The Lexicon Has Become a Fortress: The United States Supreme Court's Use of Dictionaries

Buffalo Law Review

Volumn 47, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 227-302

  Thumma, Samuel A ^a   Kirchmeier, Jeffrey L ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0009922329     PISSN: 00239356     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (524)

1. Cabell v. Markham, 148 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir.) (L. Hand, J.), aff'd, 326 U.S. 404 (1945).
2. LEWIS CARROLL, Through the Looking Glass, in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF LEWIS CARROLL 214 (Mod. Lib. ed., 1936).
3. Beyond the Supreme Court, the meanings of specific words have been important throughout the history of the United States, such as the words chosen in the Declaration of Independence or the Constitution. Perhaps the most recent example of the importance of words involves the impeachment of President William J. Clinton. During his impeachment proceedings, several dictionaries were used in arguments about the meaning of the phrase "sexual relations" as used by President Clinton in sworn testimony. See Testing of a President; 3 Little Words, 'I Have Sinned,' Plus 184 Pages in Clinton's Defense, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 1998, at A27. Further, the definitions of other terms were at issue during President Clinton's impeachment. See Nation Sees Combative President's Testimony, SAN FRANCISCO EXAMINER, Sept. 21, 1998, at A1 ("Clinton replied, 'It depends on what the meaning of the word "is" is.'"). Interestingly, long before President Clinton questioned the meaning of the word "is" in his grand jury testimony, Supreme Court Justices turned to dictionaries to define such everyday words as "any," "in," "no," "of" and "or." See Brogan v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 805, 808 (1998) (defining "no"); United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 5 (1997) (defining "any"); Dunn v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 516 U.S. 465, 470 (1997) (Souter, J., dissenting) (defining "in"); Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246, 255 (1994) (defining "or"); Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 334-35 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (defining "or"); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 182 (1970) (Douglas, J., dissenting in part) (defining "of").
4. Beyond the Supreme Court, the meanings of specific words have been important throughout the history of the United States, such as the words chosen in the Declaration of Independence or the Constitution. Perhaps the most recent example of the importance of words involves the impeachment of President William J. Clinton. During his impeachment proceedings, several dictionaries were used in arguments about the meaning of the phrase "sexual relations" as used by President Clinton in sworn testimony. See Testing of a President; 3 Little Words, 'I Have Sinned,' Plus 184 Pages in Clinton's Defense, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 1998, at A27. Further, the definitions of other terms were at issue during President Clinton's impeachment. See Nation Sees Combative President's Testimony, SAN FRANCISCO EXAMINER, Sept. 21, 1998, at A1 ("Clinton replied, 'It depends on what the meaning of the word "is" is.'"). Interestingly, long before President Clinton questioned the meaning of the word "is" in his grand jury testimony, Supreme Court Justices turned to dictionaries to define such everyday words as "any," "in," "no," "of" and "or." See Brogan v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 805, 808 (1998) (defining "no"); United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 5 (1997) (defining "any"); Dunn v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 516 U.S. 465, 470 (1997) (Souter, J., dissenting) (defining "in"); Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246, 255 (1994) (defining "or"); Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 334-35 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (defining "or"); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 182 (1970) (Douglas, J., dissenting in part) (defining "of").
5. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 U.S. 478, 482-83 (1990) (construing "child support" in 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(8)(A)(vi)); Davis v. United States, 495 U.S. 472, 478-84 (1990) (construing "use" in 26 U.S.C. § 170(c)); Mallard v. United States Dist. Ct. for the S. Dist. of Iowa, 490 U.S. 296, 301-02 (1989) (construing "request" in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)); see also James L. Weis, Comment, Jurisprudence by Webster's: The Role of the Dictionary in Legal Thought, 39 MERCER L. REV. 961, 964-66 (1988).
6. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 U.S. 478, 482-83 (1990) (construing "child support" in 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(8)(A)(vi)); Davis v. United States, 495 U.S. 472, 478-84 (1990) (construing "use" in 26 U.S.C. § 170(c)); Mallard v. United States Dist. Ct. for the S. Dist. of Iowa, 490 U.S. 296, 301-02 (1989) (construing "request" in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)); see also James L. Weis, Comment, Jurisprudence by Webster's: The Role of the Dictionary in Legal Thought, 39 MERCER L. REV. 961, 964-66 (1988).
7. See, e.g., California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 622-23 (1991) (construing "seizure" as used in Amendment IV of the U.S. Constitution); Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 264-65
8. See, e.g., Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 306 & n.11 (1985) (construing legal maxim in pari delicto potior est conditio defendentis); United States v. Turley, 352 U.S. 407, 411 (1957) (using dictionary to find that "'stolen' (or 'stealing') has no accepted common-law meaning").
9. Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363, 380 n.8 (1977); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Call Publ'g Co., 181 U.S. 92, 102 (1901).
10. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Coughran, 303 U.S. 485, 491 (1938) (construing "operate" as used by the trial court).
11. Washington Publ'g Co. v. Pearson, 306 U.S. 30, 47 & nn.10 & 11 (1939) (Black, J., dissenting) (construing "condition precedent" and "condition subsequent").
12. Stewart v. United States, 316 U.S. 354, 362 n.6 (1942).
13. See, e.g., Muscarello v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 1911 (1998) (construing "uses or carries a firearm" in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)).
14. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 164 n.3 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
15. Kay v. Ehrler, 499 U.S. 432, 435-36 n.6 (1991).
16. See Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 610-11 (1987) (discussing expansion of word "race" in 19th and 20th centuries).
17. United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 340 n.6 (1971).
18. See, e.g., Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469, 477 (1992) (discussing "normal meaning" of "entitlement"); Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue v. William Wrigley, Jr., Co., 505 U.S. 214, 222-23 (1992) (discussing how "solicitation" and "solicit" are "commonly understood"); Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 383-84 (1992) (discussing "ordinary meaning" of "relating to"); Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 460-63 (1991) (discussing "ordinary meaning" of "mixture"); John Doe Agency v. John Doe Corp., 493 U.S. 146, 153-54 (1989) (discussing "ordinary meaning" of "compilation").
19. See Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 501 n.18 (1982) (construing "roach" as used in drug paraphernalia ordinance); United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62, 72 (1971) (construing "health" as used in provision criminalizing certain abortion procedures).
20. See Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 371-73 & n.9 (1964) (finding "institution" used in loyalty oath was vague); Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939) (finding "gang" used in criminal statute was vague).
21. See, e.g., Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 477-78 nn. 10 & 11 (1987) ("Standard reference works include both broad, neutral definitions of the word 'propaganda' that are consistent with the way the word is defined in this statute, and also the narrower, pejorative definition.") (footnotes omitted); United States v. Cook, 384 U.S. 257, 261 n.5 (1966) (discussing "narrow" and "broad" definitions of "firm"); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 305-06 & n.7 (1957) ("Dictionary definitions [of 'organize'] are of little help . . . as . . . the term is susceptible of both meanings attributed to it by the parties here.").
22. See Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 64 n.3 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
23. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 481-82 (1991) (White, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part and concurring in judgment); Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Duncan, 311 U.S. 243, 251 & n.10 (1940).
24. See, e.g., G. & C. Merriam Co. v. Saalfield, 241 U.S. 22 (1916) (addressing jurisdiction of district court to make and enforce a final decree in personam concerning unfair competition in the business of publishing and selling dictionaries); G. & C. Merriam Co. v. Syndicate Publ'g Co., 237 U.S. 618 (1915) (affirming the dismissal of a bill for want of jurisdiction in a suit to restrain the use of the name "Webster" as applied to English language dictionaries); United Dictionary Co. v. G. & C. Merriam Co., 208 U.S. 260 (1908) (holding that an American copyright is not lost by publishing and selling a work abroad without inserting the required notice of copyright).
25. 462 U.S. 919, 925 n.2 (1983) (construing term "veto" as used in Article I, Section 7 of the U.S. Constitution).
26. 506 U.S. 224, 231-33 (1993) (construing "sole" and "pardon" as used in Article II, Section 2, Clause 1 of the U.S. Constitution).
27. 485 U.S. 46, 53-56 (1988) (construing "caricature").
28. 438 U.S. 726, 740 n.14 (1978) (construing "indecent").
29. 413 U.S. 15, 20 n.2 (1973) (construing "obscene" and "pornography").
30. 492 U.S. 490, 515 n.13 (1989) (Rehnquist, J., judgment and plurality opinion) (construing "necessary").
31. 410 U.S. 113, 132 & n.20, 159, 160 & n.59 (1973) (construing "quickening," "embryo," "fetus" and "viable").
32. 402 U.S. 62, 71-72 (1971) (construing "health"); see also Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 953-55 (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part) (construing "stare decisis"); Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 402 (1979) (White, J., dissenting) (construing "potential" in defining "viability" as used in Roe v. Wade). 31. 252 U.S. 189, 207 (1920) (construing "income").
33. 95 U.S. 714, 721 (1877) (construing "editor").
34. See infra note 178.
35. See infra note 182.
36. "Only a few articles have addressed the Court's use of dictionaries." Note, Looking It Up: Dictionaries and Statutory Interpretation, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1437, 1437 n.5 (1994) (citing authority); see also Ellen P. Aprill, The Law of the Word: Dictionary Shopping in the Supreme Court, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 275 (1998) (focusing on the use of dictionaries in statutory construction). Although these articles have noted the Court's increasing reliance upon dictionaries, they do not describe that increase in the following contexts: the Court's historical use of dictionaries, the terms the Court has defined, the dictionaries relied upon by the Court or the individual Justices' reliance on dictionaries throughout the Court's history.
37. "Only a few articles have addressed the Court's use of dictionaries." Note, Looking It Up: Dictionaries and Statutory Interpretation, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1437, 1437 n.5 (1994) (citing authority); see also Ellen P. Aprill, The Law of the Word: Dictionary Shopping in the Supreme Court, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 275 (1998) (focusing on the use of dictionaries in statutory construction). Although these articles have noted the Court's increasing reliance upon dictionaries, they do not describe that increase in the following contexts: the Court's historical use of dictionaries, the terms the Court has defined, the dictionaries relied upon by the Court or the individual Justices' reliance on dictionaries throughout the Court's history.
38. See infra Part I. The use of dictionaries by the Court, however, has not been limited to English dictionaries. See Appendix C. Indeed, the first dictionary cited by the Court was a French dictionary used to define a French term. See infra notes 138-41 and accompanying text.
39. See infra Part I.C.
40. See infra Part II.A and B.
41. See infra Part II.C, D and E.
42. See infra Part III.
43. See infra Part IV.
44. See infra Part V.
45. See infra Conclusion.
46. SAMUEL JOHNSON, Preface to DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 3 (1775) [hereinafter SAMUEL JOHNSON].
47. See MORTON BENSON ET AL., LEXICOGRAPHIC DESCRIPTION OF ENGLISH 2 (1986).
48. See JOSEPH HAROLD FRIEND, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN LEXICOGRAPHY 1798-1864, at 25-26 (1967); HOWARD JACKSON, WORDS AND THEIR MEANING 113 (1988); BENSON ET AL., supra note 45, at 3; DAVID CRYSTAL, THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 203-04 (1988).
49. See JOSEPH HAROLD FRIEND, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN LEXICOGRAPHY 1798-1864, at 25-26 (1967); HOWARD JACKSON, WORDS AND THEIR MEANING 113 (1988); BENSON ET AL., supra note 45, at 3; DAVID CRYSTAL, THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 203-04 (1988).
50. See JOSEPH HAROLD FRIEND, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN LEXICOGRAPHY 1798-1864, at 25-26 (1967); HOWARD JACKSON, WORDS AND THEIR MEANING 113 (1988); BENSON ET AL., supra note 45, at 3; DAVID CRYSTAL, THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 203-04 (1988).
51. See JOSEPH HAROLD FRIEND, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN LEXICOGRAPHY 1798-1864, at 25-26 (1967); HOWARD JACKSON, WORDS AND THEIR MEANING 113 (1988); BENSON ET AL., supra note 45, at 3; DAVID CRYSTAL, THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 203-04 (1988).
52. Recuyell of the Historyes of Troy was printed by William Caxton in 1475 and has been called the first English language publication printed after Johann Gutenberg's invention of the printing press. See BILL BRYSON, THE MOTHER TONGUE: ENGLISH AND HOW IT GOT THAT WAY 126-27 (1990); see also BENSON ET AL., supra note 45, at 2.
53. Recuyell of the Historyes of Troy was printed by William Caxton in 1475 and has been called the first English language publication printed after Johann Gutenberg's invention of the printing press. See BILL BRYSON, THE MOTHER TONGUE: ENGLISH AND HOW IT GOT THAT WAY 126-27 (1990); see also BENSON ET AL., supra note 45, at 2.
54. Recuyell of the Historyes of Troy was printed by William Caxton in 1475 and has been called the first English language publication printed after Johann Gutenberg's invention of the printing press. See BILL BRYSON, THE MOTHER TONGUE: ENGLISH AND HOW IT GOT THAT WAY 126-27 (1990); see also BENSON ET AL., supra note 45, at 2.
55. See BENSON ET AL., supra note 45, at 3.
56. BRYSON, supra note 47, at 152.
57. See BENSON ET AL., supra note 45, at 3.
58. BRYSON, supra note 47, at 152.
59. See id. 53. RONALD L. GOLDFARB & JAMES C. RAYMOND, CLEAR UNDERSTANDINGS: A GUIDE TO LEGAL WRITING 36 (1982); see also Philip B. Gove, Introduction, The Dictionary's Function, in THE ROLE OF THE DICTIONARY 6 (Philip B. Gove ed., 1967); BENSON ET AL., supra note 45, at 3-4.
60. See id. 53. RONALD L. GOLDFARB & JAMES C. RAYMOND, CLEAR UNDERSTANDINGS: A GUIDE TO LEGAL WRITING 36 (1982); see also Philip B. Gove, Introduction, The Dictionary's Function, in THE ROLE OF THE DICTIONARY 6 (Philip B. Gove ed., 1967); BENSON ET AL., supra note 45, at 3-4.
61. See id. 53. RONALD L. GOLDFARB & JAMES C. RAYMOND, CLEAR UNDERSTANDINGS: A GUIDE TO LEGAL WRITING 36 (1982); see also Philip B. Gove, Introduction, The Dictionary's Function, in THE ROLE OF THE DICTIONARY 6 (Philip B. Gove ed., 1967); BENSON ET AL., supra note 45, at 3-4.
62. See BRYSON, supra note 47, at 152. For a description of the evolution of Dr. Samuel Johnson's dictionary see ALLEN REDDICK, THE MAKING OF JOHNSON'S DICTIONARY 1746-1773 (1990).
63. See BRYSON, supra note 47, at 152. For a description of the evolution of Dr. Samuel Johnson's dictionary see ALLEN REDDICK, THE MAKING OF JOHNSON'S DICTIONARY 1746-1773 (1990).
64. BRYSON, supra note 47, at 152.
65. See id. at 154.
66. SAMUEL JOHNSON, supra note 44, at 159. "Lexicographer" was defined as: "A writer of dictionaries, a harmless drudge." Id. at 233.
67. [Dr. Johnson] professed a preference for what he conceived to be Saxon spellings for words like music, critic and prosaic, and thus spelled them with a final k, when in fact they were all borrowed from Latin. He was given to flights of editorializing, as when he defined a patron as one "who supports with insolence, and is paid with flattery" or oats as a grain that sustained horses in England and people in Scotland. His etymologies, according to Baugh and Cable, were "often ludicrous" and his proofreading sometimes strikingly careless. He defined a garret as a "room on the highest floor in the house" and a cockloft as "the room over the garret." Elsewhere, he gave identical definitions to leeward and windward, even though they are quite obviously opposites. BRYSON, supra note 47, at 153. When the dictionary was published, Dr. Johnson was prepared for criticism. It is the fate of those who toil at the lower employments of life . . . to be exposed to censure, without hope of praise; to be disgraced by miscarriage, or punished for neglect. . . . Among these unhappy mortals is the writer of dictionaries. . . . Every other author may aspire to praise; the lexicographer can only hope to escape reproach. SAMUEL JOHNSON, supra note 44, at 3.
68. [Dr. Johnson] professed a preference for what he conceived to be Saxon spellings for words like music, critic and prosaic, and thus spelled them with a final k, when in fact they were all borrowed from Latin. He was given to flights of editorializing, as when he defined a patron as one "who supports with insolence, and is paid with flattery" or oats as a grain that sustained horses in England and people in Scotland. His etymologies, according to Baugh and Cable, were "often ludicrous" and his proofreading sometimes strikingly careless. He defined a garret as a "room on the highest floor in the house" and a cockloft as "the room over the garret." Elsewhere, he gave identical definitions to leeward and windward, even though they are quite obviously opposites. BRYSON, supra note 47, at 153. When the dictionary was published, Dr. Johnson was prepared for criticism. It is the fate of those who toil at the lower employments of life . . . to be exposed to censure, without hope of praise; to be disgraced by miscarriage, or punished for neglect. . . . Among these unhappy mortals is the writer of dictionaries. . . . Every other author may aspire to praise; the lexicographer can only hope to escape reproach. SAMUEL JOHNSON, supra note 44, at 3.
69. See generally BRYSON, supra note 47, at 154 ("his Dictionary of the English Language . . . is a masterpiece, one of the landmarks of English literature"). Johnson's work has been cited as "first touch of sheer genius to English lexicography." Albert H. Markwardt, Dictionaries and the English Language, in THE ROLE OF THE DICTIONARY 32 (Philip B. Gove ed., 1967).
70. See generally BRYSON, supra note 47, at 154 ("his Dictionary of the English Language . . . is a masterpiece, one of the landmarks of English literature"). Johnson's work has been cited as "first touch of sheer genius to English lexicography." Albert H. Markwardt, Dictionaries and the English Language, in THE ROLE OF THE DICTIONARY 32 (Philip B. Gove ed., 1967).
