Characterizing solution concepts in games using knowledge-based programs

IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence

Volumn , Issue , 2007, Pages 1300-1307

  Halpern, Joseph Y ^a   Moses, Yoram ^b  

^a Department of Obstetrics Gynecology   (United States)

^b TECHNION ISRAEL INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (Israel)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ALL SOLUTIONS; COMMON KNOWLEDGE; CORRELATED EQUILIBRIA; INFORMATION SET; NASH EQUILIBRIA; NORMAL FORM; SEQUENTIAL EQUILIBRIUM; SOLUTION CONCEPTS;

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE;

KNOWLEDGE BASED SYSTEMS;

EID: 77958510598     PISSN: 10450823     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

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