The dialogic theory of judicial review: A new social science research agenda

George Washington Law Review

Volumn 78, Issue 6, 2010, Pages 1178-1190

  Bednar, Jenna ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 78149309699     PISSN: 00168076     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (110)

1. BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION (2009).
2. Id. at 369-70.
3. See id. at 370-72.
4. See id.
5. Id. at 382.
6. Others have noted the synchronicity between public opinion and the Supreme Court. See, e.g., LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004);
7. THOMAS R. MARSHALL, PUBLIC OPINION AND THE SUPREME COURT (1989);
8. David G. Barnum, The Supreme Court and Public Opinion: Judicial Decision Making in the Post-New Deal Period, 47 J. POL. 652 (1985);
9. Robert A. Dahl, DecisionMaking in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279 (1957);
10. Richard Funston, The Supreme Court and Critical Elections, 69 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 795 (1975);
11. Valerie J. Hoekstra, The Supreme Court and Local Public Opinion, 94 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 89 (2000);
12. William Mishler & Reginald S. Sheehan, The Supreme Court as a Countermajoritarian Institution? The Impact of Public Opinion on Supreme Court Decisions, 87 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 87 (1993);
13. Walter F. Murphy & Joseph Tanenhaus, Public Opinion and the United States Supreme Court: Mapping of Some Prerequisites for Court Legitimation of Regime Changes, 2 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 357 (1968).
14. For Friedman's own early analysis, see Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577 (1993).
15. Relatedly, other works trace the public support for the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Gregory A. Caldeira & James L. Gibson, The Etiology of Public Support for the Supreme Court, 36 AM. J. POL. SCI. 635 (1992);
16. Gregory A. Caldeira, Neither the Purse nor the Sword: Dynamics of Public Confidence in the Supreme Court, 80 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1209 (1986);
17. James L. Gibson et al., Measuring Attitudes Toward the United States Supreme Court, 47 AM. J. POL. SCI. 354 (2003);
18. Jeffery J. Mondak & Shannon Ishiyama Smithey, The Dynamics of Public Support for the Supreme Court, 59 J. POL. 1114 (1997);
19. Walter F. Murphy & Joseph Tanenhaus, Patterns of Public Support for the Supreme Court- A Panel Study, 43 J. POL. 24 (1981). None of these works, however, provides a theory based on incentives to account for these observations.
20. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 375-78.
21. See id. at 382-83.
22. See id at 382 (stating that ideally the Court should ignore "popular opinion at the moment" and instead follow "permanent popular will," but noting that this distinction is difficult for Justices to make).
23. See id. at 370.
24. See id. at 371.
25. See LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 10 (1998).
26. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 374-76.
27. See id. at 371.
28. In fact, the leash metaphor perfectly illustrates the firmament of compliance theory, the subject of much of the author's prior scholarship. See, e.g., Jenna Bednar, Is Full Compliance Possible? Conditions for Shirking with Imperfect Monitoring and Continuous Action Spaces, 18 J. THEORETICAL POL. 347 (2006).
29. See, e.g., Dahl, supra note 6, at 284-85.
30. See David W. Rohde & Kenneth A. Shepsle, Advising and Consenting in the 60-Vote Senate: Strategic Appointments to the Supreme Court, 69 J. POL. 664, 668, 675 (2007) (showing that an individual appointment has little effect on Court decisions, further weakening a connection between appointments and Court behavior);
31. Jeffrey A. Segal et al., Buyer Beware? Presidential Success Through Supreme Court Appointments, 53 POL. RES. Q. 557, 567-69 (2000) (displaying the empirical weakness of Dahl's hypothesis; while appointees may start their tenure on the bench true to the preferences of the appointing President, over time they may deviate significantly).
32. Cf. FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 376.
33. See id.
34. Cf. id. (noting that the development and enforcement of constitutional meaning result from the relationship between the courts and the public).
35. See generally DREW FUNDENBERG & JEAN TIROLE, GAME THEORY (1991) (introducing the principles of noncooperative game theory);
36. SHAUN P. HARGREAVES HEAP & YANIS VAROUFAKIS, GAME THEORY: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION (1995) (discussing the basic assumptions of game theory);
37. GRAHAM ROMP, GAME THEORY: INTRODUCTION AND APPLICATIONS (1997) (introducing game theory as an explanation for how interdependent individuals make rational decisions).
38. Cf. FUNDENBERG & TIROLE, supra note 20, at 541-42 (explaining that game theory assumes that all people involved are rational actors with common knowledge);
39. HARGREAVES HEAP & VAROUFAKIS, supra note 20, at 23-25 (same).
40. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 376, 379.
41. See id.
42. See id.; cf. HARGREAVES HEAP & VAROUFAKIS, supra note 20, at 28 (noting that game theory assumes participants know all possible actions and their consequences and make decisions based on this knowledge).
43. See, e.g., VALERIE J. HOEKSTRA, PUBLIC REACTION TO SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 150-51 (2003);
44. Hoekstra, supra note 6, at 97-98. Both show that the public, when informed, is able to formulate an opinion about Court decisions.
45. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 31.
46. Cf. Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4,1861),
47. reprinted in 4 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 262, 268 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953) (questioning the wisdom of relying on Supreme Court interpretations of constitutional questions and supporting the view that the Court's holdings bound only the parties before it, not the entire nation).
48. Contrast the usefulness of the Court to the public against Keith Whittington's 2005 explication of the Court as a tool of congressional minorities seeking to move beyond the policy status quo. See Keith E. Whittington, "Interpose Your Friendly Hand": Political Supports for the Exercise of Judicial Review by the United States Supreme Court, 99 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 583, 594 (2005).
49. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 371.
50. A fundamental project of complex systems research is to understand the conditions that cause systems to develop characteristics that none of its component parts possesses. See generally JENNA BEDNAR, THE ROBUST FEDERATION: PRINCIPLES OF DESIGN (2009) (discussing the optimality of a federal constitutional design made up of complementary but imperfect institutional components);
51. Adrian Vermeule, Foreword: System Effects and the Constitution, 123 HARV. L. REV. 4 (2009) (making a similar point about the benefit to the democratic process of having nondemocratic components).
52. See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 436-37 (1819) (invalidating a state tax on all banks, including federally created ones, as contrary to the principles of federalism);
53. FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 12-13.
54. See generally The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873) (limiting application of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to national citizenship);
55. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856) (limiting the power to confer national citizenship to Congress);
56. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832) (invalidating a state act exercising control over Cherokee Indians because the authority to interact with Native American tribes rests solely with the federal government);
57. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (holding that a state tax on banks unconstitutionally impinged on Congress's powers under the Necessary and Proper Clause).
58. If federalism were the instrument fostering the legitimacy of judicial review, then we may see broader implications of Friedman's history-beyond the United States-as it can become a lesson for emerging democracies and the establishment of the rule of law, requiring an active and independent court.
59. See supra text accompanying notes 6-8.
60. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 373-74.
61. See id. at 373. Friedman actually writes "bungee cord,"
62. id., but I prefer not to think of Justice Kennedy hanging upside down under a bridge.
63. See, e.g., Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525,561-62 (1923) (striking down legislation that provided minimum wages for women);
64. Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co. (Child Labor Tax Case), 259 U.S. 20, 43-44 (1922) (invalidating a federal tax imposed on entities that employ children);
65. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 65 (1905) (striking down a law that limited the hours bakers could work).
66. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
67. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
68. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
69. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
70. See id. at 8-9.
71. E.g., Adam H. Chames & James J. Hefferan, Jr., Mostly Pro-Corporation, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 6,2008, at 9;
72. see, e.g., Jenéa M. Reed, Note, In the Shadows of Lohr: The Disconnect Within the Supreme Court's Preemption Jurisprudence in Medical Device Liability Cases, 64 U. MIAMI L. REV. 305, 329-30 (2009).
73. See, e.g., Jeffrey Rosen, Supreme Court Inc., N.Y. TIMES MAG., Mar. 16, 2008, at 38;
74. David G. Savage, High Court Is Good for Business, L.A. TIMES, June 21, 2007, at Al.
75. But see Robert Barnes & Carrie Johnson, Pro-Business Decision Hews to Pattern of Roberts Court, WASH. POST, June 22, 2007, at D1; Rosen, supra note 45.
76. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 917 (2010) (holding that limitations on corporate funding of independent political broadcasts in candidate elections violate the First Amendment rights of corporations).
77. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 377-78.
78. See id.
79. See id. at 378.
80. See generally ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990) (analyzing models of collective action);
81. Douglas D. Heckathorn, Collective Action and Group Heterogeneity: Voluntary Provision Versus Selective Incentives, 58 AM. SOC. REV. 329 (1993) (discussing the role of heterogeneity in collective action).
82. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 254-58, 285-99.
83. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000);
84. see FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 358. The public accepted the Court's decision despite direction from one of the Justices that the public had a right to object to it.
85. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 542 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Although we may never know with complete certainty the identity of the winner of this year's Presidential election, the identity of the loser is perfectly clear. It is the Nation's confidence in the judge as an impartial guardian of the rule of law.").
86. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 374-77.
87. See id.
88. Id. at 376.
89. See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
90. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 14-15.
91. See id.
92. See id. at 384.
93. See id. at 382-84.
94. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
95. Charles H. Franklin & Liane C. Kosaki, Republican Schoolmaster: The U.S. Supreme Court, Public Opinion, and Abortion, 83 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 751 (1989).
96. See id. at 761-62.
97. See id. at 768.
98. Valerie J. Hoekstra & Jeffrey A. Segal. The Sheparding of Local Public Opinion: The Supreme Court and Lamb's Chapel, 58 J. POL. 1079 (1996).
99. See id. at 1089, 1092.
100. HOEKSTRA, supra note 25, at 154-55;
101. Hoekstra, supra note 6, at 98.
102. Phoebe C. Ellsworth & Lee Ross, Public Opinion and Capital Punishment: A Close Examination of the Views of Abolitionists and Retentionists, 29 CRIME & DELINQ. 116, 135 (1983).
103. See id. at 148-49, 165.
104. See, e.g., id.
105. James G. Wilson, The Role of Public Opinion in Constitutional Interpretation, 1993 BYU L. REV. 1037, 1043-47.
106. See, e.g., id. at 1044.
107. Sometimes the deviation lies outside of the public's immediate policy concerns, such as in United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), where the Court struck down provisions of legislation designed to punish assaults of women due to its emerging and much-updated federalism doctrine,
108. see id. at 626-27.
109. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 377-78.
110. See, e.g., HOEKSTRA, supra note 25, at 154-55.