Can bad science be good evidence? Neuroscience, lie detection, and beyond

Cornell Law Review

Volumn 95, Issue 6, 2010, Pages 1191-1219

  Schauer, Frederick ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ARTICLE; EMOTION; FORENSIC MEDICINE; FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY; HUMAN; LEGAL ASPECT; METHODOLOGY; NEUROSCIENCE; NUCLEAR MAGNETIC RESONANCE IMAGING; PHYSIOLOGY; PREDICTION AND FORECASTING; PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECT; RECUMBENCY; REPRODUCIBILITY; UNITED STATES;

DECEPTION; EMOTIONS; FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY; HUMANS; LIE DETECTION; MAGNETIC RESONANCE IMAGING; NEUROSCIENCES; PREDICTIVE VALUE OF TESTS; REPRODUCIBILITY OF RESULTS; UNITED STATES;

EID: 77958122294     PISSN: 00108847     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (257)

1. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
2. 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
3. 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
4. See infra note 24 and accompanying text. Numerous state courts have also adopted the Daubert approach.
5. See, e.g., State v. Porter, 698 A.2d 739, 742 (Conn. 1997);
6. Common wealth v. Lanigan, 641 N.E.2d 1342, 1348-1349 (Mass. 1994);
7. Miller v. Bike Athletic Co., 687 N.E.2d 735, 740-741 (Ohio 1998);
8. Wilt v. Buracker, 443 S.E.2d 196, 203 (W. Va. 1993).
9. In this Essay I use forensic, as distinguished from legal, to refer to those dimensions of criminal investigation that either precede a trial or exist apart from it.
10. Although sworn witness testimony also plays a large role in the civil law, the qualification to the common law in the accompanying text is a function of the somewhat larger role that judges in many civil law countries play in managing the process of direct factual investigation, especially in criminal cases. For good descriptions of the civil law approach, see EUROPEAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURES (Mireille Delmas-Marty & J.R. Spencer eds., 2002);
11. JACQUELINE HODGSON, FRENCH CRIMINAL JUSTICE: A COMPARATIVE ACCOUNT OF THE INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OF CRIME IN FRANCE (2005).
12. To be sure, law is not entirely alone in its reliance on testimonial evidence. Testimony and other forms of indirect evidence do play a significant role in other investigative and fact-finding enterprises. See, e. g., C. A. J. COADY, TESTIMONY: A PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY 233-276 (1992) (surveying the use of testimony in history, mathematics, and psychology);
13. John Hardwig, The Role of Trust in Knowledge, 88 J. PHIL. 693 (1991) (discussing the role of testimonial evidence in science and mathematics). Nevertheless, law is noteworthy in relying on testimony and authority more than most other disciplines, and conversely, relying substantially less on direct investigation and experimentation, especially in courtroom settings.
14. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 62 (1990) ("[A]uthority and hierarchy play a role in law that would be inimical to scientific inquiry.").
15. FED. R. EVID. 602.
16. " 'Scientific methodology today is based on generating hypotheses and testing them to see if they can be falsified; indeed, this methodology is what distinguishes science from other fields of human inquiry.'" Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993) (quoting Michael D. Green, Expert Witnesses and Sufficiency of Evidence in Toxic Substance Litigation: The Legacy of Agent Orange and Bendectin Litigation, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 643, 645 (1992).
17. See also SHEILA JASANOFF, SCIENCE AT THE BAR: LAW, SCIENCE, AND TECHNOLOGY IN AMERICA 7-11 (1995) (comparing the methods and goals of law and science);
18. Susan Haack, Irreconcilable Differences ? The Troubled Marriage of Science and Law, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 2, 7-15 (2009) (distinguishing "the investigative character of science" from the "adversarial culture of our legal system");
19. Harry W. Jones, Legal Inquiry and the Methods of Science, in LAW AND THE SOCIAL ROLE OF SCIENCE 122, 124 (Harry W.Jones ed., 1967) ("Legal propositions have their origin not in empirical observation but in authoritative pronouncement by a court or legislature.");
20. James A. Martin, The Proposed "Science Court," 75 MICH. L. REV. 1058, 1062-1064 (1977) (comparing the scientific and legal methods of determining truth).
21. See Frederick Schauer &; Richard Zeckhauser, Paltering, in DECEPTION: FROM ANCIENT EMPIRES TO INTERNET DATING 38, 38-41 (Brooke Harrington ed., 2009) (analyzing various forms of deception not involving explicit falsity).
22. See, e.g., Elizabeth B. Ford, Lie Detection: Historical, Neuropsychiatric and Legal Dimensions, 29 LJ'INT. L. & PSYCHIATRY 159, 165 (2006) ("The detection of liars and lies has been an element of many professions in the legal [and] criminal justice ⋯ fields.").
23. See, e.g., Haack, supra note 9, at 3 (describing law's early reliance on the oatfi and related religious tests).
24. See George Fisher, The fury's Rise as Lie Detector, 107 YALE L.J. 575, 580, 583 (1997) (noting that the legal system's reliance on the oath was based on "the perceived divine power of the oath to compel truthful testimony" through "the threat of divine vengeance" for perjured testimony). Thomas Raeburn White and Daniel Blau describe the history of the oath and its religious aspects.
25. See generally Thomas Raeburn White, Oaths in Judicial Proceedings and Their Effect upon the Competency of Witnesses, 51 AM. L. REG. 373 (1903);
26. Daniel Blau, Note, Holy Scriptures and Unholy Strictures: Why the Enforcement of a Religious Orthodoxy in North Carolina Demands a More Refined Establishment Clause Analysis of Courtroom Oaths, 4 FIRST AMENDMENT L. REV. 223, 227-229 (2006).
27. See Naomi Mezey & Mark C. Niles, Screening the Law: Ideology and Law in American Popular Culture, 28 COLUM.J.L. & ARTS 91, 116-117 (2005) ("[Perry Mason] had such a strong popular cultural influence that millions of people born after its last episode aired are still familiar both with the character and with his signature talent for dramatic and successful cross-examination.").
