Researching democracy and terrorism: How political access affects militant activity

Security Studies

Volumn 18, Issue 4, 2009, Pages 756-788

  Brooks, Risa ^a  

^a NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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EID: 77951698699     PISSN: 09636412     EISSN: 15561852     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/09636410903369027     Document Type: Article

References (185)

1. See especially "Strengthen Alliances to Defeat Global Terrorism and Work to Prevent Attacks Against Us and Our Friends," in The National Security Strategy (March 2006), http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/.
2. See also George W. Bush, speech to the National Endowment for Democracy, United States Chamber of Commerce, Washington, DC, 6 November 2003, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/11/20031106-2.html.
3. Dick Cheney, keynote address to the Weinberg Founders Conference 2007, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Washington, DC, 21 October 2007, www.washingtoninstitute.org.
4. Paula Dobriansky, Under Secretary of State for Global Affairs, "Promoting Democracy in the 21st Century: An essential tool against terrorism" (speech, Baltimore Council on Foreign Affairs, Baltimore, MD, 9 February 2004).
5. See also "Democracy and Security: The Bush Doctrine is Alive and Well," editorial endorsement, Wall Street Journal, 26 March 2006.
6. Jennifer Windsor, "Promoting Democratization Can Combat Terrorism," Washington Quarterly 26, no. 3 (Summer 2003): 43-58.
7. Strobe Talbott, "Democracy and the International Interest" (speech, Denver Summit of the Eight Initiative on Democracy and Human Rights, Denver, CO, October 1997).
8. Martin Indyk, "Back to the Bazaar," Foreign Affairs 81, no. 1 (January/February 2002): 75-88.
9. Shadi Hamid, "Engaging Political Islam to Promote Democracy," Policy Report (Washington, DC: Progressive Policy Institute, 27 June 2007).
10. Note that there are also critiques of the democracy-terror thesis from across the political spectrum. See for example, Thomas Carothers, "Promoting Democracy and Fighting Terror," Foreign Affairs (January/February 2003).
11. Dennis Roddy, "Democracy, Terror and Fantasy," Pittsburgh Post Gazette, 27 February 2005.
12. F. Gregory Gause III, "Can Democracy Stop Terrorism?" Foreign Affairs, (September/October 2005).
13. Francis Fukuyama and Adam Garfinkle, "A better idea: promote democracy and prevent terrorism-but don't conflate the two," Wall Street Journal, 27 March 2006.
14. See also Joseph Nye's more qualified comments. Joseph Nye, "Can Democracy Defeat Terrorism?" Taipei Times, 31 August 2005. For more on the debate.
15. see Dalia Dassa Kaye, Frederic Wehrey, Audra K. Grant, and Dale Stahl, More Freedom, Less Terror? Liberalization and Political Violence in the Arab World (Santa Monica: RAND, 2008).
16. Noted in Dassa Kaye, et al., More Freedom, Less Terror, 1.
17. originally cited in Michael Hirsch, "Where's the Clarity? Five Years After 9/11, Little of Bush's 'War on Terror' Rhetoric Is Making Sense," Newsweek.com, 7 September 2006, http://www.newsweek.com/id/45728?tid=relatedcl.
18. For recent case studies, see Dassa Kaye, et al., More Freedom, Less Terror.
19. Cindy R. Jebb, P.H. Liotta, Thomas Sherlock, and Ruth Margolies Beilter, The Fight for Legitimacy: Democracy vs. Terrorism (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006).
20. On the policy debate, see, for example, the exchange between Gause and Dobriansky. Gause, "Can Democracy Stop Terrorism".
21. Paula J. Dobriansky and Henry A. Crumpton, "Tyranny and Terror," Foreign Affairs (January/February 2006).
22. Note that in this article I intend the concept of terrorism to refer to the use of violence aimed at killing- or threatening to kill-people or destroying property to generate fear and the anticipation of future harm, as a way of coercing an opposing government, society, or authority. On the controversies surrounding efforts to define terrorism, see, for example, Alex P. Schmid and Albert J. Jongman, Political Terrorism, rev. ed. (1984; repr., New Brunswick: Transaction, 1988).
23. Andrew Silke, "An Introduction to Terrorism Research," in Andrew Silke, ed., Research on Terrorism (London: Frank Cass, 2004).
24. Joe Eyerman, "Terrorism and Democratic States: soft targets or accessible systems," International Interactions 24, no. 2 (1998): 151-70.
