Wage bargaining, hard money and economic performance: Theory and evidence for organized market economies

British Journal of Political Science

Volumn 28, Issue 1, 1998, Pages 31-61

  Iversen, Torben ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0032345175     PISSN: 00071234     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S000712349800009X     Document Type: Article

References (109)

1. See, for example, Alex Cukierman, Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, and Independence (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1992); Alberto Alesina, Gerald D. Cohen and Nouriel Roubini, 'Macroeconomic Policy and Elections in OECD Democracies' Economics and Politics, 4 (1992), 1-30; Alberto Alesina and Vittorio Grilli, 'The European Central Bank: Reshaping Monetary Policy in Europe', in Matthew Canzoneri, Vittorio Grilli and Paul Masson, eds, Establishing a Central Bank: Issues in Europe and Lessons from the United States (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 49-77; Susanne Lohmann, 'Optimal of Commitment in Monetary Policy: Credibility versus Flexibility', American Economic Review, 82 (1992), 273-86; Vittorio Grilli, Donato Masciandoro and Guido Tabellini, 'Political and Monetary Institutions and Public Financial Policies in the Industrialized Countries', Economic Policy, 13 (1991), 42-92; Kenneth Rogoff, 'The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 100 (1985), 1169-89.
2. See, for example, Alex Cukierman, Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, and Independence (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1992); Alberto Alesina, Gerald D. Cohen and Nouriel Roubini, 'Macroeconomic Policy and Elections in OECD Democracies' Economics and Politics, 4 (1992), 1-30; Alberto Alesina and Vittorio Grilli, 'The European Central Bank: Reshaping Monetary Policy in Europe', in Matthew Canzoneri, Vittorio Grilli and Paul Masson, eds, Establishing a Central Bank: Issues in Europe and Lessons from the United States (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 49-77; Susanne Lohmann, 'Optimal of Commitment in Monetary Policy: Credibility versus Flexibility', American Economic Review, 82 (1992), 273-86; Vittorio Grilli, Donato Masciandoro and Guido Tabellini, 'Political and Monetary Institutions and Public Financial Policies in the Industrialized Countries', Economic Policy, 13 (1991), 42-92; Kenneth Rogoff, 'The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 100 (1985), 1169-89.
3. See, for example, Alex Cukierman, Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, and Independence (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1992); Alberto Alesina, Gerald D. Cohen and Nouriel Roubini, 'Macroeconomic Policy and Elections in OECD Democracies' Economics and Politics, 4 (1992), 1-30; Alberto Alesina and Vittorio Grilli, 'The European Central Bank: Reshaping Monetary Policy in Europe', in Matthew Canzoneri, Vittorio Grilli and Paul Masson, eds, Establishing a Central Bank: Issues in Europe and Lessons from the United States (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 49-77; Susanne Lohmann, 'Optimal of Commitment in Monetary Policy: Credibility versus Flexibility', American Economic Review, 82 (1992), 273-86; Vittorio Grilli, Donato Masciandoro and Guido Tabellini, 'Political and Monetary Institutions and Public Financial Policies in the Industrialized Countries', Economic Policy, 13 (1991), 42-92; Kenneth Rogoff, 'The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 100 (1985), 1169-89.
4. See, for example, Alex Cukierman, Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, and Independence (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1992); Alberto Alesina, Gerald D. Cohen and Nouriel Roubini, 'Macroeconomic Policy and Elections in OECD Democracies' Economics and Politics, 4 (1992), 1-30; Alberto Alesina and Vittorio Grilli, 'The European Central Bank: Reshaping Monetary Policy in Europe', in Matthew Canzoneri, Vittorio Grilli and Paul Masson, eds, Establishing a Central Bank: Issues in Europe and Lessons from the United States (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 49-77; Susanne Lohmann, 'Optimal of Commitment in Monetary Policy: Credibility versus Flexibility', American Economic Review, 82 (1992), 273-86; Vittorio Grilli, Donato Masciandoro and Guido Tabellini, 'Political and Monetary Institutions and Public Financial Policies in the Industrialized Countries', Economic Policy, 13 (1991), 42-92; Kenneth Rogoff, 'The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 100 (1985), 1169-89.
5. See, for example, Alex Cukierman, Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, and Independence (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1992); Alberto Alesina, Gerald D. Cohen and Nouriel Roubini, 'Macroeconomic Policy and Elections in OECD Democracies' Economics and Politics, 4 (1992), 1-30; Alberto Alesina and Vittorio Grilli, 'The European Central Bank: Reshaping Monetary Policy in Europe', in Matthew Canzoneri, Vittorio Grilli and Paul Masson, eds, Establishing a Central Bank: Issues in Europe and Lessons from the United States (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 49-77; Susanne Lohmann, 'Optimal of Commitment in Monetary Policy: Credibility versus Flexibility', American Economic Review, 82 (1992), 273-86; Vittorio Grilli, Donato Masciandoro and Guido Tabellini, 'Political and Monetary Institutions and Public Financial Policies in the Industrialized Countries', Economic Policy, 13 (1991), 42-92; Kenneth Rogoff, 'The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 100 (1985), 1169-89.
6. See, for example, Alex Cukierman, Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, and Independence (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1992); Alberto Alesina, Gerald D. Cohen and Nouriel Roubini, 'Macroeconomic Policy and Elections in OECD Democracies' Economics and Politics, 4 (1992), 1-30; Alberto Alesina and Vittorio Grilli, 'The European Central Bank: Reshaping Monetary Policy in Europe', in Matthew Canzoneri, Vittorio Grilli and Paul Masson, eds, Establishing a Central Bank: Issues in Europe and Lessons from the United States (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 49-77; Susanne Lohmann, 'Optimal of Commitment in Monetary Policy: Credibility versus Flexibility', American Economic Review, 82 (1992), 273-86; Vittorio Grilli, Donato Masciandoro and Guido Tabellini, 'Political and Monetary Institutions and Public Financial Policies in the Industrialized Countries', Economic Policy, 13 (1991), 42-92; Kenneth Rogoff, 'The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 100 (1985), 1169-89.
7. See, for example, Peter Katzenstein, Small States in World Markets (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985); Peter Lange and Geoffrey Garrett, 'The Politics of Growth: Strategic Interaction and Economic Performance in the Advanced Industrial Democracies, 1974-1980', Journal of Politics, 47 (1985), 792-827; David Cameron, 'Social Democracy, Corporatism, Labor Quiescence, and the Representation of Economic Interest in Advanced Capitalist Society', in John H. Goldthorpe, ed., Order and Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), pp. 143-78; Manfred G. Schmidt, 'The Welfare State and the Economy in Periods of Economic Crisis: A Comparative Study of Twenty-Three OECD Nations', European Journal of Political Research, 11 (1983), 1-26; Adam Przeworski and Michael Wallerstein, 'The Structure of Class Conflict in Democratic Capitalist Societies', American Political Science Review, 76 (1982).
8. See, for example, Peter Katzenstein, Small States in World Markets (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985); Peter Lange and Geoffrey Garrett, 'The Politics of Growth: Strategic Interaction and Economic Performance in the Advanced Industrial Democracies, 1974-1980', Journal of Politics, 47 (1985), 792-827; David Cameron, 'Social Democracy, Corporatism, Labor Quiescence, and the Representation of Economic Interest in Advanced Capitalist Society', in John H. Goldthorpe, ed., Order and Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), pp. 143-78; Manfred G. Schmidt, 'The Welfare State and the Economy in Periods of Economic Crisis: A Comparative Study of Twenty-Three OECD Nations', European Journal of Political Research, 11 (1983), 1-26; Adam Przeworski and Michael Wallerstein, 'The Structure of Class Conflict in Democratic Capitalist Societies', American Political Science Review, 76 (1982).