71. See FRIEND, supra note 46, at 9.
72. See BENSON ET AL., supra note 45, at 6.
73. See FRIEND, supra note 46, at 9. This work came ten years after the first dictionary printed in the United States, which was a version of a British dictionary - William Perry's Only Sure Guide to the English Tongue. See BENSON ET AL., supra note 45, at 6.
74. See FRIEND, supra note 46, at 9. This work came ten years after the first dictionary printed in the United States, which was a version of a British dictionary - William Perry's Only Sure Guide to the English Tongue. See BENSON ET AL., supra note 45, at 6.
75. See FRIEND, supra note 46, at 9. This work came ten years after the first dictionary printed in the United States, which was a version of a British dictionary - William Perry's Only Sure Guide to the English Tongue. See BENSON ET AL., supra note 45, at 6.
76. See FRIEND, supra note 46, at 10.
77. See id. at 10-11; see also BENSON ET AL., supra note 45, at 6.
78. See id. at 10-11; see also BENSON ET AL., supra note 45, at 6.
79. These four dictionaries were: DANIEL JAUDON ET AL., AN ENGLISH ORTHOGRAPHICAL EXPOSITOR (1804); WILLIAM WOODBRIDGE, A KEY TO THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, OR A SPELLING, PARSING, DERIVATIVE, AND DEFINING DICTIONARY (1801); HENRY PRIEST, THE YOUNG LADIES' POCKET COMPANION (1801) and CALEB ALEXANDER, THE COLUMBIAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1800). See FRIEND, supra note 46, at 12-13.
80. These four dictionaries were: DANIEL JAUDON ET AL., AN ENGLISH ORTHOGRAPHICAL EXPOSITOR (1804); WILLIAM WOODBRIDGE, A KEY TO THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, OR A SPELLING, PARSING, DERIVATIVE, AND DEFINING DICTIONARY (1801); HENRY PRIEST, THE YOUNG LADIES' POCKET COMPANION (1801) and CALEB ALEXANDER, THE COLUMBIAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1800). See FRIEND, supra note 46, at 12-13.
81. These four dictionaries were: DANIEL JAUDON ET AL., AN ENGLISH ORTHOGRAPHICAL EXPOSITOR (1804); WILLIAM WOODBRIDGE, A KEY TO THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, OR A SPELLING, PARSING, DERIVATIVE, AND DEFINING DICTIONARY (1801); HENRY PRIEST, THE YOUNG LADIES' POCKET COMPANION (1801) and CALEB ALEXANDER, THE COLUMBIAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1800). See FRIEND, supra note 46, at 12-13.
82. These four dictionaries were: DANIEL JAUDON ET AL., AN ENGLISH ORTHOGRAPHICAL EXPOSITOR (1804); WILLIAM WOODBRIDGE, A KEY TO THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, OR A SPELLING, PARSING, DERIVATIVE, AND DEFINING DICTIONARY (1801); HENRY PRIEST, THE YOUNG LADIES' POCKET COMPANION (1801) and CALEB ALEXANDER, THE COLUMBIAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1800). See FRIEND, supra note 46, at 12-13.
83. These four dictionaries were: DANIEL JAUDON ET AL., AN ENGLISH ORTHOGRAPHICAL EXPOSITOR (1804); WILLIAM WOODBRIDGE, A KEY TO THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, OR A SPELLING, PARSING, DERIVATIVE, AND DEFINING DICTIONARY (1801); HENRY PRIEST, THE YOUNG LADIES' POCKET COMPANION (1801) and CALEB ALEXANDER, THE COLUMBIAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1800). See FRIEND, supra note 46, at 12-13.
84. FRIEND, supra note 46, at 10; see also BENSON ET AL., supra note 45, at 6.
85. FRIEND, supra note 46, at 10; see also BENSON ET AL., supra note 45, at 6.
86. "A Grammatical Institute of the English Language - consisting of three books: a grammar, a reader and a speller - appeared between 1783 and 1785." BRYSON, supra note 47, at 155.
87. See THE AMERICAN SPELLING BOOK (1788). With respect to The American Spelling Book, one author has noted: This volume (later called the Elementary Spelling Book) went through so many editions and sold so many copies that historians appear to have lost track. But it seems safe to say that there were at least 300 editions between 1788 and 1829 and that by the end of the nineteenth century it had sold more than sixty million copies . . . . BRYSON, supra note 47, at 155.
88. See THE AMERICAN SPELLING BOOK (1788). With respect to The American Spelling Book, one author has noted: This volume (later called the Elementary Spelling Book) went through so many editions and sold so many copies that historians appear to have lost track. But it seems safe to say that there were at least 300 editions between 1788 and 1829 and that by the end of the nineteenth century it had sold more than sixty million copies . . . . BRYSON, supra note 47, at 155.
89. See BRYSON, supra note 47, at 156.
90. See FRIEND, supra note 46, at 22-23. As a result, even though there were several American English Dictionaries by 1806, for the first quarter of the nineteenth century, England's Dr. Johnson had "if not a monopoly, something comfortably close to one, on both sides of the Atlantic." Id. at 23.
91. For example, the 1806 Compendious included "porpess" instead of "porpoise," "cag" and "kag" as alternatives for "keg," and "ieland" and "iland" as alternatives for "island." See id. at 22.
92. BRYSON, supra note 47, at 154, 157.
93. Id. at 129. Webster also "wrote impassioned letters to congressmen, dabbled in politics, proffered unwanted advice to presidents, led his church choir, lectured to large audiences, helped found Amherst College, and produced a sanitized version of the Bible . . . ." Id. at 157; see also JACKSON, supra note 46, at 117 (discussing Webster's attempts to introduce spelling reforms). He proposed to "regularize" spelling in A Collection of Essays and Fugitive Writings. See RONALD A. WELLS, DICTIONARIES AND THE AUTHORITARIAN TRADITION 59 (1973). Such regularizations included "waz" for "was," "breth" for "breath," "wurd" for "word," "tung" for "tongue," and "reezon" for "reason." See id. "This proposal was publicly derided, however, even by Webster's friends, and he abandoned the scheme. 'Reezon' could not carry the day." Id. at 59-60.
94. Id. at 129. Webster also "wrote impassioned letters to congressmen, dabbled in politics, proffered unwanted advice to presidents, led his church choir, lectured to large audiences, helped found Amherst College, and produced a sanitized version of the Bible . . . ." Id. at 157; see also JACKSON, supra note 46, at 117 (discussing Webster's attempts to introduce spelling reforms). He proposed to "regularize" spelling in A Collection of Essays and Fugitive Writings. See RONALD A. WELLS, DICTIONARIES AND THE AUTHORITARIAN TRADITION 59 (1973). Such regularizations included "waz" for "was," "breth" for "breath," "wurd" for "word," "tung" for "tongue," and "reezon" for "reason." See id. "This proposal was publicly derided, however, even by Webster's friends, and he abandoned the scheme. 'Reezon' could not carry the day." Id. at 59-60.
95. FRIEND, supra note 46, at 14. Indeed, in what is known as a "war of the dictionaries," Webster accused a former associate, Joseph E. Worcester, of plagiarism in the 1830s. See BENSON ET AL., supra note 45, at 8; see also FRIEND, supra note 46, at 83 ("[Webster's] fear [of Worcester] . . . precipitated the dictionary war"). Even after Webster's death, the Merriam Company published a pamphlet entitled A Gross Literary Fraud Detected, charging that the version of Worcester's Universal and Critical Dictionary - published in England - improperly failed to give credit to Webster. See WELLS, supra note 73, at 68.
96. FRIEND, supra note 46, at 14. Indeed, in what is known as a "war of the dictionaries," Webster accused a former associate, Joseph E. Worcester, of plagiarism in the 1830s. See BENSON ET AL., supra note 45, at 8; see also FRIEND, supra note 46, at 83 ("[Webster's] fear [of Worcester] . . . precipitated the dictionary war"). Even after Webster's death, the Merriam Company published a pamphlet entitled A Gross Literary Fraud Detected, charging that the version of Worcester's Universal and Critical Dictionary - published in England - improperly failed to give credit to Webster. See WELLS, supra note 73, at 68.
97. FRIEND, supra note 46, at 14. Indeed, in what is known as a "war of the dictionaries," Webster accused a former associate, Joseph E. Worcester, of plagiarism in the 1830s. See BENSON ET AL., supra note 45, at 8; see also FRIEND, supra note 46, at 83 ("[Webster's] fear [of Worcester] . . . precipitated the dictionary war"). Even after Webster's death, the Merriam Company published a pamphlet entitled A Gross Literary Fraud Detected, charging that the version of Worcester's Universal and Critical Dictionary - published in England - improperly failed to give credit to Webster. See WELLS, supra note 73, at 68.
98. FRIEND, supra note 46, at 14. Indeed, in what is known as a "war of the dictionaries," Webster accused a former associate, Joseph E. Worcester, of plagiarism in the 1830s. See BENSON ET AL., supra note 45, at 8; see also FRIEND, supra note 46, at 83 ("[Webster's] fear [of Worcester] . . . precipitated the dictionary war"). Even after Webster's death, the Merriam Company published a pamphlet entitled A Gross Literary Fraud Detected, charging that the version of Worcester's Universal and Critical Dictionary - published in England - improperly failed to give credit to Webster. See WELLS, supra note 73, at 68.
99. See BRYSON, supra note 47, at 154-55.
100. Id. at 155.
101. See FRIEND, supra note 46, at 22; BRYSON, supra note 47, at 155.
102. See FRIEND, supra note 46, at 22; BRYSON, supra note 47, at 155.
103. BRYSON, supra note 47, at 155.
104. With respect to the 1828 landmark effort, "opinion over the years has ranged from uncritical praise to full damnation." FRIEND, supra note 46, at 35; see also BENSON ET AL., supra note 45, at 7 (noting that the dictionary was "generally well received both in the United States and in Great Britain" but had "obvious weaknesses"). As was the case with his 1806 work, part of the criticism may be attributable to Webster's idiosyncratic approach to language. For example, "Webster accepted a number of clearly ungrammatical usages, among them 'it is me,' 'we was,' and 'them horses.'" BRYSON, supra note 47, at 157.
105. With respect to the 1828 landmark effort, "opinion over the years has ranged from uncritical praise to full damnation." FRIEND, supra note 46, at 35; see also BENSON ET AL., supra note 45, at 7 (noting that the dictionary was "generally well received both in the United States and in Great Britain" but had "obvious weaknesses"). As was the case with his 1806 work, part of the criticism may be attributable to Webster's idiosyncratic approach to language. For example, "Webster accepted a number of clearly ungrammatical usages, among them 'it is me,' 'we was,' and 'them horses.'" BRYSON, supra note 47, at 157.
106. BRYSON, supra note 47, at 157.
107. See id.
108. See id.
109. See id. at 158.
110. See id. at 158-59; BENSON ET AL., supra note 45, at 5.
111. BRYSON, supra note 47, at 158. For an intriguing tale of the relationship and correspondence between a chief editor of the Oxford English Dictionary and a prolific volunteer contributor to that work see SIMON WINCHESTER, THE PROFESSOR AND THE MADMAN (1998).
112. BRYSON, supra note 47, at 158. For an intriguing tale of the relationship and correspondence between a chief editor of the Oxford English Dictionary and a prolific volunteer contributor to that work see SIMON WINCHESTER, THE PROFESSOR AND THE MADMAN (1998).
113. See BRYSON, supra note 47, at 159-60.
114. See id. at 160.
115. See Aprill, supra note 35, at 286 ("Commercial dictionaries build on the work of their predecessors"); see also id. at 286-92 (discussing sources of definitions in general usage dictionaries).
116. See David Mellinkoff, The Myth of Precision and the Law Dictionary, 31 UCLA L. REV. 423, 426 (1983).
117. See id. at 426.
118. See id. at 426-27.
119. See id. at 427. Legal terms were first added to general English dictionaries in the first part of the seventeenth century. See FRIEND, supra note 46, at 26.
120. See Mellinkoff, supra note 89, at 427.
121. See id. 95. See id. at 427-28.
122. See id. at 428.
123. See id.
124. See id.
125. Id. at 429.
126. Id. 101. T. CUNNINGHAM, A NEW AND COMPLETE LAW-DICTIONARY (2 vols., London 1764-1765).
127. See Mellinkoff, supra note 89, at 429. This brief history of English law dictionaries is not comprehensive. For a more comprehensive discussion see, for example, 1 BOUVIER, Preface to A LAW DICTIONARY ADAPTED TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, AND THE SEVERAL STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION (1839) [hereinafter 1 BOUVIER].
128. See Mellinkoff, supra note 89, at 429. This brief history of English law dictionaries is not comprehensive. For a more comprehensive discussion see, for example, 1 BOUVIER, Preface to A LAW DICTIONARY ADAPTED TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, AND THE SEVERAL STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION (1839) [hereinafter 1 BOUVIER].
129. See Mellinkoff, supra note 89, at 429.
130. See id. at 430, 442 n.27.
131. 1 BOUVIER, supra note 102, at v.
132. Id. 107. Id. at v-vi.
133. See Mellinkoff, supra note 89, at 434.
134. See Preface to BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY at vi (2d ed. 1910).
135. See id. at v (referring to "maxims used in American and English law . . . necessary to be understood by . . . the student of . . . comparative jurisprudence").
136. See id. at vi.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. See Aprill, supra note 35, at 307-10 (providing a discussion of the publication process of Black's Law Dictionary); see also id. at 307 ("Only when a new edition of Black's Law Dictionary is to be prepared does the staff at West Publishing Company undertake new research").
140. See, e.g., BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1969); CYCLOPEDIC LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1940).
141. See, e.g., BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1969); CYCLOPEDIC LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1940).
142. See Mellinkoff, supra note 89, at 434.
143. See id.
144. See generally THE NEW GROVE DICTIONARY OF MUSIC & MUSICIANS (Stanley Sadie ed., 1980).
145. See generally ENCYCLOPEDIC DICTIONARY OF RELIGION (1979).
146. See generally ENCYCLOPAEDIC DICTIONARY OF PHOTOGRAPHY (1896).
147. See generally A DICTIONARY FOR ACCOUNTANTS (1952).
148. See generally THE CAR-BUILDER'S DICTIONARY (1879).
149. Sometimes such dictionaries are referred to as "normative." See SIDNEY I. LANDAU, DICTIONARIES THE ART AND CRAFT OF LEXICOGRAPHY 205 (1984).
150. Webster's Way Out Dictionary, BUS. WK., Sept. 16, 1961, at 89 (emphasis added), reprinted in DICTIONARIES AND THAT DICTIONARY 57 (James Sledd & Wilma R. Ebbitt eds., 1962).
151. Webster's Way Out Dictionary, BUS. WK., Sept. 16, 1961, at 89 (emphasis added), reprinted in DICTIONARIES AND THAT DICTIONARY 57 (James Sledd & Wilma R. Ebbitt eds., 1962).
152. LANDAU, supra note 123, at 204-05.
153. Webster's Way Out Dictionary, supra note 124, at 57 (stating that this dictionary was based on "theories" of "a new science, linguistics").
154. See LANDAU, supra note 123, at 205, 207.
155. Norman E. Isaacs, And Now, the War on Words, THE LOUISVILLE TIMES, Oct. 18, 1961, reprinted in DICTIONARIES AND THAT DICTIONARY 79 (James Sledd & Wilma R. Ebbitt eds., 1962). Distinct from this controversy surrounding general dictionaries, modern law dictionaries have been described as painfully descriptive. Indeed, law dictionaries have been criticized as "empty[ing] a bagful of definitions, without any suggestion that one definition is more equal than any other." Mellinkoff, supra note 89, at 436.
156. Norman E. Isaacs, And Now, the War on Words, THE LOUISVILLE TIMES, Oct. 18, 1961, reprinted in DICTIONARIES AND THAT DICTIONARY 79 (James Sledd & Wilma R. Ebbitt eds., 1962). Distinct from this controversy surrounding general dictionaries, modern law dictionaries have been described as painfully descriptive. Indeed, law dictionaries have been criticized as "empty[ing] a bagful of definitions, without any suggestion that one definition is more equal than any other." Mellinkoff, supra note 89, at 436.
157. Norman E. Isaacs, And Now, the War on Words, THE LOUISVILLE TIMES, Oct. 18, 1961, reprinted in DICTIONARIES AND THAT DICTIONARY 79 (James Sledd & Wilma R. Ebbitt eds., 1962). Distinct from this controversy surrounding general dictionaries, modern law dictionaries have been described as painfully descriptive. Indeed, law dictionaries have been criticized as "empty[ing] a bagful of definitions, without any suggestion that one definition is more equal than any other." Mellinkoff, supra note 89, at 436.
158. Webster's New Word Book, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1961, reprinted in DICTIONARIES AND THAT DICTIONARY 78 (James Sledd & Wilma R. Ebbitt eds., 1962).
159. Webster's New Word Book, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1961, reprinted in DICTIONARIES AND THAT DICTIONARY 78 (James Sledd & Wilma R. Ebbitt eds., 1962).
160. Id.
161. See DICTIONARIES AND THAT DICTIONARY (James Sledd & Wilma R. Ebbitt eds., 1962). "That Dictionary," of course, was Webster's Third. This book contains more than 60 reviews and critiques of Webster's Third. See id.
162. RONALD A. WELLS, DICTIONARIES AND THE AUTHORITARIAN TRADITION A STUDY IN ENGLISH USAGE AND LEXICOGRAPHY 74-86 (1973).
163. In MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. American Tel. and Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218, 227-28 (1994), Justice Scalia disregarded a definition of "modify" from Webster's Third in interpreting a statute. He noted that the dictionary definition was out of step with other dictionaries and noted that upon publication Webster's Third "was widely criticized for its portrayal of common error as proper usage." Id. at 228 n.3 (citing Wilson Follett, Sabotage in Springfield, 209 ATLANTIC 73 (Jan. 1962); Jacques Barzun, What Is a Dictionary?, 32 THE AMERICAN SCHOLAR 176, 181 (Spring 1963); Dwight Macdonald, The String Untuned, 38 THE NEW YORKER 130, 156-57 (Mar. 1962)).