25. In addition, the series of studies by Eubank and Weinberg all explore, in various ways, how democratic institutions affect the incidence of terrorist violence at the national level. William Eubank and Leonard Weinberg, "Does Democracy Encourage Terrorism?" Terrorism and Political Violence 6, no. 4 (1994): 417-43.
26. William Eubank and Leonard Weinberg, "Terrorism and Democracy: What Recent Events Disclose," Terrorism and Political Violence 10, no. 1 (1998).
27. William Eubank and Leonard Weinberg, "Terrorism and Democracy: Perpetrators and Victims," Terrorism and Political Violence 13, no. 1 (2001): 155-64.
28. See also Alan B. Krueger and Jitka Maleckova, "Education, Poverty and Terrorism: Is there a Causal Connection?" Journal of Economic Perspectives 17, no. 4 (Fall 2003).
29. Krueger, What makes a terrorist.
30. Alberto Abadie, Poverty, Political Freedom and the Roots of Terrorism, Faculty Research Working Paper Series, JFK School of Government (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, October 2004).
31. James A. Piazza, "Draining the Swamp: democracy promotion, state failure and terrorism in 19 Middle Eastern Countries," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 30, no. 6 (2007): 521-39.
32. Quan Li, "Does Democracy Promote or Reduce Transnational Terrorist Incidents?" Journal of Conflict Resolution 49, no. 2 (April 2005): 278-97.
33. See Alex P. Schmid, "Terrorism and Democracy," Terrorism and Political Violence 4, no. 4 (1992): 14-25.
34. Jeffrey Ian Ross, "Structural Causes of Oppositional Terrorism: Towards a Causal Model," Journal of Peace Research 30, no. 3 (August 1993): 317-29.
35. Note this logic suggests that the argument best applies to non-state actors excluded from power (rather than those within the state apparatus and who therefore have access) using violence against their own (versus foreign) state governments and complicit populations. My discussion for this reason focuses on groups' use of violence against the groups' own states and not transnational violence or state-led terrorist acts.
36. One other logic relates to the inadequacy of democracies in protecting against terrorism. Perhaps best articulated by Eubank and Weinberg, according to this line of argument, the openness of democratic societies makes it easier for terrorists to mobilize and harder for government officials to launch effective counterterror operations: democracy increases the incidence of terrorism. One immediate counter is that there is tremendous variation in the nature and success of counterterror operations in democracies.
37. See Robert Art and Louise Richardson, Democracy and Counterterrorism: Lessons from the Past (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2007).
38. Generally, however, although the democracy-as-vulnerable-to-terrorism thesis merits greater analysis, I stay with the political access logic in this paper in large part because of its current influence in the scholarly and policy realms.
39. See Eubank and Weinberg "Terrorism and Democracy: What Recent Events Disclose".
40. Eubank and Weinberg, "Terrorism and Democracy: Perpetrators and Victims."
41. Alternatively, a state may be in transition from authoritarianism, and the newly democratized regime may lack the ability to credibly commit to end repression of suppressed minorities or be unwilling to do so.
42. See Martha Crenshaw, "Political Explanations," Addressing the Causes of Terrorism: The Club de Madrid Series on Democracy and Terrorism, vol. 1, The Madrid Summit Working Paper Series, The International Summit on Democracy, Terrorism and Security, 8-11 March 2005 (Madrid: Club de Madrid, 2005), 15.
43. For an example from the Basque case, see Goldie Shabad and Francisco Jose Llera Ramo, "Political Violence in a Democratic State: Basque Terrorism in Spain," in Terrorism in Context, ed. Martha Crenshaw (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University, 1995), 420.
44. See also note 17.
45. On the importance of liberalization, as apart from democracy, see Dassa Kaye, et al., More Freedom, Less Terror.
46. Alan. B. Krueger, What Makes a Terrorist? (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007).
47. For a concise description of the tenets of liberal democracy, see Larry Diamond, "The Global State of Democracy," Current History 99, no. 641 (December 2000): 414-15.
48. On liberal democracy vs. illiberal democracy, see Fareed Zakaria, "The rise of illiberal democracy" Foreign Affairs (1997).
