Neural resonance: Between implicit simulation and social perception

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences

Volumn 9, Issue 3, 2010, Pages 437-458

  Slors, Marc ^a  

^a RADBOUD UNIVERSITY NIJMEGEN   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

Mental holism; Mirror neurons; Neural resonance; Simulation theory; Social perception

Indexed keywords

EID: 77955177636     PISSN: 15687759     EISSN: 15728676     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11097-009-9144-4     Document Type: Article

References (55)

1. Barker, R. G. (1968). Ecological psychology: Concepts and methods for studying the environment of human behavior. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
2. Carruthers, P. (1996). Simulation and self-knowledge: a defence of theory-theory. In P. Carruthers & P. K. Smith (Eds.), Theories of theories of mind (pp. 22-38). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
3. Chalmers, D. (1996). The conscious mind: In search of a fundamental theory. New York: Oxford University Press.
4. Csibra, G. (2005). Mirror neurons and action observation: Is simulation involved? ESF Interdisciplines. http://www. interdisciplines. org/mirror/papers/4.
5. de Vignemont, F. (2004). The co-consciousness hypothesis. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 3(1), 97-114.
6. di Pellegrino, G., Fadiga, L., Fogassi, L., Gallese, V., & Rizzolatti, G. (1992). Understanding motor events: a neurophysiological study. Experimental Brain Research, 91, 176-180.
7. Fodor, J. (1974). Special sciences. Syhthese, 28, 97-115.
8. Fogassi, L., Ferrari, P. F., Gesierich, B., Rozzi, S., Chersi, F., & Rizzolatti, G. (2005). Parietal lobe: From action organization to intention understanding. Science, 308, 662-667.
9. Gallagher, S. (1997). Mutual enlightenment: recent phenomenology in cognitive science. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 4(3), 195-214.
10. Gallagher, S. (2000). Philosophical conceptions of the self: implications for cognitive science. Trends in Cognitive Science, 4(1), 14-21.
11. Gallagher, S. (2005). How the body shapes the mind. New York: Oxford University Press.
12. Gallagher, S. (2007a). Simulation trouble. Social Neuroscience, 2(3-4), 353-365.
13. Gallagher, S. (2007b). Logical and phenomenological arguments against simulation theory. In D. Hutto & M. Ratcliffe (Eds.), Folk-psychology re-assessed (pp. 63-78). Berlin: Springer.
14. Gallagher, S. (2008a). Direct perception in the intersubjective context. Consciousness and Cognition, 17, 535-543.
15. Gallagher, S. (2008b). Inference or interaction: social cognition without precursors. Philosophical Explorations, 11(3), 163-174.
16. Gallagher, S., & Zahavi, D. (2008a). The phenomenological mind: An introduction to the philosophy of mind and cognitive science. London: Routledge.
17. Gallagher, S., & Zahavi, D. (2008b). The (in)visibility of others: A reply to Herschbach. Philosophical Explorations, 11(3), 237-244.
18. Gallese, V. (2001). The 'shared manifold' hypothesis. From mirror neurons to empathy. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 8(5-7), 33-50.
19. Gallese, V. (2003). The manifold nature of interpersonal relations: the quest for a common mechanism. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, London B, 358, 517-528.
20. Gallese, V. (2005). Embodied simulation: From neurons to phenomenal experience. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 4, 23-48.
21. Gallese, V. (2007). Before and below 'theory of mind': Embodied simulation and the neural correlates of social cognition. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, London B, 362, 659-669.
22. Gallese, V., & Goldman, A. I. (1998). Mirror neurons and the simulation theory of mind-reading. Trends in Cognitive Science, 2(12), 493-501.
23. Georgieff, N., & Jeannerod, M. (1998). Beyond consciousness of external events: A "who" system for consciousness of action and self-consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition, 7, 465-477.
24. Goldman, A. I. (1989). Interpretation psychologized. Mind and Language, 4, 161-185.