9. See, for example, Peter Katzenstein, Small States in World Markets (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985); Peter Lange and Geoffrey Garrett, 'The Politics of Growth: Strategic Interaction and Economic Performance in the Advanced Industrial Democracies, 1974-1980', Journal of Politics, 47 (1985), 792-827; David Cameron, 'Social Democracy, Corporatism, Labor Quiescence, and the Representation of Economic Interest in Advanced Capitalist Society', in John H. Goldthorpe, ed., Order and Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), pp. 143-78; Manfred G. Schmidt, 'The Welfare State and the Economy in Periods of Economic Crisis: A Comparative Study of Twenty-Three OECD Nations', European Journal of Political Research, 11 (1983), 1-26; Adam Przeworski and Michael Wallerstein, 'The Structure of Class Conflict in Democratic Capitalist Societies', American Political Science Review, 76 (1982).
10. See, for example, Peter Katzenstein, Small States in World Markets (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985); Peter Lange and Geoffrey Garrett, 'The Politics of Growth: Strategic Interaction and Economic Performance in the Advanced Industrial Democracies, 1974-1980', Journal of Politics, 47 (1985), 792-827; David Cameron, 'Social Democracy, Corporatism, Labor Quiescence, and the Representation of Economic Interest in Advanced Capitalist Society', in John H. Goldthorpe, ed., Order and Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), pp. 143-78; Manfred G. Schmidt, 'The Welfare State and the Economy in Periods of Economic Crisis: A Comparative Study of Twenty-Three OECD Nations', European Journal of Political Research, 11 (1983), 1-26; Adam Przeworski and Michael Wallerstein, 'The Structure of Class Conflict in Democratic Capitalist Societies', American Political Science Review, 76 (1982).
11. See, for example, Peter Katzenstein, Small States in World Markets (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985); Peter Lange and Geoffrey Garrett, 'The Politics of Growth: Strategic Interaction and Economic Performance in the Advanced Industrial Democracies, 1974-1980', Journal of Politics, 47 (1985), 792-827; David Cameron, 'Social Democracy, Corporatism, Labor Quiescence, and the Representation of Economic Interest in Advanced Capitalist Society', in John H. Goldthorpe, ed., Order and Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), pp. 143-78; Manfred G. Schmidt, 'The Welfare State and the Economy in Periods of Economic Crisis: A Comparative Study of Twenty-Three OECD Nations', European Journal of Political Research, 11 (1983), 1-26; Adam Przeworski and Michael Wallerstein, 'The Structure of Class Conflict in Democratic Capitalist Societies', American Political Science Review, 76 (1982).
12. Fritz Scharpf, Crisis and Choice in European Social Democracy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991); Peter A. Hall, 'Central Bank Independence and Coordinated Wage Bargaining: Their Interaction in Germany and Europe', German Politics and Society (April 1994), 1-23. See also Wolfgang Streeck, 'Pay Restraint without Incomes Policy: Institutionalized Monetarism and Industrial Unionism in Germany', in Ronald Dore, Robert Boyer and Zoe Marn, eds, The Return of Incomes Policy (London: Pinter Publishers, 1994); Robert Franzese, 'Central Bank Independence, Sectoral Interests, and the Wage Bargain', Center for European Studies Working Paper Series (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University, 1994); and Thomas Havrilevski and James Granato, 'Determinants of Inflationary Performance: Corporatist Structures vs. Central Bank Autonomy', Public Choice, 76 (1993), 249-61.
13. Fritz Scharpf, Crisis and Choice in European Social Democracy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991); Peter A. Hall, 'Central Bank Independence and Coordinated Wage Bargaining: Their Interaction in Germany and Europe', German Politics and Society (April 1994), 1-23. See also Wolfgang Streeck, 'Pay Restraint without Incomes Policy: Institutionalized Monetarism and Industrial Unionism in Germany', in Ronald Dore, Robert Boyer and Zoe Marn, eds, The Return of Incomes Policy (London: Pinter Publishers, 1994); Robert Franzese, 'Central Bank Independence, Sectoral Interests, and the Wage Bargain', Center for European Studies Working Paper Series (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University, 1994); and Thomas Havrilevski and James Granato, 'Determinants of Inflationary Performance: Corporatist Structures vs. Central Bank Autonomy', Public Choice, 76 (1993), 249-61.
14. Fritz Scharpf, Crisis and Choice in European Social Democracy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991); Peter A. Hall, 'Central Bank Independence and Coordinated Wage Bargaining: Their Interaction in Germany and Europe', German Politics and Society (April 1994), 1-23. See also Wolfgang Streeck, 'Pay Restraint without Incomes Policy: Institutionalized Monetarism and Industrial Unionism in Germany', in Ronald Dore, Robert Boyer and Zoe Marn, eds, The Return of Incomes Policy (London: Pinter Publishers, 1994); Robert Franzese, 'Central Bank Independence, Sectoral Interests, and the Wage Bargain', Center for European Studies Working Paper Series (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University, 1994); and Thomas Havrilevski and James Granato, 'Determinants of Inflationary Performance: Corporatist Structures vs. Central Bank Autonomy', Public Choice, 76 (1993), 249-61.
15. Fritz Scharpf, Crisis and Choice in European Social Democracy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991); Peter A. Hall, 'Central Bank Independence and Coordinated Wage Bargaining: Their Interaction in Germany and Europe', German Politics and Society (April 1994), 1-23. See also Wolfgang Streeck, 'Pay Restraint without Incomes Policy: Institutionalized Monetarism and Industrial Unionism in Germany', in Ronald Dore, Robert Boyer and Zoe Marn, eds, The Return of Incomes Policy (London: Pinter Publishers, 1994); Robert Franzese, 'Central Bank Independence, Sectoral Interests, and the Wage Bargain', Center for European Studies Working Paper Series (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University, 1994); and Thomas Havrilevski and James Granato, 'Determinants of Inflationary Performance: Corporatist Structures vs. Central Bank Autonomy', Public Choice, 76 (1993), 249-61.
16. Fritz Scharpf, Crisis and Choice in European Social Democracy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991); Peter A. Hall, 'Central Bank Independence and Coordinated Wage Bargaining: Their Interaction in Germany and Europe', German Politics and Society (April 1994), 1-23. See also Wolfgang Streeck, 'Pay Restraint without Incomes Policy: Institutionalized Monetarism and Industrial Unionism in Germany', in Ronald Dore, Robert Boyer and Zoe Marn, eds, The Return of Incomes Policy (London: Pinter Publishers, 1994); Robert Franzese, 'Central Bank Independence, Sectoral Interests, and the Wage Bargain', Center for European Studies Working Paper Series (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University, 1994); and Thomas Havrilevski and James Granato, 'Determinants of Inflationary Performance: Corporatist Structures vs. Central Bank Autonomy', Public Choice, 76 (1993), 249-61.
17. Katzenstein, Small States in World Markets, p. 22.
18. Stephen D. Krasner, 'Approaches to the State: Alternative Conceptions and Historical Dynamics', Comparative Politics, 16 (1984), 223-46.
