Understanding Douglass North in game-theoretic language

Structural Change and Economic Dynamics

Volumn 21, Issue 2, 2010, Pages 139-146

  Aoki, Masahiko ^a  

^a STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Belief; Complementarities; Epistemic game theory; Institutions; Linked games

Indexed keywords

COMPLEMENTARITY; CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK; ECONOMIC HISTORY; ECONOMIC THEORY; GAME THEORY; INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH; THEORETICAL STUDY;

EID: 77952674053     PISSN: 0954349X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.strueco.2009.10.002     Document Type: Article

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