164. In MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. American Tel. and Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218, 227-28 (1994), Justice Scalia disregarded a definition of "modify" from Webster's Third in interpreting a statute. He noted that the dictionary definition was out of step with other dictionaries and noted that upon publication Webster's Third "was widely criticized for its portrayal of common error as proper usage." Id. at 228 n.3 (citing Wilson Follett, Sabotage in Springfield, 209 ATLANTIC 73 (Jan. 1962); Jacques Barzun, What Is a Dictionary?, 32 THE AMERICAN SCHOLAR 176, 181 (Spring 1963); Dwight Macdonald, The String Untuned, 38 THE NEW YORKER 130, 156-57 (Mar. 1962)).
165. In MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. American Tel. and Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218, 227-28 (1994), Justice Scalia disregarded a definition of "modify" from Webster's Third in interpreting a statute. He noted that the dictionary definition was out of step with other dictionaries and noted that upon publication Webster's Third "was widely criticized for its portrayal of common error as proper usage." Id. at 228 n.3 (citing Wilson Follett, Sabotage in Springfield, 209 ATLANTIC 73 (Jan. 1962); Jacques Barzun, What Is a Dictionary?, 32 THE AMERICAN SCHOLAR 176, 181 (Spring 1963); Dwight Macdonald, The String Untuned, 38 THE NEW YORKER 130, 156-57 (Mar. 1962)).
166. In MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. American Tel. and Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218, 227-28 (1994), Justice Scalia disregarded a definition of "modify" from Webster's Third in interpreting a statute. He noted that the dictionary definition was out of step with other dictionaries and noted that upon publication Webster's Third "was widely criticized for its portrayal of common error as proper usage." Id. at 228 n.3 (citing Wilson Follett, Sabotage in Springfield, 209 ATLANTIC 73 (Jan. 1962); Jacques Barzun, What Is a Dictionary?, 32 THE AMERICAN SCHOLAR 176, 181 (Spring 1963); Dwight Macdonald, The String Untuned, 38 THE NEW YORKER 130, 156-57 (Mar. 1962)).
167. In MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. American Tel. and Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218, 227-28 (1994), Justice Scalia disregarded a definition of "modify" from Webster's Third in interpreting a statute. He noted that the dictionary definition was out of step with other dictionaries and noted that upon publication Webster's Third "was widely criticized for its portrayal of common error as proper usage." Id. at 228 n.3 (citing Wilson Follett, Sabotage in Springfield, 209 ATLANTIC 73 (Jan. 1962); Jacques Barzun, What Is a Dictionary?, 32 THE AMERICAN SCHOLAR 176, 181 (Spring 1963); Dwight Macdonald, The String Untuned, 38 THE NEW YORKER 130, 156-57 (Mar. 1962)).
168. See generally Aprill, supra note 35, at 283-85.
169. Id. at 287; see also id. at 292.
170. See generally id. at 293-97.
171. Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 234 (1951) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
172. 28 U.S. 222 (1830).
173. Id. at 230.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. 48 U.S. 283 (1849).
177. See id. at 392-94.
178. See id. at 393 (opinion of McLean, J.); id. at 410 (opinion of Wayne, J.); id. at 452 (opinion of Catron, J.); id. (Grier, J., concurring with opinion of Catron, J.); id. at 452-55 (opinion of McKinley, J.).
179. See id. at 500-01 (Daniel, J., dissenting).
180. Id. at 501 n.1 (Daniel, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
181. See id.
182. See Insurance Cos. v. Wright, 68 U.S. 456 (1863). This decision represented the second time that the Court had considered this case. See id. at 459 (citing to The Orient Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wright, 64 U.S. 401 (1859)). The 1859 opinion contained no citation to a dictionary. See The Orient Mutual Ins. Co. v. Wright, 64 U.S. 401 (1859).
183. Insurance Cos., 68 U.S. at 457.
184. Id. at 457-58.
185. Id. at 472-73.
186. Id. at 473.
187. Id. at 473.
188. Id. at 476.
189. See Weis, supra note 4, at 963.
190. 91 U.S. 37 (1875).
191. Id. at 42.
192. Id. at 42. The specific issue decided in Brown was whether an injunction should have been issued to prevent the infringement of a patent for a device used to freeze fish. Id. at 38. The quoted language appeared in the midst of a discussion of the state of the art of artificial freezing, a discussion that was made necessary because the pleadings and filings were "silent as to the ice-cream freezer." Id. at 43. The Court apparently took judicial notice "that Lord Bacon applied snow to poultry to preserve it. He said the process succeeded 'excellently well.' The experiment was made in his old age, imprudently, and brought on his last illness." Id. at 44. In the end, the Court found that the patent relied upon by plaintiff was invalid and thus remanded the case and directed the lower court to dismiss the claim. Id. 159. 116 U.S. 11 (1885).
193. Id. at 12.
194. Id. 162. 149 U.S. 304 (1893).
195. Id. at 306.
196. Id. at 306-07 (citing authority). Nix decided whether, for purposes of a tariff provision, tomatoes were fruits or vegetables. Id. at 306. After acknowledging a controversy over the issue, the Court ultimately found that tomatoes were vegetables. Id. at 307. Although discussed as a seminal dictionary case and representing a refinement in the dictionary citation rules, see Weis, supra note 4, at 963-66, the Nix opinion does not cite to any specific dictionary, Nix, 149 U.S. at 306-07. The parties in Nix, however, cited to a variety of dictionaries to define a variety of terms. Id. at 305-06.
197. 249 U.S. 130 (1919).
198. Id. at 130.
199. Id. at 132-33 (citing cases).
200. At present, the Federal Rules of Evidence provide that "the only evidence rule on the subject of judicial notice . . . deals only with judicial notice of 'adjudicative' facts. No rule deals with judicial notice of 'legislative facts.'" Fed. R. Evid. 201(a) advisory committee's note. Under this analysis, courts may use dictionaries to determine "the facts of the case," not facts relevant "to legal reasoning and the lawmaking process, whether in the formulation of a legal principle or in the enactment of a legislative body." Id. (citing KENNETH CULP DAVIS, A SYSTEM OF JUDICIAL NOTICE BASED ON FAIRNESS AND CONVENIENCE IN PERSPECTIVES OF LAW 69, 73 (1964)).
201. See Pacific Ins. Co. v. Soule, 74 U.S. 433, 445 & n.18 (1868) (defining "duty"); Gordon v. United States, 74 U.S. 188, 194 & n.7 (1868) (defining "arbitrator"); Christmas v. Russell, 72 U.S. 290, 300 & n.12 (1866) (defining "limitation"); Ex Parte Garland, 71 U.S. 333, 387, 392-93 (1866) (Miller, J., dissenting) (defining "attainder" and "punish"); Bank for Sav. v. Collector, 70 U.S. 495, 512-13 & nn.7, 8 (1865) (defining "banks of deposit" and "banks for savings"); Steamship Co. v. Joliffe, 69 U.S. 450, 461-62 & n.12 (1864) (defining "pilots"); Insurance Cos. v. Wright, 68 U.S. 456, 473 & n.13 (defining "rating").
202. See Arthur v. Moller, 97 U.S. 365, 367-68 (1878) (defining "lithograph" and "to print"); Schumacher v. Cornell, 96 U.S. 549, 554 (1877) (defining "wrench"); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 721 (1877) (defining "editor"), overruled in part by Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977); Inman S.S. Co. v. Tinker, 94 U.S. 238, 243 (1876) (defining "tonnage"); Decatur Bank v. St. Louis Bank, 88 U.S. 294, 299 n.2 (1874) (defining "cattle"); Loan Ass'n v. Topeka, 87 U.S. 655, 664 (1874) (defining "tax"); Case of the Sewing Mach. Cos., 85 U.S. 553, 585 n.28 (1873) (defining "suit"); Lapeyre v. United States, 84 U.S. 191, 195 n.8 & 195-96 n.9 (1872) (defining "proclamation"); Oulton v. Savings Inst., 84 U.S. 109, 118-19 n.14 (1872) (defining "banks"); Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. 457, 584, 601 n.150 (1870) (Chase, C.J., dissenting) (defining "coining," "money and "pound troy").
203. See Town of Enfield v. Jordan, 119 U.S. 680, 684-85 (1887) (defining "town" and "village"); Ferguson v. Arthur, 117 U.S. 482, 487 (1886) (defining "proprietary" and "proprietor"); Marvel v. Merritt, 116 U.S. 11, 12 (1885) (defining "mine," "mineral" and "ore"); Cooper Mfg. Co. v. Ferguson, 113 U.S. 727, 734-35 (1885) (defining "to carry on"); Cochrane v. Badische Anilin & Soda Fabrik, 111 U.S. 293, 299 (1884) (defining "alizarin"); Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221, 227 (1883) (defining "ex post facto"), overruled by Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37 (1990); Railroad Co. v. Mississippi, 102 U.S. 135, 143-44 (1880) (Miller, J., dissenting) (defining "suit").
204. See Keck v. United States, 172 U.S. 434, 461-62 (1899) (Brown, J., dissenting) (defining "smuggler," "smugglers, "smuggling," and "to smuggle"); United States v. Klumpp, 169 U.S. 209, 212 (1898) (defining "worsted"); United States v. Laws, 163 U.S. 258, 266 (1896) (defining "profession"); Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169, 186 (1896) (defining "abandonment"); Reagan v. United States, 157 U.S. 301, 303 (1895) (defining "felony"); Cochran v. United States, 157 U.S. 286, 296 (1895) (defining "liable"); Seeberger v. Wright & Lawther Oil & Lead Mfg. Co., 157 U.S. 183, 185 (1895) (defining "draft" and "draught"); Emert v. Missouri, 156 U.S. 296, 306 (1895) (defining "hawkers"); Ernhardt v. Steinhardt, 153 U.S. 177, 182 (1894) (defining "absinthe"); The Britannia, 153 U.S. 130, 148 (1894) (Brown, J., dissenting) (defining "course"); Bogle v. Magone, 152 U.S. 623, 626 (1894) (defining "sauce"); Sarlls v. United States, 152 U.S. 570, 572 (1894) (defining "ardent spirits," "malt liquor," "spirituous" and "spirituous liquors"); The Main v. Williams, 152 U.S. 122, 130 (1894) (defining "freight); United States v. Rodgers, 150 U.S. 249, 270 (1893) (Gray, J., dissenting) (defining "high seas"); Magone v. Heller, 150 U.S. 70, 74 (1893) (defining "expressly"); United States v. Patterson, 150 U.S. 65, 68 (1893) (defining "hearing"); Hollender v. Magone, 149 U.S. 586, 588-89 (1893) (defining "liquors"); Horner v. United States, 147 U.S. 449, 458-59 (1893) (defining "lottery").
205. See Wilder v. Inter-Island Steam Navigation Co., 211 U.S. 239, 246 (1908) (defining "arrestment"); American Tobacco Co. v. Werckmeister, 207 U.S. 284, 290-91 (1907) (defining "copyright"); Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1, 7 (1906) (defining "slavery," "slave" and "servitude"); Burton v. United States, 202 U.S. 344, 371 (1906) (defining "interested"); id. at 396 (Brewer, J., dissenting) (defining "interest"); Vicksburg v. Vicksburg Waterworks Co., 202 U.S. 453, 470-71 (1906) (defining "exclusive"); Serralles v. Esbri, 200 U.S.
206. See Chelentis v. Luckenback S.S. Co., 247 U.S. 372, 384 (1918) (defining "right" and "remedy"); Lamar v. United States, 241 U.S. 103, 113 (1916) (defining "legislative officer," "legislative officers," "office" and "officer"); Mallinckrodt Chemical Workers v. Missouri ex rel. Jones, 238 U.S. 41, 53 (1915) (defining "trust"); Rocca v. Thompson, 223 U.S. 317, 329 (1912) (defining "intervene"); Baglin v. Cusenier Co., 221 U.S. 580, 598 (1911) (defining "abandonment"); Montello Salt Co. v. Utah, 221 U.S. 452, 464-65 (1911) (defining "include"); Standard Paint Co. v. Trinidad Asphalt Mfg. Co., 220 U.S. 446, 454-55 (1911) (defining "rubberoid" and "oid"); Toxaway Hotel Co. v. J.L. Smathers & Co., 216 U.S. 439, 448 (1910) (defining "mercantile").
207. See John P. King Mfg. Co. v. City Council of Augusta, 277 U.S. 100, 102-03 (1928) (defining "statute"); Deal v. United States, 274 U.S. 277, 283 (1927) (defining "depredation" and "robbery"); O'Hara v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 269 U.S. 364, 371 (1926) (defining "watch"); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 665 (1925) (defining "advocacy"); Banco Mexicano de Commercio e Industria v. Deutsche Bank, 263 U.S. 591, 601 (1924) (defining "with reference to"); United States v. Merriam, 263 U.S. 179, 184 (1923) (defining "legacy") (quoting Orton v. Orton, 42 N.Y. 486 (1867)); United States v. Bhagat Singh Thind, 261 U.S. 204, 211 & n.1 (1923) (defining "caucasian"); Rhode Island v. Palmer, 253 U.S. 350, 396-97 n.2, 398 (1920) (McKenna, J., dissenting) (defining "concurrent" and "concurrent jurisdiction"); Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 206-07 (1920) (defining "income"); Ash Sheep Co. v. United States, 252 U.S. 159, 169 (1920) (defining "cattle")
208. See Honolulu Oil Corp. v. Halliburton, 306 U.S. 550, 552 & n.4 (1939) (defining "packer"); Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 454-55 & n.3 (1939) (defining "gang"); Washingtonian Publ'g Co. v. Pearson, 306 U.S. 30, 47 & n.10-11 (1939) (Black, J., dissenting) (defining "condition precedent" and "condition subsequent"); Polk Co. v. Glover, 305 U.S. 5, 17 & n.13 (1938) (Black, J., dissenting) (defining "arbitrary," "capricious," "harsh," "unjust" and "unreasonable"); Coverdale v. Arkansas-Louisiana Pipe Line Co., 303 U.S. 604, 607 n.1 (1938) (defining "prime mover"); New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery, 303 U.S. 552, 564 n.1 (1938) (McReynolds, J., dissenting) (defining "dispute"); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co v. Coughran, 303 U.S. 485, 491 (1938) (defining "operate"); United States v. Wurts, 303 U.S. 414, 417 (1938) (defining "refund"); United States v. Raynor, 302 U.S. 540, 549 n.14 (1938) (defining "counterfeit"); Smyth v. United States, 302 U.S. 329, 365 n.1 (1937) (McReynolds, J., dissenting) (defining "redeem"); White v. Aronson, 302 U.S. 16, 17 nn.2, 3 (1937) (defining "game" and "puzzle"); Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 301 U.S. 379, 383 n.3 (1937) (defining "pursuant to"); United States v. Giles, 300 U.S. 41, 48 (1937) (defining "make"); Paramount Publix Corp. v. American Tri-Ergon Corp., 294 U.S. 464, 471 & n.1 (1935) (defining "combination printing"); United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 186 & n.6 (1933) (defining "monopoly"); McCaughn v. Hershey Chocolate Co., 283 U.S. 488, 491 (1931) (defining "candy"); American Fruit Growers Inc. v. Brogdex Co., 283 U.S. 1, 11 (1931) (defining "manufacture").
209. See Spiegel's Estate v. Commissioner, 335 U.S. 701, 729 n.12 (1949) (Burton, J., dissenting) (defining "intended"); Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 786 n.37 (1948) (defining "excessive"); Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1, 6 nn.14, 15 (1947) (defining "equity" and "property"); American Stevedores, Inc. v. Porello, 330 U.S. 446, 450 n.6 (1947) (defining "damage" and "damages"); Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Agnew, 329 U.S. 441, 446 (1947) (defining "primarily"); United States v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230, 243-44 n.14 (1947) (defining "arbitrary" and "capricious"); Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14, 17 nn.3, 4 (1946) (defining "debauchery" and "prostitution"); Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp., 328 U.S. 275, 286 n.10, 287 n.11 (1946) (defining "discharge" and "lay-off); Roland Elec. Co. v. Walling, 326 U.S. 657, 673 (1946) (defining "retail"); Keegan v. United States, 325 U.S. 478, 501-02 n.1 (1945) (Stone, C.J., dissenting) (defining "evade"); United States v. Beach, 324 U.S. 193, 197 n.2 (1945) (Murphy, J., dissenting) (defining "white slave"); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Lenroot, 323 U.S. 490, 512 (1945) (Murphy, J., dissenting) (defining "ship"); Tennessee Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590, 598 n.11 (1944) (defining "employ" and "work"); Stewart v. United States, 316 U.S. 354, 362 n.6 (1942) (defining "islands"); Exhibit Supply Co. v. Ace Patents Corp., 315 U.S. 126, 134 (1942) (defining "embed"); Helvering v. Hammel, 311 U.S. 504, 507 (1941) (defining "sale"); Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Duncan, 311 U.S. 243, 251 n.10 (1940) (defining "alternative").
210. See Beilan v. Board of Public Educ., 357 U.S. 399, 407 (1958) (construing "incompetency") (quoting Horosko v. Mt. Pleasant Sch. Dist., 6 A.2d 866, 868, 869-70 (1939)); Colony, Inc. v. Commissioner, 357 U.S. 28, 32 (1958) (construing "omit"); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487 n.20 (1957) (construing "pruriency" and "prurient"); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 305-07 & n.7 (1957) (construing "organize); United States v. Turley, 352 U.S. 407, 411-13 & n.8 (1957) (construing "steal," "stolen" and "theft"); Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 453 n.* (1956) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (construing "traîner sur la claie"); Shields v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co., 350 U.S. 318, 326 n.2 (1956) (Reed, J., dissenting) (construing "running board"); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 520 n.28, 524 nn.43-44, 525 nn.45-47, 526 n.48, 527 n.49, 534, 535-39 & app. (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in judgment) (construing "blasphemy," "blasphemer," "sacrilege," "sacrilegious," "profane," "prophaneness" and "to profane"); Palmer v. Ashe, 342 U.S. 134, 140 n.* (1952) (Minton, J., dissenting) (construing "imbecile"); Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 234 n.7 (1951) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (construing "moral turpitude" and "turpitude"); Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 778 n.10 (1950) (construing "habeas corpus").
