. See Frickey & Smith, supra note 5, at 1744-46.
135. Id. at 1745.
136. See Nourse & Schacter, supra note 67, at 600-05, 614-16.
137. See Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 458-59, 462-65 (1892) (analyzing language and purpose of 1885 Immigration Act).
138. See NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement Corp., 511 U.S. 571, 578-79, 587-88 (1994) (presenting conflicting interpretations of language and purpose of 1947 amendment to National Labor Relations Act).
139. See Nourse & Schacter, supra note 67, at 614-16;
140. William W. Buzbee, The OneCongress Fiction in Statutory Interpretation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 171, 179, 190-92 (2000).
141. See Frickey, Revisiting the Revival, supra note 4, at 207-12 (doubting that canonical formalism has increased predictability, as illustrated by the split between majority and dissent in BFP v Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531 (1994), involving whether a canon was sufficiently "established" to justify departure from the ordinary meaning of text).
142. See Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 38, at 103-05.
143. See, e.g., Gen. Dynamics Land Sys. Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581,594-97, 603-04 (2004) (Souter & Thomas, JJ., disagree about application of whole act rule);
144. Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84, 89, 97-98 (2001) (Breyer & O'Connor, JJ., disagree about whether to ignore or apply canon against surplusage);
145. Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency, 486 U.S. 825, 836-37, 842-43 (1988) (White & Kennedy, JJ., disagree about which interpretation truly furthers whole act rule);
146. Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156, 163-64, 173-74, 177-78 (1981) (Stewart & Brennan, J.J., disagree about which interpretation is consistent with in pari materia canon).
147. See, e.g., Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 583-84, 593-94 (2000) (majority and dissent debate applicability of expressio unius to a provision of Fair Labor Standards Act);
148. John Hancock Life Ins. v. Harris Trust & Sav. Bank, 510 U.S. 86, 96-97, 112-12 (1993) (majority and dissent disagree on applicability of expressio unius to text of ERISA);
149. Breininger v. Sheet Metal Workers, 493 U.S. 67, 91-92, 97-98 (1989) (majority and dissent disagree on applicability of ejusdem generis).
150. CASEBOOK, supra note 2, at 947.
151. See, e.g., West v. Gibson, 527 U.S. 212, 217-22, 225 (1999) (rejecting language canon argument and relying on legislative history, purpose, and inaction);
152. Varity v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 511 (1996) (using language canon to raise a question about congressional intent);
153. Bufferd v. Comm'r, 506 U.S. 523, 529-30 (1993) (deflecting language canon argument as unpersuasive and relying instead on legislative history and agency interpretation to support its view of text).
154. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 16, at 68-70.
155. See id. at 69-70.
156. See Frickey, Interpretation on the Borderline, supra note 52, at 128.
157. See id. (discussing Ratzlafv. United States, 510 U.S. 135 (1994) and Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600 (1994)). For additional examples,
158. see Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 12 (2000);
159. Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848 (2000);
160. Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995);
161. McNaIIy v. United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987).
162. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 16, at 70 (discussing Court's concerns about strict liability for crimes that are not malum in se).
163. See id. at 10-11.
164. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Mille Lac Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 200 (1999);
165. N. Cheyenne Tribe v. Hollowbreast, 425 U.S. 649, 655 n.7 (1976);
166. Choctaw Nation v. United States, 318 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1943);
167. Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665, 675 (1912).
168. See, e.g., FELIX S. COHEN, COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 119-22 (3d ed. 2005) (Frickey authored the handbook's discussion of the canons, see Email from Ethan H. Shaw, LexisNexis, to Melanie Oberlin, Moritz College of Law (May 26, 2009) (on file with author));
169. Philip P. Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present: Colonialism, Constitutionalism, and Interpretation in Federal Indian Law, 107 HARV. L. REV. 381, 440 & n.249 (1993) [hereinafter Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present].
170. County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 247 (1985).
171. See COHEN, supra note 100, at 122-23;
172. Philip P. Frickey, (Native) American Exceptionalism in Federal Public Law, 119 HARV. L. REV. 431, 439-40, 477-81 (2005) [hereinafter Frickey, (Native) American Exceptionalism];
173. Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present, supra note 100, at 425-26.
174. See COHEN, supra note 100, at 126-127;
175. Philip P. Frickey, A Common Law for Our Age of Colonialism: The Judicial Divestiture of Indian Tribal Authority over Nonmembers, 109 YALE L.J. 1, 76 (1999). The presumptive privileging of Indian sovereign interests has been curtailed by Court decisions in recent decades, as Frickey has trenchantly observed.
