Transparency and political moral hazard

Public Choice

Volumn 142, Issue 1-2, 2010, Pages 215-235

  Dogan, M Kadir ^a  

^a ANKARA UNIVERSITY   (Turkey)

Author keywords

Political Agency; Elections; Asymmetric Information

Indexed keywords

EID: 77949772182     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-009-9485-0     Document Type: Article

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