The timing of elections

University of Chicago Law Review

Volumn 77, Issue 1, 2010, Pages 37-64

  Berryf, Christopher R ^a   Gersetfff, Jacob E ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO   (United States)

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EID: 77955481900     PISSN: 00419494     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (123)

1. The related literature is voluminous. See. for example, Warren E. Miller and J. Merrill Shanks, The New American Voter 39-114 (Harvard 1996) (presenting and analyzing data regarding the correlations among voter turnout and variables such as race, age, educational attainment, and income level).
2. Steven J. Rosenstone and John Mark Hansen, Mobilization, Participation, and Democracy in America 74-210 (Macmillan 1993) (considering the relationships among political participation and factors such as education level, gender, race, language, and mobilization by political leaders, by electoral campaigns, or around issues).
3. There is no shortage of canonical cites on this front, but for an example, see generally Douglas W. Rae. The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws (Yale 1967).
4. For a notable exception, see Zoltan L. Hajnal, Paul G. Lewis, and Hugh Louch. Municipal Elections in California: Turnout, Timing, and Competition 35-38 (Public Policy Institute of California 2002) (concluding, based on a study of municipal elections, that election timing accounts for half of the variation in registered voter turnout among California cities).
5. From time to time, proposals to make the federal election day a national holiday or to change election day to a weekend surface, but these proposals seem to have relatively little traction historically.
6. Christopher R. Berry and Jacob E. Gersen, Fiscal Consequences of Electoral Institutions, 52 J L & Econ 469,475 table 1 (2009)
7. See also US Census Bureau, 1992 Census of Governments: Popularly Elected Officials v-vi, online at http://www.census.gOv/prod/2/gov/gc/gc92-l-2.pdf
8. Thomas R. Souzzi, Special District Election Date Study: A Crazy Quilt *2-3 (Office of Nassau County Executive, 2007), online at http://www.nyslocalgov.org/pdf/Suozzi2.pdf (visited Oct 20,2009) (assembling local government election dates in Nassau County, New York).
9. For evidence on this point, see Hajnal, Lewis, and Louch, Municipal Elections in California at 36 figure 3.2 (cited in note 3).
10. For a review of the relevant literature, see Christopher R. Berry, Imperfect Union: Representation and Taxation in Multilevel Governments 51-88 (Cambridge 2009).
11. We offer an informal description of this phenomenon below, but one of us has elsewhere formalized a theory of selective participation and interest group politics. See Berry, Imperfect Union at 52-69 (cited in note 7).
12. See Eric Maskin and Jean Tirole, The Politician and the Judge: Accountability in Government, 94 Am Econ Rev 1034,1035 (2004).
13. See Timothy Hellwig and David Samuels, Electoral Accountability and the Variety of Democratic Regimes, 38 Brit J Polit Sci 65, 69 (2008).
14. G. Bingham Powell, Elections as Instruments of Democracy: Majoritarian and Proportional Visions 51 (Yale 2000) (arguing that the ability of voters to not reelect incumbents is essential to retaining policymakers who are responsive to what citizens want).
15. Dennis F. Thompson. Election Time: Normative Implications of the Temporal Properties
16. See Adam B. Cox, Designing Redistricting Institutions, 5 Elec L J 412, 418-21 (2006) (discussing how delayed implementation of redistricting could provide a check on manipulation of voting districts for partisan ends).
17. Adam B. Cox, The Temporal Dimension of Voting Rights, 93 Va L Rev 361. 363-64 (2007) (arguing that courts should acknowledge the temporal dimension of voting rights, which would allow a voting plan that harms particular voters in one election to be justified by benefits to those same voters in later elections).
18. See Alastair Smith, Election Timing in Majoritarian Parliaments. 33 Brit J Polit Sci 397, 399-405 (2003)
19. Kaare Strom and Stephen M. Swindle, Strategic Parliamentary Dissolution, 96 Am Polit Sci Rev 575,584-88 (2002)
20. Arthur Lupia and Kaare Strom, Coalition Termination and the Strategic Timing of Parliamentary Elections. 89 Am Polit Sci Rev 648,659 (1995).
