Information, institutions and constitutional arrangements

Public Choice

Volumn 144, Issue 1, 2010, Pages 1-36

  Muthoo, Abhinay ^a   Shepsle, Kenneth A ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WARWICK   (United Kingdom)

^b HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Institutions; Overlapping generations; Principal agents; Staggered term legislatures; Transparency

Indexed keywords

EID: 77952428721     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-009-9500-5     Document Type: Article

References (35)

1. Abreu, D. (1988). On the theory of infinitely repeated games with discounting. Econometrica, 56, 383-396.
2. Austen-Smith, D., & Banks, J. (1989). Electoral accountability and incumbency. In P. C. Ordeshook (Ed.), Models of strategic choice in politics (pp. 121-148). Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
3. Banks, J., & Sundaram, R. (1998). Optimal retention in agency problems. Journal of Economic Theory, 82, 293-323.
4. Baron, D., & Ferejohn, J. (1989). Bargaining in legislatures. American Political Science Review, 83, 1181-1206.
5. Barro, R. (1973). The control of politicians: an economic model. Public Choice, 14, 19-42.
6. Bendor, J., Kumar, S., & Siegel, D. (2005). V. O. Key formalized: retrospective voting as adaptive behavior. Washington: American Political Science Association.
7. Besley, T. (2006). Principled agents? The political economy of good government. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
8. Bhaskar, V. (1998). Informational constraints and the Overlapping generations model: folk and anti-folk theorems. Review of Economic Studies, 65, 135-149.
9. Coate, S., & Battagalini, M. (2007). Inefficiency in legislative policy-making: a dynamic analysis. American Economic Review, 97, 118-149.
10. Dixit, A. (1995). The making of economic policy: a transaction costs approach. Cambridge: MIT.
11. Dutta, P. (1995). A folk theorem for stochastic games. Journal of Economic Theory, 66, 1-32.
12. Fearon, J. (1999). Electoral accountability and the control of politicians: selecting good types versus sanctioning poor performance. In A. Przeworski, S. Stokes, & B. Manin (Eds.), Democracy, accountability, and representation (pp. 55-98). New York: Cambridge University Press.
13. Ferejohn, J. (1986). Incumbent performance and electoral control. Public Choice, 50, 5-25.
14. Ferejohn, J. (1999). Accountability and authority: toward a political theory of electoral accountability. In A. Przeworski, S. Stokes, & B. Manin (Eds.), Democracy, accountability, and representation (pp. 131-154). New York: Cambridge University Press.
15. Fiorina, M. (1981). Retrospective voting in American national elections. New Haven: Yale University Press.
16. Friedman, J. (1986). Game Theory with applications to economics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
17. Fudenberg, D., & Tirole, J. (1991). Game theory. Cambridge: MIT.
18. Gersbach, H., & Liessem, V. (2005). Re-election threshold contracts in politics. CEPR Discussion Paper No. 5175.
19. Kahneman, D., Fredrickson, B. L., Schreiber, C. A., & Redelmeier, D. A. (1993). When more pain is preferred to less: Adding a better ending. Psychological Science, 4, 401-405.
20. Kahneman, D., Wakker, P., & Sarin, R. (1997). Back to Bentham? explorations of experienced utility. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112, 375-405.
21. Kiewiet, R., & Udall, M. (1998). Twenty-five years after Kramer: an assessment of economic retrospective voting based upon improved estimates of income and employment. Economics and Politics, 10, 219-248.
22. Kramer, G. (1971). Short-term fluctuations in U. S. voting behavior, 1896-1964. American Political Science Review, 65, 131-143.
23. Laibson, D. (1997). Golden eggs and hyperbolic discounting. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 62, 443-477.
24. Levitt, S. (1996). How do senators vote? disentangling the role of voter preferences, party affiliation, and senator ideology. American Economic Review, 86, 425-441.
25. Maskin, E., & Tirole, J. (2004). The politician and the judge: accountability in government. American Economic Review, 94, 1034-1054.
26. Morelli, M. (1999). Demand competition and policy comprise in legislative bargaining. American Political Science Review, 93, 809-820.
27. Muthoo, A., & Shepsle, K. (2008). The constitutional choice of bicameralism. In E. Helpman (Ed.), Institutions and economic performance (pp. 249-292). Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
28. Persson, T., & Tabellini, G. (2000). Political economics: explaining economic policy. Cambridge: MIT.
29. Prat, A. (2005). The wrong kind of transparency. American Economic Review, 95, 862-877.
30. Redelmeier, D., & Kahneman, D. (1996). Patients' memories of painful medical treatments: real-time and retrospective evaluations of two minimally invasive procedures. Pain, 66, 3-8.
31. Redelmeier, D., Katz, J., & Kahneman, D. (2003). Memories of colonoscopy: a randomized trial. Pain, 104, 187-194.
32. Rubinstein, A. (1982). Perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model. Econometrica, 50, 97-110.
33. Sarafidis, Y. (2007). What have you done for me lately? Release of information and strategic manipulation of memories. Economic Journal, 117, 307-326.
34. Shepsle, K., van Houweling, R., Abrams, S., & Hanson, P. (2009). The senate electoral cycle and bicameral appropriations politics. American Journal of Political Science, 53, 343-359.
35. Tufte, E. (1978). Political control of the economy. Princeton: Princeton University Press.