Neurodynamics of mind: The arrow illusion of conscious intentionality as downward causation

Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science

Volumn 44, Issue 2, 2010, Pages 127-143

  Barutta, Joaquín ^d   Gleichgerrcht, Ezequiel ^b   Cornejo, Carlos ^e   Ibáñez, Agustín ^a,b,c  

^a FAVALORO UNIVERSITY   (Argentina)

^b INECO   (Argentina)

^c Facultad de Ciencias Naturales e Instituto M Lillo   (Argentina)

^d Instituto Universitario del Hospital Italianode Buenos Aires and   (Argentina)

^e PONTIFICIA UNIVERSIDAD CATÓLICA DE CHILE   (Chile)

Author keywords

Consciousness; Downward causation; Emergence; Explanatory pluralism; Large scale brain dynamics; Reductionism

Indexed keywords

EID: 77951877829     PISSN: 19324502     EISSN: 19363567     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s12124-010-9117-8     Document Type: Article

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