Simulating peer disagreements

Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A

Volumn 41, Issue 2, 2010, Pages

  Douven, I ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF LEUVEN   (Belgium)

Author keywords

Computer simulations; Hegselmann Krause model; Opinion dynamics; Peer disagreement; Social epistemology

Indexed keywords

EID: 77953359954     PISSN: 00393681     EISSN: 18792510     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.shpsa.2010.03.010     Document Type: Article

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