21. Smith, 33 Brit J Polit Sci at 399-401 (cited in note 14) (demonstrating, through anecdotal evidence, that calling early elections can negatively impact the controlling party's performance in the election)
22. Strøm and Swindle. 96 Am Polit Sci Rev at 584-88 (cited in note 14)
23. Lupia and Strøm, 89 Am Polit Sci Rev at 655-57 (cited in note 14).
24. See. for example, Smith, 33 Brit J Polit Sci at 411-17 (cited in note 14) (showing that parliamentary governments can exploit foreknowledge of economic conditions to their advantage while scheduling elections).
25. See, for example, id at 399-400 (examining Margaret Thatcher's decision to call elections following the conclusion of the Falklands War and arguing that it was based on estimations of public opinion)
26. Lupia and Strøm, 89 Am Polit Sci Rev at 659 (cited in note 14).
27. Consider Gary King, et al, A Unified Model of Cabinet Dissolution in Parliamentary Democracies, 34 Am J Polit Sci 846,860-68 (1990)
28. Bernard Grofman, The Comparative Analysis of Coalition Formation and Duration: Distinguishing Between-County and Within-Country Effects. Brit J Polit Sci 291,292-300 (1989) (examining the effect that different cabinet structures and party systems have on cabinet durability)
29. See, for example, Martin P. Wattenberg, Ian McAllister, and Anthony Salvanto, How Voting Is Like Taking an SAT Test: An Analysis of American Voter Rolloff, 28 Am Polit Q 234, 247-48 (2000) (concluding that voters skip ballot questions about which they lack information and that ballot rolloff will only increase with the trend toward including more issues per ballot).
30. For analyses of how other aspects of ballots influence elections, see Bernard Grofman and Arend Lijphart, Electoral Laws and Their Political Consequences 245-46 (Agathon 1986) (summarizing studies that have demonstrated how a favorable position on the ballot can increase the number of votes a candidate receives)
31. J.E. Mueller, Choosing among 133 Candidates, 34 Pub Opinion Q 395.399-401 (1970) (examining voter cues in an election with an unusually large slate of relatively undifferentiated candidates and no incumbents)
32. H.M. Bain and D.S. Hecock, Ballot Position and Voter's Choice: The Arrangement of Names on the Ballot and Its Effect on the Voter 88 (Wayne State 1957) (finding that voters tend to arbitrarily favor candidates who are listed first on a ballot, those who are listed immediately after the first candidate, and sometimes those who are listed last).
33. Raymond E. Wolfinger and Steven J. Rosenstone. Who Voles? 8 (Yale 1980).
34. For an example ot early emphasis on local government in the literature, see Arthur J. Alexander and Gail V. Bass, Schools, Taxes, and Voter Behavior: An Analysis of School District Property Tax Elections 19-49 (Rand 1974)
35. Phillip K. Piele and John S. Hall. Budgets, Bonds, and Bailouts: Voting Behavior in School Financial Elections 31-53 (Heath 1973)
36. Alvin Boskoff and Harmon Zeigler, Voting Patterns in a Local Election 70-71 (Lippincott 1964).
37. See, for example, Christopher R. Berry and William G. Howell, Accountability and Local Elections: Rethinking Retrospective Voting, 69 J Polit 844, 852-54 (2007).
38. Daniel L. Rubinfeld and Randall Thomas, On the Economics of Voter Turnout in Local School Elections, 35 Pub Choice 315, 322-26 (1980) (evaluating to what extent economic variables can reliably predict voter turnout in local school district elections)
39. Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Voting in a Local School Election: A Micro Analysis. 59 Rev Econ & Stat 30, 40 (1977) (noting that participation in school elections correlates with factors indicating self-interest, such as the number of children currently in school).
40. Hajnal, Lewis, and Louch, Municipal Elections in California at 2 (cited in note 3)
41. Albert K. Karnig and B. Oliver Walter, Decline in Municipal Voter Turnout: A Function of Changing Structure, 11 Am Polit Q 491,491-92 (1983).
42. Souzzi. Special District Election Date Study at *2 (cited in note 6) (noting that turnout reached as low as 3 percent in four Nassau County. New York sanitation district elections in 2002)
43. Donald F. Stetzer, Special Districts, in James R. Grossman, et al. eds, The Encyclopedia of Chicago 11 A, 116 (Chicago 2004) (noting that in Chicago turnout for special district elections is lower than for municipal elections)