176. See id. at 5873;
177. Frickey, (Native) American Exceptionalism, supra note 102, at 452-72.
178. See Frickey, Getting from Joe to Gene, supra note 5.
179. See, e.g., Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331, 337-48 (1955) (narrowly construing Civil Service Commission Loyalty Review Board's jurisdiction in case of alleged disloyalty by petitioner);
180. Cole v. Young, 351 U.S. 536 (1956) (narrowly construing federal statute);
181. Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 351 U.S. 115, 122-25 (1956) (narrowly construing operation of federal statute in case of alleged subversive design by petitioner).
182. See, e.g., United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41 (1953) (narrowly construing House resolution);
183. United States v. Witkovitch, 353 U.S. 194 (1957) (narrowly construing federal statute);
184. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957) (narrowly construing House resolution);
185. Yates v. United States, 345 U.S. 298 (1957) (narrowly construing federal statute).
186. See Frickey, Getting from Joe to Gene, supra note 5, at 450-58.
187. See id. at 459-61.
188. See ELHAUGE, supra note 12, at 168-81, 186-87.
189. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 16, at 71 (expressing discomfort with Court's use of Lenity); Frickey, Getting from Joe to Gene, supra note 5, at 446 (acknowledging the Warren Court's "aggressive rewriting of statutes" through the avoidance canon).
190. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 50, at 597, 611-12 (describing Court's dramatic shift from 1970s to 1980s regarding which constitutionally based canons warranted aggressive enforcement).
191. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985);
192. see Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 50, at 637 (noting how Court has used federalism canon to circumvent Garcia).
193. See William N. Eskridge Jr., Overriding the Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 344-45 (1991);
194. see also Lori Hausegger & Lawrence Baum, Behind the Scenes: The Supreme Court and Congress in Statutory Interpretation, in GREAT THEATRE: THE AMERICAN CONGRESS IN THE 1990s 224, 240-42 (Herbert F. Weisberg & Samuel C. Patterson eds., 1998) (finding overrides more than twice as likely when United States was a party on losing side).
195. See Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1520-59 (1994);
196. see also Eskridge, supra note 113, at 351-52 (observing that states are unusually successful at obtaining congressional overrides of Supreme Court decisions).
197. Compare, e.g., SCALIA, supra note 6, at 25-37, with STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 85-102 (2005) (disagreement among Supreme Court Justices);
198. Shapiro, supra note 6, at 943-45, with RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 276-83 (1985) (disagreement about merits of the canons);
199. Frank H. Easterbrook, What Does Legislative History Tell Us?, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 441, 447 (1990),
200. with Lawrence M. Solan, Private Language, Public Laws: The Central Role of Legislative Intent in Statutory Interpretation, 93 GEO. L.J. 427, 437-42 (2005) (disagreement about merits of legislative history).
201. See, e.g, SCALIA, supra note 6, at 31; Alex Kozinski, Should Reading Legislative History Be an Impeachable Offense?, 31 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 807, 813 (1998);
202. Kenneth W. Starr, Observations About the Use of Legislative History, 1987 DUKE LJ. 371, 375-76 (1987).
203. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 61, 61 (1994);
204. John F. Manning, Legal Realism and the Canons' Revival, 5 GREEN BAG 2D 283, 284-85, 290-95 (2002).
205. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 6, at 147-57; Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 16, at 67.
206. See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 115, at 447; Kozinski, supra note 116, at 813.
207. See Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 55 (discussing how Court's use of legislative history and canons varies from one subject matter area to another);
208. James J. Brudney, The Supreme Court as Interstitial Actor: Justice Ginsburg 's Eclectic Approach to Statutory Interpretation, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 889 (2009) (contending that one Justice's varying reliance on canons and legislative history is shaped by pragmatic interest in fostering institutional dialogue).
209. See, e.g, Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2085, 2143-57 (proposing that Congress codify rules of statutory interpretation).
210. See Joseph A. Grundfest & A. C. Pritchard, Statutes with Multiple Personality Disorders: The Value of Ambiguity in Statutory Design and Interpretation, 54 STAN. L. REV. 627, 630, 640-42 (2002);
211. see also James J. Brudney, Congressional Commentary on Judicial Interpretation of Statutes: Idle Chatter or Telling Response?, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1, 21-40 (1994).
212. See HENRY S. RICHARDSON, DEMOCRATIC AUTONOMY 116-18 (2002).
213. See Nourse & Schacter, supra note 67, at 594-97, 615-16;
214. see also Brudney, supra note 122, at 29-32.
215. Article 3, Section 1 authorizes a system of federal courts and sets a compensation standard for federal judges; Section 2 specifies federal jurisdiction; Section 3 addresses treason. The only mention of how courts are to function is the requirement for a jury trial in federal criminal cases. U.S. CONST, art. III, § 2, cl. 3.
