Board interlocks and the propensity to be targeted in private equity transactions

Journal of Financial Economics

Volumn 97, Issue 1, 2010, Pages 174-189

  Stuart, Toby E ^a   Yim, Soojin ^a  

^a HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL   (United States)

Author keywords

Board interlocks; Board networks; Corporate governance; Private equity; Social networks

Indexed keywords

EID: 77952671892     PISSN: 0304405X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2010.03.012     Document Type: Article

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