Principal-principal-agency relationships and the role of external governance

Managerial and Decision Economics

Volumn 31, Issue 4, 2010, Pages 249-261

  Ward, Damian ^a   Filatotchev, Igor ^b  

^a BRADFORD UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT   (United Kingdom)

^b CITY UNIVERSITY   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 77952347270     PISSN: 01436570     EISSN: 10991468     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/mde.1473     Document Type: Article

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