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Volumn 29, Issue 3, 2010, Pages 299-307

Voters and coalition governments

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COMPLEXITY; DEMOCRACY; ELECTION; PARTY POLITICS; POLITICAL THEORY; STRATEGIC APPROACH; VOTING BEHAVIOR;

EID: 77954631774     PISSN: 02613794     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.electstud.2010.03.010     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (75)

References (43)
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