211. See Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 348 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting) (defining "garnishment"); Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298, 306 n.7 (1969) (defining "entertainment); United States v. An Article of Drug . . . Bacto-Unidisk . . ., 394 U.S. 784, 800 n.20 (1969) (defining "drug"); United States v. Donruss Co., 393 U.S. 297, 311 n.2 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (defining "intention"); Cheng Fan Kwok v. INS, 392 U.S. 206, 218 n.* (1968) (White, J., dissenting) (defining "pursuant"); United States v. Cook, 384 U.S. 257, 261 n.5 (1966) (defining "firm"); United States v. Standard Oil Co., 384 U.S. 224, 234 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (defining "refuse matter"); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 174 & n.2 (1965) (defining "supreme being" and "theism"); Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 297 n.17 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (defining "victualling house"); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 371 n.9 (1964) (defining "institution"); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 193 n.9 (1964) (Brennan, J., judgment and plurality opinion) (defining "community"); Manual Enters., Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 483 n.4 (1962) (Harlan, J., judgment and plurality opinion) (defining "filthy," "indecent," "lewd," "obscene" and "vile"); Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 892 n.6 (1961) (defining "tradesman"); Jarecki v. G.D. Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303, 308 n.3 (1961) (defining "discovers" and "invents"); Massey Motors, Inc. v. United States, 364 U.S. 92, 106 n.7 (1960) (defining "salvage value" and "useful life"); United States v. Mersky, 361 U.S. 431, 445 (1960) (Frankfurter, dissenting) (defining "statute").
212. See P.C. Pfeiffer Co. v. Ford, 444 U.S. 69, 77 n.7 (1979) (defining "including"); Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 517, 521 n.11 (1979) (defining "presume" and "intent"); Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 338 (1979) (defining "property"); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 581 n.9 (1979) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (defining "prison"); Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 442 (1979) (defining "mobilia sequuntur personum"); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 432 n.9 (1979) (defining "unequivocal"); Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 240 n.2 (1979) (defining "covert"); Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 199 n.1 (1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (defining "malice"); National Muffler Dealers Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 480 n.10 (1979) (defining "board of trade" and "chamber of commerce"); Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 211 (1979) (defining "insurance"); Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 402 (1979) (White, J., dissenting) (defining "potential"); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 740 n.14 (1978) (defining "indecent"); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry, 438 U.S. 531, 541 n.11 (1978) (defining "boycott"); NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 243 n.* (1978) (Stevens, J., concurring) (defining "interference"); Andrus v. Charlestone Stone Prods. Co., 436 U.S. 604, 610 (1978) (defining "minerals") (quoting Northern Pacific Ry. v. Soderberg, 188 U.S. 526, 530 (1903)); California v. Southland Royalty Co., 436 U.S. 519, 527 (1978) (defining "dedicate"); United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 629-30 n.5 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (defining "envelope"); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 657 n.9 (1977) (defining "hematoma"); Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363, 380 n.8 (1977) (defining "common law") (quoting Western Union Tel. Co. v. Call Publ'g Co., 181 U.S. 92, 102 (1901)); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 nn.20 & 21 (1975) (defining "contrivance," "contrive," "device" and "manipulate"); Alamo Land & Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 424 U.S. 295, 312 (1975) (White, J., dissenting) (defining "encumbrance"); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 438 n.3 (1975) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (defining "nunnery"); Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256, 273 n.8 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (defining "commutation" and "pardon"); Old Dominion Branch No. 496 v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 283 (1974) (defining "scab"); Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 201 & n.21 (1974) (defining "working conditions"); Huddleston v. United States, 415 U.S. 814, 820 (1974) (defining "acquire"); Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 132 (1974) (defining "opprobrious") (quoting Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 525 (1972)); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 20 n.2 (1973) (defining "obscene" and "pornography"); BPOE Lodge No. 2043 v. Ingraham, 411 U.S. 924, 926 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting from dismissal for lack of substantial federal question) (defining "ethnic"); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 132 & n.20, 159, 160 & n.59 (1973) (defining "quickening," "embryo," "fetus" and "viable"); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 112 n.16 (1972) (defining "diversion"); Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345, 349 n.7 (1972) (defining "magistrate"); Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Auth. v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 405 U.S. 707, 710 n.1 (1972) (defining "emplane"); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 525 (1972) (defining "abusive" and "opprobrious"); McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 571 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in judgment) (defining "peer"); United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62, 72 (1971) (defining "health"); Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 351-52 & n.5 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in result) (defining "religion"); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 182 (1970) (Douglas, J., dissenting in part) (defining "of"); id. at 211 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (defining "color").
213. See John Doe Agency v. John Doe Corp., 493 U.S. 146, 153 (1989) (defining "compilation"); Breininger v. Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n Local Union No. 6, 493 U.S. 67, 97 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (defining "discipline"); County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 648-49 & n.5 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (defining "religion" and "respect"); Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 515 n.13 (1989) (Rehnquist, C.J., judgment and plurality opinion) (defining "necessary"); Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 265 nn.6 & 7, 268 n.10 (1989) (defining "fines for offenses" and "damages"); id. at 297 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (defining "damages" and "fine"); H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 238 (1989) (defining "pattern"); Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 810 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (defining "tonality"); Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 69 n.9 (1989) (defining "body politic" and "public corporation"); id. at 78-80 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (defining "bodies politic and corporate," "body politic," "body politic or corporate" and "corporation sole"); Sullivan v. Hudson, 490 U.S. 877, 894 (1989) (White, J., dissenting) (defining "civil action"); Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council, 490 U.S. 360, 366 n.6 (1989) (defining "salmonid"); Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 490 U.S. 122, 128 (1989) (defining "irregularity"); Mallard v. United States Dist. Ct. for the S. Dist. of Iowa, 490 U.S. 296, 301 (1989) (defining "request"); Department of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press, 489 U.S. 749, 763-64 n.16 (1989) (defining "private"); Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 163-64 (1988) (defining "finding of fact"); Pittston Coal Group v. Sebben, 488 U.S. 105, 113 (defining "criteria"); id. at 134 n.7 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (defining "criterion"); United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 962-63 & n.9 (1988) (Brennan, J., concurring) (defining "servitude"); Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 913-14 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (defining "damages"); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 719 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (defining "inferiour"); Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 564 (1988) (defining "substantial"); id. at 576, 577 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)) (defining "substantial" and "reasonable"); Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 482 (1988) (defining "picketing"); Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 221 n.2 (1988) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (defining "witness"); Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 700 (1988) (defining "service of process"); McCoy v. Wisconsin Court of Appeals, 486 U.S. 429, 450 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (defining "amicus curiae"); K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 298-99 (1988) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (defining "owner" and "ownership"); id. at 324 n.2 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (defining "oven"); McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co., 486 U.S. 128, 137 (1988) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (defining "willful"); EEOC v. Commercial Office Prods. Co., 486 U.S. 107, 115 (1988) (defining "terminate" and "termination"); Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 786 (1988) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment) (defining "material"); Regents of Univ. of California v. Public Employment Relations Bd., 485 U.S. 589, 598 (1988) (defining "compensation"); id. at 610 & n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (defining "good will"); Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 468 n.4 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (defining "prohibit"); K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 485 U.S. 176, 184 (1988) (defining "embargo"); id. at 192 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (defining "embargo"); Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 54-55 (1988) (defining "caricature"); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 476-77 n.6 (1988) (defining "tidelands"); Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 334-35 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (defining "likely" and "or"); McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 370-71 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (defining "defraud"); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 598-99 (1987) (Powell, J., concurring) (defining "creation" and "evolution"); City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 479
214. 182. See Clinton v. City of New York, 118 S. Ct. 2091, 2098 n.13 (1998) (defining "person"); National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 118 S. Ct. 2168, 2180-81 (1998) (Scalia, J. concurring) (defining "ensure"); id. at 2189 (Souter, J., dissenting) (defining "consider," "consideration" and "take into consideration"); Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196, 2215 (U.S. 1998) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (defining "major"); United States v. Bajakajian, 118 S. Ct. 2028, 2034, 2036 & n.9, 2037 (1998) (defining "remedial action," "instrumentality" and "excessive"); Pennsylvania Dep't of Corrections v. Yeskey, 118 S. Ct. 1952, 1955 (1998) (defining "eligible" and "participate"); Muscarello v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 1911, 1914, 1915 (1998) (defining "carry" and "carry arms or weapons"); id. at 1921 nn.2, 5 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (defining "carry," "carry arms or weapons" and "carries a firearm"); United States v. Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct. 1876, 1887 (1998) (defining "operate"); AVCO Corp. v. United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers, 118 S. Ct. 1626, 1629 (1998) (Scalia, J., opinion of the Court) (defining "for"); Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal, 118 S. Ct. 1618, 1624 (1998) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (defining "application" and "present"); Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 118 S. Ct. 1279, 1288 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring) (defining "court"); Cohen v. De la Cruz, 118 S. Ct. 1212, 1217 (1998) (defining "debt for"); Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 118 S. Ct. 974, 977 n.7 (1998) (defining "willful"); Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 118 S. Ct. 818, 823 (1998) (defining "doubt" and "objective"); Brogan v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 805, 808 (1998) (defining "no"); Foster v. Love, 118 S. Ct. 464, 467 (1997) (defining "election"); City of Boerne v. P.F. Flores, 117 S. Ct 2157, 2173, 2174 n.1 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring in part) (defining "peace" and "licentious"); McMillian v. Monroe County, Alabama, 520 U.S. 781, 794 (1997) (defining "sheriff"); United States v. LaBonte, 520 U.S. 751, 757 (1997) (defining "maximum"); Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 637-38 & n. 20 (1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (defining "impost" and "duty"); Commissioner v. Estate of Hubert, 520 U.S. 93, 118 (1997) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (defining "substantial"); id. at 128 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (defining "material"); United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 5 (1997) (defining "any"); Dunn v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 519 U.S. 465, 470 (1997) (Souter, J., dissenting) (defining "in"); Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (defining "subject to"); Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 342 (1997) (defining "employed"); Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc. v. Department of Labor, 519 U.S. 248, 255 (1997) (defining "entitle"); Walters v. Metropolitan Educ. Enters., Inc., 519 U.S. 202, 207 (1997) (defining "have"); O'Gilvie v. United States, 519 U.S. 79, 83 (1996) (defining "on account of"); Melendez v. United States, 518 U.S. 120, 126 & n.4 (1996) (defining "motion"); Smiley v. Citibank, 517 U.S. 735, 745 (1996) (defining "interest" and "rate"); Henderson v. United States, 517 U.S. 654, 680 (1996) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (defining "forthwith"); 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 491 & n.4 (1996) (defining "temperance"); Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 516 U.S. 479, 485 (1996) (defining "imminent"); Morse v. Republican Party of Virginia, 517 U.S. 186, 254 (1996) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (defining "state"); Barnett Bank of Marion County v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 38 (1996) (defining "specifically"); Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 529 (1996) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (defining "administer"); Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca, 516 U.S. 124, 133 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (defining "equitable"); Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325, 337 (1996) (defining "price/earnings ratio"); NLRB v. Town & Country Elec., Inc., 516 U.S. 85, 90 (1995) (defining "employee"); Rutledge v. United States, 517 U.S. 292, 299 n.10 (1996) (defining "concert"); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 836 (1995) (defining "promote" and "manifest"); id. at 872 n.1 (Souter, J., dissenting) (defining "seminary"); Capitol Square Rev. & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 763 (1995)
215. 28 U.S. 222, 230 (1830).
216. 48 U.S. 283, 501 n.* (1849) (Daniel, J., dissenting).
217. See THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES ITS BEGINNINGS & ITS JUSTICES 1790-1991, at 78 (1991) [hereinafter THE SUPREME COURT: ITS BEGINNINGS].
218. See THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES ITS BEGINNINGS & ITS JUSTICES 1790-1991, at 78 (1991) [hereinafter THE SUPREME COURT: ITS BEGINNINGS].
219. See id. at 104.
220. 68 U.S. 456, 473 n.13 (1863).
221. See Kring v. State, 107 U.S. 221, 227 (1883) (defining "ex post facto"); Railroad Co. v. Mississippi, 102 U.S. 135, 143-44 (1880) (Miller, J., dissenting) (defining "suit"); Loan Ass'n v. Topeka, 87 U.S. 655, 664 (1874) (defining "tax"); Ex Parte Garland, 71 U.S. 33, 387, 392-93 (1866) (Miller, J., dissenting) (defining "attainder" and "punish").
222. See THE SUPREME COURT: ITS BEGINNINGS, supra note 185, at 120.
223. See generally infra Appendix B (chronicling individual Justices' dictionary usage).
224. See generally infra Appendix B.
225. See infra Appendix B.
226. See infra Appendix B.
227. See infra Appendix B.
228. See infra Appendix B.
229. See infra Appendix B.
230. See infra Appendix B. During his 26 years on the Court (first as an Associate and then as Chief Justice), Justice Rehnquist has cited the dictionary in 25 cases to define 33 terms, resulting in "frequency of dictionary usage rates" (hereinafter "frequency rates") of 0.96 cases per year and 1.27 terms per year. See infra Appendix B (discussing Justice and Chief Justice Rehnquist's dictionary usage).
231. See infra Appendix B. In his eleven years on the Court, Justice Kennedy has cited a dictionary in seven cases to define nine terms, resulting in frequency rates of 0.64 cases per year and 0.82 terms per year. See infra Appendix B (discussing Justice Kennedy's dictionary usage).
232. See infra Appendix B.
233. See infra Appendix B.
234. See infra Appendix B.
235. See infra Appendix C (chronicling the frequency with which the Court has used particular dictionaries). If editions of dictionaries were counted separately, the number would be much larger. At times it is unclear to which dictionary the Court is citing. For example, on several occasions the Court has cited to Webster's without stating to which of the many versions and editions it is citing. In other cases, the Justice authoring the decision did not indicate what dictionary was cited. See Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1045 (1983) (Rehnquist, J.) (plurality opinion) (defining "initiated" in "the ordinary dictionary sense"); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 442 (1980) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (defining "hideous" by citing "[t]he dictionary"); McCaughn v. Hershey Chocolate Co., 283 U.S. 488, 491 (1931) (noting alternative definitions of "candy . . . as the dictionary also suggests").
236. See infra Appendix C.
237. See infra Appendix C.
238. See infra Appendix C.
239. See infra Appendix C.
240. See infra Appendix C.
241. See infra Appendix C.
242. See infra Appendix C.
243. See infra Appendix C.
244. 350 U.S. 318 (1956).
245. Id. at 326 n.2 (quoting THE CAR-BUILDERS' CYCLOPEDIA (19th ed. 1953)).
246. 491 U.S. 781 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
247. Id. at at 810 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting THE NEW GROVE DICTIONARY OF MUSIC & MUSICIANS (S. Sadie ed., 1980)).
248. Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918) (Holmes, J.).
249. The fact that each step in this process can have a powerful influence on the outcome of a case may explain why courts do not allow jurors to consult dictionaries while they are deliberating. See, e.g., United States v. Aguirre, 108 F.3d 1284, 1288-90 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 335 (1997); Yannacopoulos v. General Dynamics Corp., 75 F.3d 1298, 1304 (8th Cir. 1996), reh'g denied; United States v. Gillespie, 61 F.3d 457, 459-60 (6th Cir. 1995); United States v. Kupau, 781 F.2d 740, 744-45 (9th Cir. 1986).
250. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (1994).
251. Compare United States v. Riascos-Suarez, 73 F.3d 616, 622 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that the defendant had "carried" a firearm because he had it within reach in the car), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 136 (1996), with United States v. Molina, 102 F.3d 928, 932 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that if defendant moves a car containing both guns and drugs, the "carrying" requirement is met regardless of whether the firearm was within the defendant's reach), and United States v. Miller, 84 F.3d 1244, 1260 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding that the defendant "carried" the firearm even though it was out of reach because he had dominion and control over it), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 443 (1996), overruled on other grounds, United States v. Holland, 116 F.3d 1353 (10th Cir. 1997). The Court recently resolved this issue, holding that "carries a firearm" applies "to a person who knowingly possesses and conveys firearms in a vehicle, including in the locked glove compartment or trunk of a car, which the person accompanies." Muscarello v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 1911, 1913-14 (1998). In Muscarello, both the majority and the dissent relied on dictionaries to support their conclusions. See id. at 1914-15 (defining "carry" and "carry arms or weapons"); id. at 1921 nn.2 & 5 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (defining "carry," "carry arms or weapons" and "carries a firearm").
252. 452 U.S. 161 (1981).
253. Id. at 166.
254. The Bennett Amendment to Title VII provides: It shall not be an unlawful employment practice under this subchapter for any employer to differentiate upon the basis of sex in determining the amount of the wages or compensation paid or to be paid to employees of such employer if such differentiation is authorized by the provisions of section 206(d) of title 29.
255. U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1994); see City of Los Angeles v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 711-12 & n.22 (1978) (noting that "[s]hortly before the enactment of Title VII in 1964, Senator Bennett proposed an amendment providing that a compensation differential based on sex would not be unlawful if it was authorized by [29 U.S.C. § 206(d), known as] the Equal Pay Act").
256. See Gunther, 452 U.S. at 167-68.
257. Id. at 168-69.
258. Id. at 169 (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 122 (5th ed. 1979)). The Court reinforced its interpretation by citing to WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY. See id. at 169 n.9 (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 147 (1976)).
259. Id. at 169 (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 122 (5th ed. 1979)). The Court reinforced its interpretation by citing to WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY. See id. at 169 n.9 (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 147 (1976)).
260. Id. at 169 (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 122 (5th ed. 1979)). The Court reinforced its interpretation by citing to WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY. See id. at 169 n.9 (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 147 (1976)).