19. I here use 'equilibria' in the same sense as Krasner: as stable institutional configurations. Although it may be possible to represent these configurations in a game-theoretic equilibrium model, this is not the task of this article and it is not necessary for understanding the logic of the argument.
20. Strictly speaking, it is also necessary to assume that rationality is common knowledge. See Jon Elster, Explaining Technical Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 77.
21. In the absence of strategic competence - as in the case of a finite multi-player prisoner's dilemma (PD) game - all players have a dominant strategy, and their choices are unaffected by the choices of others.
22. See David Soskice, 'Wage Determination: The Changing Role of Institutions in Advanced Industrialized Countries', Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 6 (1990), 36-61; 'The German Apprenticeship System: Reconciling Markets and Institutions', in Lisa Lynch, ed., International Comparisons of Private Sector Training, NBER Conference Volume (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992); and 'Innovation Strategies of Companies: A Comparative Institutional Explanation of Cross-Country Differences' (unpublished, Wissenschaftszentrum für Sozialforschung, 1994).
23. See David Soskice, 'Wage Determination: The Changing Role of Institutions in Advanced Industrialized Countries', Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 6 (1990), 36-61; 'The German Apprenticeship System: Reconciling Markets and Institutions', in Lisa Lynch, ed., International Comparisons of Private Sector Training, NBER Conference Volume (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992); and 'Innovation Strategies of Companies: A Comparative Institutional Explanation of Cross-Country Differences' (unpublished, Wissenschaftszentrum für Sozialforschung, 1994).
24. See David Soskice, 'Wage Determination: The Changing Role of Institutions in Advanced Industrialized Countries', Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 6 (1990), 36-61; 'The German Apprenticeship System: Reconciling Markets and Institutions', in Lisa Lynch, ed., International Comparisons of Private Sector Training, NBER Conference Volume (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992); and 'Innovation Strategies of Companies: A Comparative Institutional Explanation of Cross-Country Differences' (unpublished, Wissenschaftszentrum für Sozialforschung, 1994).
25. Systems in which all bargaining takes place at the firm or plant level fall in to the Liberal Market Economy category. Perhaps it would therefore be more appropriate to speak of centralized and 'semi-centralized' bargaining systems, but as long as the definitions are kept in mind it should be possible to avoid this more cumbersome terminology.
26. Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965) and The Rise and Decline of Nations (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1982); Lars Calmfors and John Driffill, 'Centralization of Wage Bargaining', Economic Policy (1988), 14-61; Peter Lange, 'Unions, Workers, and Wage Regulation: The Rational Bases of Consent', in Goldthorpe, ed., Order and Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism, pp. 98-123; Cameron, 'Social Democracy, Corporatism, Labor Quiescence, and the Representation of Economic Interest in Advanced Capitalist Society'; Przeworski and Wallerstein, 'The Structure of Class Conflict in Democratic Capitalist Societies'.
27. Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965) and The Rise and Decline of Nations (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1982); Lars Calmfors and John Driffill, 'Centralization of Wage Bargaining', Economic Policy (1988), 14-61; Peter Lange, 'Unions, Workers, and Wage Regulation: The Rational Bases of Consent', in Goldthorpe, ed., Order and Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism, pp. 98-123; Cameron, 'Social Democracy, Corporatism, Labor Quiescence, and the Representation of Economic Interest in Advanced Capitalist Society'; Przeworski and Wallerstein, 'The Structure of Class Conflict in Democratic Capitalist Societies'.
28. Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965) and The Rise and Decline of Nations (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1982); Lars Calmfors and John Driffill, 'Centralization of Wage Bargaining', Economic Policy (1988), 14-61; Peter Lange, 'Unions, Workers, and Wage Regulation: The Rational Bases of Consent', in Goldthorpe, ed., Order and Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism, pp. 98-123; Cameron, 'Social Democracy, Corporatism, Labor Quiescence, and the Representation of Economic Interest in Advanced Capitalist Society'; Przeworski and Wallerstein, 'The Structure of Class Conflict in Democratic Capitalist Societies'.
29. Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965) and The Rise and Decline of Nations (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1982); Lars Calmfors and John Driffill, 'Centralization of Wage Bargaining', Economic Policy (1988), 14-61; Peter Lange, 'Unions, Workers, and Wage Regulation: The Rational Bases of Consent', in Goldthorpe, ed., Order and Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism, pp. 98-123; Cameron, 'Social Democracy, Corporatism, Labor Quiescence, and the Representation of Economic Interest in Advanced Capitalist Society'; Przeworski and Wallerstein, 'The Structure of Class Conflict in Democratic Capitalist Societies'.
30. Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965) and The Rise and Decline of Nations (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1982); Lars Calmfors and John Driffill, 'Centralization of Wage Bargaining', Economic Policy (1988), 14-61; Peter Lange, 'Unions, Workers, and Wage Regulation: The Rational Bases of Consent', in Goldthorpe, ed., Order and Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism, pp. 98-123; Cameron, 'Social Democracy, Corporatism, Labor Quiescence, and the Representation of Economic Interest in Advanced Capitalist Society'; Przeworski and Wallerstein, 'The Structure of Class Conflict in Democratic Capitalist Societies'.
31. Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965) and The Rise and Decline of Nations (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1982); Lars Calmfors and John Driffill, 'Centralization of Wage Bargaining', Economic Policy (1988), 14-61; Peter Lange, 'Unions, Workers, and Wage Regulation: The Rational Bases of Consent', in Goldthorpe, ed., Order and Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism, pp. 98-123; Cameron, 'Social Democracy, Corporatism, Labor Quiescence, and the Representation of Economic Interest in Advanced Capitalist Society'; Przeworski and Wallerstein, 'The Structure of Class Conflict in Democratic Capitalist Societies'.
32. See Michael Alvarez, Geoffrey Garrett and Peter Lange. 'Government Partisanship, Labor Organization, and Macroeconomic Performance', American Political Science Review, 85 (1991); Lange and Garrett, 'The Politics of Growth: Strategic Interaction and Economic Performance in the Advanced Industrial Democracies, 1974-1980'; Cameron, 'Social Democracy, Corporatism, Labor Quiescence, and the Representation of Economic Interest in Advanced Capitalist Society'; Schmidt, 'The Welfare State and the Economy in Periods of Economic Crisis: A Comparative Study of Twenty-Three OECD Nations'.
33. See Michael Alvarez, Geoffrey Garrett and Peter Lange. 'Government Partisanship, Labor Organization, and Macroeconomic Performance', American Political Science Review, 85 (1991); Lange and Garrett, 'The Politics of Growth: Strategic Interaction and Economic Performance in the Advanced Industrial Democracies, 1974-1980'; Cameron, 'Social Democracy, Corporatism, Labor Quiescence, and the Representation of Economic Interest in Advanced Capitalist Society'; Schmidt, 'The Welfare State and the Economy in Periods of Economic Crisis: A Comparative Study of Twenty-Three OECD Nations'.
34. See Michael Alvarez, Geoffrey Garrett and Peter Lange. 'Government Partisanship, Labor Organization, and Macroeconomic Performance', American Political Science Review, 85 (1991); Lange and Garrett, 'The Politics of Growth: Strategic Interaction and Economic Performance in the Advanced Industrial Democracies, 1974-1980'; Cameron, 'Social Democracy, Corporatism, Labor Quiescence, and the Representation of Economic Interest in Advanced Capitalist Society'; Schmidt, 'The Welfare State and the Economy in Periods of Economic Crisis: A Comparative Study of Twenty-Three OECD Nations'.