49. Here I refer to Freedom House's terminology, which defines political rights as involving three sets of criteria associated with electoral processes, political pluralism and participation, and functioning of government. Civil liberties consist of attributes associated with freedom of expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of law, and personal autonomy and individual rights. For details, see www.FreedomHouse.org. Note that we might also include democratizing states here, if we distinguish those as states that have established the basic institutions for competitive elections but not other features of liberal democracies. Alternatively, it might make sense to create a different category of "democratizing" states or those in transition from autocracy to democracy if we anticipate that there is something unique about the kinds of political access and the incentives therein of states in the process of change from one system to another. For an argument that the transition phase is a unique form of political environment that engenders particular incentives.
50. see Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, Electing to Fight: Why Emerging Democracies Go to War (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005).
51. Dassa Kaye, et al., More Freedom, Less Terror argues also that change in a system-for that study, back-tracking from newly established liberalization measures-is especially likely to bolster political violence.
52. These can be defined as a type of political system involving guided pluralism, controlled elections, and selective repression. See Daniel Brumberg, "The Trap of Liberalized Autocracy," Journal of Democracy 13, no. 4 (October 2002): 56-68.
53. Daniel Brumberg, "Liberalization Versus Democracy," in Uncharted Journey: Promoting Democracy in the Middle East, ed. Thomas Carothers and Marina Ottaway (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005), 15-35.
54. Alternatively, liberalized autocracy might be seen as one point on a continuum of regime type, in which a state exhibits notable, but not comprehensive, political rights and civil liberties.
55. See Dassa Kaye, et al., More Freedom, Less Terror.
56. See also Krueger, What makes a Terrorist.
57. See Eubank and Weinberg, "Terrorism and Democracy: What Recent Events Disclose".
58. Eubank and Weinberg, "Terrorism and Democracy: Perpetrators and Victims".
59. Eyerman, "Terrorism and Democratic States".
60. Piazza, "Draining the Swamp".
61. Li, "Does Democracy Promote or Reduce Transnational Terrorist Incidents?"
62. In many places, this is a religious or ethnic community or some subsection thereof: the IRA (Catholics), ETA (Basque population), Hamas (Palestinians), and Hezbollah (Lebanese Shia).
63. Robert A. Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism, (New York: Random House, 2005), 94-100.
64. Mia Bloom, Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Bombing (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 19-44.
65. On developing political parties, see Leonard Weinberg and Ami Pedahzur, Political Parties and Terrorist Groups (London: Routledge, 2003).
66. These hybrids appear to be surprisingly common. One study shows that of 399 contemporary terrorist groups, 124 are affiliates with or splits from political parties. Study cited in Ted Robert Gurr, "Economic Factors," Addressing the Causes of Terrorism: The Club de Madrid Series on Democracy and Terrorism, vol. 1, The Madrid Summit Working Paper Series, The International Summit on Democracy, Terrorism and Security, 8-11 March 2005 (Madrid: Club de Madrid, 2005).
67. Weinberg and Pedahzur, Political Parties and Terrorist Groups. In fact, several contemporary and historical militant groups have affiliated political parties or participate in party politics. Prominent examples include groups like ETA, the Provisional IRA, and Hamas.
68. Shabad and Llera Ramo, "Political Violence in a Democratic State."
69. We also see the hybrid phenomenon with the emergence of ETA'S political wing, Herri Batasuna, and the political party's successors.
70. On the demise of terrorist groups, see Audrey Kurth Cronin, "How Al-Qaida Ends: The Decline and Demise of Terrorist Groups," International Security 31, no. 1 (Summer 2006): 7-48.
71. Gordon H. McCormick, "Terrorist Decision Making," Annual Review of Political Science 6 (2003): 481.
72. See also Martha Crenshaw, "The Logic of Terrorism: Terrorist Behavior as a Product of Strategic Choice," in Walter Reich, ed. Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind, 1998.
73. Eyerman, "Terrorism and Democratic States."
74. See also Eubank and Weinberg, "Terrorism and Democracy: What Recent Events Disclose".
75. Eubank and Weinberg, "Terrorism and Democracy: Perpetrators and Victims."
76. See Eubank and Weinberg, "Terrorism and Democracy: What Recent Events Disclose".
77. Eubank and Weinberg, "Terrorism and Democracy: Perpetrators and Victims."
78. Eyerman, "Terrorism and Democratic States".
79. Abadie, Poverty, Political Freedom and the Roots of Terrorism.
80. On democratizing states constituting a unique form of political environment and category of political access, see note 13.
