NIMBY and mechanism design under different constitutional constraints

International Tax and Public Finance

Volumn 17, Issue 2, 2010, Pages 114-132

  Besfamille, Martin ^a   Lozachmeur, Jean Marie ^b  

^a UNIVERSIDAD TORCUATO DI TELLA   (Argentina)

^b TOULOUSE SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (France)

Author keywords

Asymmetric information; Constitutional constraints; Mechanism design; NIMBY; Noxious facilities

Indexed keywords

EID: 77952057459     PISSN: 09275940     EISSN: 15736970     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10797-008-9101-0     Document Type: Article

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