Dynamic competition in antitrust law

Journal of Competition Law and Economics

Volumn 5, Issue 4, 2009, Pages 581-631

  Gregory Sidak, J ^a,b   Teece, David J ^c  

^a TILBURG UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

^b The Coase Foundation for Law and Economics   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 77749341272     PISSN: 17446414     EISSN: 17446422     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/joclec/nhp024     Document Type: Article

References (181)

1. ANTITRUST, INNOVATION, AND COMPETITIVENESS (Thomas M. Jorde & David J. Teece eds., Oxford University Press 1992).
2. Id. at 5.
3. Id. at 3.
4. See Raymond S. Hartman, David J. Teece, Will Mitchell & Thomas M. Jorde, Assessing Market Power in Regimes of Rapid Technological Change, 2 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 317 (1993).
5. David J. Teece & Mary Coleman, The Meaning of Monopoly: Antitrust Analysis in High-Technology Industries, 43 ANTITRUST BULL. 801 (1998)
6. Christopher Pleatsikas & David J. Teece, The Analysis of Market Definition and Market Power in the Context of Rapid Innovation, 19 INT'L J. INDUS. ORG. 665 (2001).
7. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES (revised Apr. 8, 1997), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/horiz_book/hmgl.html.
8. See Michael L. Katz & Howard A. Shelanski, "Schumpeterian" Competition and Antitrust Policy in High-Tech Markets, 14 COMPETITION 47 (2005), available at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/institutes/bclt/pubs/shelanski/katz_Shelanski_Schumpeter__30Nov2006_final.pdf [hereinafter "Schumpeterian" Competition].
9. See, e.g., David S. Evans & Keith N. Hylton, The Lawful Acquisition and Exercise of Monopoly Power and Its Implications for the Objectives of Antitrust, 4 COMPETITION POL'Y INT'L 203 (2008).
10. Jonathan Baker, "Dynamic Competition" Does Not Excuse Monopolization, 4 COMPETITION POL'Y INT'L 243 (2008)
11. Christian Ewald, Competition and Innovation: Dangerous "Myopia" of Economists in Antitrust? 4 COMPETITION POL'Y INT'L 253 (2008)
12. Richard Gilbert, Injecting Innovation into The Rule of Reason: A Comment on Evans and Hylton, 4 COMPETITION POL'Y INT'L 263 (2008)
13. Herbert Hovenkamp, Schumpeterian Competition and Antitrust, 4 COMPETITION POL'Y INT'L 273 (2008)
14. Thomas K. McCraw, Joseph Schumpeter on Competition, 4 COMPETITION POL'Y INT'L 309 (2008)
15. Ilya Segal & Michael D. Whinston, Antitrust in Innovative Industries, 97 AM. ECON. REV. 1703 (2007).
16. For an earlier Schumpeterian perspective on the Microsoft antitrust case, see Howard A. Shelanski & J. Gregory Sidak, Antitrust Divestiture in Network Industries, 68 U. CHI. L.REV. 1 (2001)
17. J. Gregory Sidak, An Antitrust Rule for Software Integration, 18 YALE J. ON REG. 1 (2001).
18. For a discussion of the role of dynamic competition in the antitrust analysis of patent royalties and standard-setting, see Richard Schmalensee, Standard-Setting, Innovation Specialists, and Competition Policy, 57 J. INDUS. ECON. 526 (2009).
19. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 1 (1995), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0558.pdf [hereinafter ANTITRUST-IP GUIDELINES].
20. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR COLLABORATION AMONG COMPETITORS (Apr. 2000), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/04/ftcdojguidelines.pdf.
21. FED. TRADE COMM'N & U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES: QUESTIONS FOR PUBLIC COMMENT (Sept. 22, 2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/workshops/hmg/hmg-questions.pdf [hereinafter QUESTIONS FOR PUBLIC COMMENT].
22. Id. at 5, question 15.
23. See Robert W. Crandall & Clifford M. Winston, Does Antitrust Policy Improve Consumer Welfare? Assessing the Evidence, 17 J. ECON. PERSP., No. 4, 3, at 4 (2003).
24. Id. at 23.
25. See Richard A. Posner, Antitrust in the New Economy, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 925 (2001).
26. Id. at 942.
27. See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: AN INQUIRY INTO PROFITS, CAPITAL, CREDIT, INTEREST, AND THE BUSINESS CYCLE (1911).
28. See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY (1942).
29. Id. at 105.
30. FED. TRADE COMM'N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 1 (2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf.