44. Nancy Burns, The Formation of American Local Governments: Private Values in Public Institutions 12 (Oxford 1994).
45. See Harvey J. Tucker. Low Voter Turnout and. American Democracy *2 (unpublished workshop paper, European Consortium for Political Research, 2004), online at http://www.essex.ac.uk/ecpr/events/jointsessions/paperarchive/uppsala/ ws9/tucker.pdf (visited Dec 27. 2009)
46. Zoltan L. Hajnal and Paul G. Lewis. Municipal Institutions and Voter Turnout in Local Elections, 38 Urban Aff Rev 645, 656 (2003)
47. Hajnal, Lewis, and Louch, Municipal Elections in California at 18 (cited in note 3)
48. Arthur J. Townley, Dwight P. Sweeney, and June H. Schmieder, School Board Elections: A Study of Citizen Voting Patterns, 29 Urban Educ 50, 59 (1994) (noting a dramatic increase in voter participation for several Riverside County. California school district elections after a change to coordinate with local general elections).
49. Stephanie Dunne, W. Robert Reed, and James Wilbanks, Endogenizing the Median Voter: Public Choice Goes to School, 93 Pub Choice 99, 114-15 (1997) (concluding that the power toselect election dates is a useful tool for voter demographic manipulation).
50. See also Tucker, Low Voter Turnout at *9-11 (cited in note 25) (noting that a set of particularly controversial Texas constitutional amendments passed, in part, due to strategic placement of an election at a time chosen to minimize turnout)
51. See generally Marc Meredith, The Strategic Timing of Direct De-mocracy, 21 Econ & Polit 159 (2009) (suggesting that supporters of ballot initiatives may strateg-ically time when these initiatives are brought to a vote because of a relationship between the timing of a statewide election and the demographics of the likely voters).
52. Dunne. Reed, and Wilbanks, 93 Pub Choice at 104-11 (cited in note 26).
53. Samuel Issacharoff, Pamela S. Karlen. and Richard H. Pildes, eds, The Law of Democracy: Legal Structure of the Political Process 867-981 (Foundation 2007).
54. But see Nathanial Persily, In Defense of Poxes Guarding Henhouses: The Case for Judicial Acquiescence to Incumbent-Protecting Gerrymanders, 116 Harv L Rev 649, 663-64, 668-69 (2002) (arguing that redistricting is unlikely to result in bipartisan gerrymanders because most districts are not politically lopsided on a consistent basis).
55. See Dunne, Reed, and Wilbanks, 93 Pub Choice at 114-15 (cited in note 26).
56. But see Arthur Lupia and Mathew D. McCubbins, The Democratic Dilemma: Can Citizens Learn What They Need to Know? 4, 17 (Cambridge 1998) (arguing that while most voters generally lack information about politics, this lack of information will not necessarily lead them to make unreasoned decisions).
57. Dunne, Reed, and Wilbanks, 93 Pub Choice at 100 (cited in note 26).
58. See Berry and Howell, 69 J Polit at 846 (cited in note 22).
59. For a formal theory of these dynamics, see Berry. Imperfect Union at 52-69 (cited in note 7).
60. For a discussion, see Andreu Mas-Colell, Michael D. Whinston, and Jerry R. Green. Microeconomic Theory 857-925 (Oxford 1995) (discussing the mechanism design problem, which concerns the elicitation of individual preferences and the constraints that limit social decisions in responding to these preferences).
61. For a review of the debate, see generally Kenneth A. Shepsle and Barry R. Weingast, Positive Theories of Congressional Institutions. 19 Legis Stud Q 149 (1994).
62. See Keith Krehbiel, Information and Legislative Organization 68 (Michigan 1991)
63. Thomas W. Gilligan and Keith Krehbiel, Collective Decisionmaking and Standing Committees: An Informational Rationale for Restrictive Amendment Procedures, 3 J L, Econ. & Org 287,288-89 (1987).
64. See Carlo Perroni and Kimberly A. Scharf. Tiebout with Politics: Capital Tax Competition and Constitutional Choices, 68 Rev Econ Stud 133, 150 (2001) (arguing that intergovernmental competition over tax policy constrains the fiscal choices of the median voter)
65. Phillip Sprunger and John D. Wilson, Imperfectly Mobile Households and Durable Local Public Goods: Does the Capitalization Mechanism Work?, 44 J Urban Econ 468, 487-88 (1998) (exploring models of governmental competition where transaction costs pose a significant barrier to voter relocation)
66. Michael Rauscher, Leviathan and Competition among Jurisdictions: The Case of Benefit Taxation, 44 J Urban Econ 59, 66 (1998)
67. Susan Rose-Ackerman, Tiebout Models and the Competitive Ideal: An Essay on the Political Economy of Local Government, in John M. Quigley, ed, Perspectives on Local Public Finance and Public Policy 23, 25-36 (JAI1983)
68. John C. Sonstelie and Paul R. Portney, Profit Maximizing Communities and the Theory of Local Public Expenditure. 5 J Urban Econ 263,276-77 (1978)
