Experience versus perception of corruption: Russia as a test case

Global Crime

Volumn 11, Issue 2, 2010, Pages 145-163

  Rose, Richard ^a   Mishler, William ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ABERDEEN   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA   (United States)

Author keywords

Bribes; Corruption; Perception; Political support; Russia

Indexed keywords

EID: 77951736949     PISSN: 17440572     EISSN: 17440580     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/17440571003669175     Document Type: Article

References (67)

1. This article was prepared with the assistance of a grant from the British ESRC(RES-062-23-03441) Testing the Durability of Regime Support.
2. See, for example, Michael Johnston, Syndromes of Corruption: Wealth, Power and Democracy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005);
3. Susan Rose-Ackerman, Corruption and Government: Causes Consequences and Reform (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999);
4. Vito Tanzi, 'Corruption Around the World', in Governance, Corruption and Economic Performance, ed. G. Abed and S. Gupta (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 2002), 19-58.
5. See, for example, Christopher J. Anderson and Y.V. Tverdova, 'Corruption, Political Allegiances and Attitudes Toward Government in Contemporary Democracies', American Journal of Political Science 47, no. 1 (2003): 91-109
6. Mitchell A. Seligson, 'The Impact of Corruption on Regime Legitimacy: A Comparative Study of Four Latin American Countries', Journal of Politics 64, 2 (2002): 408-33.
7. Elemer Hankiss, 'Games of Corruption: East Central Europe, 1945-1999', in Political Corruption in Transition: A Sceptic's Handbook, ed. S. Kotkin and A. Sajo (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2002), 248.
8. Eram Dabla-Norris, 'A Game Theoretic Analysis of Corruption in Bureaucracies', in Governance, Corruption, and Economic Performance, ed. G. Abed and S. Gupta (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 2002), 111-34.
9. Joel S. Hellman, 'Winners Take All: The Politics of Partial Reform in Postcommunist Transitions', World Politics 50 (1998): 203-34
10. Joshua Charap and Christian Harm, 'Institutionalized Corruption and the Kleptocratic State', in Governance, Corruption, and Economic Performance, ed. G. Abed and S. Gupta (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 2002), 137.
11. C. McManus-Czubinska, W.L. Miller, R. Markowski, and J. Wasilewski, 'Why Is Corruption in Poland "A Serious Cause for Concern"?' Crime, Law and Social Change 41 (2004): 107-32.
12. For reviews, see Johann Graf Lambsdorff, The Institutional Economics of Corruption and Reform (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007);
13. Daniel Treisman, 'What Have We Learned about the Causes of Corruption from Ten Years of Cross-National Empirical Research?', Annual Review of Political Science 10 (2007): 211-44;
14. Global Integrity, A User's Guide to Measuring Corruption (New York: United Nations Development Programme, 2008);
15. Diana Schmidt, 'Anti-corruption: What Do We Know? Research on Preventing Corruption in the Post-Communist World', Political Studies Review 5, no. 2 (2007): 202-33.
16. See http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2009.
17. See www.governance.org; Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi, Governance Matters VI: Aggregate and Individual Governance Indicators, 1996-2006 (Washington, DC: World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4280, 2007).
18. See Christine Arndt and Charles Oman, Uses and Abuses of Governance Indicators (Paris: OECD Development Centre Studies, 2006)
19. Stephen Knack, 'Measuring Corruption: A Critique of Indicators in Eastern Europe and Central Asia', Journal of Public Policy 27, no. 3 (2007): 255-92.
20. W.I. Thomas, The Unadjusted Girl (Boston: Little Brown, 1923).
21. George T. Abed and Sanjeev Gupta, eds., Governance, Corruption and Economic Performance (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 2002)
22. Johann Graf Lambsdorff, The Institutional Economics of Corruption and Reform (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007): Chapter 5. cf.
23. Donatella Della Porta and Yves Meny, eds., Democracy and Corruption in Europe (London: Pinter, 1996);
24. Susan J. Pharr and Robert D. Putnam, ed., Disaffected Democracies: What's Troubling the Trilateral Countries? (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 173
25. Mitchell A. Seligson, The Impact of Corruption on Regime Legitimacy: A Comparative Study of Four Latin American Countries, Journal of Politics 64, no. 2 (2002): 408-33.
26. cf. Edward Banfield, The Moral Basis of a Backward Society (Glencoe, IL: The Free Press, 1958).
27. For example, Joel S. Hellman, 'Winners Take All: The Politics of Partial Reform in Postcommunist Transitions', World Politics 50 (1998): 203-34;
28. Rasma Karklins, The System Made Me Do It (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2005);
29. S. Kotkin and A. Sajo, eds., Political Corruption in Transition: A Sceptic's Handbook (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2002).
30. Gary Becker, 'Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach', Journal of Political Economy 76 (1968): 169-217.
31. Diego Gambetta, 'Corruption: an Analytical Map', in Political Corruption in Transition: A Sceptic's Handbook, ed. S. Kotkin and A. Sajo (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2002), 33-56.
32. Bo Rothstein, 'Social Trust and Honesty in Government: A Causal Mechanisms Approach, in Creating Social Trust in Post-Socialist Transition, ed. Janos Kornai, Bo Rothstein, and Susan Rose-Ackerman (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 20-21.
33. William Mishler and Richard Rose, Seeing Is Not Believing: Measuring Corruption Perceptions and Experiences (paper presented at Midwest Political Science Association, Annual Meeting, Chicago, April 2-5, 2009).
