Democratic accountability in open economies

Quarterly Journal of Political Science

Volumn 5, Issue 1, 2010, Pages 71-97

  Sattler, Thomas ^a   Brandt, Patrick T ^b   Freeman, John R ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY COLLEGE DUBLIN   (Ireland)

^b UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT DALLAS   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 77951649771     PISSN: 15540626     EISSN: 15540634     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1561/100.00009031     Document Type: Article

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