69. For a general review of the literature, see, for example, Sprunger and Wilson. 44 J Urban Econ at 485-87.
70. But see, for example, Dennis Epple and Allan Zelenitz, The Implications of Competition among Jurisdictions: Does Tiebout Need. Politics?, 89 J Polit Econ 1197,1216 (1981) (arguing that Tiebout competition alone is insufficient to constrain government excesses).
71. See, for example. Patrick Ellcessor and Jan E. Leighley, Voters, Non-voters and Minority Representation, in Charles E. Menifield. ed, Representation of Minority Groups in the U.S.: Implications for the Twenty-first Century 127, 142 (Austin & Winfield 2001)
72. Benjamin Highton and Raymond E. Wolfinger. The Political Implications of Higher Turnout, 31 Brit J Polit Sci 179.183 (2001)
73. Sidney Verba, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Henry E. Brady, Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics 167-68 (Harvard 1995) (noting that while demographic differences exist between voters and nonvoters, the substantive disagreements between the two groups tend to be small).
74. See Christopher R. Berry and Jacob E. Gersen, Electoral Timing, Selective Participation, and Public Policy (unpublished manuscript, 2010).
75. An exception is South Carolina. See Berry and Howell, 69 J Polit at 848 (cited in note 22) (noting that South Carolina "is the only state that centrally collects precinct-level election data for local school board races").
76. Hajnal. Lewis, and Louch, Municipal Elections in California at ix-x (cited in note 3).
77. California changed its primary date from June to March in 1996. In 2004 it changed the date back to June. In 2008 it changed the date to February to coincide with "Super Tuesday."
78. Assembly Bill No 2605. An Act to Amend Sections 1007 and 5017 of. and to Add Section 5000.5 to, the Education Code. Relating to Education, codified at Cal Educ Code § 1007 et seq (West).
79. See. for example, Republican Analysis of AB 2605, California State Assembly, Assembly Elections and Reapportionment Committee (Aug 22,1986) (claiming that consolidated elections will increase voter turnout and thereby reduce the power of special interests like teachers' unions)
80. Analysis of AB 2605, California State Senate, Senate Rules Committee (July 3,1986) (noting that the bill would lead to cost savings by allowing for the consolidation of elections)
81. Letter from Jeffrey N. Hamilton, Superintendent, Fort Jones Union Elementary School District, to Johan Klehs, Chairperson, Assembly Elections and Reapportionment Committee (Apr 4, 1986) (conveying support for AB 2605 because it "would provide a broader base of support for the public school system")
82. Letter from Bob L. Blacett, District Superintendent, Modoc Joint Unified School District, to Johan Klehs, Chairperson, Assembly Elections and Reapportionment Committee (Apr 2, 1986) (supporting AB 2605 for its "cost savings throughout California")
83. Letter from James M. Donnelly, Director, Governmental Relations, to Johan Klehs, Chairperson, Assembly Elections and Reapportionment Committee (Feb 27,1986) (expressing support for the bill because it "would result in cost savings and in greater voter participation").
84. 1986 Cal Stat 188 § 1, codified at Cal Elec Code § 10404 (West).
85. See Letter from Richard Robinson. Assemblyman. 72d District, to George Deukmajian, Governor, State of California (Aug 21,1986) (noting that "without enactment ot AB 2605, school districts could ⋯ be left to pay the full costs for conducting the expensive, low-turnout elections in the off years").
86. See. for example. Karen Maeshiro, Big Changes for Schools? Larger Classes, Middle School Reorganization Mulled, LA Daily News 1 (Feb 14, 2005) ("In other cost-cutting moves, the board at its Feb. 1 meeting approved petitioning the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors to move the district's school board elections from odd-numbered years to even-numbered years so they would coincide with general elections and save the district between $40,000 and $60,000.")
87. Dee Anne Traitel. Chula Vista School Trustees Elect to Shift Vote, Save Money, San Diego Union-Trib B6 (Apr 24, 1985) ("In an effort to cut costs, trustees of the Chula Vista School District have decided to hold school-board elections on the same day as statewide elections. Last night's resolution will save the district half of the current $30,000 cost per election.").