31. Wesley M. Cohen & Richard C. Levin, Empirical Studies of Innovation and Market Structures, in 2 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 1059 (Richard L. Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig eds., 1989).
32. Paul L. Joskow, Firm Decision-Making Processes and Oligopoly Theory, 65 AM. ECON. REV. 270, 278 (1975).
33. See MORTON KAMIEN & NANCY SCHWARZ, MARKET STRUCTURE AND INNOVATION (1982)
34. Partha Dasgupta & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Industrial Structure and the Nature of Innovation Activity, 90 ECON. J. 26 (1980).
35. See Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY, 104 (Richard R. Nelson ed., 1962).
36. See David J. Teece, Profiting from Technological Innovation: Implications for Integration, Collaboration, Licensing and Public Policy, 15 RES. POL'Y 285 (1986).
37. Sidney G. Winter, The Logic of Appropriability: From Schumpeter to Arrow to Teece, 35 RES. POL'Y 1100 (2006).
38. See Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383 (1970).
39. See Kyle J. Mayer & David J. Teece, Unpacking Strategic Alliances: The Structure and Purpose of Alliance versus Supplier Relationships, 66 J. ECON. BEHAVIOR & ORG. 106 (2008).
40. For a managerially oriented analysis of the limits of outsourcing in the context of innovation, see Henry W. Chesbrough & David J. Teece, When Is Virtual Virtuous: Organizing for Innovation, 74 HARV. BUS. REV., No. 1, 65 (1996).
41. See Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers, 76 AM. ECON. ASS'N PAPERS & PROC. 323 (1986).
42. Nobel laureate Oliver E. Williamson explains that the decision by firms to use debt or equity to support individual investment projects is likely to be linked to the redeployability of the underlying investment.
43. See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE (Oxford Univ. Press 1996).
44. Because new product development programs commonly involve investment in assets that are substantially irreversible (like R&D) or nonredeployable (like specialized equipment), or both, debt has only limited value in financing innovation, unless a firm has collateral and is under-leveraged to begin with. Accordingly, the funding sources generally available to support new product development are internal cash flow and new equity.
45. For an expanded discussion, see RICHARD H. DAY, GUNNAR ELIASSON & CLAS G. WIHLBORG, THE MARKETS FOR INNOVATION, OWNERSHIP AND CONTROl (North-Holland 1993).
46. Teece, Profiting from Technological Innovation, supra note 25
47. See Winter, The Logic of Appropriability, supra note 26
48. See Richard C. Levin, Alvin K. Klevorick, Richard R. Nelson & Sidney G. Winter, Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research and Development, 1987 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY: MICROECONOMICS 783.
49. See Edwin Mansfield, Marc Schwartz & Samuel Wagner, Imitation Costs and Patents: An Empirical Study, 91 J. ECON. 907 (1981).
50. Teece, Profiting from Technological Innovation, supra note 25
51. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 17, at 83
52. See Teece, Profiting from Technological Innovation, supra note 25
53. David J. Teece, Reflections on "Profiting from Innovation", 35 RES. POL'Y 1131 (2006).
54. See Nathan Rosenberg, On Technological Expectations, 86 ECON. J. 523 (1976).
55. See Winter, supra note 26
56. Teece, Profiting from Technological Innovation, supra note 25
57. See ALMARIN PHILLIPS, TECHNOLOGY AND MARKET STRUCTURE: A STUDY OF THE AIRCRAFT INDUSTRY (Heath Lexington 1971)
58. Id. at 3.
59. See Keith Pavitt, Michael Robson & Joe Townsend, The Size Distribution of Innovating Firms in the U.K., 35 J. INDUS. ECON. 297 (1987)
60. David B. Audretsch & Zoltan J. Acs, Innovation, Market Share, and Firm Size, 69 REV. ECON. & STAT. 567 (1988)
61. David B. Audretsch & Zoltan J. Acs, Innovation in Large and Small Firms: An Empirical Analysis, 78 AM. ECON. REV. 678 (1998).
62. Audretsch's empirical work on innovation rates shows that, "whereas the large-firm innovation rates are relatively high in rubber, instruments, and chemicals, the small firm innovation rates are relatively high in instruments, chemicals, non-electrical machinery, and electrical equipment."
63. DAVID B. AUDRETSCH, INNOVATION AND INDUSTRY EVOLUTION 36 (MIT Press 1995).