35. See Michael Alvarez, Geoffrey Garrett and Peter Lange. 'Government Partisanship, Labor Organization, and Macroeconomic Performance', American Political Science Review, 85 (1991); Lange and Garrett, 'The Politics of Growth: Strategic Interaction and Economic Performance in the Advanced Industrial Democracies, 1974-1980'; Cameron, 'Social Democracy, Corporatism, Labor Quiescence, and the Representation of Economic Interest in Advanced Capitalist Society'; Schmidt, 'The Welfare State and the Economy in Periods of Economic Crisis: A Comparative Study of Twenty-Three OECD Nations'.
36. In a decentralized bargaining system, by contrast, weak unions lack veto power over distributive outcomes and will be more vulnerable to slack labour market conditions. In the jargon of bargaining theory, the 'inside options' of low-wage unions tend to be superior to their 'outside options', leading to a gradual compression of wages. See Michael Wallerstein, 'Centralized Bargaining and Wage Restraint', American Journal of Political Science, 34 (1990), 982-1004.
37. It can be objected that if high-paid workers are willing to accept greater redistribution though the bargained wage (even accepting wage cuts), there would be no reason for the confederation to push up nominal wage claims in order to preserve an acceptable distributive balance in the total wage increase. Real wage adjustment could thus be achieved without monetary accommodation, while distributive outcomes would be identical (since high-skill workers would benefit proportionally more from drift). However, such deals are difficult to sell to the membership of high-wage unions. Rank-and-file members with incomplete information will rationally worry about the bargaining skills of their representatives if these rely primarily on non-negotiated drift, and since such drift represents an uncertain prospect while negotiated wage increases represent sure gains, there is every reason for the median union member to demand a 'fair share' of the bargained increase. Whatever the exact size of this share - in most cases it will probably approximate a 50-50 split - it will force negotiators to use nominal increases to achieve their distributive goals (i.e., an acceptable division of total increases after drift).
38. See, for example, Karl-Otto Faxen, Clas-Erik Odhner and R. Spånt, 'Lönebildning för sysselsätning och prisstabilitet', Ekonomisk Debatt, 17 (1989), 510-24; Douglas Hibbs and Håkan Locking, 'Löneutjamning och löneokningstakt under den solidariske lönepolitiken', Ekonomisk Debatt, 8 (1991), 653-64; and Douglas Hibbs and Håkan Locking, 'Wage Compression, Wage Drift, and Wage Inflation in Sweden', Labour Economics, 77 (1996), 109-41. The latter presents a formal model and detailed econometric evidence for Sweden.
39. See, for example, Karl-Otto Faxen, Clas-Erik Odhner and R. Spånt, 'Lönebildning för sysselsätning och prisstabilitet', Ekonomisk Debatt, 17 (1989), 510-24; Douglas Hibbs and Håkan Locking, 'Löneutjamning och löneokningstakt under den solidariske lönepolitiken', Ekonomisk Debatt, 8 (1991), 653-64; and Douglas Hibbs and Håkan Locking, 'Wage Compression, Wage Drift, and Wage Inflation in Sweden', Labour Economics, 77 (1996), 109-41. The latter presents a formal model and detailed econometric evidence for Sweden.
40. See, for example, Karl-Otto Faxen, Clas-Erik Odhner and R. Spånt, 'Lönebildning för sysselsätning och prisstabilitet', Ekonomisk Debatt, 17 (1989), 510-24; Douglas Hibbs and Håkan Locking, 'Löneutjamning och löneokningstakt under den solidariske lönepolitiken', Ekonomisk Debatt, 8 (1991), 653-64; and Douglas Hibbs and Håkan Locking, 'Wage Compression, Wage Drift, and Wage Inflation in Sweden', Labour Economics, 77 (1996), 109-41. The latter presents a formal model and detailed econometric evidence for Sweden.
41. See Scharpf, Crisis and Choice in European Social Democracy, chap. 9.
42. See Wendy Carlin and David Soskice, Macroeconomics and the Wage Bargain (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990).
43. This logic follows very closely the idea of non-myopic equilibria proposed by Steven Brams, Negotiation Games (New York: Routledge Press, 1990), and Theory of Moves (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). In this highly pertinent game-theoretic formulation, players ask themselves before they act whether a change in their own behaviour is likely to trigger retaliation by others, possibly leaving them worse off than the status quo. If this is the case, then gains that could be realized only if others stayed put (such as defection in a PD game) are effectively discounted. For this 'non-myopic' logic to work, individual players' actions must have significant effects on the welfare of other players. In other words, players must possess strategic capacity.
44. This logic follows very closely the idea of non-myopic equilibria proposed by Steven Brams, Negotiation Games (New York: Routledge Press, 1990), and Theory of Moves (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). In this highly pertinent game-theoretic formulation, players ask themselves before they act whether a change in their own behaviour is likely to trigger retaliation by others, possibly leaving them worse off than the status quo. If this is the case, then gains that could be realized only if others stayed put (such as defection in a PD game) are effectively discounted. For this 'non-myopic' logic to work, individual players' actions must have significant effects on the welfare of other players. In other words, players must possess strategic capacity.
45. See William D. Nordhaus, 'The Political Business Cycle', Review of Economic Studies, 42 (1975), 169-90; Alex Cukierman and Alan H. Meltzer, 'A Positive Theory of Discretionary Policy, the Costs of Democratic Government, and the Benefits of a Constitution', Economic Inquiry, 24 (1986), 367-88; and Alesina, Cohen and Roubini, 'Macroeconomic Policy and Elections in OECD Democracies'.
46. See William D. Nordhaus, 'The Political Business Cycle', Review of Economic Studies, 42 (1975), 169-90; Alex Cukierman and Alan H. Meltzer, 'A Positive Theory of Discretionary Policy, the Costs of Democratic Government, and the Benefits of a Constitution', Economic Inquiry, 24 (1986), 367-88; and Alesina, Cohen and Roubini, 'Macroeconomic Policy and Elections in OECD Democracies'.
47. See William D. Nordhaus, 'The Political Business Cycle', Review of Economic Studies, 42 (1975), 169-90; Alex Cukierman and Alan H. Meltzer, 'A Positive Theory of Discretionary Policy, the Costs of Democratic Government, and the Benefits of a Constitution', Economic Inquiry, 24 (1986), 367-88; and Alesina, Cohen and Roubini, 'Macroeconomic Policy and Elections in OECD Democracies'.
48. Cukierman, Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, and Independence; Alberto Alesina and Lawrence Summers, 'Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence', Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 256 (1993), 151-62; Havrilevski and Granato, 'Determinants of Inflationary Performance: Corporatist Structures vs. Central Bank Autonomy'; Grilli, Masciandoro and Tabellini, 'Political and Monetary Institutions and Public Financial Policies in the Industrialized Countries'; Alberto Alesina, 'Politics and Business Cycles in Industrial Democracies', Economic Policy, 8 (1989), 58-98.
49. Cukierman, Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, and Independence; Alberto Alesina and Lawrence Summers, 'Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence', Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 256 (1993), 151-62; Havrilevski and Granato, 'Determinants of Inflationary Performance: Corporatist Structures vs. Central Bank Autonomy'; Grilli, Masciandoro and Tabellini, 'Political and Monetary Institutions and Public Financial Policies in the Industrialized Countries'; Alberto Alesina, 'Politics and Business Cycles in Industrial Democracies', Economic Policy, 8 (1989), 58-98.