28. See 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1367 (Chadbourn rev. 1974) (asserting that cross-examination is the "greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth").
29. See Jules Epstein, The Great Engine That Couldn't: Science, Mistaken Identifications, and the Limits of Cross-Examination, 36 STETSON L. REV. 727, 774-782 (2007) (noting the inability of cross-examination to "undercut eyewitness reliability" in some respects, which may in turn lead to erroneous identifications);
30. Marvin E. Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1031, 1036 (1975) (characterizing the truth-determining ability of the adversarial process as "untested" and lawyers' belief in it as "self-congratulat[ory]").
31. See, e.g., United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 313 (1998) ("'[T]he Jury is the liedetector.'") (quoting United States v. Barnard, 490 F.2d 907, 912 (9th Cir. 1973));
32. United States v. Thompson, 615 F.2d 329, 332 (5th Cir. 1980) (describing the jury's function as "credibility determination");
33. Bloom v. People, 185 P.3d 797, 807 (Colo. 2008) ("[P]olygraph evidence [is inadmissible because it] will prejudice the jury's evaluation of a witness's credibility.");
34. State v. Christiansen, 163 P.3d 1175, 1180 (Idaho 2007) ("'(Jurors] are the judges of the credibility of witnesses.'" (quoting People v. Barnes, 9 P. 532, 533 (Idaho 1886));
35. State v. Myers, 382 N.W.2d 91, 95 (Iowa 1986) ("[W]eighing the truthful ness of a witness is a matter reserved exclusively to the fact finder.");
36. State v. Lyon, 744 P.2d 231, 240 (Or. 1987) (Linde.J., concurring) ("The cherished courtroom drama of confrontation, oral testimony and cross-examination is designed to let a jury pass judgment on [parties' and witnesses'] truthfulness and on the accuracy of their testimony.").
37. See generally Fisher, supra note 13 (offering a comprehensive historical account of the rise of the jury as lie detector in the American legal system).
38. See, e.g., James P. Timony, Demeanor Credibility, 49 CATH. U. L. REV. 903, 907-913 (2000) (discussing the various criteria that constitute credibility evidence, including demeanor, reputation for truthfulness, prior inconsistent statement, contradiction, and corroboration).
39. See generally ALDERT VRIJ, DETECTING LIES AND DECEIT: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF LYING AND THE IMPUCATIONS FOR PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE (2000);
40. Jeremy A. Blumenthal, A Wipe of the Hands, a Lick of the Lips: The Validity of Demeanor Evidence in Assessing Witness Credibility, 72 NEBR. L. REV. 1157, 1190-1197 (1993);
41. Olin Guy Wellborn III, Demeanor, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1075, 1082-1088 (1991).
42. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (holding that scientific evidence must use methods generally accepted in die relevant scientific community in order to be admissible).
43. Don Grubin & Lars Mardin, Lie Detection and the Polygraph: A Historical Review, 16 J. FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY & PSYCHOL. 357, 359-360 (2005).
44. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE POLYGRAPH AND LIE DETECTION 295 (2003).
45. Polygraph evidence is per se inadmissible in many jurisdictions. See, e.g., United States v. Gilliard, 133 F.3d 809, 815 (11th Cir. 1998);
46. United States v. Sanchez, 118 F.3d 192, 197 (4th Cir. 1997);
47. State v. Jones, 753 N.W.2d 677, 690 (Minn. 2008). Other jurisdictions condition the admission of polygraph evidence on the stipulation of die parties. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 351.1 (1995);
48. Brown v. Darcy, 783 F.2d 1389, 1395 (9th Cir. 1986);
49. Wilkins v. State, 190 P.3d 957, 970 (Kan. 2008). New Mexico is die most prominent exception.
50. See N.M. R. EVID. 11-707 (permitting the admission of polygraph evidence to prove the "die trudifulness of any person called as a witness"). But other jurisdictions also express some increased sympathy to polygraph use.
51. See, e.g., United States v. Cordoba, 104 F.3d 225, 228 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that a per se exclusion of polygraph evidence does not survive Daubert);
52. Rupe v. Wood, 93 F.3d 1434, 1437 (9th Cir. 1996) (allowing defen dant to use polygraph evidence at sentencing hearing);
53. United States v. Galbreth, 908 F. Supp. 877, 896 (D.N.M. 1995) (allowing polygraph evidence if examiner is properly qualified);
54. Commonwealth v. Duguay, 720 N.E.2d 458, 463 (Mass. 1999) (requiring die reliability of polygraphic evidence to " 'be established by proof in a given case that a qualified tester who conducted die test had in similar circumstances demonstrated ⋯ die high level of accuracy of the conclusions that the tester reached in diose tests'").tos Davatzikos et al., Classifying Spatial Patterns of Brain Activity with Machine Learning Meth-24
55. 509 U.S. 579, 589-90 (1993) (holding that Federal Rule of Evidence 702 displaced the Frye standard and instructing trial judges to "screen[ ] ⋯ scientific testimony or evidence" for both legal relevance and scientific validity). The Supreme Court added further refinements in Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147 (1999) (holding that trial courts' gatekeeping obligations under Daubert extend to nonscientific expert testimony), and General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 138-39 (1997) (declaring "abuse of discretion" the appropriate standard in "reviewing a trial court's decision to admit or exclude expert testimony under [Daubert]" (quoting Commonwealth v. Stewart, 663 N.E.2d 255 (Mass. 1996))).
56. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-594
57. See CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE 701-702 (4th ed. 2009) (describing continuing exclusion of most polygraph evidence).
58. See also supra note 23.
59. Marcus E. Raichle, A Brief History of Human Brain Mapping, 32 TRENDS IN NEUROSCIENCE 118, 118 (2008) ("Cognitive neuroscience combines the experimental strategies of cognitive psychology with various techniques to actually examine how brain function sup ports mental activities.").