261. See id. at 198 (Rehnqusit, J. dissenting).
262. See id. at 198 n.10 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 169 (4th ed. 1968)).
263. "Black's Law Dictionary 169 (4th ed. 1968) defines 'authorized' to mean 'to permit a thing to be done in the future.'" Id. at 198 n.10 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 169 (4th ed. 1968)). Justice Rehnquist's reliance on the dictionary seems more legitimate than the majority's because Rehnquist looked to a definition of the specific statutory term, whereas the majority looked to a different tense of the statutory term. Nevertheless, Justice Rehnquist, in making his argument, did not primarily rely on the dictionary, and he criticized the Court's heavy reliance upon the dictionary definition of the term. Noting that the Court relied too heavily upon the dictionary, Justice Rehnquist noted that "the Court should instead attempt to implement the legislative intent of Congress." Id. at 198 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
264. "Black's Law Dictionary 169 (4th ed. 1968) defines 'authorized' to mean 'to permit a thing to be done in the future.'" Id. at 198 n.10 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 169 (4th ed. 1968)). Justice Rehnquist's reliance on the dictionary seems more legitimate than the majority's because Rehnquist looked to a definition of the specific statutory term, whereas the majority looked to a different tense of the statutory term. Nevertheless, Justice Rehnquist, in making his argument, did not primarily rely on the dictionary, and he criticized the Court's heavy reliance upon the dictionary definition of the term. Noting that the Court relied too heavily upon the dictionary, Justice Rehnquist noted that "the Court should instead attempt to implement the legislative intent of Congress." Id. at 198 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
265. 478 U.S. 597 (1986).
266. See id. at 599-602.
267. Mississippi River Flood Control Act (Flood Control Act of 1928), 33 U.S.C. §§ 702a-702m, 704 (1994).
268. James, 478 U.S. at 604 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 702c (1994)).
269. Id. at 605, 612.
270. Id. at 605 n.6 (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 571 (1961); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 351 (5th ed. 1979)).
271. Id. at 605 n.6 (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 571 (1961); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 351 (5th ed. 1979)).
272. Id. at 606-12.
273. Id. at 615-16 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
274. Id. at 615 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing BOUVIER'S LAW DICTIONARY 749 (8th ed. 1914)).
275. Id. at 616 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
276. See, e.g., Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 178 (1993) and id. at 187-88 (Souter, J., dissenting) (containing disagreement between majority and dissenting opinions as to whether word "conduct" in RICO provision was used as a verb or as a noun).
277. WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 8a-10a (3d ed. unabr. 1965).
278. Id. at 12a, 14a. By comparison, the areas of "Girl Scouts," "Girl Guiding" and "Camp Fire Girls" each had one outside consultant as did "Mosses and Liverworts," "Pipe Organs" and "Rugs." Id. at 10a-14a.
279. See BOUVIER'S LAW DICTIONARY xiv-xxviii (Rawles 3d Rev. 1914) (listing 54 attorneys who, among others, assisted in editing the 1867 edition of Bouvier's Law Dictionary).
280. 496 U.S. 478 (1990).
281. Id. at 479-80.
282. Frederick Schauer, Statutory Construction and the Coordinating Function of Plain Meaning, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 231, 244.
283. See Sullivan, 496 U.S. at 482.
284. Id. at 496 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
285. 492 U.S. 257 (1989).
286. Id. at 262-63.
287. Id. at 274-76.
288. Id. at 265 & n.6 (citing 1 E. COKE, INSTITUTES 126b (1812); T. CUNNINGHAM, A NEW AND COMPLETE LAW-DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1771) (nonpaginated); T. TOMLINS, LAW DICTIONARY 796-99 (1836); J. BOUVIER, LAW DICTIONARY 525 (4th ed. 1852)). Justice Blackmun noted that the cited dictionaries were consistent with CUNNINGHAM'S LAW-DICTIONARY, which defined " 'fines for offences' as 'amends, pecuniary punishment, or recompence for an offence committed against the King and his laws, or against the Lord of a manor.'" Id. (quoting 2 T. CUNNINGHAM, supra). 251. Id. at 195 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
289. Id. at 265 & n.6 (citing 1 E. COKE, INSTITUTES 126b (1812); T. CUNNINGHAM, A NEW AND COMPLETE LAW-DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1771) (nonpaginated); T. TOMLINS, LAW DICTIONARY 796-99 (1836); J. BOUVIER, LAW DICTIONARY 525 (4th ed. 1852)). Justice Blackmun noted that the cited dictionaries were consistent with CUNNINGHAM'S LAW-DICTIONARY, which defined " 'fines for offences' as 'amends, pecuniary punishment, or recompence for an offence committed against the King and his laws, or against the Lord of a manor.'" Id. (quoting 2 T. CUNNINGHAM, supra). 251. Id. at 195 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
290. Id. at 265 & n.6 (citing 1 E. COKE, INSTITUTES 126b (1812); T. CUNNINGHAM, A NEW AND COMPLETE LAW-DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1771) (nonpaginated); T. TOMLINS, LAW DICTIONARY 796-99 (1836); J. BOUVIER, LAW DICTIONARY 525 (4th ed. 1852)). Justice Blackmun noted that the cited dictionaries were consistent with CUNNINGHAM'S LAW-DICTIONARY, which defined " 'fines for offences' as 'amends, pecuniary punishment, or recompence for an offence committed against the King and his laws, or against the Lord of a manor.'" Id. (quoting 2 T. CUNNINGHAM, supra). 251. Id. at 195 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
291. Id. at 265 & n.6 (citing 1 E. COKE, INSTITUTES 126b (1812); T. CUNNINGHAM, A NEW AND COMPLETE LAW-DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1771) (nonpaginated); T. TOMLINS, LAW DICTIONARY 796-99 (1836); J. BOUVIER, LAW DICTIONARY 525 (4th ed. 1852)). Justice Blackmun noted that the cited dictionaries were consistent with CUNNINGHAM'S LAW-DICTIONARY, which defined " 'fines for offences' as 'amends, pecuniary punishment, or recompence for an offence committed against the King and his laws, or against the Lord of a manor.'" Id. (quoting 2 T. CUNNINGHAM, supra). 251. Id. at 195 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
292. Id. at 265 & n.6 (citing 1 E. COKE, INSTITUTES 126b (1812); T. CUNNINGHAM, A NEW AND COMPLETE LAW-DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1771) (nonpaginated); T. TOMLINS, LAW DICTIONARY 796-99 (1836); J. BOUVIER, LAW DICTIONARY 525 (4th ed. 1852)). Justice Blackmun noted that the cited dictionaries were consistent with CUNNINGHAM'S LAW-DICTIONARY, which defined " 'fines for offences' as 'amends, pecuniary punishment, or recompence for an offence committed against the King and his laws, or against the Lord of a manor.'" Id. (quoting 2 T. CUNNINGHAM, supra). 251. Id. at 195 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
293. Id. at 265 & n.6 (citing 1 E. COKE, INSTITUTES 126b (1812); T. CUNNINGHAM, A NEW AND COMPLETE LAW-DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1771) (nonpaginated); T. TOMLINS, LAW DICTIONARY 796-99 (1836); J. BOUVIER, LAW DICTIONARY 525 (4th ed. 1852)). Justice Blackmun noted that the cited dictionaries were consistent with CUNNINGHAM'S LAW-DICTIONARY, which defined " 'fines for offences' as 'amends, pecuniary punishment, or recompence for an offence committed against the King and his laws, or against the Lord of a manor.'" Id. (quoting 2 T. CUNNINGHAM, supra). 251. Id. at 195 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
294. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting T. SHERIDAN, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (6th ed. 1796) (unpaginated) (stating that a fine was "a mulct [or] pecuniary punishment"); S. JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (7th ed. 1785) (unpaginated) (stating that a fine was "a mulct [or] pecuniary punishment," a "penalty," or "money paid for any exemption or liberty"); C. RICHARDSON, A NEW DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 796 (1839) ("any thing (as a sum or money) paid at the end, to make an end, termination or conclusion of a suit, of a prosecution")).
295. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting T. SHERIDAN, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (6th ed. 1796) (unpaginated) (stating that a fine was "a mulct [or] pecuniary punishment"); S. JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (7th ed. 1785) (unpaginated) (stating that a fine was "a mulct [or] pecuniary punishment," a "penalty," or "money paid for any exemption or liberty"); C. RICHARDSON, A NEW DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 796 (1839) ("any thing (as a sum or money) paid at the end, to make an end, termination or conclusion of a suit, of a prosecution")).
296. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting T. SHERIDAN, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (6th ed. 1796) (unpaginated) (stating that a fine was "a mulct [or] pecuniary punishment"); S. JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (7th ed. 1785) (unpaginated) (stating that a fine was "a mulct [or] pecuniary punishment," a "penalty," or "money paid for any exemption or liberty"); C. RICHARDSON, A NEW DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 796 (1839) ("any thing (as a sum or money) paid at the end, to make an end, termination or conclusion of a suit, of a prosecution")).
297. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting T. SHERIDAN, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (6th ed. 1796) (unpaginated) (stating that a fine was "a mulct [or] pecuniary punishment"); S. JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (7th ed. 1785) (unpaginated) (stating that a fine was "a mulct [or] pecuniary punishment," a "penalty," or "money paid for any exemption or liberty"); C. RICHARDSON, A NEW DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 796 (1839) ("any thing (as a sum or money) paid at the end, to make an end, termination or conclusion of a suit, of a prosecution")).
298. 511 U.S. 825 (1994).
299. Id. at 847.
300. See id. at 854 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (discussing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 300 (1991)).
301. Id. at 854-55 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 1843 (1961); WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1736 (1923)). Justice Blackmun noted that WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY defined "punishment" as "[a]ny pain, suffering, or loss inflicted on or suffered by a person because of a crime or evil-doing." Id. at 855 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (quoting WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1736 (1923)).
302. Id. at 854-55 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 1843 (1961); WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1736 (1923)). Justice Blackmun noted that WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY defined "punishment" as "[a]ny pain, suffering, or loss inflicted on or suffered by a person because of a crime or evil-doing." Id. at 855 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (quoting WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1736 (1923)).
303. Id. at 854-55 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 1843 (1961); WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1736 (1923)). Justice Blackmun noted that WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY defined "punishment" as "[a]ny pain, suffering, or loss inflicted on or suffered by a person because of a crime or evil-doing." Id. at 855 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (quoting WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1736 (1923)).
304. See id. at 859 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1234 (6th ed. 1990); T. SHERIDAN, A GENERAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1780)). Justice Thomas noted that Sheridan defines "punishment" as "[a]ny infliction imposed in vengeance of a crime." Id. at 859 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting T. SHERIDAN, A GENERAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1780)).
305. See id. at 859 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1234 (6th ed. 1990); T. SHERIDAN, A GENERAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1780)). Justice Thomas noted that Sheridan defines "punishment" as "[a]ny infliction imposed in vengeance of a crime." Id. at 859 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting T. SHERIDAN, A GENERAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1780)).
306. See id. at 859 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1234 (6th ed. 1990); T. SHERIDAN, A GENERAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1780)). Justice Thomas noted that Sheridan defines "punishment" as "[a]ny infliction imposed in vengeance of a crime." Id. at 859 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting T. SHERIDAN, A GENERAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1780)).
307. See id. at 859 (Thomas, J., concurring).
308. 512 U.S. 218 (1994).
309. See id. at 225.
310. Id. (citing RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1236 (2d ed. 1987); WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 1452 (1976); 9 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 952 (2d ed. 1989); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)).
311. Id. (citing RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1236 (2d ed. 1987); WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 1452 (1976); 9 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 952 (2d ed. 1989); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)).
312. Id. (citing RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1236 (2d ed. 1987); WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 1452 (1976); 9 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 952 (2d ed. 1989); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)).
313. Id. (citing RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1236 (2d ed. 1987); WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 1452 (1976); 9 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 952 (2d ed. 1989); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)).
314. Id. (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 1452 (1976)).
315. Id. at 226-27. "Webster's Third itself defines 'modify' to connote both (specifically) major change and (specifically) minor change. It is hard to see how that can be. When the word 'modify' has come to mean both 'to change in some respects' and 'to change fundamentally' it will in fact mean neither of those things." Id. at 227.
316. Id. at 228 n.3.
317. See id. at 228.
318. See id. at 241-42 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
319. "Dictionaries can be useful aids in statutory interpretation, but they are no substitute for close analysis of what words mean as used in a particular statutory context." Id. at 240 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
320. Id. at 241-42 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
321. See id. at 242 & n.5 (Stevens J., dissenting) (quoting WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 628 (4th ed. 1934); 9 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 952 (2d ed. 1989); RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1236 (2d ed. 1987); WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 1452 (1981); WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 739 (1973); WEBSTER'S SEVENTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 544 (1963); WEBSTER'S SEVENTH NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 1577 (2d ed. 1934); N. WEBSTER, AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828)). In the majority opinion, however, Justice Scalia noted that the versions of WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY published after 1949 are essentially abridgments of the "out-of-step" WEBSTER'S THIRD. Id. at 226-28 & n.3.
322. See id. at 242 & n.5 (Stevens J., dissenting) (quoting WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 628 (4th ed. 1934); 9 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 952 (2d ed. 1989); RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1236 (2d ed. 1987); WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 1452 (1981); WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 739 (1973); WEBSTER'S SEVENTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 544 (1963); WEBSTER'S SEVENTH NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 1577 (2d ed. 1934); N. WEBSTER, AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828)). In the majority opinion, however, Justice Scalia noted that the versions of WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY published after 1949 are essentially abridgments of the "out-of-step" WEBSTER'S THIRD. Id. at 226-28 & n.3.
323. See id. at 242 & n.5 (Stevens J., dissenting) (quoting WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 628 (4th ed. 1934); 9 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 952 (2d ed. 1989); RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1236 (2d ed. 1987); WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 1452 (1981); WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 739 (1973); WEBSTER'S SEVENTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 544 (1963); WEBSTER'S SEVENTH NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 1577 (2d ed. 1934); N. WEBSTER, AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828)). In the majority opinion, however, Justice Scalia noted that the versions of WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY published after 1949 are essentially abridgments of the "out-of-step" WEBSTER'S THIRD. Id. at 226-28 & n.3.
324. See id. at 242 & n.5 (Stevens J., dissenting) (quoting WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 628 (4th ed. 1934); 9 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 952 (2d ed. 1989); RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1236 (2d ed. 1987); WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 1452 (1981); WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 739 (1973); WEBSTER'S SEVENTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 544 (1963); WEBSTER'S SEVENTH NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 1577 (2d ed. 1934); N. WEBSTER, AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828)). In the majority opinion, however, Justice Scalia noted that the versions of WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY published after 1949 are essentially abridgments of the "out-of-step" WEBSTER'S THIRD. Id. at 226-28 & n.3.
325. See id. at 242 & n.5 (Stevens J., dissenting) (quoting WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 628 (4th ed. 1934); 9 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 952 (2d ed. 1989); RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1236 (2d ed. 1987); WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 1452 (1981); WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 739 (1973); WEBSTER'S SEVENTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 544 (1963); WEBSTER'S SEVENTH NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 1577 (2d ed. 1934); N. WEBSTER, AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828)). In the majority opinion, however, Justice Scalia noted that the versions of WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY published after 1949 are essentially abridgments of the "out-of-step" WEBSTER'S THIRD. Id. at 226-28 & n.3.
326. See id. at 242 & n.5 (Stevens J., dissenting) (quoting WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 628 (4th ed. 1934); 9 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 952 (2d ed. 1989); RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1236 (2d ed. 1987); WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 1452 (1981); WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 739 (1973); WEBSTER'S SEVENTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 544 (1963); WEBSTER'S SEVENTH NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 1577 (2d ed. 1934); N. WEBSTER, AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828)). In the majority opinion, however, Justice Scalia noted that the versions of WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY published after 1949 are essentially abridgments of the "out-of-step" WEBSTER'S THIRD. Id. at 226-28 & n.3.
327. See id. at 242 & n.5 (Stevens J., dissenting) (quoting WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 628 (4th ed. 1934); 9 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 952 (2d ed. 1989); RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1236 (2d ed. 1987); WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 1452 (1981); WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 739 (1973); WEBSTER'S SEVENTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 544 (1963); WEBSTER'S SEVENTH NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 1577 (2d ed. 1934); N. WEBSTER, AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828)). In the majority opinion, however, Justice Scalia noted that the versions of WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY published after 1949 are essentially abridgments of the "out-of-step" WEBSTER'S THIRD. Id. at 226-28 & n.3.
328. See id. at 242 & n.5 (Stevens J., dissenting) (quoting WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 628 (4th ed. 1934); 9 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 952 (2d ed. 1989); RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1236 (2d ed. 1987); WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 1452 (1981); WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 739 (1973); WEBSTER'S SEVENTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 544 (1963); WEBSTER'S SEVENTH NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 1577 (2d ed. 1934); N. WEBSTER, AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828)). In the majority opinion, however, Justice Scalia noted that the versions of WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY published after 1949 are essentially abridgments of the "out-of-step" WEBSTER'S THIRD. Id. at 226-28 & n.3.
329. See Weis, supra note 4, at 973-76. That Note argues that, because meaning is difficult to discern, the complicated process of defining words should not be limited by reference to a single dictionary that contains few definitions. See id. at 974. Rather, "[e]ach lawyer should be armed with dictionaries, novels, poems, and anything else that might convince the judge." Id. at 973.
330. See infra Appendix C.
331. See Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868, 919-20 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring); Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 863-64 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 529 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 719 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 624 (1991) ("From the time of the founding to the present, the word 'seizure' [as used in U.S. Const. Amend. IV] has meant a 'taking possession.'").
332. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 585-86 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).
333. See, e.g., Molzof v. United States, 502 U.S. 301, 307 (1992); Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 77 (1990) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing "[c]ontemporaneous editions of legal dictionaries" to define "maturity" as used in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934); Mallard v. United States Dist. Ct. for the N. Dist. of Iowa, 490 U.S. 296, 301 (1989); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Public Employment Relations Bd., 485 U.S. 589, 598 (1988) (giving statutory language "its normal meaning" and citing a dictionary "from the period during which the [statutory provision] was enacted"); McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 370-71 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing "law dictionaries of the era" when statute was enacted).
