International Law and the Objectivity of Value

Leiden Journal of International Law

Volumn 22, Issue 1, 2009, Pages 51-78

  Voyiakis, Emmanuel ^a  

^a Elliott Jaques Building   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

international law; objectivity; scepticism; values

Indexed keywords

EID: 78149364147     PISSN: 09221565     EISSN: 14789698     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0922156508005633     Document Type: Article

References (93)

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20. Harvard Law Review., at 47.
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29. Koskenniemi, Nordic Journal of International Law 5, at 536.
30. Nordic Journal of International Law at 18.
31. Koskenniemi, Nordic Journal of International Law 5, at 531.
32. Nordic Journal of International Law at 218.
33. Carty prefers this formulation;see Carty, ‘Critical International Law’, Nordic Journal of International Law 23, at 68.
34. Cf. D. Davidson, ‘Objectivity and Practical Reason’, in E. Ullmann-Margalit (ed.), Reasoning Practically (2000), Essay 1, at 3-5.
35. J. Mackie, Ethics: Inventing Right andWrong (1977), 36-7.
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37. The Nature ofMorality: An Introduction to Ethics., at 38-9.
38. Cf. J. McDowell, ‘Values and Secondary Qualities’, in T. Honderich (ed.), Morality and Objectivity (1985), 118 ff.
39. D. Wiggins, ‘Truth, Invention and the Meaning of Life’, (1976) 62 Proceedings of the British Academy 33, at 348-9;.
40. R. Dworkin, ‘Objectivity and Truth: You'd Better Believe It’, (1996) 25 Philosophy &Public Affairs 87, at 877 ff.
41. Dworkin, Philosophy &Public Affairs 34, at 83.
42. Philosophy &Public Affairs., at 86-7.
43. Mackie, Philosophy &Public Affairs 32, at 4-6;.
44. Koskenniemi, Philosophy &Public Affairs 5, at 475-477.
45. McDowell, Philosophy &Public Affairs 34, at 118.
46. Wiggins, Philosophy &Public Affairs 34, at 349.
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48. H. Putnam, Realism and Reason (1983), at xviii.
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52. T. Nagel, ‘Davidson's New Cogito’, in Hahn, Philosophy &Public Affairs 41, Essay 7, at 195-8.
53. Davidson, Philosophy &Public Affairs 43, at 8-9.
54. Cf. Davidson, Philosophy &Public Affairs 43, Essay 9, ‘What Thought Requires’, at 135 ff.
55. D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective (2001), Essay 10, at 138-40.
56. Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective., Essay 5, ‘Indeterminism and Antirealism’, at 78-9.
57. Davidson, Indeterminism and Antirealism 48, Essay 14, ‘Three Varieties of Knowledge’, at 204 ff.
58. Koskenniemi, Indeterminism and Antirealism 5, at 318.
59. Davidson, Indeterminism and Antirealism 48, Essay 1, ‘First Person Authority’, at 3.
60. Hans-Georg Gadamer and Ludwig Wittgenstein. See Heidegger, Indeterminism and Antirealism 14, at 25-26;.
61. H.-G. Gadamer, Truth and Method, trans. J. Weinsheimer and D. Marshall (1989), at 383 ff.
62. L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (1954), at para. 72 ff.
63. Davidson, Indeterminism and Antirealism 43, Essay 9, ‘What Thought Requires’.
64. H. Putnam, ‘Meaning and Reference’, (1973) 70 Journal of Philosophy 699, at 705.
65. Wittgenstein, Indeterminism and Antirealism 54, at paras. 225-34.
66. S. Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (1982).
67. Cf. Davidson, Indeterminism and Antirealism 48, Essay 8, ‘The Second Person’, at 116.
68. Davidson, Indeterminism and Antirealism 48, Essay 1, ‘First Person Authority’, at 6 ff.
69. Cf. W. V. O. Quine, Word and Object (1960).
70. I. Hacking, Why Does Language Matter to Philosophy? (1975), at 146-50;.
71. C. Taylor, ‘Understanding the Other: A Gadamerian View of Conceptual Schemes’, in J. Malpas, U. Arnswald, and J. Kertscher (eds.), Gadamer's Century (2002), Essay 15, at 291-2.
72. L. E. Hahn (ed.), The Library of Living Philosophers: The Philosophy of Hans-Georg Gadamer, Vol. XXIV (1997), Essay 3, at 122-5.
73. Davidson, Indeterminism and Antirealism 51, at 211.
74. Cf. Davidson, ‘On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme’, Indeterminism and Antirealism 48, at 191.
75. Davidson, Indeterminism and Antirealism 48, Essay 8, ‘The Second Person’, at 116 ff.
76. Indeterminism and Antirealism at 111-12.
77. Davidson, Indeterminism and Antirealism 48, Essay 6, ‘The Irreducibility of the Concept of the Self’, at 89-90.
78. Davidson, Indeterminism and Antirealism 43, Essay 3, ‘The Objectivity of Values’, at 50-51.
79. C. Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity (1996), at 139.
80. Tasioulas, The Sources of Normativity 16.
81. Cf. J. Waldron, Law and Disagreement (1999), Essay 8, ‘The Irrelevance of Moral Objectivity’, at 165 ff.;.
82. J. Waldron, The Dignity of Legislation (1992), at 61-2.
83. R. Rorty, ‘Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth’, in E. Lepore (ed.), Truth and Interpretation: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson (1986), at 87.
84. Cf. Dworkin, The Sources of Normativity 34, at 94.
85. S. Cavell, Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome: The Constitution of Emersonian Perfectionism (1990), at 65, where Cavell attributes to sceptics the tendency to hyperbolize words’.
86. Waldron, The Sources of Normativity 71, at 170.
87. Cf. R. Rorty, Philosophy and Social Hope (1999), at 35-7.
88. Gadamer, The Sources of Normativity 54, at 363 ff.
89. Koskenniemi, The Sources of Normativity 5, at 318.
90. Koskenniemi is not alone in this view. Similar claims are made by R. Unger, Knowledge and Politics (1984), at 66-7;.
91. W. Sullivan, Reconstructing Public Philosophy (1982), at 38-40;.
92. M. Kelman, A Guide to Critical Legal Studies (1987), at 64 ff.
93. W. Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy (1990), at 98-100.