The complexity of rules and how they may evolve over time

Evolution and Design of Institutions

Volumn , Issue , 2006, Pages 100-122

  Ostrom, Elinor ^a  

^a INDIANA UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 78049251114     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.4324/9780203965597     Document Type: Chapter

References (65)

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