Competition among mechanism designers in a common value environment

Review of Economic Design

Volumn 4, Issue 3, 1999, Pages 273-292

  Peters, Michael ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO   (Canada)

Author keywords

Common value auctions; Competition; Mechanism design

Indexed keywords

EID: 0013528575     PISSN: 14344742     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s100580050038     Document Type: Article

References (11)

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