50. Cukierman, Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, and Independence; Alberto Alesina and Lawrence Summers, 'Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence', Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 256 (1993), 151-62; Havrilevski and Granato, 'Determinants of Inflationary Performance: Corporatist Structures vs. Central Bank Autonomy'; Grilli, Masciandoro and Tabellini, 'Political and Monetary Institutions and Public Financial Policies in the Industrialized Countries'; Alberto Alesina, 'Politics and Business Cycles in Industrial Democracies', Economic Policy, 8 (1989), 58-98.
51. Cukierman, Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, and Independence; Alberto Alesina and Lawrence Summers, 'Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence', Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 256 (1993), 151-62; Havrilevski and Granato, 'Determinants of Inflationary Performance: Corporatist Structures vs. Central Bank Autonomy'; Grilli, Masciandoro and Tabellini, 'Political and Monetary Institutions and Public Financial Policies in the Industrialized Countries'; Alberto Alesina, 'Politics and Business Cycles in Industrial Democracies', Economic Policy, 8 (1989), 58-98.
52. Cukierman, Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, and Independence; Alberto Alesina and Lawrence Summers, 'Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence', Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 256 (1993), 151-62; Havrilevski and Granato, 'Determinants of Inflationary Performance: Corporatist Structures vs. Central Bank Autonomy'; Grilli, Masciandoro and Tabellini, 'Political and Monetary Institutions and Public Financial Policies in the Industrialized Countries'; Alberto Alesina, 'Politics and Business Cycles in Industrial Democracies', Economic Policy, 8 (1989), 58-98.
53. The neutrality of money thesis is elegantly presented in Robert Barro and David Gordon, 'Rules, Discretion, and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy', Journal of Monetary Policy, 12 (1983), 589-610.
54. One of the curious aspects of the new classical literature on central banks is that while it is committed to a rational expectations framework in which nominal variables are deemed unimportant, the benefits of central bank independence (which are considered important) are stated in terms of nominal variables such as inflation. Elsewhere, however, I have shown formally that the Barro-Gordon model yields real effects of money if the free market assumption is dropped and wage-or price-setters are given strategic capacity. See Torben Iversen, 'The Real Effects of Money: An Institutional Model of the Effects of Wage Bargaining and Monetary Policies on Unemployment' (Berkeley Center for German and European Studies Working Paper Series, 1996).
55. 2) insures that a very uneven distribution of members (i.e., where a few unions are dominant) leads to a lower N than if the unions were equally sized.
56. Philipe Schmitter, 'Interest Intermediation and Regime Governability in Contemporary Western Europe and North America', in Suzanne Berger, ed., Organizing Interests in Western Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), pp. 285-327; Cameron, 'Social Democracy, Corporatism, Labor Quiescence, and the Representation of Economic Interest in Advanced Capitalist Society'; Calmfors and Driffill, 'Centralization of Wage Bargaining'.
57. Philipe Schmitter, 'Interest Intermediation and Regime Governability in Contemporary Western Europe and North America', in Suzanne Berger, ed., Organizing Interests in Western Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), pp. 285-327; Cameron, 'Social Democracy, Corporatism, Labor Quiescence, and the Representation of Economic Interest in Advanced Capitalist Society'; Calmfors and Driffill, 'Centralization of Wage Bargaining'.
58. Philipe Schmitter, 'Interest Intermediation and Regime Governability in Contemporary Western Europe and North America', in Suzanne Berger, ed., Organizing Interests in Western Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), pp. 285-327; Cameron, 'Social Democracy, Corporatism, Labor Quiescence, and the Representation of Economic Interest in Advanced Capitalist Society'; Calmfors and Driffill, 'Centralization of Wage Bargaining'.
59. The apparent correspondence also disguises a real disagreement over the proper classification of Japan and Switzerland. In the full Calmfors-Driffill ranking of all OECD countries, for example, these cases are located in close proximity to Britain and the United States - systems that fall into my category of Liberal Market Economies. I have here accepted Soskice's critique of the Calmfors-Driffill classification of these cases (Soskice, 'Wage Determination: The Changing Role of Institutions in Advanced Industrialized Countries'), especially their insufficient attention to the role of powerful employers' organizations at the national and sectoral/industry levels (see also Colin Crouch, Industrial Relations and European State Traditions (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993)). What is important for our purposes is that the highly structured Japanese and Swiss bargaining systems, and the strong industry and national organizations that underpin these systems, make it reasonable to categorize them in the Organized Market Economy group.
60. The apparent correspondence also disguises a real disagreement over the proper classification of Japan and Switzerland. In the full Calmfors-Driffill ranking of all OECD countries, for example, these cases are located in close proximity to Britain and the United States - systems that fall into my category of Liberal Market Economies. I have here accepted Soskice's critique of the Calmfors-Driffill classification of these cases (Soskice, 'Wage Determination: The Changing Role of Institutions in Advanced Industrialized Countries'), especially their insufficient attention to the role of powerful employers' organizations at the national and sectoral/industry levels (see also Colin Crouch, Industrial Relations and European State Traditions (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993)). What is important for our purposes is that the highly structured Japanese and Swiss bargaining systems, and the strong industry and national organizations that underpin these systems, make it reasonable to categorize them in the Organized Market Economy group.
61. In other words, the classification reflects the answers to the following prioritized set of questions: (i) at what level is bargaining taking place? and (ii) how enforceable are the bargaining agreements?
62. See David Backus and John Driffill, 'Inflation and Reputation', American Economic Review, 75 (1985), 530-8.
63. See, for example, Susan Collins, 'Inflation and the European Monetary System', in Francesco Giavazzi, Stefano Micossi and Marcus Miller, eds, The European Monetary System (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 112-33; Stanley Fischer, 'International Economic Policy Coordination', NBER Working Paper no. 2344 (1987); John B. Goodman, Monetary Sovereignty. The Politics of Central Banking in Western Europe (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992), pp. 197-202.
64. See, for example, Susan Collins, 'Inflation and the European Monetary System', in Francesco Giavazzi, Stefano Micossi and Marcus Miller, eds, The European Monetary System (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 112-33; Stanley Fischer, 'International Economic Policy Coordination', NBER Working Paper no. 2344 (1987); John B. Goodman, Monetary Sovereignty. The Politics of Central Banking in Western Europe (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992), pp. 197-202.
65. See, for example, Susan Collins, 'Inflation and the European Monetary System', in Francesco Giavazzi, Stefano Micossi and Marcus Miller, eds, The European Monetary System (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 112-33; Stanley Fischer, 'International Economic Policy Coordination', NBER Working Paper no. 2344 (1987); John B. Goodman, Monetary Sovereignty. The Politics of Central Banking in Western Europe (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992), pp. 197-202.
66. This argument holds with greater force in the case of the predecessor to the ERM, the European currency 'Snake', which allowed for frequent and often large currency realignments. But even in the ERM, Weber has detected a 'strong' and a 'weak' currency block (the former organized around the German DM, the latter around the French Franc) (Axel Weber, 'European Economic and Monetary Union and Asymmetries and Adjustment Problems in the European Monetary System: Some Empirical Evidence', European Economy, Special Edition (1993), 187-207).
67. Specifically, the index was created by partitioning the 1973-93 period into three sub-periods of varying length. The rule for the partitioning was that within-period variance in growth rates should be minimized, while between-period variance should be maximized. No country exhibited more than three distinct sub-periods, and in some cases there is little variance between the periods.