81. Krueger, What Makes A Terrorist, 82.
82. Li, "Does Democracy Promote or Reduce Transnational Terrorist Incidents?"
83. Piazza, "Draining the Swamp."
84. Li, "Does Democracy Promote or Reduce Transnational Terrorist Incidents?" 279.
85. Li focuses exclusively on transnational terrorism whereby a domestic actor targets a foreign installation in a country, a foreign terrorist targets a domestic target in a country, or a foreign terrorist attacks some other foreign target in a country.
86. Li, "Does Democracy Promote or Reduce Transnational Terrorist Incidents?" 280.
87. Eubank and Weinberg are careful to identify whether an attacker came from a democratic state and the regime type of the target; they find that terrorism is common even when the attacker came from a democracy and the target is a democracy. (They are interested, for example, in whether members of authoritarian regimes attack democracies or vice versa. Yet why the regime type of the attacker's home country should be consequential here is unclear.) As they put it, "The prototypical terrorist event recorded in ITERATE [the data employed] was an attack on the territory of a democratic country committed by the citizen(s) of a democracy against the citizen(s) or property of the same or some other stable democracy." Eubank and Weinberg, "Terrorism and Democracy: Perpetrators and Victims," 161.
88. Yet, as this statement reveals, they do not specify whether the terrorist and the target are from the same democracy. Consistent with the logic of the political access model, we should look at the incidence of militant groups employing terrorism against their own democratic states. It is only then that the incentives-the possibility to pursue nonviolent options-should have the potential to condition the utility of engaging in terrorism. On this point, see Piazza, "Draining the Swamp."
89. Eubank and Weinberg focus on executed attacks only, finding them more common in democracies and therefore concluding that terrorism is worse in democracies in part because they are handicapped in launching counter-terror operations. The selection effect obscures the possibility that democracies may succumb to more violent and nonviolent protests overall than autocracies and may foil more attacks than are executed.
90. For a review, see McCormick, "Terrorist Decision Making".
91. see also John Horgan, The Psychology of Terrorism (London: Routledge, 2005).
92. Bruce Bongar, et al., Psychology of Terrorism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).
93. Jerrold Post, The Mind of the Terrorist (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).
94. Peter Olsson, The Cult of Osama: Psychoanalyzing Bin Laden and his magnetism for Muslim youths (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2008).
95. McCormick, "Terrorist Decision Making," 477.
96. Ibid., 480.
97. Jessica Stern, Terror in the Name of God (New York: HarperCollins, 2004).
98. Rex A. Hudson, Who Becomes a Terrorist and Why (Guilford, CT: The Lyons Press, 1999), 52-56.
99. Crenshaw, "Political Explanations," 13.
100. Jerrold Post, "Psychology" Addressing the Causes of Terrorism: The Club de Madrid Series on Democracy and Terrorism, vol. 1, The Madrid Summit Working Paper Series, The International Summit on Democracy, Terrorism and Security, 8-11 March 2005 (Madrid: Club de Madrid, 2005), 7.
101. McCormick, "Terrorist Decision Making," 486.
102. See Irving Janis and Leon Mann, Decision-Making: A Psychological Analysis of Conflict, Choice, Commitment (New York: The Free Press, 1972).
103. This is a widely observed conclusion. For examples, see the profiling work done by Hudson, Who Becomes a Terrorist and Why, 91-97.
104. and the review of the literature by Neil J. Smelser and Faith Mitchell, eds., Terrorism: Perspectives from the Behavioral and Social Sciences (Washington, DC: National Research Council, National Academies Press, 2002), 31.
105. See, for example, Bloom, Dying to Kill; Cynthia Irwin, Militant Nationalism (University of Minnesota Press, 1999).
106. Jacob D. Shapiro and David A. Siegel, "Under funding in Terrorist Organizations," International Studies Quarterly 51 (June 2007): 405-30.
107. See also Frederick D. Miller, "The End of SDS and the Emergence of Weatherman: Demise Through Success," in Social Movements of the Sixties and Seventies, ed. Jo Freeman (New York: Longman, 1983), 283.
108. Miller, "The End of SDS," 283.
109. For an especially strong articulation of the view, see Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003).
110. Crenshaw, "Political Explanations," 15.
111. Peter Katzenstein, ed. The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 6.
112. employs a fairly traditional definition of the concept of culture in political science. Ann Swidler's concept of culture might also be usefully employed, as is Elizabeth Kier's. Elizabeth Kier, Imagining War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997).
113. As Swidler characterizes it, culture, is a "'tool kit' of habits, skills and styles from which people construct 'strategies of action."'.
114. Ann Swidler, "Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies," American Sociological Review 51 (April 1986): 273.
