Epistemic Dimensions of Personhood

Epistemic Dimensions of Personhood

Volumn , Issue , 2008, Pages 1-192

  Evnine, Simon J ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI   (United States)

Author keywords

Agency; Belief; Epistemology; Kant; Persons; Rationality

Indexed keywords

EID: 78549262614     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199239948.001.0001     Document Type: Book

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