Income Redistribution in an Economic Union: The Trade off between Inter- and Intra-National Redistribution

International Tax and Public Finance

Volumn 4, Issue 3, 1997, Pages 325-335

  Cremer, Helmuth ^a   Pestieau, Pierre ^b  

^a UNIVERSITÉ DE TOULOUSE   (France)

^b UNIVERSITY OF LIÈGE   (Belgium)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0043104910     PISSN: 09275940     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1008668405593     Document Type: Article

References (11)

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3. Bukovetsky, S., M. Marchand and P. Pestieau. (1997). "Tax Competition and Revelation of Preferences for Public Expenditure." CORE DP 9703.
4. Cornes, R. and E. Silva. (1996). "Transfers Between Jurisdiction with Private Information: The Equity/Efficiency Trade-off." Unpublished paper. University of Keele.
5. Cremer, H., M. Marchand and P. Pestieau. (1996). "Interregional Redistribution Through Tax Surcharge." International Tax and Public Finance 3, 157-174.
6. Cremer, H. and P. Pestieau. (1996). "Distributive Implications of European Integration." European Economic Review 40, 747-758.
7. Gilbert, G. and P. Picard. (1996). "Incentives and the Optimal Size of Local Territories." European Economic Review 40, 19-42.
8. Laffont, J.-J. (1995). "Incentives in China's Federal Tax System." Unpublished paper. University of Toulouse.
9. Lockwood, B. (1996). "Interregional Insurance with Asymmetric Information." Unpublished paper. University of Exeter.
10. Raff, H. and J. Wilson. (1995). "Income Redistribution and Well-Informed Regional Government." Unpublished paper. University of Indiana.
11. Stiglitz, J. E. (1982). "Self Selection and Pareto-Efficient Taxation." Journal of Public Economics 17, 213-240.