216. Id. art. I, § 5, cl. 2.
217. Id. cl. 3.
218. See, e.g., 2 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 290-91 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lemer eds., 1987) (remarks of James Wilson at Federal, Sept. Convention 14, 1787);
219. id. at 292-93 (remarks of George Mason at Virginia Ratifying Convention, June 14-15, 1788);
220. id. at 294 (debate in North Carolina Ratifying Convention, July 26, 1788). The debates reveal a strong commitment to publishing the journals of Senate and House proceedings-debates focused on how the Constitution should clarify exceptions for highly sensitive military and diplomatic transactions.
221. See DANIEL N. HOFFMAN, GOVERNMENTAL SECRECY AND THE FOUNDING FATHERS 26-28, 35-37 (1981).
222. See generally JOSEPH STORY, 2 COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION § 838 (1833) ("The object of the whole clause [1.5.3] is to ensure publicity of the proceedings to the legislature, and a correspondent responsibility of the members to their respective constituents.").
223. See U.S. CONST, art. I, § 5, cl. 3; see also STORY, supra note 128, at § 839.
224. So long as known and open responsibility is valuable as a check, or an incentive among the representatives of a free people, so long a journal of their proceedings, and their votes, published in the face of the world, will continue to enjoy public favour, and be demanded by public opinion. Id. (emphasis added).
225. See G. H. JENNINGS, AN ANECDOTAL HISTORY OF THE BRITISH PARLIAMENT FROM THE EARLIEST PERIODS 559 (Horace Cox 4th ed. 1899). By the mid-eighteenth century, early reporting on parliamentary debates included some outright fabrication of members' speeches by persons who had not been present at the debates. See id. at 561;
226. see also Parliament Home Page Hansard (official report), htrp://www.parliament.uk/about/livingheritage/evolutionofparliament/ communicating/keydates/publicationofofficialreport.cfm (last visited Mar. 19, 2010) [hereinafter History of Hansard] (stating that suppression of unofficial printings of debates did not cease until 1771). See generally Adrian Vermeule, The Constitutional Law of Congressional Procedure, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 361,411 (2004).
227. See HOFFMAN, supra note 128, at 14;
228. EDMUND CODY BURNETT, THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 67 (Norton 1964) (1941);
229. Vermeule, supra note 130; see also Senate Historical Office, Reporters of Debate and the Congressional Record, http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/ history/ corrmionforiefmg/ReportersJ3ebate-Congressional-Record.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2010) (describing Continental Congress having closed its doors to the public and the press).
230. See 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 xi-xxv (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966);
231. BURNETT, supra note 131, at 691-92.
232. 3 GENERAL SERIES: A BRIEF CHRONOLOGY OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS 8 (Apr. 2009) available at http://www.parliament.uk/documents/upload/ G03.pdf (newspaper reporters are first allocated seats in public gallery in 1803).
233. See HOFFMAN, supra note 128, at 13-14; 2 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, supra note 128, at 289 (quoting Articles of Confederation, calling for monthly publication of journals with exception for parts requiring secrecy because "relating to treaties, alliances or military operations"); id. at 301 (quoting James Wilson's Lectures on Law in 1791, referring to Constitution of Pennsylvania that required journals to be published weekly).
234. STORY, supra note 128, § 838, quoted in Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 671 (1892).
235. See ROBERT C. BYRD, 2 THE SENATE 311-12 (1991);
236. MILDRED AMER, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, THE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD; CONTENT, HISTORY AND ISSUES 1 (Jan. 14,1993).
237. See Elizabeth Gregory McPherson, Reporting the Debates of Congress, Q. J. SPEECH, Apr. 1942, 141, reprinted in 88 CONG. REC. A2182 (1942) (extension of remarks of Rep. Mundt, June 10,1942); see also AMER, supra note 136, at 2-3.
238. See McPherson, supra note 137, at 142-43;
239. SAMUEL OPPENHEIM, THE EARLY CONGRESSIONAL DEBATES AND REPORTERS 10-11 (1889) (Paper read at Fourteenth Annual Meeting of N.Y. State Stenographers Assn). Rep. Gerry had been a delegate to the Continental Congress and the Constitutional Convention, and one of the signers of the Declaration of Independence and the Articles of Confederation. Subsequently, he served as Governor of Massachusetts and as Vice President under President Madison.
240. See GEORGE ATHAN BILLIAS, ELBRIDGE GERRY: FOUNDING FATHER AND REPUBLICAN STATESMAN 68-81, 89, 153-206, 308-29 (1976).
241. OPPENHEIM, supra note 138, at 10. The Gerry Resolution was referred to a committee but no action was taken on the committee report. Id. at 12.
