Conspicuous consumption, snobbism and conformism

Journal of Public Economics

Volumn 66, Issue 1, 1997, Pages 55-71

  Corneo, Giacomo ^a   Jeanne, Olivier ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BONN   (Germany)

^b UNIVERSITÉ PARIS EST   (France)

Author keywords

Consumption externalities; Signalling; Status seeking

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031256588     PISSN: 00472727     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(97)00016-9     Document Type: Article

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