60. For accessible explanations of fMRI, see SCOTT A. HUETTEL, ALLEN W. SONG, &GREGORY MCCARTHY, FUNCTIONAL MAGNETIC RESONANCE IMAGINC (2004); Raichle, supra note 27, at 118-125
61. See Teneille Brown & Emily Murphy, Through a Scanner Darkly: Functional Neuroimaging as Evidence of a Criminal Defendant's Past Mental States, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1119, 1190 (2010);
62. Matthew Baptiste Holloway, One Image, One Thousand Incriminating Words: Images of Brain Activity and the Privilege Against Self-incrimination, 27 TEMP. J. SCI. TECH. & ENVTL. L. 141, 146 (2008).
63. Holloway, supra note 29, at 145-146
64. The literature is large and growing. Some studies claim to have produced positive conclusions regarding the capabilities of neuroscience-based lie detection. See, e.g., Christos Davatzikos et al., Classifying Spatial Patterns of Brain Activity with Machine Learning Methods: Application to Lie Detection, 28 NEUROIMAGE 663, 667-668 (2005) (concluding that a nonlinear pattern classification method can detect patterns of brain activity associated with lying);
65. G. Ganis et al., Neural Correlates of Different Types of Deception: An fMPJ Investigation, 13 CEREBRAL CORTEX 830, 832-838 (2003) (yielding results that "show that different patterns of brain activation arise when people tell lies than when they tell the truth");
66. Joshua D. Greene & Joseph M. Paxton, Patterns of Neural Activity Associated with Honest and Dishonest Moral Decisions, 106 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SCI. U. S. 12506, 12509-12510 (2009) (suggesting that individual differences in brain "control network activity" are associated with differences in presence of dishonest behavior);
67. F. Andrew Kozel, Tamara M. Padgett &: Mark George, Brief Communication, A Replication Study of the Neural Correlates of Deception, 118 BEHAV. NEUROSCIENCE 852, 855 (2004) (finding that "[f]or lying, compared with telling the truth, there is more activation in the right anterior cingulate, right inferior frontal, right orbitofrontal, right middle frontal, and left middle temporal areas");
68. F. Andrew Kozel et al., Detecting Deception Using Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging, 58 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 605, 611 (2005) [hereinafter Detecting Deception] (concluding that "fMRI can be used to detect deception within a cooperative individual");
69. Andrew Kozel et al., A Pilot Study of Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging Brain Correlates of Deception in Healthy Young Men, 16 J. NEUROPSYCHIATRY & CLINICAL NEUROSCIENCE 295, 304 (2004) (concluding that using blood oxygen level dependent fMRI "to investigate brain changes associated with deception is ⋯ possible");
70. Daniel D. Langleben et al., Telling Truth from Lie in Individual Subjects with Fast Event-Related fMRI, 26 HUM. BRAIN MAPPING 262, 271 (2005) [hereinafter Telling Truth] (concluding that fMRI images may be able to distinguish a truth from a lie on the basis that a lie "appears to be a more working memory-intensive activity, characterized by increased activation of the inferolateral cortex implicated in response selection, inhibition, and generation");
71. D. D. Langleben et al., Rapid Communication, Brain Activity During Simulated Deception: An Event-Related Functional Magnetic Resonance Study, 15 NEUROIMAGE 727, 730-731 (2002) (finding a "neurophysiological difference between deception and truth");
72. Tatia M.C. Lee et al., Neural Correlates of Feigned Memory Impairment, 28 NEUROIMAGE 305, 310-12 (2005); Tatia M.C. Lee et al., Lie Detection by Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging, 15 HUM. BRAIN MAPPING 157, 161-63 (2002) (concluding that it is "unfeasible" to control one's cerebral activity to avoid lie detection);
73. Donald H. Marks, Mehdi Adineh & Sudeepa Gupta, Determination of Truth From Deception Using Functional MRI and Cognitive Engrams, 5 INTERNET J. RADIOLOGY 1 (2006), http://www.ispub.com/journal/the-internet-journal-of- radiology/volume-5-number-1-35/article/determination-of-truth-from-deception- using-functional-mri-and-cognitive-engrams.html (showing that "specific activation patterns occur in the brain of individuals looking at specific pictures, and also whether they are contemplating giving a truthful or a deceptive response");
74. Feroze B. Mohamed et al., Brain Mapping of Deception and Truth Telling about an Ecologically Valid Situation: Functional MR Imaging and Polygraph Investigation - Initial Experience, 238 RADIOLOGY 679, 679 (2006) (concluding that "[s]pecific areas of the brain involved in deception or truth telling can be depicted with functional MR imaging");
75. Jennifer Maria Nuñez et al., Intentional False Responding Shares Neural Substrates with Response Conflict and Cognitive Control, 25 NEUROIMAGE 267, 273-276 (2005) (finding certain brain regions to be "significantly more active when falsifying information as compared to when answering truthfully");
76. Sean A. Spence et al., Speaking of Secrets and Lies: The Contribution of Ventrolateral Prefrontal Cortex to Vocal Deception, 40 NEUROIMAGE 1411, 1415-1418 (2008);
77. Sean A. Spence et al., Behavioural and Functional Anatomical Correlates of Deception in Humans, 12 NEUROREPORT 2849, 2851-2852 (2001) (finding that individuals telling lies have increased response times and increased activation in specific regions of the brain).
78. See No Lie MRI Homepage, http://www.noliemri.com (last visited Apr. 10, 2010).
79. See Cephos Homepage, http://www.cephoscorp.com (last visited Apr. 10, 2010).
80. See, e.g., Lawrence A. Farwell & Sharon S. Smith, Using Brain MERMER to Detect Knowledge Despite Efforts to Conceal, 46 J. FORENSIC SCI. 135, 135-37, 142 (2001).
81. PAUL EKMAN, TELLING LIES: CLUES TO DECEIT IN THE MARKETPLACE, POLITICS, AND MARRIAGE 123-161 (rev. ed. 2009).
82. See Lie to Me Homepage, http://www.fox.com/lietome/about (last visited Apr. 10, 2010).
83. See, e.g., I. Pavlidis & J. Levine, Monitoring of Periorbital Blood Flow Rate Through Thermal Image Analysis and Its Application to Polygraph Testing, 3 PROC. 23RD ANN. INT'L CONF. IEEE ENGINEERING MED. & BIOLOGY SOC'Y 2826, 2829 (2001).