242. See HOFFMAN, supra note 128, at 49-50;
243. McPherson, supra note 137, at 142-43;
244. see also RICHARD J. MCKINNEY, AN OVERVIEW OF THE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD AND ITS PREDECESSOR PUBLICATIONS 1 (Apr. 2005) available at http://www.llsdc.org/ attachments/ wysiwyg/544/cong-record.pdf (last visited Apr. 18, 2010)
245. See MATTHEW ERIC GLASSMAN, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, FRANKING PRIVILEGE: HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT AND OPTIONS FOR CHANGE (Dec. 5, 2007) (describing how Congress from 1789 onward has authorized its members and officials to transmit postage-free mail conveying information about congressional business).
246. See McPherson, supra note 137, at 142-43; AMER, supra note 136, at 2-3;
247. see also BYRD, supra note 136, at 312;
248. DONALD A. RITCHIE, PRESS GALLERY 7-8 (1991) (discussing initial decision by House members to open congressional proceedings to the press, as members confronted both "their desire for newspaper coverage and their inability to control the substance of the reporting").
249. U.S. CONST, art. I, § 5, cl. 2. See 2 STORY, supra note 128, § 835 ("No person can doubt the propriety of the provision authorizing each house to determine the rules of its own proceedings. If the power did not exist, it would be utterly impracticable to transact the business of the nation, either at all, or at least with decency, deliberation, and order.").
250. See Walter Kravitz, Evolution of the Senate's Committee System, in CHANGING CONGRESS: THE COMMITTEE SYSTEM 27, 28 (Norman J. Ornstein ed., 1974) [hereinafter CHANGING CONGRESS];
251. DAVID T. CANON ET AL., 1 COMMITTEES IN THE U.S. CONGRESS, 1789-1946 xxxviii (2002).
252. See STEVEN S. SMITH & CHRISTOPHER J. DEERING, COMMITTEES IN CONGRESS 10-12 (1984);
253. see also CANON ET AL., supra note 143, at xxxviii; Kravitz supra note 143, at 29; United States Senate - Senate Committees, http://www.senate.gov/ artandhistory/history/common/ briefing/Committees .htm (last visited Apr. 6,2010) [hereinafter Senate Committees].
254. See CANON ET. AL., supra note 143, at xxxix-xl;
255. WILLIAM L. MORROW, CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES 14-15 (1969);
256. Nelson W. Polsby, The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives, 62 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 144, 153-56 (1968); Senate Committees, supra note 144.
257. See CANON ET. AL., supra note 143, at xxxix-xl; MORROW, supra note 144 at 14-15;
258. Polsby, supra note 145, at 154-55;
259. Kravitz, supra note 143, at 29-30; Senate Committees, supra note 144.
260. See James J. Brudney, Below the Surface: Comparing Legislative History Usage by the House of Lords and the Supreme Court, 85 WASH. U. L.R. 1, 40-42 (2007);
261. see also Garrison Nelson, Assessing the Congressional Committee System: Contributions from a Comparative Perspective, in CHANGING CONGRESS, supra note 143, at 120, 123-24.
262. See generally RALPH VOLNEY HARLOW, THE HISTORY OF LEGISLATIVE METHODS IN THE PERIOD BEFORE 1825 3-5 (1917) (discussing how standing committees were used to a limited extent in Parliament in late sixteenth century but had ceased to be a factor in legislative work well before American independence). The colonial and early state legislatures relied on a mix of tightly controlled select committees and preliminary versions of standing committees; the latter may well have influenced the creation of permanent standing committees in Congress.
263. See LAUROS G. MCCONACHIE, CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES 17-25 (1898);
264. PEVERILL SQUIRE & KEITH E. HAMM, 101 CHAMBERS: CONGRESS, STATE LEGISLATURES, AND THE FUTURE OF LEGISLATIVE STUDIES 106 (2005).
265. See OPPENHEIM, supra note 138, at 32-50 (discussing recurrent floor debates in House from 1800 to 1827, in which proposed and enacted Rules emphasized the need for accurate reporting of floor debates); RITCHIE, supra note 141, at 12-30 (describing rise of officially designated printers of House and Senate debates, along with small cohort of regular reporters on floor proceedings);
266. see also MCCONACHIE, supra note 147, at 97, 124-38 (describing expansive and growing influence of standing committees from 1815 to 1850);
267. Thomas F. Broden, Jr., Congressional Committee Reports: Their Role and History, 33 NOTRE DAME LAW. 209, 226-30 (1968) (describing development of detailed and informative committee reports between 1820s and Civil War).
