The lottery paradox and our epistemic goal

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly

Volumn 89, Issue 2, 2008, Pages 204-225

  Douven, Igor ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF LEUVEN   (Belgium)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 60949456975     PISSN: 02790750     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2008.00316.x     Document Type: Article

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