68. Yet, there is some disagreement about the coding of the Japanese central bank in terms of independence. For example, in the Bade and Parkin index, the central banks of Japan and the United States share the third position.
69. Michael Hutchison, Takatoshi Ito and Tom Cargil, Political Economy of Japanese Monetary Policy (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, forthcoming), chap. 8; Edward Lincoln, Japan Facing Economic Maturity (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1988), p. 179; T.J. Pempel, Policy and Politics in Japan: Creative Conservatism (Philadelphia, Penn.: Temple University Press, 1982), pp. 61-2.
70. Michael Hutchison, Takatoshi Ito and Tom Cargil, Political Economy of Japanese Monetary Policy (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, forthcoming), chap. 8; Edward Lincoln, Japan Facing Economic Maturity (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1988), p. 179; T.J. Pempel, Policy and Politics in Japan: Creative Conservatism (Philadelphia, Penn.: Temple University Press, 1982), pp. 61-2.
71. Michael Hutchison, Takatoshi Ito and Tom Cargil, Political Economy of Japanese Monetary Policy (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, forthcoming), chap. 8; Edward Lincoln, Japan Facing Economic Maturity (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1988), p. 179; T.J. Pempel, Policy and Politics in Japan: Creative Conservatism (Philadelphia, Penn.: Temple University Press, 1982), pp. 61-2.
72. Hutchison, Ito and Cargil, chap. 8.
73. The index has the same range as the hard currency index.
74. The data is bi-yearly and from the OECD Database on Unemployment Benefit Entitlements and Replacement Rates. The compensation rate for the first year of unemployment is weighted twice that of the second or third year since the compensation rates for the first year of unemployment is likely to influence union wage policies more than rates for the second and third year. Compensation rates beyond this three-year time horizon are assumed not to affect the wage behaviour of unions. In one case, Sweden, the data was adjusted to take into account that unemployed people in this country can re-earn rights to full compensation by accepting a guaranteed employment offer in a labour market programme. The low legal compensation rates for the second and third years are otherwise highly misleading.
75. Nathaniel Beck and Jonathan Katz, 'What to Do (And Not to Do) With Time-Series Cross-Section Data,' American Political Science Review, 89 (1995), 634-48.
76. Date for unemployment and export market growth is from OECD, OECD Economic Outlook (Paris, various years).
77. The results when these variables are included are only marginally different, but available upon request.
78. This procedure is very similar to that proposed in James A. Stimson, 'Regression in Space and Time: A Statistical Essay', American Journal of Political Science, 29 (1985), 914-47. The solution of including a full set of n - 1 country dummies is difficult to apply in this case since the independent institutional variables are very stable over time and therefore highly co-linear with the country dummies.
79. I have already discussed why indices of Central Bank independence are misleading in the case of Japan. In the case of Austria, it is noteworthy that one of the most comprehensive comparative studies of Austrian monetary policies suggests that Austrian monetary institutions are more flexible and accommodating than implied by the high Central Bank independence score. See Scharpf, Crisis and Choice in European Social Democracy, chap. 10.
80. All other variables are kept constant at their mean.
81. Gösta Esping-Andersen, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990).
82. Richard B. Freeman, 'Labor Market Institutions and Economic Performance', Economic Policy, 6 (1988), 64-80; Robert Rowthorn, 'Centralization, Employment and Wage Dispersion', Economic Journal, 102 (1992), 506-23; Jonas Pontusson, 'Wage Distribution and Labor Market Institutions in Sweden, Austria and Other OECD Countries' (unpublished, Cornell University, 1996); P. Minford, 'Interest Rates and Bond Financed Deficits in a Ricardian Two-Party Democracy', CEPR Discussion Paper No. 79 (1985); Douglas Hibbs, The American Political Economy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987).
83. Richard B. Freeman, 'Labor Market Institutions and Economic Performance', Economic Policy, 6 (1988), 64-80; Robert Rowthorn, 'Centralization, Employment and Wage Dispersion', Economic Journal, 102 (1992), 506-23; Jonas Pontusson, 'Wage Distribution and Labor Market Institutions in Sweden, Austria and Other OECD Countries' (unpublished, Cornell University, 1996); P. Minford, 'Interest Rates and Bond Financed Deficits in a Ricardian Two-Party Democracy', CEPR Discussion Paper No. 79 (1985); Douglas Hibbs, The American Political Economy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987).
84. Richard B. Freeman, 'Labor Market Institutions and Economic Performance', Economic Policy, 6 (1988), 64-80; Robert Rowthorn, 'Centralization, Employment and Wage Dispersion', Economic Journal, 102 (1992), 506-23; Jonas Pontusson, 'Wage Distribution and Labor Market Institutions in Sweden, Austria and Other OECD Countries' (unpublished, Cornell University, 1996); P. Minford, 'Interest Rates and Bond Financed Deficits in a Ricardian Two-Party Democracy', CEPR Discussion Paper No. 79 (1985); Douglas Hibbs, The American Political Economy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987).
85. Richard B. Freeman, 'Labor Market Institutions and Economic Performance', Economic Policy, 6 (1988), 64-80; Robert Rowthorn, 'Centralization, Employment and Wage Dispersion', Economic Journal, 102 (1992), 506-23; Jonas Pontusson, 'Wage Distribution and Labor Market Institutions in Sweden, Austria and Other OECD Countries' (unpublished, Cornell University, 1996); P. Minford, 'Interest Rates and Bond Financed Deficits in a Ricardian Two-Party Democracy', CEPR Discussion Paper No. 79 (1985); Douglas Hibbs, The American Political Economy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987).
86. Richard B. Freeman, 'Labor Market Institutions and Economic Performance', Economic Policy, 6 (1988), 64-80; Robert Rowthorn, 'Centralization, Employment and Wage Dispersion', Economic Journal, 102 (1992), 506-23; Jonas Pontusson, 'Wage Distribution and Labor Market Institutions in Sweden, Austria and Other OECD Countries' (unpublished, Cornell University, 1996); P. Minford, 'Interest Rates and Bond Financed Deficits in a Ricardian Two-Party Democracy', CEPR Discussion Paper No. 79 (1985); Douglas Hibbs, The American Political Economy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987).
87. For the shifting institutional preferences of employers and high-skilled workers in the engineering sector, see Peter Swenson, 'Bringing Capital Back In, or Social Democracy Reconsidered: Employer Power, Cross-Class Alliances, and Centralization of Industrial Relations in Denmark and Sweden', World Politics, 43 (1991), 513-45; Jonas Pontusson and Peter Swenson, 'Markets, Production, Institutions, and Politics: Why Swedish Employers have Abandoned the Swedish Model', Comparative Political Studies, 29 (1996), 223-50; and Torben Iversen, 'Power, Flexibility and the Breakdown of Centralized Wage Bargaining: The Cases of Denmark and Sweden in Comparative Perspective', Comparative Politics, 28 (1996), 399-436.
88. For the shifting institutional preferences of employers and high-skilled workers in the engineering sector, see Peter Swenson, 'Bringing Capital Back In, or Social Democracy Reconsidered: Employer Power, Cross-Class Alliances, and Centralization of Industrial Relations in Denmark and Sweden', World Politics, 43 (1991), 513-45; Jonas Pontusson and Peter Swenson, 'Markets, Production, Institutions, and Politics: Why Swedish Employers have Abandoned the Swedish Model', Comparative Political Studies, 29 (1996), 223-50; and Torben Iversen, 'Power, Flexibility and the Breakdown of Centralized Wage Bargaining: The Cases of Denmark and Sweden in Comparative Perspective', Comparative Politics, 28 (1996), 399-436.