64. Relatedly, Audretsch finds that "[t]he small firm innovation rate exceeds the large firm innovation rate in fourteen of the industrial sectors, but the large firm innovation rate exceeds the small-firm innovation rate in four of the sectors.. .. [T]he relative innovative advantage of large firms tends to be promoted in industries that are capital intensive, advertising intensive, concentrated, and highly unionized." Id. at 38.
65. RICHARD R. NELSON & SIDNEY G. WINTER, AN EVOLUTIONARY THEORY OF ECONOMIC CHANGE (Belknap Press 1982).
66. JOHN SUTTON, TECHNOLOGY AND MARKET STRUCTURE: THEORY AND HISTORY 4 (MIT Press 1998)
67. See Cohen & Levin, supra note 21.
68. SUTTON, supra note 48, at 5.
69. See Franklin Fisher, Games Economists Play: A Noncooperative View, 20 RAND J. ECON. 113 (1989).
70. John Sutton, Explaining Everything, Explaining Nothing? Game Theoretic Models in Industrial Organization, 34 EUR. ECON. REV. 505 (1990)
71. Sam Peltzman, The Handbook of Industrial Organization: A Review Article, 99 J. POL. ECON. 201 (1991).
72. See SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 17, ch. 8.
73. See Morton I. Kamien & Nancy L. Schwartz, Self Financing of an R&D Project, 68 AM. ECON. REV. 252 (1978).
74. There is also considerable empirical evidence that augmented R&D activity follows increases in profitability with short lags
75. See Ben Branch, Research and Development Activity and Profitability: Distributed Lag Analysis, 82 J. POL. ECON. 999 (1974)
76. Ariel Pakes, On Patents, R&D, and the Stock Market Rate of Return, 93 J. POL. ECON 390 (1985).
77. FREDERICK M. SCHERER & DAVID ROSS, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 642, 644 (Houghton Mifflin Co. 3d ed. 1990).
78. Id. at 645.
79. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 17, at 83
80. QUESTIONS FOR PUBLIC COMMENT, supra note 10, at 4, question 8
81. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 17, at 8
82. See CARL MENGER, GRUNDSATZE DER VOLKWIRTSCHAFTSLEHRE (PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS) (1871)
83. FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, The Meaning of Competition, in INDIVIDUALISM AND ECONOMIC ORDER 94 (1948).
84. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 17, at 83
85. See BURTON H. KLEIN, DYNAMIC ECONOMICS (1977).
86. See William J. Abernathy & James M. Utterback, Patterns of Industrial Innovation, 80 TECH. REV. 40 (1978).
87. See, e.g., Steven Klepper & Elizabeth Grady, The Evolution of New Industries and the Determinants of Market Structure, 21 RAND. J. ECON. 27 (1990)
88. James M. Utterback & Fernando Suarez, Innovation, Competition, and Industry Structure, 22 RES. POL'Y 1 (1993)
89. Franco Malerba & Luigi Orsenigo, The Dynamics and Evolution of Industries, 5 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 51 (1996).
90. Hayek argued that evolutionary theory in economics did not borrow from Darwin. To the contrary, Hayek argued that evolutionary concepts about markets contained in Adam Smith's writings influenced Darwin's theory of natural selection.
91. See FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE FATAL CONCEIT: THE ERRORS OF SOCIALISM 24 (W.W. Bartley ed., 3d ed. 1988).
92. See WILLIAM H. DURHAM, COEVOLUTION: GENES, CULTURE, AND HUMAN DIVERSITY 22 (1991).
93. Durham identifies five requirements for an economic theory of change: units of transmission (for example, ideas and values); sources of variation (for example, invention); mechanisms of transmission; processes of transformation; and sources of isolation
94. See MICHAEL T. HANNAN & JOHN H. FREEMAN, ORGANIZATIONAL ECOLOGY (1989).
95. See David J. Teece, Explicating Dynamic Capabilities: The Nature and Microfoundations of (Sustainable) Enterprise Performance, 28 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 1319 (2007)
96. Mie Augier & David J. Teece, Strategy as Evolution with Design: The Foundations of Dynamic Capabilities and the Role of Managers in the Economic System, 29 ORG. STUD. 1255 (2008).
97. See HOWARD ALDRICH, ORGANIZATIONS EVOLVING 33-50 (1999)
98. See JOHANN P. MURMANN, KNOWLEDGE AND COMPETITION ADVANTAGE: THE COEVOLUTION OF FIRMS, TECHNOLOGY, AND NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 15 (2003).
99. See Teece, supra note 70, at 1335
100. See SCHUMPETER, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, supra note 16, at 82
101. See, e.g., GIOVANNI DOSI, TECHNICAL CHANGE AND INDUSTRIAL TRANSFORMATION (1984).
102. See MURMANN, supra note 72
