Collective agents and moral responsibility

Journal of Social Philosophy

Volumn 38, Issue 3, 2007, Pages 456-468

  Mäkelä, Pekka ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 77952307563     PISSN: 00472786     EISSN: 14679833     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9833.2007.00391.x     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (12)

1. See, Philip Pettit, A Theory of Freedom (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001);
2. Philip Pettit, "Groups with Minds of Their Own," in Socializing Metaphysics, ed. F. Schmitt (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), 167-94;
3. David Copp, "On the Agency of Certain Collective Entities: An Argument from 'Normative Autonomy'," Midwest Studies in Philosophy 30 (2006): 194-221.
4. See R. Jay Wallace, Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996).
5. Philip Pettit, "Responsibility Incorporated," Ethics 117 (2007): 171-201.
6. Pettit, "Groups," 183-84.
7. The discussion here draws on: Pettit, A Theory;
8. and Pettit, "Responsibility Incorporated."
9. See also Christian List and Philip Pettit, "Aggregating Sets of Judgments: An Impossibility Result," Economics and Philosophy 18 (2002): 89-110.
10. Cf. the notion of "ethos" in Raimo Tuomela's account. See Raimo Tuomela, The Philosophy of Social Practices (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002);
11. Raimo Tuomela, The Philosophy of Sociality: The Shared Point of View (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007).
12. See The Philosophy of Sociality also for a notion of collective responsibility where a collective is responsible through its members' responsibility qua members.