Chapter 70 Trading Institutions and Emission Allowances

Handbook of Experimental Economics Results

Volumn 1, Issue C, 2008, Pages 661-668

  Cason, Timothy N ^a  

^a PURDUE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 77957059945     PISSN: 15740722     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1016/S1574-0722(07)00070-4     Document Type: Review

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