Chapter 14 Non-compliance and fisheries policy formulation

Developments in Aquaculture and Fisheries Science

Volumn 36, Issue C, 2006, Pages 355-373

  Hatcher, Aaron ^a   Pascoe, Sean ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PORTSMOUTH   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 77956846880     PISSN: 01679309     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1016/S0167-9309(06)80017-7     Document Type: Article

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