88. See Letter from Karen L. Yelverton, Senior Legislative Advocate, California School Boards Association, to Richard Robinson, Member of the Assembly (Mar 10,1986) (committing support for the bill "if amendments are taken to eliminate the County Board of Supervisors' approval of school board decisions").
89. The remaining three thousand elections consist of a smattering of community college, county, and other local offices that had relatively few elections each or could not be matched to a specific geographic area.
90. Note that our definition of turnout can differ for two elections held on the same day as a result of ballot rolloff.
91. Because 94 percent of school district elections took place in November, we excluded other months from our analysis.
92. See note 20.
93. See Berry and Gersen, Electoral Timing (cited in note 41). Specifically, we control for population size, as well as the racial and age composition of the jurisdiction. In addition, we control for the homeownership rate and the fraction of families with children, which are expected to be especially important determinants of participation in local elections. We emphasize that these variables measure the aggregate attributes of the population in the jurisdictions, not the attributes of individual voters, and therefore the usual cautions regarding the ecological fallacy apply.
94. See Gary King, A Solution to the Ecological Inference Problem: Reconstructing Individual Behavior from Aggregate Data 7,16-17 (Princeton 1997).
95. See, for example, Hajnal and Lewis, 38 Urban Aff Rev at 656 (cited in note 25).
96. Townley, Sweeney, and Schmieder, 29 Urban Educ at 56-61 (cited in note 25).
97. Dunne, Reed, and Wilbanks, 93 Pub Choice at 107-10 (cited in note 26) (showing that public school officials can increase the likelihood of success of school bond measures by scheduling the election during the school year because it lowers the cost of voting for those most likely to vote in favor of the measure).
98. Berry and Gersen, Electoral Timing (cited in note 41).
99. Terry M. Moe. Political Control and the Power of the Agent, 22 J L. Econ, & Org 1, 18 (2006) (finding that in a school district election in Charter Oak, California, overall voter participation was 7 percent while teacher participation was 46 percent).
100. See California Department of Education, Selected Certified Salaries and Related Statistics 1999-2000, online at http://www.cde.ca.gov/ds/fd/cs/ documents/j90total9900.pdf (visited Oct 21, 2009) (collecting detailed information about teacher salaries including lowest, average, and highest salaries from 85 percent of the state's school districts).
101. No data is available from years prior to 1999. The data are obtained by CDE from local school districts through a survey. Although participation in the survey is voluntary, the response rate was 84 percent of districts representing 98 percent of the state's students in the 2006 survey. The responses are rigorously checked by CDE and reconfirmed with the districts before publication.
102. See California Department of Education, Selected Certificated Salaries and Related Statistics 2005-06 (Dec 2006), online at http://www.cde.ca.gov/ds/ fd/cs (visited Jan 3,2010).
103. Focusing on the starting salary, the highest salary, or the average salary yields comparable results to those discussed below.
104. In other work, we control for a variety of district level covariates that could influence teacher salaries. The main results remain unchanged. Controlling for district level covariates reduces the effect slightly to $1,400. See Berry and Gersen, Electoral Timing (cited in note 41).
105. These estimates come from a model including district and year fixed effects, as well as time-varying district level covariates. For complete results, see id.
106. While our analysis is focused exclusively on California, an independent analysis finds comparable results using cross-sectional data from eight states. See Sarah E Anzia, Election Timing and the Electoral Influence of Interest Groups (unpublished manuscript, Oct 3, 2009), online at http://www.stanford.edu/ ~sanzia/Election-Timing-10-3-09.pdf (visited Feb 4,2010).
107. US Const Art I. § 4. cl 1.
108. See Federalist 60-61 (Hamilton), in The Federalist 403, 403-04 (Wesleyan 1961) (Jacob E. Cooke, ed) (arguing that giving the federal government the full power to control elections would allow it to guarantee the election of "some favourite class of men" by "confining the places of election to particular districts"). See also Philip B. Kurland and Ralph Lerner, eds, 1 The Founders' Constitution 248-79 (Chicago 1987) (assembling excerpts from early debates).