84. See, e.g., Britton Chance et al., A Novel Method for Fast Imaging of Brain Function, NonInvasively, with Light, 2 OPTICS EXPRESS 411, 413 (1998).
85. Henry T. Greely & Judy Illes, Neuroscience-Based Lie Detection: The Urgent Need for Regulation, 33 AM. J. L. & MED. 377, 395-404 (2007).
86. See atojane Campbell Moriarty, Visions of Deception: Neuroimages and the Search for Truth, 42 AKRON L. REV. 739, 758-761 (2009) (arguing that fMRI-based lie detection satisfies neither Frye nor Daubert standards);
87. Michael S. Pardo, Neuroscience Evidence, Legal Culture, and Criminal Procedure, 33 AM. J. CRIM. L. 301, 311-320 (2006) (detailing conceptual, empirical, and practical limitations of fMRI-based lie detection for use in the courtroom).
88. Greely & Illes, supra note 39, at 413.
89. Nancy Kanwisher, The Use of JMRI Lie Detection: What Has Been Shown and What Has Not, in USING IMAGING TO IDENTIFY DECEIT: SCIENTIFIC AND ETHICAL QUESTIONS 7, 12 (2009). Kanwisher's use of "compelling" to set her threshold for usability is noteworthy because much of the question of fMRI's legal use depends precisely on how strong the case must be for fMRI-based lie detection before its use is permissible. To assert that the case must be compelling is thus to impose a very high burden, but why the burden should be as high as requiring "compelling" evidence, as opposed to, say, "plausible" evidence, "some" evi dence, or "more persuasive than not" evidence, is unclear. Much that follows in this Essay is exacdy about diis issue, but it is important to recognize that those who insist at the outset that the evidence be compelling have stacked die deck by, in essence, assuming the conclusion.
90. Marcus E. Raichle, An Introduction to Functional Brain Imaging in the Context of Lie Detection, in USING IMAGING TO IDENTIFY DECEIT, supra note 41, at 3, 6.
91. Elizabeth A. Phelps, Lying Outside the Laboratory: The Impact of Imagery and Emotion on the Neural Circuitry of Lie Detection, in USING IMAGING TO IDENTIFY DECEIT, supra note 41, at 14, 20.
92. Editorial, Deceiving the Law, 11 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 1231,1231 (2008) ("There is little evidence to indicate that the newer [fMRI-based] lie-detection technologies ⋯ work well enough to detect deception accurately on an individual level with an error rate that is low enough to be anywhere near acceptable in court.").
93. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, EMERGING COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE AND RELATED TECHNOLOGIES 37 (2008) (concluding diat "there has not yet been sufficient systematic research to determine if functional neuroimaging can meet die challenges to the neurophysiological detection of psychological states relevant to decepdon").
94. See, e.g., James R. Merikangas, Commentary: Functional MRI Lie Detection, 36 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 499, 499-501 (2008) (concluding that fMRI lie detection technol ogy does not meet the Daubert criteria for courtroom testimony);
95. Michael S. Gazzaniga, The Law and Neuroscience, 60 NEURON 412, 413, 415 (2008) (cautioning against die introduction of neuroscience-based lie detection evidence because jurors and judges may erroneously accept such evidence as legally dispositive);
96. Jed S. Rakoff, Lie Detection in the Courts: The Vain Search for the Magic Bullet, in USING IMACING TO IDENTIFY DECEIT, supra note 41, at 40, 44 (arguing that neuroscience-based lie detection "suffers from several defects that would render such evidence inadmissible under [Federal Rule of Evidence] 702");
97. Joseph R. Simpson, Functional MRI Lie Detection: Too Good to Be True?, 36 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 491, 493 (2008) ("[H]ow well fMRI lie detection would work in real-life situations remains an open question.");
98. Sean A. Spence, Playing Devil's Advocate: The Case Against JMRI Lie Detection, 13 LEGAL & CRIMINOLOGICAL PSYCH. 11,11 (2008) (suggesting that fMRI-based lie detection is inapplicable to the "real world" and lacks scientific reliability because no fMRI-based lie detection study has been replicated).
99. For a discussion and definitions of scientific reliability and validity, albeit not iden tical to the usages here and in some of the relevant scientific literature, see JOHN MONAHAN & LAURENS WALKER, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAW 57-67 (6th ed. 2006).
100. Greely & Illes, supra note 39, at 403-04 (noting the "artificiality of the deceptive tasks" in fMRI studies and claiming that they bear no resemblance to lying in the real world). A similar argument is that "[r]eports of finding brain patterns of activation corre sponding to 'deception' almost always use subjects (often university students) who are told to lie about something (usually a relatively unimportant matter). Equating the lies told in such an artificial setting to the kinds of lies people tell in reality is pure fantasy at this point." Deceiving the Law, supra note 44, at 1231.
101. See, e.g., Kanwisher, supra note 41, at 12 (noting that a laboratory subject who lies because he is "instructed to do so" is not lying); Greely & Illes, supra note 39, at 403-404
102. Greely & Illes, supra note 39, at 402-404
103. Critics claim that subjects can foil fMRI readings through detectable countermeasures, such as moving their tongues around, and undetectable countermeasures, such as performing simple mental arithmetic.
104. See Kanwisher, supra note 41, at 12.
105. See also Greely & Illes, supra note 39, at 404-405
106. Kanwisher, supra note 41, at 13.
107. For example, Christos Davatzikos, the lead researcher of the Davatzikos study, supra note 31, serves on the Science Board of No Lie MRI. See No Lie MRI Scientific Board, http://noliemri.com/aboutUs/ScienceBoard.htm (last visited Apr. 10 2010). Similarly, Frank Kozel, the lead researcher of the three Kozel studies, supra note 31, serves as a scien tific advisor for Cephos.