25. Goldman, A. I. (2006). Simulating minds. The philosophy, psychology and neuroscience of mindreading. New York: Oxford University Press.
26. Goldman, A. I., & Sripada, C. S. (2005). Simulationist models of face-based emotion recognition. Cognition, 94, 193-213.
27. Gordon, R. M. (1986). Folk-psychology as simulation. Mind and Language, 1, 159-171.
28. Hatfield, E., Cacioppo, J. T., & Rapson, R. L. (1994). Emotional contagion. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
29. Herschbach, M. (2008). Folk psychological and phenomenological accounts of social perception. Philosophical Explorations, 11(3), 223-236.
30. Heal, J. (1986). Replication and Functionalism. In J. Butterfield (Ed.), Language, mind and logic. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
31. Hurley, S. (2005). Active perception and perceiving action: the shared circuits model. In T. Gendler & J. Hawthorne (Eds.), Perceptual experience. New York: Oxford University Press.
32. Iacoboni, M., Molnar-Szakacs, I., Gallese, V., Buccino, G., Mazziotta, J. C., & Rizzolatti, G. (2005). Grasping the intentions of other with one's own mirror neuron system. PLoS Biology, 3, 529-535.
33. Jacob, P. (2002). The scope and limits of mental simulation. In J. Dokic & J. Proust (Eds.), Simulation and knowledge of action (pp. 87-109). Amsterdam: Benjamins.
34. Jacob, P. (2008). What de mirror neurons contribute to human social cognition? Mind and Language, 23(2), 190-223.
35. Jacob, P., & Jeannerod, M. (2005). The motor theory of social cognition: A critique. Trends in Cognitive Science, 9, 21-25.
36. Jeannerod, M., & Pacherie, E. (2004). Agency, simulation and self-identification. Mind and Language, 19(2), 113-146.
37. Lewis, D. (1972). Psychophysical and theoretical identifications. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 50, 249-258.
38. McDowell, J. (1998). Reductionism and the first-person. In J. Dancy (Ed.), Reading parfit (pp. 230-250). Oxford: Blackwell.
39. Menary, R. (2008). Embodied narratives. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 15(6), 63-84.
40. Neisser, U. (1988). Five kinds of self-knowledge. Philosophical Psychology, 1, 35-59.
41. Newman-Norlund, R. D., van Schie, H. T., van Zuijlen, A. M. J., & Bekkering, H. (2007). The mirror-neuron system is more active during complementary compared with imitative action. Nature Neuroscience, 10(7), 817-818.
42. Noë, A., & Thompson, E. (2004). Are there neural correlates of consciousness? Journal of Consciousness Studies, 11(1), 3-28.
43. Parfit, D. (1984). Reasons and persons. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
44. Putnam, H. (1967). Psychological predicates. In W. Capitan & W. Merrill (Eds.), Art mind and religion (pp. 37-48). Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh University Press.
45. Rizzolatti, G., Fadiga, L., Gallese, V., & Fogassi, L. (1996). Premotor cortex and the recognition of motor actions. Cognitive Brain Research, 3(2), 131-141.
46. Saxe, R. (2005). Against simulation: The argument from error. Trends in Cognitive Science, 9, 174-179.
47. Saxe, R. (2009). The neural evidence for simulation is weaker than I think you think it is. Philosophical Studies, 144, 447-456.
48. Scheerer, M. (1954). Cognitive theory. In G. Lindzey (Ed.), Handbook of social psychology: Vol. 1. Theory and method (pp. 91-142). Reading: Addison-Wesley.
49. Slors, M. V. P. (1998). Two conceptions of psychological continuity. Philosophical Explorations, 1, 61-80.
50. Slors, M. V. P. (2001a). The diachronic mind. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
51. Slors, M. V. P. (2001b). Personal identity, memory and circularity: An alternative for Q-memory. The Journal of Philosophy, 98(4), 186-214.
52. Strawson, P. F. (1996). The bounds of sense: An essay on Kant's critique of pure reason. London: Routledge.
53. Varela, J., Thompson, E., & Rosch, E. (1991). The embodied mind: Cognitive science and human experience. Cambridge: MIT.
54. Zahavi, D. (2005). Subjectivity and selfhood: Investigating the first-person perspective. Cambridge: MIT.
55. Zahavi, D. (2008). Simulation, projection and empathy. Consciousness and Cognition, 17, 514-522.