109. See notes 72-79.
110. See Souzzi, Special District Election Date Study at *2 (cited in note 6).
111. See text accompanying note 50.
112. Alaska Stat Ann § 29.26.040 (Lexis) (requiring that the "date of a regular election is the first Tuesday of October annually, unless a different date or interval of years is provided by ordinance"). The city of Anchorage, for example, holds its municipal elections in April. See Municipality of Anchorage, Municipality Elections Home Page, online at http://www.muni.org/departments/assembly/clerk/elections/pages/default.aspx (visited Oct 21,2009).
113. Conn Gen Stat Ann § 9-164 (West). These municipal elections include the election of first selectmen and selectmen. Conn Gen Stat Ann § 9-188 (West). The board of selectmen has more discre tion when deciding when special elections will be held when there are vacancies or a newly created office, but still must follow a number of restrictions and notice requirements. Conn Gen Stat Ann § 9-164(b) (West). Towns are required to have an annual town meeting, but special town meetings can also be convened by the selectmen or twenty voters. Conn Gen Stat Arm § 7-1 (West).
114. See La Rev Stat Ann § 18:402 (West).
115. La Rev Stat Ann § 18:402(C)(1) (West).
116. La Rev Stat Ann § 18:402(C)(2) (West). However, Louisiana has different rules regarding the timing of elections in parishes containing a municipality with a population of at least 475,000, a provision that seems meant to apply only to Orleans Parish
117. See Louisiana Secretary of State, 2010 Elections (June 10, 2009), online at http://www.sos.louisiana.gOv/Portals/0/elections/pdf/Copyofelectionsl0061009. pdf (visited Oct 21, 2009); Louisiana Secretary of State, 2010 Elections: Orleans Parish Only, online at http://www.sos.louisiana.gOv/Portals/0/elections/ pdf/Calendar2010Elections-N.O.pdf (visited Oct 21, 2009); Louisiana Secretary of State, 2010 Elections: Election Schedule for All Parishes except Orleans Parish, online at http://www.sos.louisiana.gOv/Portals/0/elections/pdf/ Calendar%202010%20Elections.pdf (visited Oct 12, 2009). For those "parishes." general elections "shall be held on the fourth Saturday after the first Saturday in February of an election year." La Rev Stat Ann § 18:402(D)(2) (West). Interestingly, no city in Orleans Parish has a population even close to 475,000 now. Rules regarding special elections, while similarly splitting parishes with and without populous cities, are also strictly prescribed. La Rev Stat Ann § 18:402(E) (West).
118. Mont Code Ann § 13-l-104(l)(a).
119. Mont Code Ann § 13-1-104(2).
120. "The general village election shall be held on the third Tuesday in March except in any village which presently elects, or hereafter adopts a proposition to elect, its officers on a date other than the third Tuesday in March." NY Elec Law § 15-104(l)(a) (McKinney). Elections for "town officers and for the consideration of such questions as may be proposed by the town board or the duly qualified electors, pursuant to the provisions of this chapter, shall be held on the Tuesday next succeeding the first Monday in November of every odd-numbered year." NY Town Law § 80 (McKinney). However, Broome County is allowed to hold its election on the Tuesday after the first Monday in November of an even-numbered year. NY Town Law § 86 (McKinney). The disorganization of elections in Nassau County is a result of the county continuing to have special improvement district commissioners. Though constrained by notice and a few other requirements, special improvement district commissioners were allowed to choose the date of their elections. NY Town Law § 212 (McKinney). An effort to get rid of the office and give its authority to the town boards led to NY Town Law § 57-a (McKinney), which required that the town board vote by at least three-fourths to continue the office or that the voters in the district hold a special election to keep the office. Fire district officers are elected on the second Tuesday in December, with a few specified exceptions. NY Town Law § 175 (McKinney).
121. See, for example, Paul R. Abramson and John H. Aldrich, The Decline of Electoral Participa tion in America, 76 Am Polit Sci Rev 502,502 (1982) (noting the danger of electoral nonparticipation).
122. Howard A. Scarrow, Ballot Format in Plurality Partisan Elections, in Bernard Grofman and Arend Lijphart, Electoral Laws and Their Political Consequences 242, 243-16 (Agathon 1986) (discussing literature).
123. This is a direct parallel to the welfare properties of logrolls in legislatures. See Thomas Stratmann, Logrolling, in Charles K. Rowley and Friedrich Schneider, eds, The Encyclopedia of Public Choice. 372, 372 (Kluwer 2008) (noting that logrolling may produce a collective choice closer to the social optimal than sincere voting would because vote trading accounts for intensities of preferences).