268. See OPPENHEIM, supra note 138, at 51;
269. see also BYRD, supra note 136, at 314;
270. RITCHIE, supra note 141, at 29-30; McPherson, supra note 137, at 146-47; AMER, supra note 136, at 4-5.
271. See AMER, supra note 136, at 5-6; Senate Historical Office, supra note 131, at 2.
272. See MCCONACHIE, supra note 147, at 60,400-01; Broden, supra note 148, at 228.
273. See Broden, supra note 148, at 229.
274. See WM. HOLMES BROWN & CHARLES JOHNSON, HOUSE PRACTICE 281 (2003) (dating House requirement from 1880);
275. Broden, supra note 148, at 238 (dating Senate majority practice from 1900).
276. See generally WOODROW WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT 90-91 (Meridan Books 1973) (1885) (contrasting British system, which relies on majority party cabinet as a "single standing committee that is charged with the origination of legislation," with American system, which relies on "a [series of] Standing Committee[s], drawn from both parties, for the consideration of each topic of legislation").
277. See supra notes 135-138 and accompanying text.
278. See, e.g., MCCONACHIE, supra note 147, at 60 (reporting a House member's statement in 1829 that printed committee reports were for the enlightenment of the House as well as public opinion); WILSON, supra note 153, at 71 (observing that "[a] Committee is commissioned, not to instruct the public, but to instruct and guide the House");
279. JAMES BRYCE, THE AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH 148, 155-57 (1891) (discussing how members rely heavily on reports from standing committees to guide and shape their positions);
280. see also OPPENHEIM, supra note 138, at 32-33 (reporting House member's statement in 1800, emphasizing that the reasons behind legislators' conduct "should be clearly understood in order that their measures might be comprehended and their motives known," quite apart from enabling their constituents to "judge whether they had faithfully discharged their duty"); supra text accompanying note 139 (reporting Rep. Gerry's statement in 1792 that documentation of floor debates would help executive branch to administer the laws and would aid the courts in interpreting these laws).
281. See supra notes 149-150 and accompanying text.
282. See supra notes 151-153 and accompanying text.
283. See RICHARDSON, supra note 123, at 204;
284. see also ALAN GRANT, THE AMERICAN POLITICAL PROCESS 45-52, 65-66, 302 (5th ed. 1994); Brudney, supra note 147, at 45-46.
285. See, e.g., Doe v. Chao, 540 U.S. 614, 622-23 (2004);
286. Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 250-63, 280, 286 (1994);
287. James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Liberal Justices' Reliance on Legislative History: Principle, Strategy, and the Scalia Effect, 29 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 117, 146-53(2008).
288. See Broden, supra note 148, at 209-10, 214;
289. James J. Brudney, Intentionalism's Revival, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1001, 1011-12 (2007) (discussing ex ante value of committee reports for members and ex post value for lobbyists, press, and public).
290. The Constitution also references the President's need for guidance from executive department officers. U.S. CONST, art. II, § 2, cl. 1. This in turn relates to the President's obligation to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed." Id. § 3. Although the requirement of faithful execution principally reflected a concern to prohibit the President from suspending laws that had been enacted, some participants understood the provision also to require executive interpretation of inconclusive text.
291. See 4 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, supra note 128, at 123, 126 (quoting a Letter from William Symmes to Captain Peter Osgood, Nov. 15, 1787, during Massachusetts Ratifying Convention: "Can we exactly say . . . what may be called or comprehended in a faithful execution? .... Should a Federal law happen to be as generally expressed as the President's authority; must he not interpret the Act! For in many cases he must execute the laws independent of any judicial decision."). See generally Mashaw & Perry, supra note 12 (analyzing early examples of agency statutory interpretation); Mashaw, supra note 12 (analyzing early examples of agency statutory interpretation).
292. James Wilson, Statement at the Federal Convention (Sept. 14, 1787), reprinted in THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, supra note 128, at 291.
293. See Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 55, at 1292 & n.249 (referencing multiple statements from Republican and Democratic legislators since late 1980s).
294. Professor Vermeule has suggested that the Journal Clause's goal of promoting transparency in the lawmaking process may be frustrated because most of the real legislative bargaining occurs in less accessible venues such as off the floor or in closed markup sessions. See Vermeule, supra note 130, at 413. In practice, however, much of the bargaining must be sufficiently public to attract other members who are undecided. Further, even bargaining that is secret must be recognized or recorded in order for the terms of the bargain to be clear enough so that others can be persuaded to sign on. Staged floor colloquies and conference report statements of the bill managers are often examples of this kind of record.
295. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
296. See Posner, supra note 80, at 806;
297. see also Robert A. Katzmann, Bridging the Statutory Gulf Between Courts and Congress: A Challenge of Positive Political Theory, 80 GEO. L.J. 653, 662-65 (1992);
298. Eric Lane, Legislative Process and Its Judicial Renderings: A Study in Contrasts, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 639, 651, 656 (1987);
299. Abner J. Mikva, Reading and Writing Statutes, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 627, 629-31 (1987). This is not altogether surprising, given that roughly half the members are not lawyers and those who are have likely been away from legal practice for many years.
300. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Lawyers, Democracy and Dispute Resolution: The Declining Influence of Lawyer-Statesman Politicians and Lawyerly Values, 5 NEV. L.J. 479, 484 (2005);
301. James Salzer, Lack of Lawyer-Legislators May Help Tort Reform Pass, ATLANTA J. -CONST., Mar. 27,2003, at Dl.
302. Nourse & Schacter, supra note 67, at 597-605 (describing views of committee staffers and legislative counsel); Breyer, supra note 67, at 870-71 (questioning whether legislators are aided by knowledge that court-produced canons may govern future legislation, given a less-thanefficient legislative process characterized by partisan and decentralized bargaining);
303. see also Robert A. Katzmann & Stephanie M. Herseth, An Experiment in Statutory Communication Between Courts and Congress: A Progress Report, 85 GEO. L.J. 2189, 2192-93 (1997) (reporting that congressional committees are largely unaware of appellate court decisions construing statutory text);
304. Robert A. Katzmann & Russell R. Wheeler, A Mechanism for "Statutory Housekeeping": Appellate Courts Working with Congress, 9 J. APP. PRAC & PROCESS 131, 140 (2007) (discussing project to make Legislative Counsel in House and Senate more aware of basic rules and conventions when drafting legislation).
305. See Nourse & Schacter, supra note 67, at 594-600, 614-16; Lane, supra note 165, at 657.
306. See, e.g., Boudreauet al., supra note 67, at 961-71; Solan, supra note 115, at 444-49.
307. See Frickey, Faithful Interpretation, supra note 5, at 1089.
308. For an overview on the difference between rules and standards as legal directives, see Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 57-62 (1992).
309. For discussion of how the distinction between rules and standards may be best understood as a continuum rather than a dichotomy, see, for example, Jules L. Coleman, Rules and Social Facts, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 703, 711-15 (1991);
310. Michael S. Moore, Three Concepts of Rules, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 771, 794 (1991).
311. See generally Sullivan, supra note 170, at 62 (discussing utility of rules); id. at 66 (discussing utility of standards);
312. see also Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 577, 590-92 (1988) (discussing arguments favoring rule-like directives); id. at 592-93 (discussing arguments favoring standards-like directives).
313. See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1179-80(1989).
314. See BREYER, supra note 115, at 85-88;
315. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY, & ELIZABETH GARRETT, LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 219-20, 231 (2d ed. 2006).
316. See ESKRIDGE ET. AL., supra note 173, at 311-12; GREENAWALT, supra note 46, at 173;
317. William N. Eskridge Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 636-37 (1990);
318. see also Bank One Chicago, N.A. v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co., 516 U.S. 264, 276-77 (1996) (Stevens, J., concurring).
319. See CASEBOOK, supra note 2, at 981-82;
320. see also Schwegemann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 395 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring).
321. See CASEBOOK, supra note 2, at 1000; ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 173, at 312; GREENWALT, supra note 46, at 173; Eskridge, supra note 174, at 636-38;
322. see also North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 524-27 (1982).
323. Various sources have discussed the lesser authoritative status of legislative inaction and post-enactment history. See, e.g., Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, 447 U.S. 102, 117-18 (1980) (post-enactment history);
324. CASEBOOK, supra note 2, at 1061, 1040 (legislative inaction and post-enactment history);
325. John Grabow, Congressional Silence and the Search for Legislative Intent: A Venture into "Speculative Unrealities," 64 B.U. L. REV. 737 (1984) (legislative inaction and post-enactment history). On the lesser authority of floor statements by bill opponents and by supporters outside the enacting coalition, see, for example, ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 173, at 313 and GREENAWALT, supra note 46, at 173 (statements by bill opponents). See generally GREENAWALT, supra note 46, at 175 (listing a full hierarchy, ascribed to Eskridge); ESKRIDGE, supra note 174, at 636-40 (setting forth full hierarchy).
326. Committee reports are of limited value when the provision in dispute has been added to the bill as a floor amendment, or when the report's commentary on a provision is as inconclusive as the text itself. See CASEBOOK, supra note 2, at 982;
327. see also Brudney, supra note 122, at 94-97 (discussing why committee reports accompanying omnibus budget reconciliation measures may often include untrustworthy commentary on isolated substantive law matters inserted for strategic purposes).