34. Russell Dalton, Democratic Challenges, Democratic Choices: The Erosion of Political Support in Advanced Industrial Democracies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).
35. David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York: John Wiley, 1965).
36. W. van der Brug, C. van der EIjk, and M. Franklin, The Economy and the Vote (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007);
37. Raymond Duch and Randolph T. Stevenson, The Economic Vote: How Political and Economic Institutions Condition Election Results (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
38. See, for example, Leonardo Morlino, 'Good' and 'Bad' Democracies: How to Conduct Research into the Quality of Democracy, Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics 20, no. 1 (2004): 5-27.
39. See Richard Rose, William Mishler, and Christian Haerpfer, Democracy and Its Alternatives: Understanding Post-Communist Societies (Oxford: Polity Press and Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998)
40. William Mishler and Richard Rose, 'Political Support for Incomplete Democracies: Realist vs. Idealist Theories and Measures', International Political Science Review 22, no. 4 (2001): 303-20.
41. Mayfair Mei-hui Yang, Gifts, Favors and Banquets: The Art of Social Relationships in China (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994)
42. Alena V. Ledeneva, Russia's Economy of Favours (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
43. For the full text of the questionnaire and the sample report, see Rose, 2007.
44. Rasma Karklins, The System Made Me Do It (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2005).
45. See Chrystia Freeland, Sale of the Century: The Inside Story of the Second Russian Revolution (London: Little Brown, 2000)
46. Paul Klebnikov, Godfather of the Kremlin: Boris Berezovsky and the Looting of Russia (New York: Harcourt Brace, 2000). While carrying out further investigations into corruption in Russian government, Paul Klebnikov was murdered in Moscow in 2004.
47. Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization (Glencoe, IL: The Free Press, 1947).
48. Robert E. Klitgaard, Controlling Corruption (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 75. 32.
49. Michael Lipsky, Street-Level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the Individual in Public Services (New York: Russell Sage, 1980).
50. The Russian word used, vzyatka, has similar connotations to the English word for bribe.
51. Taxation, encounters with the police and military service may colloquially be described as private 'bads'. As such, people have an even greater incentive to pay a bribe in order not to be subject to such exactions.
52. European Commission, The Attitudes of Europeans towards Corruption (Brussels: Special Eurobarometer 291, 2008)
53. Transparency International, Report on the Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer 2006 (Berlin: Transparency International, 2006).
54. Mitchell A. Seligson, 'The Impact of Corruption on Regime Legitimacy: A Comparative Study of Four Latin American Countries', Journal of Politics 64, no. 2 (2002): 418ff.;
55. Mireille Razafindrakoto and François Roubaud, 'How Far Can We Trust Expert Opinions on Corruption? An Experiment Based on Surveys in Francophone Africa', in Global Corruption Report 2005 (London: Pluto Press, 2005), 292-5;
56. William L. Miller, Ase B. Grodeland and T.Y. Koshechkina, A Culture of Corruption? (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2001), Tables 4.5, 4.6; Transparency International, Report on the Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer 2006 (Berlin: Transparency International, 2006); and European Commission, The Attitudes of Europeans towards Corruption (Brussels: Special Eurobarometer 291, 2008).
57. Richard Rose, 'Going Public with Private Opinions: Are Post-Communist Citizens Afraid to Say What They Think?', in Journal of Elections and Public Opinion 17, no. 2 (2007): 123-42.
58. Since there is a skew distribution in the number of bribes paid, we also ran regression equations which collapsed respondents into three categories, paying a bribe more than once, paying a bribe once, and not paying a bribe. The results are the same as those reported here.
59. Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 64, 69.
60. Richard Rose, Getting Things Done with Social Capital: New Russia Barometer VII. Studies in Public Policy Number 303 (Glasgow: Centre for the Study of Public Policy, 1998), 48.
61. On this, see Janine R. Wedel, ed., The Unplanned Society: Poland During and After Communism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992).
62. See Richard Rose, William Mishler, and Neil Munro, Russia Transformed: Developing Popular Support for a New Regime (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), Chapters 5-8.
63. Richard Rose, Getting Things Done with Social Capital: New Russia Barometer VII. Studies in Public Policy Number 303 (Glasgow: Centre for the Study of Public Policy, 1998).
64. For comparative Asian answers, see Takashi Inoguchi, ed., Human Beliefs and Values in East and Southeast Asia in Transition (Tokyo: Akashi Shoten, 2009), 305.
65. European Commission, The Attitudes of Europeans towards Corruption (Brussels: Special Eurobarometer 291, 2008), 3, 12.
66. See William Mishler and Richard Rose, 'Seeing Is Not Believing: Measuring Corruption Perceptions and Experiences' (paper presented at Midwest Political Science Association, Annual Meeting, Chicago, April 2-5, 2009).
67. Mireille Razafindrakoto and François Roubaud, 'How Far Can We Trust Expert Opinions on Corruption? An Experiment Based on Surveys in Francophone Africa', in Global Corruption Report 2005 (London: Pluto Press, 2005), Table 26.1.