115. For examples of this approach as applied to military organizations, see Jeffrey Legro, Cooperation under Fire: Anglo-German Restraint during World War II (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995).
116. Kier, Imagining War.
117. One problem here, of course, is measuring what in group discourse and belief systems is a reflection of a persistent organizational culture versus what in its discourse and belief system is a reflection of its strategic circumstances. Observance of a reflexive opposition to political action in group doctrine and statements may be a reflection of, and reinforced by, the absence of political opportunities. Some independent measures of organizational culture are essential.
118. Given the need to sustain group support for killing innocents, organizational cultures of terror groups might be more prone to reflect themes of resistance to political activity and the justification of violence.
119. Joseba Zulakia, Basque Violence: Metaphor and Sacrament (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1988): 424.
120. April Carter, "Anarchism and Violence," in Nomos XIX - Anarchism, ed. Roland J. Pennock and John W. Chapman (New York: New York University Press, 1978), 320-40.
121. quoted in McCormick, "Terrorist Decision Making," 478.
122. Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God, 150.
123. In a different vein, Hoffman argues that in its most recent wave of attacks, religious-based terrorism is especially virulent in its commitment to violence. Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, rev. ed. (1998 repr., New York: Columbia University Press, 2006).
124. See also Magnus Rangstorp, "Terrorism in the Name of Religion," Journal of International Affairs (Summer 1996).
125. I discuss three central variants, but my treatment of organizational approaches is not exhaustive.
126. Sometimes they use slightly different language. Irwin refers to ideologues, radicals and politicos. Irwin, Militant Nationalism. DeNardo refers to pragmatists versus purists. James DeNardo, Power in Numbers (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985).
127. Note that the meaning of these distinctions, especially for hardliners versus softliners, is not always well defined. The differences could reduce to several things: individuals/factions may exhibit different preferences over outcomes (that is, intensity of commitment to attainment of all goals).
128. preferences over strategy (valuations of the costs and risks of alternative approaches to pursuing those goals); or beliefs about the causal relationship between different strategies and their outcomes-divergences that are commonly rooted in personality/intellectual dispositions or prior experiences in the organization.
129. For examples of these sorts of differentiated functions, see Rohan Gunarantna, Inside Al Qaeda (New York: Berkeley Books, 2003).
130. Stern, Terror in the Name of God.
131. Shapiro and Siegel, in "Underfunding in Terrorist Organizations," argue that middle managers benefit from the clandestine nature of the organization and the difficulty of internal monitoring the exigencies of keeping operations secret poses for the leadership; middle managers are able to skim funds allocated for operations as well as to draw salaries. They therefore have a vested interest in maintaining the terrorist activities of the organization because of the private benefits that they accrue.
132. One might, for example, draw here on the Williamson's work on the firm. See Oliver E. Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications (New York: Free Press, 1975).
133. On social network theory, see John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, Networks and Netwars (Santa Monica: Rand, 2001).
134. James D. Thompson, Organizations in Action (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2007).
135. Stanley Wasserman and Katherine Faust, Social Network Analysis: Methods and Applications (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).
136. Marc Sageman, Leaderless Jihad (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008).
137. On the role of ideology connecting dispersed membership communities, see Stern, Terror in the Name of God.
138. Barry Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984).
139. Jack Snyder, "Civil-Military Relations and the Cult of the Offensive, 1914 and 1984," in Military Strategy and the Origins of the First World War, ed. Steven E. Miller (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991).
140. Stephen Van Evera, "The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War," in Military Strategy have all applied this approach to understanding military organizations' preferences.
141. See, for example, Graham Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the CubanMissile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971).
142. Reports from the CTC commonly emphasize organizational factors in explaining militant group behavior. Also see Max Abrahms "What Terrorists Really Want: Terrorist Motives and Counterterrorism Strategy," International Security 32, no. 4 (Spring 2008).
143. Bloom, Dying to Kill.
144. Implicit in the outbidding literature is that organizations are motivated to protect their own prerogatives and prestige (otherwise they might defer to the most "effective" among them).
145. See Ethan Bueno de Mesquita, "Conciliation, Counterterrorism and Patterns of Terrorist Violence," International Organization 59 (Winter 2005): 145-76.
146. Bloom, Dying to Kill.
147. Andrew H. Kydd and Barbara F. Walter, "The Strategies of Terrorism," International Security 31, no. 1 (Summer 2006): 49-80.