328. See CASEBOOK, supra note 2, at 1048-49 (discussing instances in which Court presumes that Congress has acquiesced in a high-profile or foundational interpretation by a federal court or an authoritative agency, especially where Congress reenacts or amends a statute without material changes to the provision in dispute);
329. see also Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 792, 804 n.4 (1998) (applying this "reenactment rule" exception to ascribe meaning to legislative inaction);
330. Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580-81 (1978) (explaining that when Congress reenacts a statute without change, it is presumed to be aware of and to adopt judicial interpretations of the statute that preceded reenactment);
331. Mont. Wilderness Ass'n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 655 F.2d 951, 957 (9th Cir. 1981), cert, denied, 455 U.S. 989 (1982) (relying on postenactment legislative history because interpretation of earlier statute was drafted by Congress's designated experts on Conference Committee, it was explained to all members through floor statements accompanying Conference Report, and it was relied on by members when voting on the later bill);
332. Brudney, supra note 122, at 90-91, 97-99 (discussing two instances in which postenactment legislative history was unusually reliable because it represented an integral part of the shared understanding reached by Congress as a whole).
333. See supra notes 178-179.
334. ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 173, at 304.
335. See Brudney, supra note 122, at 75-80.
336. Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 528 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring).
337. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1085 (2008) (describing and classifying Court's varying degrees of respect for agency interpretations-from extremely strong deference in certain subject matter areas or with respect to agency interpretation of its own regulations, to relatively weak deference with regard to less formal or authoritative elaborations of a statutory scheme);
338. Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833 (2001) (discussing stronger deference regime under Chevron doctrine and intermediate deference regime under Skidmore doctrine, and explaining what sources of congressional law justify each approach).
339. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984); Merrill & Hickman, supra note 184.
340. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 228 (2001);
341. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139-40 (1944).
342. See generally CASEBOOK, supra note 2, at 1194-97, 1200-03, 1223-24 (discussing historical development of Court's agency deference standards).
343. See Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140 (referencing "the thoroughness evident in [an agency's] consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control").
344. See, e.g., BankAmerica Corp. v. United States, 462 U.S. 122, 130-32 (1983);
345. Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Co. v. FPC, 364 U.S. 137, 154 (1960).
346. See generally ALFRED C. AMAN, JR. & WILLIAM T. MAYTON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 496-97 (2d ed. 2001).
347. See. e.g., General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 142-43 (1976);
348. Saxbe v. Bustos, 419 U.S. 65,73 (1974).
349. See generally AMAN & MAYTON, supra note 188, at 498-99.
350. See, e.g., Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 586-88 (2000) (rejecting deference to private Department of Labor opinion letter). See generally AMAN & MAYTON, supra note 188, at 502.
351. See, e.g., Bragdon v. Abbott 524 U.S. 624,642-45 (1998) (deferring to expert medical judgment).
352. See generally CHARLES H. KOCH, 3 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE 115 (2d ed. 1997).
353. See Eskridge & Baer, supra note 184;
354. see also Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 831-47 (2006) (demonstrating that Court's invocation of Chevron doctrine from 1989 to 2005 reflects Justices' ideological preferences when deciding whether to defer to agency rulings).
355. See Eskridge & Baer, supra note 184; Merrill & Hickman, supra note 184.
356. See, e.g., Avecor, Inc. v. NLRB 931 F.2d 924, 937-38 (D.C. Cir. 1991);
357. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. NLRB, 904 F.2d 1156, 1159 (7th Cir. 1990) (referencing agency's failure to offer adequate reasons);
358. see also Lee Lumber v. NLRB, 117 F. 3d 1454, 1462 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (referencing agency's failure to respond to prior judicial invitations).
359. Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 528(1947).
360. See Frederick Schauer, Statutory Construction and the Coordinating Function of Plain Meaning, 1990 SUP. Cr. REV. 231,251 & n.82 (1990).
361. Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d) (2006);
362. see Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552 (1988).
363. Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2102(b)(2)(A) (2006);
364. see Pena v. Am. Meat Packing Co., 362 F.3d 418 (7th Cir. 2004).
365. See Karl L. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401-06 (1950).
366. See, e.g., Edward L. Rubin, Modern Statutes, Loose Canons and the Limits of Practical Reason: A Response to Farber and Ross, 45 VAND L. REV. 579, 580 (1992) (critical of presumption "that a statute is primarily a linguistic artifact"); Buzbee, supra note 86, at 234 (critical of counterfactual assumptions about omniscient legislators in drafting process);
367. see also POSNER, supra note 115, at 277-82 (describing as "wholly unrealistic" the assumption that Congress is omniscient in its linguistic drafting process).
