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Volumn 26, Issue 2-3, 2002, Pages 271-295

Does executive portfolio structure affect risk management? CEO risk-taking incentives and corporate derivatives usage

Author keywords

Corporate hedging; Executive compensation; Managerial incentives; Risk management

Indexed keywords


EID: 0036153369     PISSN: 03784266     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0378-4266(01)00222-9     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (148)

References (33)
  • 6
    • 0008012231 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • The stock and flow of CEO equity incentives
    • Unpublished working paper, Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA
    • (1999)
    • Core, J.1    Guay, W.2
  • 7
    • 0003870892 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Estimating the value of stock option portfolios and their sensitivities to price and volatility
    • Unpublished working paper, Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA
    • (2000)
    • Core, J.1    Guay, W.2
  • 11
    • 0003575307 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Executive stock options as home-made leverage: Why financial structure does not affect the incentive to take risk
    • Unpublished working paper, University of British Columbia, Vancouver
    • (1999)
    • Garvey, G.T.1    Mawani, A.2
  • 31
    • 0009169278 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Who manages risk? An empirical examination of risk management practices in the gold mining industry
    • (1996) Journal of Finance , vol.51 , pp. 1097-1137
    • Tufano, P.1


* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.