334. In United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting), construing the term "envelope" contained in section 3 of the Act of July 18, 1866 (dealing with authority of customs officials), Justice Stevens stated, "[c]ontemporary American dictionaries emphasize the usage of the word as descriptive of a package or wrapper as well as an ordinary letter." Id. at 629-30.
335. See National Muffler Dealers Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 479-80 (1979) ("Those terms had commonly understood meanings before the statute was enacted.").
336. See Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 351 n.5 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in result) ("In the realm of statutory construction it is appropriate to search for meaning in the congressional vocabulary in a lexicon most probably consulted by Congress [that is, WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1934) (unabridged)]").
337. See Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 351 n.5 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in result) ("In the realm of statutory construction it is appropriate to search for meaning in the congressional vocabulary in a lexicon most probably consulted by Congress [that is, WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1934) (unabridged)]").
338. See Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 247 (1979) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (explaining that Congress is not composed of dictionary editors); Aprill, supra note 35, at 299 ("Legislators do not consult dictionaries or incorporate by reference dictionary definitions in drafting statutes.").
339. See Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 500 n.10 (1985) (quoting "lust" as defined in WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (2d ed. unabr. 1949) but "excluding the obsolete meanings"); see also BOUVIER'S LAW DICTIONARY 431 (Rawles 3d Rev. 1914) (defining "cat" as a whip "sometimes used for whipping criminals" but not referring to a feline); id. at 866 (containing, as the sole entry for "diet": "[a] general assembly is sometimes so called on the continent of Europe").
340. See Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 500 n.10 (1985) (quoting "lust" as defined in WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (2d ed. unabr. 1949) but "excluding the obsolete meanings"); see also BOUVIER'S LAW DICTIONARY 431 (Rawles 3d Rev. 1914) (defining "cat" as a whip "sometimes used for whipping criminals" but not referring to a feline); id. at 866 (containing, as the sole entry for "diet": "[a] general assembly is sometimes so called on the continent of Europe").
341. Even then, caution is required as contemporaneous dictionaries may provide some (but likely could not provide all) of the possible alternative meanings for a term. See Aprill, supra note 35, at 327 ("no dictionary can be expected to report all usages, and no dictionary can be current as of its date of publication").
342. 491 U.S. 58 (1989).
343. See id. at 71.
344. See id. at 78 (quoting Dictionary Act of Feb. 25, 1871, § 2, 16 Stat. 431).
345. See id. at 69 (quoting 1 B. ABBOTT, DICTIONARY OF TERMS AND PHRASES USED IN AMERICAN OR ENGLISH JURISPRUDENCE 155 (1879); W. ANDERSON, A DICTIONARY OF LAW 127 (1893); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 143 (1891); A. BURRILL, A LAW DICTIONARY AND GLOSSARY 212 (2d ed. 1871)).
346. See id. at 69 (quoting 1 B. ABBOTT, DICTIONARY OF TERMS AND PHRASES USED IN AMERICAN OR ENGLISH JURISPRUDENCE 155 (1879); W. ANDERSON, A DICTIONARY OF LAW 127 (1893); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 143 (1891); A. BURRILL, A LAW DICTIONARY AND GLOSSARY 212 (2d ed. 1871)).
347. See id. at 69 (quoting 1 B. ABBOTT, DICTIONARY OF TERMS AND PHRASES USED IN AMERICAN OR ENGLISH JURISPRUDENCE 155 (1879); W. ANDERSON, A DICTIONARY OF LAW 127 (1893); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 143 (1891); A. BURRILL, A LAW DICTIONARY AND GLOSSARY 212 (2d ed. 1871)).
348. See id. at 69 (quoting 1 B. ABBOTT, DICTIONARY OF TERMS AND PHRASES USED IN AMERICAN OR ENGLISH JURISPRUDENCE 155 (1879); W. ANDERSON, A DICTIONARY OF LAW 127 (1893); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 143 (1891); A. BURRILL, A LAW DICTIONARY AND GLOSSARY 212 (2d ed. 1871)).
349. Id. at 79 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting 1 B. ABBOTT, DICTIONARY OF TERMS AND PHRASES USED IN AMERICAN OR ENGLISH JURISPRUDENCE 155 (1879); W. ANDERSON, A DICTIONARY OF LAW 127 (1893); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 143 (1891); A. BURRILL, A LAW DICTIONARY AND GLOSSARY 212 (2d ed. 1871)).
350. Id. at 79 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting 1 B. ABBOTT, DICTIONARY OF TERMS AND PHRASES USED IN AMERICAN OR ENGLISH JURISPRUDENCE 155 (1879); W. ANDERSON, A DICTIONARY OF LAW 127 (1893); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 143 (1891); A. BURRILL, A LAW DICTIONARY AND GLOSSARY 212 (2d ed. 1871)).
351. Id. at 79 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting 1 B. ABBOTT, DICTIONARY OF TERMS AND PHRASES USED IN AMERICAN OR ENGLISH JURISPRUDENCE 155 (1879); W. ANDERSON, A DICTIONARY OF LAW 127 (1893); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 143 (1891); A. BURRILL, A LAW DICTIONARY AND GLOSSARY 212 (2d ed. 1871)).
352. Id. at 79 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting 1 B. ABBOTT, DICTIONARY OF TERMS AND PHRASES USED IN AMERICAN OR ENGLISH JURISPRUDENCE 155 (1879); W. ANDERSON, A DICTIONARY OF LAW 127 (1893); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 143 (1891); A. BURRILL, A LAW DICTIONARY AND GLOSSARY 212 (2d ed. 1871)).
353. Id. at 79 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting 1 B. ABBOTT, DICTIONARY OF TERMS AND PHRASES USED IN AMERICAN OR ENGLISH JURISPRUDENCE 155 (1879); W. ANDERSON, A DICTIONARY OF LAW 127 (1893); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 143 (1891); A. BURRILL, A LAW DICTIONARY AND GLOSSARY 212 (2d ed. 1871)).
354. See id. at 79 (Brennan, J., dissenting). For example, Justice Brennan quoted one dictionary as stating, "the term body politic is often used in a general way, as meaning the state or the sovereign power, or the city government, without implying any distinct express incorporation." Id. (quoting 1 B. ABBOTT, DICTIONARY OF TERMS AND PHRASES USED IN AMERICAN OR ENGLISH JURISPRUDENCE 155 (1879)). However, Justice White quoted that same dictionary as defining the term as the "most exact expression" for "public corporation." Id. at 69 n.9 (quoting 1 B. ABBOTT, DICTIONARY OF TERMS AND PHRASES USED IN AMERICAN OR ENGLISH JURISPRUDENCE 155 (1879)). Thus, the interpretation depended upon which definition within the same dictionary was used.
355. See id. at 79 (Brennan, J., dissenting). For example, Justice Brennan quoted one dictionary as stating, "the term body politic is often used in a general way, as meaning the state or the sovereign power, or the city government, without implying any distinct express incorporation." Id. (quoting 1 B. ABBOTT, DICTIONARY OF TERMS AND PHRASES USED IN AMERICAN OR ENGLISH JURISPRUDENCE 155 (1879)). However, Justice White quoted that same dictionary as defining the term as the "most exact expression" for "public corporation." Id. at 69 n.9 (quoting 1 B. ABBOTT, DICTIONARY OF TERMS AND PHRASES USED IN AMERICAN OR ENGLISH JURISPRUDENCE 155 (1879)). Thus, the interpretation depended upon which definition within the same dictionary was used.
356. See id. at 79 (Brennan, J., dissenting). For example, Justice Brennan quoted one dictionary as stating, "the term body politic is often used in a general way, as meaning the state or the sovereign power, or the city government, without implying any distinct express incorporation." Id. (quoting 1 B. ABBOTT, DICTIONARY OF TERMS AND PHRASES USED IN AMERICAN OR ENGLISH JURISPRUDENCE 155 (1879)). However, Justice White quoted that same dictionary as defining the term as the "most exact expression" for "public corporation." Id. at 69 n.9 (quoting 1 B. ABBOTT, DICTIONARY OF TERMS AND PHRASES USED IN AMERICAN OR ENGLISH JURISPRUDENCE 155 (1879)). Thus, the interpretation depended upon which definition within the same dictionary was used.
357. 118 S. Ct. 1911 (1998).
358. Id. at 1913 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (1994)).
359. Id. at 1913-14.
360. Id. at 1920 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
361. Id. at 1915 (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 214 (6th ed. 1990)); id. at 1921 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 214 (6th ed. 1990)). The complete definition given is "[t]o wear, bear or carry them upon the person or in the clothing or in a pocket, for the purpose of use, or for the purpose of being armed and ready for offensive or defensive action in case of a conflict with another person." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 214 (6th ed. 1990).
362. Id. at 1915 (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 214 (6th ed. 1990)); id. at 1921 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 214 (6th ed. 1990)). The complete definition given is "[t]o wear, bear or carry them upon the person or in the clothing or in a pocket, for the purpose of use, or for the purpose of being armed and ready for offensive or defensive action in case of a conflict with another person." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 214 (6th ed. 1990).
363. Id. at 1915 (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 214 (6th ed. 1990)); id. at 1921 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 214 (6th ed. 1990)). The complete definition given is "[t]o wear, bear or carry them upon the person or in the clothing or in a pocket, for the purpose of use, or for the purpose of being armed and ready for offensive or defensive action in case of a conflict with another person." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 214 (6th ed. 1990).
364. Muscarello, 118 S. Ct. at 1915.
365. Id. at 1921 n.2 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
366. Id. at 1921 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
367. Cole v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 238, 240 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
368. Aprill, supra note 35, at 310.
369. 233 U.S. 604 (1914).
370. Id. at 607, 610, 613; see also Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 451 (1911) (holding that a proceeding in equity for civil contempt-consisting of doing that which was forbidden by an injunction - must be dismissed without prejudice where there has been a complete settlement between the parties of all the matters involved in the original equity cause).
371. Gompers, 233 U.S. at 610.
372. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
373. Id. at 468 n.4 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Curiously, however, Justice Brennan then added that it was "noteworthy that Webster's includes, as one of the two accepted definitions of 'prohibit' [as used in the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause], 'to prevent from doing something.'" Id. (quoting WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1983)).
374. 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (holding that the Commerce Clause does not grant Congress the authority to prohibit gun possession within 1000 feet of a school).
375. See id. at 585-86 (Thomas, J., concurring).
376. See id. (quoting 1 S. JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 361 (4th ed. 1773); N. BAILEY, AN UNIVERSAL ETYMOLOGICAL ENGLISH DICTIONARY (26th ed. 1789); T. SHERIDAN, A COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (6th ed. 1796)); see also supra note 272 and accompanying text (citing cases where Justice Scalia has suggested the Court look at dictionaries from the time of the Constitutional Convention in order to interpret Constitutional provisions).
377. See id. (quoting 1 S. JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 361 (4th ed. 1773); N. BAILEY, AN UNIVERSAL ETYMOLOGICAL ENGLISH DICTIONARY (26th ed. 1789); T. SHERIDAN, A COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (6th ed. 1796)); see also supra note 272 and accompanying text (citing cases where Justice Scalia has suggested the Court look at dictionaries from the time of the Constitutional Convention in order to interpret Constitutional provisions).
378. See id. (quoting 1 S. JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 361 (4th ed. 1773); N. BAILEY, AN UNIVERSAL ETYMOLOGICAL ENGLISH DICTIONARY (26th ed. 1789); T. SHERIDAN, A COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (6th ed. 1796)); see also supra note 272 and accompanying text (citing cases where Justice Scalia has suggested the Court look at dictionaries from the time of the Constitutional Convention in order to interpret Constitutional provisions).
379. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 585-86 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing 3 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 552 (2d ed. 1989)).
380. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 585-86 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing 3 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 552 (2d ed. 1989)).
381. See id.
382. A discussion of general construction principles is beyond the scope of this article. Volumes - indeed shelves - have been written about general construction principles used by, and advocated for, the Court. See, e.g., Bradley C. Karkkainen, "Plain Meaning": Justice Scalia's Jurisprudence of Strict Statutory Construction, 17 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 401 (1994); A. Raymond Randolph, Dictionaries, Plain Meaning, and Context in Statutory Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 71 (1994); Note, Looking it Up: Dictionaries and Statutory Interpretation, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1437 (1994); Robert J. Martineau, Craft and Technique, Not Canons and Grand Theories: A Neo-Realist View of Statutory Construction, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (1993); Peter H. Carroll, III, Literalism: The United States Supreme Court's Methodology for Statutory Construction in Bankruptcy Cases, 25 ST. MARY'S L.J. 143 (1993); William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621 (1990); Frederick Schauer, Statutory Construction and the Coordinating Function of Plain Meaning, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 231; Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 59 (1988); William S. Blatt, The History of Statutory Interpretation: A Study in Form and Substance, 6 CARDOZO L. REV. 799, 804 (1985); Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules of Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395 (1950). The focus of the discussion in this Article is limited to the few construction principles set forth by the Court in turning to the dictionary to construe statutory terms or phrases.
383. A discussion of general construction principles is beyond the scope of this article. Volumes - indeed shelves - have been written about general construction principles used by, and advocated for, the Court. See, e.g., Bradley C. Karkkainen, "Plain Meaning": Justice Scalia's Jurisprudence of Strict Statutory Construction, 17 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 401 (1994); A. Raymond Randolph, Dictionaries, Plain Meaning, and Context in Statutory Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 71 (1994); Note, Looking it Up: Dictionaries and Statutory Interpretation, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1437 (1994); Robert J. Martineau, Craft and Technique, Not Canons and Grand Theories: A Neo-Realist View of Statutory Construction, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (1993); Peter H. Carroll, III, Literalism: The United States Supreme Court's Methodology for Statutory Construction in Bankruptcy Cases, 25 ST. MARY'S L.J. 143 (1993); William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621 (1990); Frederick Schauer, Statutory Construction and the Coordinating Function of Plain Meaning, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 231; Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 59 (1988); William S. Blatt, The History of Statutory Interpretation: A Study in Form and Substance, 6 CARDOZO L. REV. 799, 804 (1985); Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules of Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395 (1950). The focus of the discussion in this Article is limited to the few construction principles set forth by the Court in turning to the dictionary to construe statutory terms or phrases.
384. A discussion of general construction principles is beyond the scope of this article. Volumes - indeed shelves - have been written about general construction principles used by, and advocated for, the Court. See, e.g., Bradley C. Karkkainen, "Plain Meaning": Justice Scalia's Jurisprudence of Strict Statutory Construction, 17 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 401 (1994); A. Raymond Randolph, Dictionaries, Plain Meaning, and Context in Statutory Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 71 (1994); Note, Looking it Up: Dictionaries and Statutory Interpretation, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1437 (1994); Robert J. Martineau, Craft and Technique, Not Canons and Grand Theories: A Neo-Realist View of Statutory Construction, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (1993); Peter H. Carroll, III, Literalism: The United States Supreme Court's Methodology for Statutory Construction in Bankruptcy Cases, 25 ST. MARY'S L.J. 143 (1993); William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621 (1990); Frederick Schauer, Statutory Construction and the Coordinating Function of Plain Meaning, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 231; Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 59 (1988); William S. Blatt, The History of Statutory Interpretation: A Study in Form and Substance, 6 CARDOZO L. REV. 799, 804 (1985); Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules of Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395 (1950). The focus of the discussion in this Article is limited to the few construction principles set forth by the Court in turning to the dictionary to construe statutory terms or phrases.
385. A discussion of general construction principles is beyond the scope of this article. Volumes - indeed shelves - have been written about general construction principles used by, and advocated for, the Court. See, e.g., Bradley C. Karkkainen, "Plain Meaning": Justice Scalia's Jurisprudence of Strict Statutory Construction, 17 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 401 (1994); A. Raymond Randolph, Dictionaries, Plain Meaning, and Context in Statutory Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 71 (1994); Note, Looking it Up: Dictionaries and Statutory Interpretation, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1437 (1994); Robert J. Martineau, Craft and Technique, Not Canons and Grand Theories: A Neo-Realist View of Statutory Construction, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (1993); Peter H. Carroll, III, Literalism: The United States Supreme Court's Methodology for Statutory Construction in Bankruptcy Cases, 25 ST. MARY'S L.J. 143 (1993); William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621 (1990); Frederick Schauer, Statutory Construction and the Coordinating Function of Plain Meaning, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 231; Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 59 (1988); William S. Blatt, The History of Statutory Interpretation: A Study in Form and Substance, 6 CARDOZO L. REV. 799, 804 (1985); Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules of Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395 (1950). The focus of the discussion in this Article is limited to the few construction principles set forth by the Court in turning to the dictionary to construe statutory terms or phrases.
386. A discussion of general construction principles is beyond the scope of this article. Volumes - indeed shelves - have been written about general construction principles used by, and advocated for, the Court. See, e.g., Bradley C. Karkkainen, "Plain Meaning": Justice Scalia's Jurisprudence of Strict Statutory Construction, 17 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 401 (1994); A. Raymond Randolph, Dictionaries, Plain Meaning, and Context in Statutory Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 71 (1994); Note, Looking it Up: Dictionaries and Statutory Interpretation, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1437 (1994); Robert J. Martineau, Craft and Technique, Not Canons and Grand Theories: A Neo-Realist View of Statutory Construction, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (1993); Peter H. Carroll, III, Literalism: The United States Supreme Court's Methodology for Statutory Construction in Bankruptcy Cases, 25 ST. MARY'S L.J. 143 (1993); William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621 (1990); Frederick Schauer, Statutory Construction and the Coordinating Function of Plain Meaning, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 231; Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 59 (1988); William S. Blatt, The History of Statutory Interpretation: A Study in Form and Substance, 6 CARDOZO L. REV. 799, 804 (1985); Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules of Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395 (1950). The focus of the discussion in this Article is limited to the few construction principles set forth by the Court in turning to the dictionary to construe statutory terms or phrases.