89. For the shifting institutional preferences of employers and high-skilled workers in the engineering sector, see Peter Swenson, 'Bringing Capital Back In, or Social Democracy Reconsidered: Employer Power, Cross-Class Alliances, and Centralization of Industrial Relations in Denmark and Sweden', World Politics, 43 (1991), 513-45; Jonas Pontusson and Peter Swenson, 'Markets, Production, Institutions, and Politics: Why Swedish Employers have Abandoned the Swedish Model', Comparative Political Studies, 29 (1996), 223-50; and Torben Iversen, 'Power, Flexibility and the Breakdown of Centralized Wage Bargaining: The Cases of Denmark and Sweden in Comparative Perspective', Comparative Politics, 28 (1996), 399-436.
90. See Torben Iversen, 'Contested Economic Institutions: The Politics of Macro-Economics and Wage Bargaining in Organized Market Economies' (doctoral Dissertation, Duke University 1995). For the concept of diversified quality production, see Wolfgang Streeck, 'On the Institutional Conditions of Diversified Quality Production', in Egon Matzner and Wolfgang Streeck, Beyond Keynesianism (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1991), pp. 21-61.
91. See Torben Iversen, 'Contested Economic Institutions: The Politics of Macro-Economics and Wage Bargaining in Organized Market Economies' (doctoral Dissertation, Duke University 1995). For the concept of diversified quality production, see Wolfgang Streeck, 'On the Institutional Conditions of Diversified Quality Production', in Egon Matzner and Wolfgang Streeck, Beyond Keynesianism (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1991), pp. 21-61.
92. Lincoln, Japan Facing Economic Maturity, pp. 27-8.
93. Pempel, Policy and Politics in Japan: Creative Conservatism, p. 104.
94. Hall, 'Central Bank Independence and Coordinated Wage Bargaining: Their Interaction in Germany and Europe'. For analyses along similar lines see Scharpf, Crisis and Choice in European Social Democracy; and Streeck, 'Pay Restraint without Incomes Policy'.
95. Hall, 'Central Bank Independence and Coordinated Wage Bargaining: Their Interaction in Germany and Europe'. For analyses along similar lines see Scharpf, Crisis and Choice in European Social Democracy; and Streeck, 'Pay Restraint without Incomes Policy'.
96. Hall, 'Central Bank Independence and Coordinated Wage Bargaining: Their Interaction in Germany and Europe'. For analyses along similar lines see Scharpf, Crisis and Choice in European Social Democracy; and Streeck, 'Pay Restraint without Incomes Policy'.
97. Hall, 'Central Bank Independence and Coordinated Wage Bargaining: Their Interaction in Germany and Europe', p. 11.
98. Hall, 'Central Bank Independence and Coordinated Wage Bargaining: Their Interaction in Germany and Europe', p. 4.
99. Hall, 'Central Bank Independence and Coordinated Wage Bargaining: Their Interaction in Germany and Europe', p. 15.
100. Included here are several instances of 'incomes policies' - see Robert J. Flanagan, David Soskice and Lloyd Ulman, Unionism, Economic Stabilization, and Incomes Policies: European Experience (Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 1983), p. 983.
101. See Miriam Golden and Michael Wallerstein, 'Unions, Employers, and Collective Bargaining: A Report on Data for 16 Countries from 1950 to 1990' (presented at the Annual Meetings of the Midwest Political Science Association, 1995). This information has been supplemented with descriptions of particular national bargaining systems in Andrei S. Markovits, The Politics of West German Trade Unions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); Jesper Due, Jørgen Steen Madsen, Carsten Strøby Jensen and Lars Kjerulf Petersen, The Survival of the Danish Model: A Historical Sociological Analysis of the Danish System of Collective Bargaining (Copenhagen: DJöF, 1994); Colin Crouch, Industrial Relations and European State Traditions (Oxford:
102. See Miriam Golden and Michael Wallerstein, 'Unions, Employers, and Collective Bargaining: A Report on Data for 16 Countries from 1950 to 1990' (presented at the Annual Meetings of the Midwest Political Science Association, 1995). This information has been supplemented with descriptions of particular national bargaining systems in Andrei S. Markovits, The Politics of West German Trade Unions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); Jesper Due, Jørgen Steen Madsen, Carsten Strøby Jensen and Lars Kjerulf Petersen, The Survival of the Danish Model: A Historical Sociological Analysis of the Danish System of Collective Bargaining (Copenhagen: DJöF, 1994); Colin Crouch, Industrial Relations and European State Traditions (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993); and chapters in Flanagan, Soskice, and Ulman, Unionism, Economic Stabilization, and Incomes Policies: European Experience (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1983); John P. Windmuller, Collective Bargaining in Industrialized Market Economies: A Reappraisal (Geneva: ILO, 1987); and in Anthony Ferner and Richard Hyman, eds, Industrial Relations in the New Europe (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1992). In the case of Japan (which is not covered by the EIRR), the classification is based on Taishiro Shirai, 'Japan', in John P. Windmuller, Collective Bargaining in Industrialized Market Economies: A Reappraisal (Geneva: ILO, 1987), pp. 242-52, and news reports in the Japan Labor Bulletin.
103. See Miriam Golden and Michael Wallerstein, 'Unions, Employers, and Collective Bargaining: A Report on Data for 16 Countries from 1950 to 1990' (presented at the Annual Meetings of the Midwest Political Science Association, 1995). This information has been supplemented with descriptions of particular national bargaining systems in Andrei S. Markovits, The Politics of West German Trade Unions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); Jesper Due, Jørgen Steen Madsen, Carsten Strøby Jensen and Lars Kjerulf Petersen, The Survival of the Danish Model: A Historical Sociological Analysis of the Danish System of Collective Bargaining (Copenhagen: DJöF, 1994); Colin Crouch, Industrial Relations and European State Traditions (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993); and chapters in Flanagan, Soskice, and Ulman, Unionism, Economic Stabilization, and Incomes Policies: European Experience (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1983); John P. Windmuller, Collective Bargaining in Industrialized Market Economies: A Reappraisal (Geneva: ILO, 1987); and in Anthony Ferner and Richard Hyman, eds, Industrial Relations in the New Europe (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1992). In the case of Japan (which is not covered by the EIRR), the classification is based on Taishiro Shirai, 'Japan', in John P. Windmuller, Collective Bargaining in Industrialized Market Economies: A Reappraisal (Geneva: ILO, 1987), pp. 242-52, and news reports in the Japan Labor Bulletin.