148. McCormick, "Terrorist Decision Making," 488.
149. Irwin, Militant Nationalism.
150. Peter R. Neumann, "The bullet and the ballot box: the case of the IRA," The Journal of Strategic Studies 28, no. 6 (December 2005).
151. Note one approach not discussed here is organizational learning. Relevant here is Trujillo and Jackson's emphasis on how an organization's capacity in acquisition, interpretation, distribution, and storage of new information facilitates improvements is strategic decision making, tactical planning, or operational activities. Accordingly, better learners may recognize and act upon the opportunities available when the group has political access (for example, form hybrids), while poor learners (those that exhibit weak capacities in these areas) could be less responsive to changes in their political environment; violence will continue at a status quo level. Horacio R. Trujillo and Brian A. Jackson, "Organizational Learning and Terrorist Groups," in Teaching Terror, ed. James J.F. Forest (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005), 52-68.
152. Cronin, "How Al-Qaida Ends," 27, for example, suggests that society plays a central role in providing "active and passive" support to terrorist groups. In so doing, her study echoes the common, if rarely fully developed, theme in the literature that terrorists are influenced by their need to maintain social support and the assistance local communities provide them. For other studies emphasizing the importance of social support (or mass publics) and terrorism, see Pape, Dying to Win.
153. Bloom, Dying to Kill.
154. Ethan Bueno de Mesquita, "Terrorist Factions" Quarterly Journal of Political Science 3, no. 4 (2008).
155. Jebb, et al., The Fight for Legitimacy, 8.
156. Dassa Kaye, et al., More Freedom, Less Terror.
157. The National Security Strategy, 10.
158. Gregory Gause III, "Can Democracy Stop Terrorism," Foreign Affairs (September/October 2005).
159. Katerina Delacoura, "Islamist Terrorism and the Middle East Democratic Deficit: Political Exclusion, Repression and the Causes of Extremism," Democratization 13, no. 3 (June 2006): 508-25.
160. Jebb, et al., The Fight for Legitimacy.
161. Dassa Kaye, et al., More Freedom, Less Terror.
162. See Stathis Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil-Wars (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006).
163. For a review of the debate, see, for example, Pape, Dying to Win, 17-20.
164. Krueger and Maleckova, "Education, Poverty and Terrorism".
165. Abadie, Poverty, Political Freedom and the Roots of Terrorism.
166. Krueger, What Makes a Terrorist.
167. See Paul R. Ehrlich and Jianguo Liu, "Some Roots of Terrorism," Population and Environment 24, no. 2 (November 2002).
168. For an approach that emphasizes other socio-economic and demographic factors, see Brian Nichiporuk, "Regional Demographics and the War on Terrorism," RUSI Journal 148, no. 1 (February 2003): 22-29.
169. Moniza Khokhar, "Reforming Militant Madaris in Pakistan," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 30, no. 4 (April 2007): 353-65.
170. For an alternative view, see Peter Bergen and Swati Pandley, "The Madrassa Scapegoat," The Washington Quarterly (Spring 2006).
171. Krueger and Maleckova, "Education, Poverty and Terrorism."
172. Ibid., 126-27.
173. Judith Palmer Harik, "Between Islam and the System: Sources and Implications of Popular Support for Lebanon's Hizballah," Journal of Conflict Resolution 40, no. 1 (March 1996): 41-67.
174. This is a central theme in Stern, Terror in the Name of God.
175. See also Andrea Elliott, "Where Boys Grow up to be Jihadis," New York Times Magazine, 25 November 2007.
176. Ethan Bueno de Mesquita, "Conciliation, Counterterrorism and Patterns of Terrorist Violence," 145-76.
177. Robert W. White, "From Peaceful Protest to Guerilla War: Micromobilization of the Provisional Irish Republican Army," The American Journal of Sociology 94, no. 6 (May 1989): 1277-302.
178. Kydd and Walter, "Strategies of Terrorism."
179. Martha Crenshaw, "The Causes of Terrorism," Comparative Politics 13, no. 4 (July 1981): 382.
180. The U.S. Army, Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007).
181. On controversies about how to measure social support and whether attitudes (as evident in polls) are good indicators, see Stathis Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil-War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
182. The Pew Global Attitudes Project, Global Opinion Trends 2002-2007: A Rising Tide Lifts Mood in the Developing World, http://pewglobal.org/reports/pdf/257.pdf.
183. Pape, Dying to Win, 94-100.
184. Bloom, Dying to Kill, 19-44.
185. Neumann, "The bullet and the ballot box."