387. A discussion of general construction principles is beyond the scope of this article. Volumes - indeed shelves - have been written about general construction principles used by, and advocated for, the Court. See, e.g., Bradley C. Karkkainen, "Plain Meaning": Justice Scalia's Jurisprudence of Strict Statutory Construction, 17 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 401 (1994); A. Raymond Randolph, Dictionaries, Plain Meaning, and Context in Statutory Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 71 (1994); Note, Looking it Up: Dictionaries and Statutory Interpretation, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1437 (1994); Robert J. Martineau, Craft and Technique, Not Canons and Grand Theories: A Neo-Realist View of Statutory Construction, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (1993); Peter H. Carroll, III, Literalism: The United States Supreme Court's Methodology for Statutory Construction in Bankruptcy Cases, 25 ST. MARY'S L.J. 143 (1993); William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621 (1990); Frederick Schauer, Statutory Construction and the Coordinating Function of Plain Meaning, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 231; Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 59 (1988); William S. Blatt, The History of Statutory Interpretation: A Study in Form and Substance, 6 CARDOZO L. REV. 799, 804 (1985); Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules of Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395 (1950). The focus of the discussion in this Article is limited to the few construction principles set forth by the Court in turning to the dictionary to construe statutory terms or phrases.
388. A discussion of general construction principles is beyond the scope of this article. Volumes - indeed shelves - have been written about general construction principles used by, and advocated for, the Court. See, e.g., Bradley C. Karkkainen, "Plain Meaning": Justice Scalia's Jurisprudence of Strict Statutory Construction, 17 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 401 (1994); A. Raymond Randolph, Dictionaries, Plain Meaning, and Context in Statutory Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 71 (1994); Note, Looking it Up: Dictionaries and Statutory Interpretation, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1437 (1994); Robert J. Martineau, Craft and Technique, Not Canons and Grand Theories: A Neo-Realist View of Statutory Construction, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (1993); Peter H. Carroll, III, Literalism: The United States Supreme Court's Methodology for Statutory Construction in Bankruptcy Cases, 25 ST. MARY'S L.J. 143 (1993); William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621 (1990); Frederick Schauer, Statutory Construction and the Coordinating Function of Plain Meaning, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 231; Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 59 (1988); William S. Blatt, The History of Statutory Interpretation: A Study in Form and Substance, 6 CARDOZO L. REV. 799, 804 (1985); Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules of Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395 (1950). The focus of the discussion in this Article is limited to the few construction principles set forth by the Court in turning to the dictionary to construe statutory terms or phrases.
389. A discussion of general construction principles is beyond the scope of this article. Volumes - indeed shelves - have been written about general construction principles used by, and advocated for, the Court. See, e.g., Bradley C. Karkkainen, "Plain Meaning": Justice Scalia's Jurisprudence of Strict Statutory Construction, 17 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 401 (1994); A. Raymond Randolph, Dictionaries, Plain Meaning, and Context in Statutory Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 71 (1994); Note, Looking it Up: Dictionaries and Statutory Interpretation, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1437 (1994); Robert J. Martineau, Craft and Technique, Not Canons and Grand Theories: A Neo-Realist View of Statutory Construction, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (1993); Peter H. Carroll, III, Literalism: The United States Supreme Court's Methodology for Statutory Construction in Bankruptcy Cases, 25 ST. MARY'S L.J. 143 (1993); William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621 (1990); Frederick Schauer, Statutory Construction and the Coordinating Function of Plain Meaning, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 231; Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 59 (1988); William S. Blatt, The History of Statutory Interpretation: A Study in Form and Substance, 6 CARDOZO L. REV. 799, 804 (1985); Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules of Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395 (1950). The focus of the discussion in this Article is limited to the few construction principles set forth by the Court in turning to the dictionary to construe statutory terms or phrases.
390. A discussion of general construction principles is beyond the scope of this article. Volumes - indeed shelves - have been written about general construction principles used by, and advocated for, the Court. See, e.g., Bradley C. Karkkainen, "Plain Meaning": Justice Scalia's Jurisprudence of Strict Statutory Construction, 17 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 401 (1994); A. Raymond Randolph, Dictionaries, Plain Meaning, and Context in Statutory Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 71 (1994); Note, Looking it Up: Dictionaries and Statutory Interpretation, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1437 (1994); Robert J. Martineau, Craft and Technique, Not Canons and Grand Theories: A Neo-Realist View of Statutory Construction, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (1993); Peter H. Carroll, III, Literalism: The United States Supreme Court's Methodology for Statutory Construction in Bankruptcy Cases, 25 ST. MARY'S L.J. 143 (1993); William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621 (1990); Frederick Schauer, Statutory Construction and the Coordinating Function of Plain Meaning, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 231; Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 59 (1988); William S. Blatt, The History of Statutory Interpretation: A Study in Form and Substance, 6 CARDOZO L. REV. 799, 804 (1985); Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules of Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395 (1950). The focus of the discussion in this Article is limited to the few construction principles set forth by the Court in turning to the dictionary to construe statutory terms or phrases.
391. A discussion of general construction principles is beyond the scope of this article. Volumes - indeed shelves - have been written about general construction principles used by, and advocated for, the Court. See, e.g., Bradley C. Karkkainen, "Plain Meaning": Justice Scalia's Jurisprudence of Strict Statutory Construction, 17 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 401 (1994); A. Raymond Randolph, Dictionaries, Plain Meaning, and Context in Statutory Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 71 (1994); Note, Looking it Up: Dictionaries and Statutory Interpretation, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1437 (1994); Robert J. Martineau, Craft and Technique, Not Canons and Grand Theories: A Neo-Realist View of Statutory Construction, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (1993); Peter H. Carroll, III, Literalism: The United States Supreme Court's Methodology for Statutory Construction in Bankruptcy Cases, 25 ST. MARY'S L.J. 143 (1993); William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621 (1990); Frederick Schauer, Statutory Construction and the Coordinating Function of Plain Meaning, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 231; Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 59 (1988); William S. Blatt, The History of Statutory Interpretation: A Study in Form and Substance, 6 CARDOZO L. REV. 799, 804 (1985); Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules of Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395 (1950). The focus of the discussion in this Article is limited to the few construction principles set forth by the Court in turning to the dictionary to construe statutory terms or phrases.
392. See Rowland v. California Men's Colony, 506 U.S. 194, 199 (1993).
393. See, e.g., Pioneer Inv. Serv. Co. v. Brunswick Assoc. Ltd. Partnership, 507 U.S. 380, 394-95 (1993) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 199-200 (1993); United States v. Rodgers, 466 U.S. 475, 479 (1984); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1979); Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979); Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 9 (1962); see also Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 410 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[O]ur job is to determine whether the ordinary meaning [applies], and if it does not, to ask whether there is any solid indication in the text or structure of the statute that something other than ordinary meaning was intended.").
394. Burlington Northern, Inc. v. United States, 459 U.S. 131, 143 n.8 (1982) (emphasis added).
395. Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 266 (1981) (citations omitted); cf. Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 410-11 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that the Court should determine whether any possible meaning of the term to be construed "suits [the Court's] preconception" of the statute's scope, "and if it does not, to ask whether there is any solid indication in the text or structure of the statute that something other than ordinary meaning was intended").
396. "Since [United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235 (1989)], more and more disputes about the meaning of statutes are greeted with citations to dictionaries." Randolph, supra note 307, at 71-72; see also supra Part II.C (discussing Court's increasing reliance upon dictionaries in recent years); Aprill, supra note 35, at 277 (noting that several commentators have remarked on the Court's increasing use of dictionaries for statutory interpretation); Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 351, 355 (1994).
397. "Since [United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235 (1989)], more and more disputes about the meaning of statutes are greeted with citations to dictionaries." Randolph, supra note 307, at 71-72; see also supra Part II.C (discussing Court's increasing reliance upon dictionaries in recent years); Aprill, supra note 35, at 277 (noting that several commentators have remarked on the Court's increasing use of dictionaries for statutory interpretation); Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 351, 355 (1994).
398. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 351 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in result).
399. Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48, 50 (1975) (finding "crime against nature" was not vague and rejecting claim that a facially vague statute cannot be saved by construction).
400. Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 247 (1979) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Cf. Aprill, supra note 35, at 299 ("legislators do not consult dictionaries or incorporate by reference dictionary definitions in drafting statutes").
401. United States v. John Doe, Inc. I, 481 U.S. 102, 125 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority's construction of "disclose" used in Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)).
402. Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 U.S. 478, 483 (1990).
403. 5 U.S.C. § 504(b)(1)(C)(i) (1988).
404. Ardestani v. INS, 502 U.S. 129, 135 (1991).
405. Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129, 132 (1993).
406. Helvering v. Hammel, 311 U.S. 504, 507 (1941) (construing "sale" after citing dictionary for proposition that word can have many meanings).
407. K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, 486 U.S. 281, 319 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part); accord Reves v. Ernest & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 178 (1993) ("context is important").
408. Board of Educ. v. Mergens ex rel. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 270-71 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
409. Id. 325. Osborne v. San Diego Land & Town Co., 178 U.S. 22, 38 (1900); see also Muscarello v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 1911, 1915 (1998) (finding that dictionary definitions did "not purport to limit the 'carrying of arms' to the circumstances" described).
410. National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Boston & Maine Corp., 503 U.S. 407, 418 (1992) (citation omitted). Justice Stevens echoed this thought: Instead of mechanically repeating earlier dictionary definitions of the word 'relate' as its only guide to decision in an important and difficult area of statutory construction, the Court should pause to consider, first, the wisdom of the basic rule disfavoring federal pre-emption of state laws, and second, the specific concerns identified in the legislative history as the basis for federal pre-emption. District of Columbia v. Greater Washington Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. 125, 138 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
411. Washington County v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 198 n.10 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (quoting Cabell v. Markham, 148 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir.) (L. Hand, J.), aff'd, 326 U.S. 404 (1945)).
412. Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assoc. Ltd. Partnership, 507 U.S. 380, 396 n.14 (1993).
413. Compare Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 61-62 n.3 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (examining what a jury of lay persons would have understood at the time the provision was enacted; "There is not the slightest question that a jury of lay-persons would have understood the phrase [malice in the 1870s] as requiring actual ill-will, desire to injure, or other improper motive on the part of the defendant. . . . [Wanton] would have been understood by laymen to require some sort of evil or dissolute intention"), with Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 351 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in result) (referring to WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY to determine how Congress intended the meaning of a term).
414. Compare Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 61-62 n.3 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (examining what a jury of lay persons would have understood at the time the provision was enacted; "There is not the slightest question that a jury of lay-persons would have understood the phrase [malice in the 1870s] as requiring actual ill-will, desire to injure, or other improper motive on the part of the defendant. . . . [Wanton] would have been understood by laymen to require some sort of evil or dissolute intention"), with Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 351 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in result) (referring to WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY to determine how Congress intended the meaning of a term).
415. Curiously, however, Justice Frankfurter also wrote the opinion containing the most extensive use of the dictionary in the history of the Court. See Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 517, 519-27 nn.42-48 & app. (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in judgment).
416. Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 844, 849-50 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., on denial of petition for rehearing).
417. Reed v. Pennsylvania R.R., 351 U.S. 502, 510 (1956) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
418. See infra Appendix B.
419. Board of Educ. v. Mergens ex rel. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 291 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (construing Equal Access Act, 20 U.S.C. § 4071-72 (1984)).
420. 507 U.S. 463 (1993).
421. Id. at 472.
422. Id. at 471.
423. See id. at 476. The Court reasoned that the term "cold-blooded" provided sufficient narrowing under the Eighth Amendment because not all murders are "cold-blooded," and thus not all murderers would be eligible for the death penalty under that aggravating factor. Id. at 475-76. The Court noted that "cold-blooded" means "emotionless," and that some murders are not "cold-blooded" because some murderers do exhibit emotion, such as anger. See id. at 476.
424. Id. at 489 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 693-94 n.16 (1990) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Cartwright v. Maynard, 822 F.2d 1477, 1489 (10th Cir. 1987))).
425. Id. at 482.
426. Id. at 481-82 (citations omitted).
427. Id. at 484 n.13.
428. Perhaps as a result of this type of debate, the Court's struggle to define and clarify aggravating factors generally has led to inconsistent results. See generally Richard A. Rosen, The "Especially Heinous" Aggravating Circumstance in Capital Cases - The Standardless Standard, 64 N.C. L. REV. 941 (1986); see also Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Aggravating and Mitigating Factors: The Paradox of Today's Arbitrary and Mandatory Capital Punishment Scheme, 6 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 345, 363-68 (1997); Michael Mello, Florida's "Heinous, Atrocious or Cruel" Aggravating Circumstance: Narrowing the Class of Death-Eligible Cases Without Making It Smaller, 13 STETSON L. REV. 523 (1984);
429. Perhaps as a result of this type of debate, the Court's struggle to define and clarify aggravating factors generally has led to inconsistent results. See generally Richard A. Rosen, The "Especially Heinous" Aggravating Circumstance in Capital Cases - The Standardless Standard, 64 N.C. L. REV. 941 (1986); see also Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Aggravating and Mitigating Factors: The Paradox of Today's Arbitrary and Mandatory Capital Punishment Scheme, 6 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 345, 363-68 (1997); Michael Mello, Florida's "Heinous, Atrocious or Cruel" Aggravating Circumstance: Narrowing the Class of Death-Eligible Cases Without Making It Smaller, 13 STETSON L. REV. 523 (1984);
430. Perhaps as a result of this type of debate, the Court's struggle to define and clarify aggravating factors generally has led to inconsistent results. See generally Richard A. Rosen, The "Especially Heinous" Aggravating Circumstance in Capital Cases - The Standardless Standard, 64 N.C. L. REV. 941 (1986); see also Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Aggravating and Mitigating Factors: The Paradox of Today's Arbitrary and Mandatory Capital Punishment Scheme, 6 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 345, 363-68 (1997); Michael Mello, Florida's "Heinous, Atrocious or Cruel" Aggravating Circumstance: Narrowing the Class of Death-Eligible Cases Without Making It Smaller, 13 STETSON L. REV. 523 (1984);
431. Terrill Pollman, Maynard v. Cartwright: Channeling Arizona's Use of the Heinous, Cruel, or Depraved Aggravating Circumstance To Impose the Death Penalty, 32 ARIZ. L. REV. 193 (1990).
432. 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
433. Id. at 564, 569.
434. Id. at 570 (Brennan, J., concurring).
435. But cf. Decatur Bank v. St. Louis Bank, 88 U.S. 294 (1874) (relying on dictionary to construe contract term "cattle" to include "hogs").
436. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 954 (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part) (relying on BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1406 (6th ed. 1990) to define "stare decisis"); Montana v. Hall, 481 U.S. 400, 409 n.17 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (relying on BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1023 (5th ed. 1979) to define "per curiam"); Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 306 & n.11 (1985) (relying on BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 711 (5th ed. 1979) to define "in pari delicto potior est conditio defendentis"); Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 600 n.8 (1982) (relying on BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979) to define "parens patriae"); Japan Line, Ltd. v. Los Angeles County, 441 U.S. 434, 442 (1979) (relying on BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1968) to define "mobilia sequuntur personam"); Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 779 n.10 (1950) (relying on THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1933) to define "habeas corpus").
437. Patapsco Ins. Co. v. Coulter, 28 U.S. 222, 230 (1830) (defining "prevariquez" in case involving an insurance claim by a shipper against a carrier for loss of cargo); see also supra notes 138-41 and accompanying text.
438. 350 U.S. 422 (1956).
439. Id. at 453 n.8 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Ullmann concerned the petitioner's invocation of his Fifth Amendment privilege during a grand jury investigation of alleged members of the Communist party. Id. at 423-24. The Court upheld the contempt conviction, but Justice Douglas argued in dissent that the disclosure that a person is a Communist excommunicates him from society. Id. at 453. As part of this argument, Justice Douglas addressed penalties in France that produce infamy in law. Id. at 452-53.
440. 470 U.S. 392 (1985).
441. See id. at 399-400.
442. See id. 355. Id. at 399.
443. Id. 357. Id. at 400 n.3 (citing M. LEGRAND, DICTIONNAIRE USUAL DE DROIT (1931)). The source for the proposition that "accident" is sometimes used to describe the cause of the injury was GRAND LAROUSSE DE LANGUE FRANÇAISE (1971). See Saks, 470 U.S. at 400. Reliance on this source ignores the proposition that language usage may have changed since the Warsaw Convention was drafted and ratified in the 1920s and 1930s. Therefore, the 1971 dictionary is a questionable source - as a matter of temporal remoteness - to determine "the shared expectations of the contracting parties." Id. at 399. Cf. Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 501 n.10 (1985) (indicating that the meaning of a word can change over time).
444. Id. 357. Id. at 400 n.3 (citing M. LEGRAND, DICTIONNAIRE USUAL DE DROIT (1931)). The source for the proposition that "accident" is sometimes used to describe the cause of the injury was GRAND LAROUSSE DE LANGUE FRANÇAISE (1971). See Saks, 470 U.S. at 400. Reliance on this source ignores the proposition that language usage may have changed since the Warsaw Convention was drafted and ratified in the 1920s and 1930s. Therefore, the 1971 dictionary is a questionable source -as a matter of temporal remoteness - to determine "the shared expectations of the contracting parties." Id. at 399. Cf. Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 501 n.10 (1985) (indicating that the meaning of a word can change over time).
445. Saks, 470 U.S. at 400.
446. Id. 360. Id. Curiously, the negotiating history of the Convention appeared to take a back seat to the dictionary definition even though extensive minutes of the negotiations were available to the Court. Id. 361. 499 U.S. 530 (1991).
447. Id. at 534-35.
448. Id.
449. Id. at 534-36 (citing J. JERAUTE, VOCABULAIRE FRANÇAIS-ANGLAIS ET ANGLAIS FRANÇAIS DE TERMS ET LOCUTIONS JURIDIQUES 205 (1953); 3 GRAND LAROUSSE DE LA LANGUE FRANÇAISE 833 (1987)).
450. Id. at 534-36 (citing J. JERAUTE, VOCABULAIRE FRANÇAIS-ANGLAIS ET ANGLAIS FRANÇAIS DE TERMS ET LOCUTIONS JURIDIQUES 205 (1953); 3 GRAND LAROUSSE DE LA LANGUE FRANÇAISE 833 (1987)).
