Pricing anomalies in the market for diamonds: Evidence of conformist behavior

Economic Inquiry

Volumn 48, Issue 2, 2010, Pages 353-368

  Scott, Frank ^a   Yelowitz, Aaron ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 77952687428     PISSN: 00952583     EISSN: 14657295     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1465-7295.2009.00237.x     Document Type: Article

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