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Volumn 2, Issue , 2010, Pages 947-952

Tolerable manipulability in dynamic assignment without money

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE; EFFICIENCY; PARETO PRINCIPLE;

EID: 77958606304     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper
Times cited : (7)

References (11)
  • 7
    • 20744441823 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Online ascending auctions for gradually expiring goods
    • Lavi, R., and Nisan, N. 2005. Online ascending auctions for gradually expiring goods. In SODA.
    • (2005) SODA
    • Lavi, R.1    Nisan, N.2
  • 9
    • 0141607427 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Strategyproof and nonbossy multiple assignments
    • Papai, S. 2001. Strategyproof and nonbossy multiple assignments. Journal of Public Economic Theory 3(3):257-71.
    • (2001) Journal of Public Economic Theory , vol.3 , Issue.3 , pp. 257-271
    • Papai, S.1
  • 10
    • 84926103783 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Online mechanisms
    • Nisan, N.; Rough-garden, T.; Tardos, E.; and Vazirani, V., eds., Cambridge University Press, chapter 16
    • Parkes, D. C. 2007. Online mechanisms. In Nisan, N.; Rough-garden, T.; Tardos, E.; and Vazirani, V., eds., Algorithmic Game Theory. Cambridge University Press, chapter 16.
    • (2007) Algorithmic Game Theory
    • Parkes, D.C.1
  • 11
    • 0033466202 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods
    • Svensson, L.-G. 1999. Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods. Social Choice and Welfare 16(4):557-567.
    • (1999) Social Choice and Welfare , vol.16 , Issue.4 , pp. 557-567
    • Svensson, L.-G.1


* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.