108. See Cephos Scientific Advisors, http://cephoscorp.com/about-us/index. php#scientific (last visited Apr. 10, 2010). Finally, No Lie MRI uses technology and methods under a license from Daniel Langleben, lead researcher on many other studies, supra note 31.
109. See No Lie MRI Patents, http://www.noliemri.com/investors/Patents. htm(last visited Apr. 10, 2010).
110. Detecting Deception, supra note 31, at 610.
111. See also Davatzikos, supra note 31, at 663 (88%);
112. Telling Truth, supra note 31, at 262 (78%).
113. Henry T. Greely, Neuroscience-Based Lie Detection: The Need for Regulation, in USING IMAGINC TO IDENTIFY DECEIT, supra note 41, at 46, 51 (arguing tihat reported accuracy rates should be "taken with a grain of salt" because the actual accuracy of fMRI lie detection on "diverse subjects in realistic settings, with or without countermeasures" is unknown).
114. See Dale A. Nance, Reliability and the Admissibility of Experts, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 191, 203 (2003) (urging the use of legal standards in evaluating scientific expertise)
115. See, e.g., Kanwisher, supra note 41, at 12 (noting that the stakes of lie detection in the real world are "prison, or life, or life in prison").
116. Deborah Halber, Scientists: A Good Lie Detector Is Hard to Find, MIT NEWS, Feb. 12, 2007, http://web.mit.edu/newsoffice/2007/lying.html (quoting Nancy Kanishwer, Professor of Brain and Cognitive Sciences at MIT).
117. Id.
118. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761 (1966) (holding that the Fifth Amendment does not apply to physical, nontestimonial evidence taken from a suspect).
119. Id. at 763-764
120. The Fifth Amendment issues are discussed in Benjamin Holley, It's All in Your Head: Neurotechnological Lie Detection and the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, 28 DEV. MENTAL HEALTH L. 1, 14-22 (2009)
121. Sarah E. Stoller & Paul Root Wolpe, Emerging Neurotechnologies for Lie Detection and the Fifth Amendment, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 359, 365-74 (2007).
122. A case in Mumbai, India has fueled this worry because the prosecution successfully used an involuntary fMRI scan to challenge the veracity of a criminal defendant. See Deceiving the Law, supra note 44, at 1231.
123. Commentators have described the evidence that a criminal defendant needs to raise a reasonable doubt as "slight." Michael H. Graham, Burdens of Proof and Presumptionsin Criminal Cases, 45 CRIM. L. BULL. 192 (2009).
124. Note that the accuracy rate for identifying truth may differ from the accuracy rate for identifying a lie. Suppose a defendant claims that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed and that an fMRI indicates he is telling the truth. On the existing state of the research, this fMRI result is more reliable - has a smaller likelihood of error - than an fMRI result that indicates that the defendant's statement was false. See Kanwisher, supra note 41, at 11. In other words, FMRI identifies truths as lies less often than it identifies lies as truths.
125. 523 U.S. 303 (1998).
126. id. at 306.
127. Military Rule of Evidence 707 prohibits the admission of any lie-detection technology in military trials.
128. See MIL. R. EVID. 707;
129. see also Scheffer 523 U.S. at 306-307
130. U.S. CONST, amend. V.
131. U.S. CONST, amend. VI.
132. See 523 U.S. at 320 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
133. Id. at 318-320 (Kennedy, J. (joined by Justices O'Connor, Ginsburg, and Breyer), concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
134. Id. at 317.
135. Id. at 309.
136. See Erica Beecher-Monas, A Ray of Light forjudges Blinded by Science: Triers of Science and Intellectual Due Process, 33 GA. L. REV. 1047, 1062 (1999) (arguing that reliability "is not an all-or-nothing proposition, but rather depends on the application of the evidence and the acceptable risk of error").
137. See, e.g., United States v. Beasley, 102 F.3d 1440, 1444-1448 (8th Cir. 1996) (ruling that polymerase chain reaction DNA testing satisfied Daubert standards);
138. United States v. Cuff, 37 F. Supp. 2d 279, 280-283 (S. D. N. Y. 1999) (denying motion in limine to exclude DNA evidence);
139. State v. Bartylla, 755 N.W.2d 8, 12, 14-20 (Minn. 2008) (upholding conviction where DNA "'cold hit' match" linked DNA profile of defendant with DNA of perpetra tor that police collected at crime scene).
140. 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 185, at 729 (Kenneth S. Broun ed., 6th ed. 2006).
141. See also Judson F. Falknor, Extrinsic Policies Affecting Admissibility, 10 RUTGERS L. REV. 574, 576 (1956) ("[I]t is not to be supposed that every witness can make a home run.").
142. For more on the confusion of admissibility and sufficiency, see Dale A. Nance, Conditional Relevance Reinterpreted, 70 B.U. L. REV. 447, 449-459 (1990).
143. See United States v. Glynn, 578 F. Supp. 2d 567, 574-575 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (holding that ballistics evidence is admissible in a criminal case even if it only makes a proposition"'more likely dian not'");
144. In re Ephedra Products Liability Litigation, 393 F. Supp. 2d 181, 187-188 (S. D. N. Y. 2005) (rejecting the argument that scientific expert testimony must be supported by "definitive scientific proof").
145. For an extended argument in favor of asymmetry between prosecution and defense in the standards for admission of scientific evidence, see CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PROVING THE UNPROVABLE: THE ROLE OF LAW, SCIENCE, AND SPECULATION IN ADJUDICATING CULPABIL ITY AND DANGEROUSNESS 131-144 (2007);
146. compare Aaron Katz, A "Moving Bar" Approach to Assessing the Admissibility of Expert Causation Testimony, 57 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 579, 601 (2009) (urging that the reliability requirement of Daubert And Joiner vary depending on the nature of the case in which the issue arises). The strongest response to the argument for asymme try is that the presumption of innocence and the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt burden of proof already incorporate the justifiable, defendant-skewed epistemic goals of the criminal justice system and that overlaying special evidentiary burdens on the prosecution (or spe cial evidentiary benefits on the defense) would be a form of double counting.