451. Id. at 537 (citations omitted). The Court's concerns were, however, "partly allayed" because "the dictionary translation accords with the wording used in the 'two main translations of the 1929 Convention in English.'" Id. at 537 (quoting R. MANKIEWICZ, THE LIABILITY REGIME OF THE INT'L AIR CARRIER 197 (1981)).
452. Id. at 537-38.
453. Id. at 537-40.
454. Id. at 540-43.
455. Id. at 532 (citation omitted).
456. See id. 371. Id. at 546-47.
457. Id. at 546 (quoting Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 403 (1985)).
458. Id. at 551; see also id. at 549-50 (citing the Supreme Court of Israel's decision in Cie Air France v. Teichner, 39 Revue Française de Droit Aerien, at 243, 23 Eur. Tr.L., at 102).
459. Id. at 552.
460. Id. at 534, 552.
461. 509 U.S. 155 (1993).
462. Id. at 177-87.
463. Id. at 180. The Immigration and Nationality Act used the words "'deport or return'" which showed "an obvious parallel" to the language of the United Nations Convention. Id. 379. Id. at 180-81.
464. Id. at 180-82 nn. 37-38 (citing THE NEW CASSELL'S FRENCH DICTIONARY 440 (1973) and LAROUSSE MODERN FRENCH-ENGLISH DICTIONARY 545 (1978)). The Court noted that "refouler" is not an exact synonym for the English word "return." See id. at 180.
465. Id. at 180-82 nn. 37-38 (citing THE NEW CASSELL'S FRENCH DICTIONARY 440 (1973) and LAROUSSE MODERN FRENCH-ENGLISH DICTIONARY 545 (1978)). The Court noted that "refouler" is not an exact synonym for the English word "return." See id. at 180.
466. Id. at 182-87.
467. Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 531 (1991).
468. See Sale, 509 U.S. at 182-87; Floyd, 499 U.S. at 537.
469. Sale, 509 U.S. at 181-82.
470. See Sale, 509 U.S. at 180-87; Floyd, 499 U.S. at 537-43.
471. AMBROSE BIERCE, THE DEVIL'S DICTIONARY 71 (Forum Books ed., 1948).
472. See supra Parts III.A (selecting the proper word to be defined), III.B (selecting the proper type of dictionary), III.C (selecting the proper dictionaries), III.D (selecting the proper edition).
473. See supra text accompanying notes 281-94; Randolph, supra note 307, at 72-73 (citing cases).
474. See, e.g., Muscarello v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 1911, 1914-15 (1998) (defining "carry" and "carry arms or weapons"); id. at 1920, 1921 nn.2, 5 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (defining "carry," "carry arms or weapons" and "carries a firearm"); Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 228-29, 231, 237-38 (1993) (defining "to use," "to cane" and "in relation to"); id. at 241-42 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (defining "use"); Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 69 n.9 (1989) (defining "body politic" and "public corporation"); id. at 78-80 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (defining "bodies politic and corporate," "body politic," "corporation sole" and "body politic or corporate").
475. See Aprill, supra note 35, at 321 ("Justice Scalia's use of dictionaries as a tool of textualism appears instrumental indeed, invoked only when it produces the desired result."); id. at 334 (noting that the citation to dictionaries, and the failure to cite dictionaries, often may "represent strategic moves intended not only to make judicial subjectivity look objective, but also to narrow congressional power and administrative discretion whenever possible").
476. See Aprill, supra note 35, at 298, 303 ("Dictionaries will differ in the definitions they include for a single word . . . [and] general dictionaries exhibit serious deficiencies not only for technical legal terms, but also for the use of common words in a legal context.").
477. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 202 (1981); E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 3.6, at 113-23 (1982); see also Hotchkiss v. National City Bank, 200 F. 287, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1911) ("A contract has, strictly speaking, nothing to do with the personal, or individual, intent of the parties.") (L. Hand., J.), aff'd, 201 F. 664 (2d Cir. 1912), aff'd, 231 U.S. 50 (1913) (quoted in E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 3.6, at 113).
478. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 202 (1981); E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 3.6, at 113-23 (1982); see also Hotchkiss v. National City Bank, 200 F. 287, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1911) ("A contract has, strictly speaking, nothing to do with the personal, or individual, intent of the parties.") (L. Hand., J.), aff'd, 201 F. 664 (2d Cir. 1912), aff'd, 231 U.S. 50 (1913) (quoted in E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 3.6, at 113).
479. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 202 (1981); E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 3.6, at 113-23 (1982); see also Hotchkiss v. National City Bank, 200 F. 287, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1911) ("A contract has, strictly speaking, nothing to do with the personal, or individual, intent of the parties.") (L. Hand., J.), aff'd, 201 F. 664 (2d Cir. 1912), aff'd, 231 U.S. 50 (1913) (quoted in E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 3.6, at 113).
480. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 202 (1981); E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 3.6, at 113-23 (1982); see also Hotchkiss v. National City Bank, 200 F. 287, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1911) ("A contract has, strictly speaking, nothing to do with the personal, or individual, intent of the parties.") (L. Hand., J.), aff'd, 201 F. 664 (2d Cir. 1912), aff'd, 231 U.S. 50 (1913) (quoted in E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 3.6, at 113).
481. This focus on the sender, the message and the receiver is not novel. "There are three basic elements in communication: the source or sender, the message, and the destination or receiver. . . . Effective communication requires efficiency on the part of all three." SCOTT M. CUTLIP & ALLEN H. CENTER, EFFECTIVE PUBLIC RELATIONS 190 (5th ed. 1982). This generally accepted theory of communications is referred to in a variety of different formulations, including the "SMCR" (or Sender-Message-Channel-Receiver) theory as well as the "SMCRE" (Source-Message-Channel-Receiver-Effects) theory. See id. at 198 fig.9-3 (citing EVERETT M. ROGERS & W. FLOYD SHOEMAKER, COMMUNICATION OF INNOVATIONS 20 (1971)); see also ALEXIS S. TAN, MASS COMMUNICATION THEORIES AND RESEARCH 60 fig.4-1 (1981) (citing CLAUDE E. SHANNON & WARREN WEAVER, THE MATHEMATICAL THEORY OF COMMUNICATION (1949)); id. at 67-71, 68 fig.4-4. The theory apparently originated with two electrical engineers - Messrs. Shannon and Weaver - when addressing "technical problems of electronic communication," but may be applied "to most forms of human communication." Id. at 55.
482. This focus on the sender, the message and the receiver is not novel. "There are three basic elements in communication: the source or sender, the message, and the destination or receiver. . . . Effective communication requires efficiency on the part of all three." SCOTT M. CUTLIP & ALLEN H. CENTER, EFFECTIVE PUBLIC RELATIONS 190 (5th ed. 1982). This generally accepted theory of communications is referred to in a variety of different formulations, including the "SMCR" (or Sender-Message-Channel-Receiver) theory as well as the "SMCRE" (Source-Message-Channel-Receiver-Effects) theory. See id. at 198 fig.9-3 (citing EVERETT M. ROGERS & W. FLOYD SHOEMAKER, COMMUNICATION OF INNOVATIONS 20 (1971)); see also ALEXIS S. TAN, MASS COMMUNICATION THEORIES AND RESEARCH 60 fig.4-1 (1981) (citing CLAUDE E. SHANNON & WARREN WEAVER, THE MATHEMATICAL THEORY OF COMMUNICATION (1949)); id. at 67-71, 68 fig.4-4. The theory apparently originated with two electrical engineers - Messrs. Shannon and Weaver - when addressing "technical problems of electronic communication," but may be applied "to most forms of human communication." Id. at 55.
483. This focus on the sender, the message and the receiver is not novel. "There are three basic elements in communication: the source or sender, the message, and the destination or receiver. . . . Effective communication requires efficiency on the part of all three." SCOTT M. CUTLIP & ALLEN H. CENTER, EFFECTIVE PUBLIC RELATIONS 190 (5th ed. 1982). This generally accepted theory of communications is referred to in a variety of different formulations, including the "SMCR" (or Sender-Message-Channel-Receiver) theory as well as the "SMCRE" (Source-Message-Channel-Receiver-Effects) theory. See id. at 198 fig.9-3 (citing EVERETT M. ROGERS & W. FLOYD SHOEMAKER, COMMUNICATION OF INNOVATIONS 20 (1971)); see also ALEXIS S. TAN, MASS COMMUNICATION THEORIES AND RESEARCH 60 fig.4-1 (1981) (citing CLAUDE E. SHANNON & WARREN WEAVER, THE MATHEMATICAL THEORY OF COMMUNICATION (1949)); id. at 67-71, 68 fig.4-4. The theory apparently originated with two electrical engineers - Messrs. Shannon and Weaver - when addressing "technical problems of electronic communication," but may be applied "to most forms of human communication." Id. at 55.
484. This focus on the sender, the message and the receiver is not novel. "There are three basic elements in communication: the source or sender, the message, and the destination or receiver. . . . Effective communication requires efficiency on the part of all three." SCOTT M. CUTLIP & ALLEN H. CENTER, EFFECTIVE PUBLIC RELATIONS 190 (5th ed. 1982). This generally accepted theory of communications is referred to in a variety of different formulations, including the "SMCR" (or Sender-Message-Channel-Receiver) theory as well as the "SMCRE" (Source-Message-Channel-Receiver-Effects) theory. See id. at 198 fig.9-3 (citing EVERETT M. ROGERS & W. FLOYD SHOEMAKER, COMMUNICATION OF INNOVATIONS 20 (1971)); see also ALEXIS S. TAN, MASS COMMUNICATION THEORIES AND RESEARCH 60 fig.4-1 (1981) (citing CLAUDE E. SHANNON & WARREN WEAVER, THE MATHEMATICAL THEORY OF COMMUNICATION (1949)); id. at 67-71, 68 fig.4-4. The theory apparently originated with two electrical engineers - Messrs. Shannon and Weaver - when addressing "technical problems of electronic communication," but may be applied "to most forms of human communication." Id. at 55.
485. See generally supra Part I.C.
486. See, e.g., Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assoc. Ltd. Partnership, 507 U.S. 380, 396 n.14 (1993) ("Faced with a choice between our own precedent and Black's Law Dictionary, we adhere to the former."); Washington County v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 198 n.10 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (noting that "[r]ather than 'make a fortress out of the dictionary,' the Court should instead attempt to implement the legislative intent of Congress" (quoting Cabell v. Markham, 148 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir.) (L. Hand, J.), aff'd, 326 U.S. 404 (1945))); Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 247 (1979) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that the Congress that enacted the McCarran-Ferguson Act "was composed of neither insurance experts nor dictionary editors").
487. See Aprill, supra note 35, at 327 ("Alternative dictionary meanings, whether in the same dictionary or different ones, may very well contradict one another because dictionary definitions are descriptive and not prescriptive.").
488. See Aprill, supra note 35, at 287-92.
489. A related issue arises when the Court determines that it must define a term that it cannot find in the dictionary and, undaunted, attempts to use a combination of definitions in its interpretation. See Board of Educ. v. Mergens ex rel. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 289-91 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (construing Equal Access Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071-72 (1984)). Neither Webster nor Congress has authorized us to assume that "non-curriculum" is a precise antonym of the word 'curriculum." "Non-plus," for example, does not mean "minus" and it would be incorrect to assume that a "nonentity" is not an "entity" at all. Purely as a matter of defining a newly-coined word, the term "noncurriculum" could fairly be construed to describe either the subjects that are "not a part of the current curriculum" or the subjects that "cannot properly be included in a public school curriculum." Either of these definitions is perfectly "sensible" because both describe subjects "that are not related to the body of courses offered by the school." When one considers the basic purpose of the Act, and its unquestioned linkage to our [prior] decision . . . the latter definition surely is the more "sensible." Id. (citations omitted); see supra notes 279 & 357 (discussing fact that meanings of words can change over time); supra notes 323-24, 334 and accompanying text (discussing Board of Educ. v. Mergens ex rel. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990)).
490. See Preface to BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY at vi (2d ed. 1910) (acknowledging that it contains "many" entries "in which the definition had to be written entirely de novo"). 400. An analogy is judicial notice of case law. Clearly, the Court may take judicial notice of judicial decisions. However, it is doubtful that the Court would take judicial notice of a decision by relying on a paraphrased rendition or summary, particularly where the actual decision was available. See Fed. R. Evid. 201(b) (requiring that "[a] judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned") (emphasis added).
491. Moreover, one commentator suggests that Black's Law Dictionary has an inherent state law bias. "To the extent that the definitions in Black's Law Dictionary derive from state court decisions, the U.S. Supreme Court may well be permitting these state courts to shape federal law, although the legal holdings of the state courts have no precedential effect for the meaning of federal statutes." Aprill, supra note 35, at 312.
492. Mellinkoff, supra note 89, at 436.
493. Cf. 3 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 544 (Supp. 1998). The definitions supplied by the parties to a contract are entitled to greater weight than is any particular definition in any dictionary; this is because the dictionary maker is stating the usages of other men in many other contexts, while the parties are prescribing their own usage in the specific context of their own transaction. Dictionary makers have no control over the contexts in which the words they define have been used by men, the dead as well as the living; the parties to a contract are constructing their own context in a living transaction the elements of which are better known to themselves than to any others. Id.
494. Mellinkoff, supra note 89, at 439. The regional difference examples cited here are based on those suggestions in Mellinkoff, supra note 89, at 439.
495. Jackson v. State, 498 S.E.2d 780, 782 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998).
496. State v. Balukovic, 956 P.2d 250, 253 (Or. Ct. App. 1998).
497. Davis v. Somers, 915 P.2d 1047, 1048 (Or. Ct. App. 1996).
498. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1302 (6th ed. 1990). See also Aprill, supra note 35, at 309.
499. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1302 (6th ed. 1990). See also Aprill, supra note 35, at 309.
500. See Aprill, supra note 35, at 313 (noting that "dictionary definitions can be a beginning point for determining the meaning of the word in a statute, but should not be an end point").
501. "[T]he meaning of a word cannot be determined in isolation, but must be drawn from the context in which it is used." Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129, 132 (1993). As another example, the majority in Burton v. United States, interpreting the word "interested" in a criminal statute, noted that dictionaries and cases illustrate that the word has different meanings, "[b]ut its meaning here is to be ascertained by considering the subject matter of the statute in which the word appears." 202 U.S. 344, 371 (1906). In dissent, however, Justice Brewer gave weight to dictionary definitions. Id. at 396 (quoting BOUVIER'S LAW DICTIONARY and BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY).
502. See text accompanying supra Part III (discussing problems with the Court's general process for using the dictionary).
503. See, e.g., Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129, 131-32 (1993) (stating that it is a "fundamental principle of statutory construction (and, indeed, of language itself) that the meaning of a word cannot be determined in isolation, but must be drawn from the context in which it is used"); National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Boston & Maine Corp., 503 U.S. 407, 418 (1992) (citation omitted) (stating that alternative dictionary definitions "each making some sense under the statute . . . indicate[] that the statute is open to interpretation. Few phrases in a complex scheme of regulation are so clear as to be beyond the need for interpretation when applied in a real context"); Ardestani v. INS, 502 U.S. 129, 133-34 (1991) ("The word 'under' has many dictionary definitions and must draw its meaning from its context."); see also Pioneer Investment Services Co. v. Brunswick Associates Limited Partnership, 507 U.S. 380, 394-95 (1993) ("Faced with a choice between our own precedent and Black's Law Dictionary, we adhere to the former.").
504. See MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 512 U.S. 218, 240 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Dictionaries can be useful aids in statutory interpretation, but they are no substitute for close analysis of what words mean as used in a particular statutory context."); K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, 486 U.S. 281, 319 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Words, like syllables, acquire meaning not in isolation but within their context.").
505. Mellinkoff, supra note 89, at 439.
506. See Randolph, supra note 307, at 73.
507. 507 U.S. 197 (1993).
508. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1346, 2671-80 (1994) (also codified as amended in other scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
509. Id. § 2680(k).
510. Smith, 507 U.S. at 201 (quoting WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 609 (2d ed. 1945)).
511. Randolph, supra note 307, at 73 & n.22. Interestingly, however, the 1990 edition of BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY is cited in this article to define statutory language first enacted in 1948, with the author noting that he "would have cited an older edition, but one was not handy." Id. 421. 88 U.S. 294 (1874).
512. Decatur Bank, 88 U.S. at 299-301. "In its limited sense [cattle] is used to designate the different varieties of horned animals but it is also frequently used with a broader signification as embracing animals in general which serve as food for man." Id. at 299-300.
513. Id. at 299 (quoting WORCESTER'S DICTIONARY).
514. 252 U.S. 159 (1920).
515. Id. at 169.
516. Id. at 167-69 (citing "the 1837 edition of Webster;" "Webster's New International Dictionary" and "The Standard Dictionary").
517. See Kolender v. Thompson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983); see also id. (criminal statute must adequately define the criminal offense "in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement").
518. Kolender, 461 U.S. at 357.
519. Osborne v. San Diego Land & Town Co., 178 U.S. 22, 38 (1900).
520. Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481 n.9 (1986).
521. For example, in a tax case, the Court cited a dictionary to address the perplexing issue of whether a jigsaw puzzle was a "puzzle" or a "game." White v. Aronson, 302 U.S. 16, 17-18 & nn. 2 & 3 (1937). In concluding that jigsaw puzzles actually were puzzles, the Court concluded that "[a]mple evidence disclosed that in commercial usage jigsaw picture puzzles were never regarded as games; also that the trade recognized a definite distinction between puzzles and games. We must assume that Congress had knowledge of these things." Id. at 20. It is doubtless true that only an assumption would support the conclusion of such congressional awareness.
522. Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 234 (1951) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
523. Cabell v. Markham, 148 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir.) (L. Hand, J.), aff'd, 326 U.S. 404 (1945).
524. T.S. ELIOT, Four Quartets: East Coker, in THE COMPLETE POEMS AND PLAYS 1909-1950, at 125 (1962).