368. See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text (discussing Frickey's observations); supra notes 165-167 and accompanying text (discussing observations by other scholars).
369. See, e.g., Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency, 486 U.S. 825, 836-37, 842-43 (1988) (disagreement between White, J., and Kennedy, J., over how whole act rule should apply);
370. Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 458-59,462-65 (1892) (acknowledging direct conflict between expressio unius and whole act rule when construing 1885 Immigration Act).
371. See generally Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 38, at 103-05 (discussing systemic malleability of language canons).
372. See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 697-98, 702, 719-21 (1995) (disagreement between Stevens & Scalia, JJ., as to whether whole act rule or noscitur a sociis controls);
373. see also Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156, 162-63, 177-78 (1981) (disagreement between Stewart & Brennan, JJ., as to whether expressio unius or in pari materia should control meaning of text).
374. See Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 38, at 105-06 (contrasting open-ended canons like constitutional avoidance, and presumption against implied repeals, which offer only vague guidance to Congress, with specific canons like presumptions against asserting extraterritorial jurisdiction or abrogating states' Eleventh Amendment immunity).
375. See Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 55, at 1268 (contrasting generally applicable legal principles such as rules disfavoring federal preemption of core state functions or implied waivers of sovereign immunity with specific subject matter policies such as presumptions favoring labor arbitration or disfavoring implied tax exemptions).
376. See Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 38, at 106 (discussing cases);
377. Note, supra note 66, at 1612-13 (discussing Court's evenly divided record on cases involving federal preemption canon from 1983 to 2004).
378. Professor Rosenkranz suggests that Congress might establish these canonical priorities legislatively (see Rosenkranz, supra note 121, at 2148-50), but comparable options are presumably open to the Court.
379. See generally Samuel A. Thumma & Jefferey L. Kirchmeier, The Lexicon Has Become a Fortress: The United States Supreme Court's Use of Dictionaries, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 227, 267-76 (1999) (discussing Court's need to choose between general usage and more technical dictionaries; between dictionaries produced by different "authors"; between different editions of the same dictionary; and between different-generally prioritized-definitions of the word in question). Admittedly, the Justices have been criticized for a largely subjective and often chaotic reliance on dictionaries since usage expanded in the 1980s.
380. See id. at 264-76;
381. Note, Looking It Up: Dictionaries and Statutory Interpretation, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1437, 1445-49 (2007).
382. Still, the Court could establish strong presumptions with respect to dictionary usage-e.g., announcing a preference for Webster's International, for editions in place when the litigation arose (as opposed to when the law was enacted), and for a word's primary definition (as opposed to secondary or tertiary definitions). See Rosenkranz, supra note 121, at 2147-48 (proposing that Congress adopt a similar approach).
383. See Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 55, at 1266-70, 1294-1300 (tax law versus workplace law).
384. See Brudney, supra note 120, at 913-22 (discussing approach of Justice Ginsburg).
385. See ELHAUGE, supra note 12, at 9-12,151-52 (contending that canons occupy a third-tier position as preference-eliciting default rules). For critical perspective on Elhauge, see Garrett, supra note 75, at 2124-28.
386. Cf. Thomas Merrill, Textualism and the Chevron Doctrine, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 351, 372 (1994) (critical of textualism as an exercise in judicial ingenuity, in contrast to the more grounded archaeological approach taken by intentionalism).
387. On the critique of legislative history as strategically planted or opportunistically created, see, for example, Eskridge, supra note 174, at 643-44;
388. Barry R. Weingast & William J. Marshall, The Industrial Organization of Congress; or Why Legislators, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets, 96 J. POL. ECON. 132,148-52 (1988);
389. Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 99 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring). On the critique of legislative history as selectively and subjectively invoked by judges, see, for example, GREENAWALT, supra note 46, at 181 and Kozinski, supra note 116, at 813.
390. See, e.g., Brudney, supra note 122, at 47-60 (explaining why, notwithstanding anecdotal exceptions, legislative history is neither corruptly produced nor unrepresentative of the larger body); Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 159, at 131-60 (demonstrating empirically that for the universe of statutory workplace law decisions between 1969 and 2006, liberal Justices did not invoke legislative history to favor their own policy preferences).
391. See, e.g., George A. Costello, A verage Voting Members and Other "Benign Fictions ": The Relative Reliability of Committee Reports, Floor Debates, and Other Sources of Legislative History, 1990 DUKE L.J. 39, 60-73;
392. Eskridge, supra note 174, at 636-40;
393. Charles Tiefer, The Reconceptualization of Legislative History in the Supreme Court, 2000 Wis. L. REV. 205, 264-70 (2000).