147. See LARRY LAUDAN, TRUTH, ERROR, AND THE CRIMINAL LAW: AN ESSAY IN LEGAL EPISTEMOLOGY 123-128, 144 (2006). But this argument rests on the assumption, perhaps justified but perhaps not, that the existing standard of proof achieves the socially proper distribution of errors of false acquittal and false conviction. If it does not, then, given the historical provenance of the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard, adjusting the results of that standard through other evidentiary, substantive, or procedural devices hardly seems inappropriate. Nor is there reason to believe that the best way to achieve the optimal distribution of error is with one burden of proof rule rather than a combination of multiple evidentiary and procedu ral rules.
148. See Raphael M. Goldman & Alvin I. Goldman, Review of Truth, Error and the Criminal Law: An Essay in Legal Epistemology, by Larry Laudan, 15 LEGAL THEORY 55, 59-60 (2009) (book review);
149. Michael S. Pardo, On Misshapen Stones and Criminal Law's Epis temology, 86 TEXAS L. REV. 347, 371-74 (2007) (reviewing LAUDAN, TRUTH, ERROR, AND THE CRIMINAL LAW, supra). Regardless of the outcome of the debate about asymmetry, how ever, the very existence of the debate and the terms on which it is conducted demonstrate the folly of trying to determine questions of the legal usability of evidence without taking legal goals and legal standards into account.
150. See In re Winship, 379 U.S. 358, 371 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) ("In a civil suit between two private parties for money damages, for example, we view it as no more serious in general for there to be an erroneous verdict in the defendant's favor than for there to be an erroneous verdict in the plaintiffs favor."). On the decision-theoretic aspects of burdens of proof in civil cases in general
151. see James Brook, Inevitable Errors: The Preponder ance of the Evidence Standard in Civil Litigation, 18 TULSA LJ. 79 (1982);
152. Bruce L. Hay & Kathryn E. Spier, Burdens of Proof in Civil Litigation: An Economic Perspective, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 413 (1997);
153. John Kaplan, Decision Theory and the Factfinding Process, 20 STAN. L. REV. 1065 (1968);
154. Dale A. Nance, Civility and the Burden of Proof, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 647 (1994);
155. Frederick Schauer & Richard Zeckhauser, On the Degree of Confidence for Adverse Decisions, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 27 (1996). Ronald Allen challenges the conventional view about burdens in civil cases, arguing, correctly, that because the plaintiff must typically prove each of the multiple elements of a cause of action by a preponderance of the evidence, the actual burden on the plaintiff is substantially higher than that on the defen dant.
156. See Ronald J. Allen, The Nature of Juridical Proof, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 373 (1991);
157. Ronald J. Allen, A Reconceptualization of Civil Trials, 66 B.U. L. REV. 401 (1986).
158. See supra notes 39-55 and accompanying text.
159. Nance, supra note 56, at 200;
160. See also Beecher-Monas, supra note 75, at 1062.
161. See, e.g., KENNETH R. FOSTER & PETER W. HUBER, JUDGING SCIENCE: SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE AND THE FEDERAL COURTS 17 (1997) ("[D]ecisions about validity depend on the needs one has for the data.").
162. See, e.g., Craig A. Anderson, James J. Lindsay, & Brad J. Bushman, Research in the Psychological Laboratory: Truth or Triviality, 8 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 3, 3 (1999).
163. Id. at 7.
164. Id. at 5.
165. See Greene & Paxton, supra note 31, at 12506-12507 (describing an fMRI study that provided an incentive to subjects to engage in dishonesty but instructed subjects to tell the truth).
166. See, e.g., Simpson, supra note 46, at 494 ("All of the published literature involves scenarios in which the volunteer subjects have been instructed to lie.").
167. See, e.g., Greely & Illes, supra note 39, at 403-404 (arguing that "[i]t is not clear how this difference [i.e., the lie instruction] from the more usual lie detection settings would affect the results" of the experiments);
168. Kanwisher, supra note 41, at 12.
169. See, e.g., Simpson, supra note 46, at 494 ("No literature addresses the question of how this basic fact [i.e., the command to lie] affects brain activation patterns, in comparison with the more realistic situation in which the person being tested makes a completely free decision about whether to lie ⋯ .").
170. See David H. Kaye, Statistical Significance and the Burden of Persuasion, 46 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 13, 20 (1983) ("'Typically, a scientist will not so certify evidence unless the probability of error, by standard statistical measurement, is less than 5%.'" (quoting EthylCorp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 28 n.58 (D.C. Cir. 1975)).
171. See also Raichle, supra note 42, at 5 (equating scientific "validity" with "high statistical quality").
172. For a description of and support for the "story model,"
173. see INSIDE THE JUROR: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUROR DECISION MAKING (Reid Hastie ed., 1993);
174. Reid Hastie, The Role of "Stories" In Civil Jury Judgments, 32 UNIV. MICH. J.L. REFORM 227, 229-231 (1999);
175. Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, A Cognitive Theory of Juror Decision Making The Story Model, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 519 (1991);
176. Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, The Story Model for Juror Decision Making, in INSIDE THE JUROR 192-221 (Reid Hastie ed., 1993).
177. See Amalia Amaya, Inference to the Best Legal Explanation, in LEGAL EVIDENCE AND PROOF: STATISTICS, STORIES, LOGIC 135, 138 (Hendrik Kaptein, Henry Prakken & Bart Verheij eds., 2009) (describing inference to die best explanation in the law "as an 'infer ence to the most coherent theory of the case'");
178. Michael S. Pardo & Ronald J. Allen, Juridical Proof and the Best Explanation, 27 LAW & PHIL. 223, 225 (2008) (arguing that "the process
179. Bayesian approaches, inherendy more incremental and dius less holistic, provide "a framework for quantifying uncertainty and mediods for revising uncertainty measures in the light of acquired evidence." Stephen E. Fienberg & Mark J. Schervish, The Relevance of Bayesian Inference for the Presentation of Statistical Evidence and for Legal Decisionmaking, 66 B. U. L. REV. 771, 773 (1986);
180. Alvin I. Goldman, Quasi-Objective Bayesianism and Legal Evidence, 42 JURIMETRICS 237 (2002).
181. See, e.g., Hancock v. Mid-South Mgmt. Co., 673 S. E. 2d 801, 803 (S. C. 2009) ("[I]n cases applying the preponderance of the evidence burden of proof, the non-moving party is only required to submit a mere scintilla of evidence in order to widistand a motion for summary judgment.")
