Dynamics in congestion games

Performance Evaluation Review

Volumn 38, Issue 1 SPEC. ISSUE, 2010, Pages 107-118

  Shah, Devavrat ^a   Shin, Jinwoo ^a  

^a MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

Author keywords

Congestion game; Logarithmic Sobolov constant; Logit response

Indexed keywords

BEHAVIOR MODEL; CONGESTION GAMES; EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS; INTERNET CONGESTION CONTROL; NASH EQUILIBRIUM; NON EQUILIBRIUM; PROBABILISTIC MODELS; ROAD TRANSPORTATION NETWORKS; STATE SPACE; TIME VARYING; UNCERTAINTY PRINCIPLES;

DYNAMICAL SYSTEMS; GAME THEORY; MARKOV PROCESSES;

THREE TERM CONTROL SYSTEMS;

EID: 77954938538     PISSN: 01635999     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/1811099.1811052     Document Type: Conference Paper

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