104. See Miriam Golden and Michael Wallerstein, 'Unions, Employers, and Collective Bargaining: A Report on Data for 16 Countries from 1950 to 1990' (presented at the Annual Meetings of the Midwest Political Science Association, 1995). This information has been supplemented with descriptions of particular national bargaining systems in Andrei S. Markovits, The Politics of West German Trade Unions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); Jesper Due, Jørgen Steen Madsen, Carsten Strøby Jensen and Lars Kjerulf Petersen, The Survival of the Danish Model: A Historical Sociological Analysis of the Danish System of Collective Bargaining (Copenhagen: DJöF, 1994); Colin Crouch, Industrial Relations and European State Traditions (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993); and chapters in Flanagan, Soskice, and Ulman, Unionism, Economic Stabilization, and Incomes Policies: European Experience (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1983); John P. Windmuller, Collective Bargaining in Industrialized Market Economies: A Reappraisal (Geneva: ILO, 1987); and in Anthony Ferner and Richard Hyman, eds, Industrial Relations in the New Europe (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1992). In the case of Japan (which is not covered by the EIRR), the classification is based on Taishiro Shirai, 'Japan', in John P. Windmuller, Collective Bargaining in Industrialized Market Economies: A Reappraisal (Geneva: ILO, 1987), pp. 242-52, and news reports in the Japan Labor Bulletin.
105. See Miriam Golden and Michael Wallerstein, 'Unions, Employers, and Collective Bargaining: A Report on Data for 16 Countries from 1950 to 1990' (presented at the Annual Meetings of the Midwest Political Science Association, 1995). This information has been supplemented with descriptions of particular national bargaining systems in Andrei S. Markovits, The Politics of West German Trade Unions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); Jesper Due, Jørgen Steen Madsen, Carsten Strøby Jensen and Lars Kjerulf Petersen, The Survival of the Danish Model: A Historical Sociological Analysis of the Danish System of Collective Bargaining (Copenhagen: DJöF, 1994); Colin Crouch, Industrial Relations and European State Traditions (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993); and chapters in Flanagan, Soskice, and Ulman, Unionism, Economic Stabilization, and Incomes Policies: European Experience (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1983); John P. Windmuller, Collective Bargaining in Industrialized Market Economies: A Reappraisal (Geneva: ILO, 1987); and in Anthony Ferner and Richard Hyman, eds, Industrial Relations in the New Europe (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1992). In the case of Japan (which is not covered by the EIRR), the classification is based on Taishiro Shirai, 'Japan', in John P. Windmuller, Collective Bargaining in Industrialized Market Economies: A Reappraisal (Geneva: ILO, 1987), pp. 242-52, and news reports in the Japan Labor Bulletin.
106. See Miriam Golden and Michael Wallerstein, 'Unions, Employers, and Collective Bargaining: A Report on Data for 16 Countries from 1950 to 1990' (presented at the Annual Meetings of the Midwest Political Science Association, 1995). This information has been supplemented with descriptions of particular national bargaining systems in Andrei S. Markovits, The Politics of West German Trade Unions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); Jesper Due, Jørgen Steen Madsen, Carsten Strøby Jensen and Lars Kjerulf Petersen, The Survival of the Danish Model: A Historical Sociological Analysis of the Danish System of Collective Bargaining (Copenhagen: DJöF, 1994); Colin Crouch, Industrial Relations and European State Traditions (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993); and chapters in Flanagan, Soskice, and Ulman, Unionism, Economic Stabilization, and Incomes Policies: European Experience (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1983); John P. Windmuller, Collective Bargaining in Industrialized Market Economies: A Reappraisal (Geneva: ILO, 1987); and in Anthony Ferner and Richard Hyman, eds, Industrial Relations in the New Europe (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1992). In the case of Japan (which is not covered by the EIRR), the classification is based on Taishiro Shirai, 'Japan', in John P. Windmuller, Collective Bargaining in Industrialized Market Economies: A Reappraisal (Geneva: ILO, 1987), pp. 242-52, and news reports in the Japan Labor Bulletin.
107. See Miriam Golden and Michael Wallerstein, 'Unions, Employers, and Collective Bargaining: A Report on Data for 16 Countries from 1950 to 1990' (presented at the Annual Meetings of the Midwest Political Science Association, 1995). This information has been supplemented with descriptions of particular national bargaining systems in Andrei S. Markovits, The Politics of West German Trade Unions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); Jesper Due, Jørgen Steen Madsen, Carsten Strøby Jensen and Lars Kjerulf Petersen, The Survival of the Danish Model: A Historical Sociological Analysis of the Danish System of Collective Bargaining (Copenhagen: DJöF, 1994); Colin Crouch, Industrial Relations and European State Traditions (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993); and chapters in Flanagan, Soskice, and Ulman, Unionism, Economic Stabilization, and Incomes Policies: European Experience (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1983); John P. Windmuller, Collective Bargaining in Industrialized Market Economies: A Reappraisal (Geneva: ILO, 1987); and in Anthony Ferner and Richard Hyman, eds, Industrial Relations in the New Europe (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1992). In the case of Japan (which is not covered by the EIRR), the classification is based on Taishiro Shirai, 'Japan', in John P. Windmuller, Collective Bargaining in Industrialized Market Economies: A Reappraisal (Geneva: ILO, 1987), pp. 242-52, and news reports in the Japan Labor Bulletin.
108. See Miriam Golden and Michael Wallerstein, 'Unions, Employers, and Collective Bargaining: A Report on Data for 16 Countries from 1950 to 1990' (presented at the Annual Meetings of the Midwest Political Science Association, 1995). This information has been supplemented with descriptions of particular national bargaining systems in Andrei S. Markovits, The Politics of West German Trade Unions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); Jesper Due, Jørgen Steen Madsen, Carsten Strøby Jensen and Lars Kjerulf Petersen, The Survival of the Danish Model: A Historical Sociological Analysis of the Danish System of Collective Bargaining (Copenhagen: DJöF, 1994); Colin Crouch, Industrial Relations and European State Traditions (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993); and chapters in Flanagan, Soskice, and Ulman, Unionism, Economic Stabilization, and Incomes Policies: European Experience (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1983); John P. Windmuller, Collective Bargaining in Industrialized Market Economies: A Reappraisal (Geneva: ILO, 1987); and in Anthony Ferner and Richard Hyman, eds, Industrial Relations in the New Europe (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1992). In the case of Japan (which is not covered by the EIRR), the classification is based on Taishiro Shirai, 'Japan', in John P. Windmuller, Collective Bargaining in Industrialized Market Economies: A Reappraisal (Geneva: ILO, 1987), pp. 242-52, and news reports in the Japan Labor Bulletin.
109. See Miriam Golden and Michael Wallerstein, 'Unions, Employers, and Collective Bargaining: A Report on Data for 16 Countries from 1950 to 1990' (presented at the Annual Meetings of the Midwest Political Science Association, 1995). This information has been supplemented with descriptions of particular national bargaining systems in Andrei S. Markovits, The Politics of West German Trade Unions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); Jesper Due, Jørgen Steen Madsen, Carsten Strøby Jensen and Lars Kjerulf Petersen, The Survival of the Danish Model: A Historical Sociological Analysis of the Danish System of Collective Bargaining (Copenhagen: DJöF, 1994); Colin Crouch, Industrial Relations and European State Traditions (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993); and chapters in Flanagan, Soskice, and Ulman, Unionism, Economic Stabilization, and Incomes Policies: European Experience (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1983); John P. Windmuller, Collective Bargaining in Industrialized Market Economies: A Reappraisal (Geneva: ILO, 1987); and in Anthony Ferner and Richard Hyman, eds, Industrial Relations in the New Europe (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1992). In the case of Japan (which is not covered by the EIRR), the classification is based on Taishiro Shirai, 'Japan', in John P. Windmuller, Collective Bargaining in Industrialized Market Economies: A Reappraisal (Geneva: ILO, 1987), pp. 242-52, and news reports in the Japan Labor Bulletin.