182. See, e. g., De La Fuente II v. FDIC, 332 F. 3d 1208, 1220 (9th Cir. 2003).
183. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-22 (1968).
184. U.S. CONST, amend. IV.
185. For an example of an argument that misleading evidence persuades juries, see Walter Sinnott-Armstrong et al., Brain Images as Legal Evidence, 5 EPISTEME 359, 367-370 (2008). On juror incompetence more generally,
186. see Michael S.Jacobs, Testing the Assumptions Un derlying the Debate About Scientific Evidence: A Closer Look at Juror "Incompetence" and Scientific "Objectivity,"25 CONN. L. REV. 1083, 1086-1088 (1993).
187. See, e.g., Gazzaniga, supra note 46, at 413 (cautioning against the "undisciplined" use of neuroscience evidence since jurors tend to "over-accept[ ]" such findings "and even prematurely grant[ ] the status of sheer truth to some").
188. See Frederick Schauer, On the Supposed Jury-Dependence of Evidence Law, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 165, 172-175 (2006).
189. See LAUDAN, supra note 80, at 214-215 For good summaries of the existing primary research, much of which suggests that juries are not nearly as inept at evaluating scientific or expert evidence as is often supposed
190. see NEIL VIDMAR & VALERIE P. HANS, AMERICAN JURIES: THE VERDICT 177-80 (2007);
191. Richard D. Friedman, Minimizing the Jury Over-Valua tion Concern, 2003 MICH. ST. L. REV. 967, 982-86 (2003);
192. Jacobs, supra note 100, at 1086-93;
193. Daniel A. Krauss & Bruce D. Sales, The Effects of Clinical and Scientific Expert Testimony on Juror Decision Making in Capital Sentencing, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 267, 273-277 (2001);
194. Rich ard O. Lempert, Civil Juries and Complex Cases: Taking Stock After Twelve Years, in VERDICT: ASSESSINC THE CIVILJURY SYSTEM 181, 230-235 (Robert E. Litan ed. 1993);
195. Dale A. Nance & Scott B. Morris, An Empirical Assessment of Presentation Formats for Trace Evidence with a Rela tively Large and Quantifiable Random Match Probability, 42 JURIMETRICS 403, 404 (2002);
196. Neil Vidmar & Shari Seidman Diamond, Juries and Expert Evidence, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 1121, 1149-1166 (2001).
197. See also Cheryl Boudreau & Mathew D. McCubbins, Competition in the Courtroom: When Does Expert Testimony Improve Jurors' Decisions?, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 793, 814-815 (2009) (finding that juror comprehension of expert testimony can increase when opposing experts exchange reasons with each other);
198. Joseph Sanders, The Merits of the Paternalistic Justification for Restrictions on the Admissibility of Expert Evidence, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 881, 908-10, 936-938 (2003) (endorsing the jury overvaluation worry but basing it more on problems of complexity of evidence rather man on jury misunderstanding of science or expertise and suggesting that even complexity may not present insurmountable problems).
199. See David P. McCabe & Alan D. Castel, Seeing is Believing The Effect of Brain Images on Judgments of Scientific Reasoning, 107 COGNITION 343, 349-351 (2008) (concluding that "there is, indeed, something special about the brain images with respect to influencing judgments of scientific credibility");
200. Deena Skolnick Weisberg et al., The Seductive Allure of Neuroscience Explanations, 20 J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 470, 475-477 (2008) (finding that "logically irrelevant neuroscience information can be seductive - it can have much more of an impact on participants'judgments than it ought to").
201. See Weisberg et al., supra note 104, at 471-72, 475-77. The term "neurobabble" comes from Sinnott-Armstrong et al., supra note 100, at 368.
202. McCabe & Castel, supra note 104, at 345-47, 349-351 ("The use of brain images to represent the level of brain activity associated widi cognitive processes influenced ratings of the scientific merit of the reported research, compared to identical articles including no image, a bar graph, or a topographical map.").
203. Jessica R. Gurley & David K. Marcus, The Effects of Neuroimaging and Brain Injury on Insanity Defenses, 26 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 85, 93-95 (2008) ("The addition of neuroimages showing brain damage increased the likelihood of a [not guilty by reason of insanity] verdict.").
204. See Adina L. Roskies, Are Neuroimages Like Photographs of the Brain?, 74 PHIL. SCI. 860, 868 (2007) (criticizing the conflation of photography and neuroimaging);
205. Sinnott-Arm strong et al., supra note 100, at 367-368 (discussing the impact of photographic evidence). On the distorting effect of photographs generally)
206. see David A. Bright & Jane Goodman- Delahunty, Gruesome Evidence and Emotion: Anger, Blame, and Jury Decision-Making, 30 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 183 (2006), and on the distorting effect of colored images,
207. see Aura Hanna & Roger Remington, The Representation of Color and Form in Long-Term Memory, 24 MEMORY & COGNITION 322, 328-329 (1996).
208. See supra note 103.
209. See Schauer, supra note 102, at 166 n. 3.
210. See id. at 172 & n. 31.
211. Justice Stevens notes and responds to this objection in United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 338 n.29 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing against the proposition that allowing the defendant to admit exculpatory polygraph evidence would result in permitting the prosecution "to introduce inculpatory test results").
212. See supra notes 18-19.
213. See Charles F. Bond, Jr. & Bella M. DePaulo, Accuracy of Deception Judgments, 10 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCH. REV. 214, 214, 217 (2006);
214. see also Maureen O'Sullivan, Why Most People Parse Palters, Fibs, Lies, Whoppers, and Other Deceptions Poorly, in DECEPTION, supra note 10, at 74;
215. Aldert Vrij et al., Increasing Cognitive Load to Facilitate Lie Detection: The Benefit of Recalling an Event in Reverse Order, 32 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 253, 253 (2008).
216. FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(1).
217. FED. R. EVID. 608(a).
218. Id.
219. See sources cited supra note 9.
220. See also Margaret A. Berger, Upsetting the Balance Between Adverse Interests: The Impact of the Supreme Court's Trilogy on Expert Testimony in Toxic Tort Litigation, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289, 300-302 (2001) (distinguishing legal and scientific standards of causation).
221. See DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., SCIENCE IN THE LAW: STANDARDS, STATISTICS AND RESEARCH ISSUES § 1-3.5.1 (2002) (determining value of scientific expert opinion "is a matter of policy, not science").
222. See supra note 24.
223. See, e.g., United States v. Starzecpyzel, 880 F. Supp. 1027, 1039 (S.D.N.Y. 1995);
224. JOSEPH SANDERS, BENECTIN ON TRIAL: A STUDY OF MASS TORT LITIGATION 210 (1998).
225. 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
226. On the junk science problem generally, see PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM (1991).
227. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD 127-182 (2009).
228. See, e.g., United States v. Monteiro, 407 F. Supp. 2d 351, 355 (D. Mass. 2006) (ex cluding ballistics testimony);
229. United States v. Green, 405 F.2d 104, 120-122 (D. Mass. 2005)(same);
230. cf Robert Epstein, Fingerprints Meet Daubert: The Myth of Fingerprint "Science" is Revealed, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 605 (2002) (questioning scientific basis for fingerprint matching).
231. See Michael J. Saks, Explaining the Tension Between the Supreme Court's Embrace of Validity as the Touchstone of Admissibility of Expert Testimony and Lower Courts' (Seeming) Rejection of Same, 5 EPISTEME 329, 330-332 (2008) ("[F]orensic science evidence stands on a foundation more of impressions and faith than of science.");
232. Michael J. Saks, Merlin and Solomon: Les sons from the Law's Formative Encounters with Forensic Identification Science, 49 HASTINGS LJ. 1069, 1094-1127 (1998).
233. Indeed, Justice Stevens acknowledged the view that Daubert addressed the too easy acceptance of "junk science." See General Electric v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 153 n.6 (1997) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
234. See also, e.g., Maxine D. Goodman, A Hedgehog on the Witness Stand - What's the Big Idea: The Challenges of Using Daubert to Assess Social Science and Nonscientific Testimony, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 635, 645 & n.43 (2010) (noting that Daubert addressed the problem of junk science).
235. See Richard D. Friedman, Squeezing Daubert Out of the Picture, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 1047, 1053-1056 (2003);
236. Nance, supra note 56, at 252;
237. Michael S. Pardo, Evidence Theory and the NAS Report on Forensic Science, 2010 UTAH L. REV. (fordicoming 2010) (manuscript at 23-24), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1511719. For the related argument that standards for the authentication of documents are better understood and determined as matters of evidentiary sufficiency,
238. see Lawrence A. Alexander & Elaine A. Alexander, The Authentication of Documents Requirement: Barrier to Falsehood or to Truth?, 10 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 266, 278-279 (1973).
239. See supra notes 115-117
240. This realization may be why Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael made clear that al though Daubert's broad concept of reliability is applicable to all expert testimony, using the norms of science to evaluate reliability is only necessary when the proposed evidence or testimony purports to be scientific.
241. See 526 U. S. 137, 151-152 (1999);
242. see also supra note 79 and accompanying text.
243. See ROBERT J. LEVINE, THE ETHICS AND REGULATION OF CLINICAL RESEARCH 185-213 (2d ed. 1986);
244. Sharona Hoffman, The Use of Placebos in Clinical Trials: Responsible Research or Unethical Practice?, 33 CONN. L. REV. 449, 451 (2001).
245. SINCLAIR LEWIS, ARROWSMITH (1925).
246. The obligation of law simply to reach a decision and the inability of law to postpone a judgment until better evidence is available are especially important in this context.
247. See Neil B. Cohen, The Gatekeeping Role in Civil Litigation and the Abdication of Legal Values in Favor of Scientific Values, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 943, 947-948 (2003).
248. When I suggest that the decision about the use or nonuse of neuroscience-based lie detection for trial or forensic purposes must be made according to legal standards, I do not also mean to suggest that the decision should be made solely by lawyers and judges. Committees or other decision-making processes which represent both legal and scientific professionals would be preferable to leaving the decision solely to legal professionals or solely to scientists. My principal concern in diis paper is to argue against the view that only scientists applying scientific criteria should decide on the appropriate uses for science or its conclusions.
249. See FREDERICK SCHAUER, THINKING LIKE A LAWYER: A NEW INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 211-212 (2009).
250. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *358.
251. See also Alexander Volokh, Aside, n Guilty Men, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 173 (1997). Modern analyses of the Blackstonian maxim have understood, properly, that we should be interested in the consequences or utilities of four and not just two different outcomes - true convictions, false convictions, true acquit tals, and false acquittals.
252. See Alan Cullison, Probability Analysis of Judicial Facl-Finding: A Preliminary Outline of the Subjective Approach, 1 U. TOL. L. REV. 538, 564-568 (1969);
253. Richard D. Friedman, Standards of Persuasion and the Distinction Between Fact and Law, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 916, 938 (1992);
254. Erik Lillquist, Recasting Reasonable Doubt: Decision Theory and the Virtues of Variability, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 85, 93-96 (2002);
255. Michael L. DeKay, The Difference Between Blackstone-Like Error Ratios and Probabilistic Standards of Proof 21 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 95, 99-100 (1996);
256. Lawrence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1329, 1375 (1971).
257. See David L. Faigman, Expert Evidence in Flatland: The Geometry of a World Without Scientific Culture, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 255, 267 (2003) (achieving balance between false positives and false negatives is a legal question).