The price of uncertainty

Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce

Volumn , Issue , 2009, Pages 285-294

  Balcan, Maria Florina ^a   Blum, Avrim ^b   Mansour, Yishay ^c  

^a MICROSOFT RESEARCH   (United States)

^b Carnegie Mellon University   (United States)

^c TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY   (Israel)

Author keywords

Algorithmic game theory; Best response dynamics; Social cost

Indexed keywords

ALGORITHMIC GAME THEORY; BEST RESPONSE; BEST RESPONSE DYNAMICS; COST SHARING; COST-SHARING GAMES; POTENTIAL GAMES; SET COVERINGS; SET-COVER; SMALL FLUCTUATION; SOCIAL COST; SPIN-OUTS;

COST EFFECTIVENESS; COSTS; DYNAMICS; ELECTRIC CONDUCTIVITY MEASUREMENT; ELECTRONIC COMMERCE; SCHEDULING; SPIN FLUCTUATIONS;

GAME THEORY;

EID: 77950569302     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/1566374.1566416     Document Type: Conference Paper

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