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Volumn 25, Issue 3, 2010, Pages 1211-1219

A two-tier matrix game approach for obtaining joint bidding strategies in FTR and energy markets

Author keywords

Energy settlement; financial transmission rights (FTRs); FTR settlement; matrix game; Nash equilibrium; restructured electricity markets; value iteration based reinforcement learning

Indexed keywords

FINANCIAL TRANSMISSION RIGHT; MATRIX GAME; NASH EQUILIBRIUM; RESTRUCTURED ELECTRICITY MARKETS; VALUE ITERATION;

EID: 77954834581     PISSN: 08858950     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1109/TPWRS.2010.2041076     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (14)

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* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.