Announcements and credibility under inflation targeting

Economics Letters

Volumn 100, Issue 2, 2008, Pages 249-253

  Demir, Banu ^b   Yigit, Taner M ^a  

^a BILKENT UNIVERSITY   (Turkey)

^b WORLD BANK   (United States)

Author keywords

E31; E42; E58; Inflation expectations; Inflation target announcements; Learning

Indexed keywords

EID: 77956448567     PISSN: 01651765     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2008.02.002     Document Type: Article

References (7)

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5. Johnson D. The effect of inflation targets on the level of expected inflation in five countries. Review of Economics and Statistics 85 4 (2003) 1076-1081
6. Walsh C.E. Announcements, inflation targeting and central bank incentives. Economica 66 (1999) 255-269
7. Walsh C.E. Accountability, transparency, and inflation targeting. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 35 5 (2003) 829-849