103. Id. at 51.
104. Id. at 92.
105. Joskow, supra note 22, at 278
106. Katz & Shelanski, "Schumpeterian" Competition, supra note 6, at 50 (quoting United States v. Corn Prods. Ref. Co., 234 F. 964, 1012 (S.D.N.Y. 1916)).
107. See, e.g., Mehmet Oktemgil, Gordon E. Greenley & Amanda J. Broderick, An Empirical Study of Isolating Mechanisms in UK Companies, 122 EURO. J. OPERATIONS RES. 638 (2000).
108. See ENTRY AND MARKET CONTESTABILITY: AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON (Paul A. Geroski & Joachim Schwalbach eds., 1991)
109. Paul A. Geroski, What Do We Know about Entry? 13 INT'L J. INDUS. ORG. 421 (1995).
110. Giovanni Dosi, Orietta Marsili, Luigi Orsenigo & Roberta Salvatore, Learning, Market Selection and the Evolution of Industrial Structures, 7 SMALL BUS. ECON. 411 (1995).
111. See, e.g., NATHAN ROSENBERG, INSIDE THE BLACK BOX (1982)
112. CHRISTOPHER FREEMAN, THE ECONOMICS OF INDUSTRIAL INNOVATION (2d ed. 1982)
113. Giovanni Dosi, Sources, Procedures and Microeconomic Effects of Innovation, 26 J. ECON. LIT. 1120 (1988).
114. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2, 18.
115. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINE, supra note 5.
116. Janusz A. Ordover & Daniel M. Wall, Understanding Econometric Methods of Market Definition, 3 ANTITRUST 20, 20-21 (1989).
117. William E. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 HARV. L. REV. 937 (1981).
118. J. GREGORY SIDAK & DANIEL F. SPULBER, DEREGULATORY TAKINGS AND THE REGULATORY CONTRACT: THE COMPETITIVE TRANSFORMATION OF NETWORK INDUSTRIES IN THE UNITED STATES 355-56 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1997).
119. See Hartman, Teece, Mitchell & Jorde, supra note 4
120. See, e.g., Teece, Explicating Dynamic Capabilities, supra note 70
121. David J. Teece, Gary Pisano & Amy Shuen, Dynamic Capabilities and Strategic Management, 18 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 509 (1997).
122. Katz and Shelanski argue: Even absent innovation, there are reasons to be cautious about the interpretation of market share data. In order to generate sensible predictions of the effects of a merger, the measurement and analysis of market shares should always be tied to a coherent theory of competitive effects that fits the facts of the industry under consideration. Put another way, the analysis of market shares can most confidently be used to predict adverse competitive effects of a merger when one has an empirically supported theory that market shares are informative of competitive conditions and that an increase in concentration will harm competition and consumers.
123. Michael L. Katz & Howard A. Shelanski, Merger Policy and Innovation: Must Enforcement Change to Account for Technological Change? 29 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 10710, 2004), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=583708.
124. See Teece & Coleman, supra note 4
125. Pleatsikas & Teece, supra note 4; Shelanski & Sidak, supra note 7
126. Shelanski & Sidak, supra note 7
127. See Richard J. Gilbert & Steven Sunshine, Incorporating Dynamic Efficiency Concerns in Merger Analysis: The Use of Innovation Markets, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 569 (1995).
128. 384 U.S. 127 (1966).
129. See EDITH PENROSE, THE THEORY OF THE GROWTH OF THE FIRM (1959)
130. Id. at 149-50.
131. Id. at 24.
132. Id. at 54.
133. See Gilbert & Sunshine, supra note 94
134. See OPEN INNOVATION: RESEARCHING A NEW PARADIGM (Henry W. Chesbrough, Wim Vanhaverbeke & Joel West eds., 2006).
135. See Michael L. Katz & Howard A. Shelanski, Mergers and Innovation, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 8 (2007).
136. United States v. Oracle Corp., 331 F. Supp. 2d 1098 (N.D. Ca. 2004). Teece testified as an expert witness for Oracle.
137. Thomas O. Barnett, Maximizing Welfare through Technological Innovation, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1191 (2007) (article based on October 2007 speech).
138. U.S. DEP'T JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY: SINGLE-FIRM CONDUCT UNDER SECTION 2 OF THE SHERMAN ACT 123 (2008).
139. The seminal empirical analysis is Jerry A. Hausman, Valuing the Effect of Regulation on New Services in Telecommunications, 1997 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY: MICROECONOMICS 1 (measuring the forgone consumer welfare from regulatory delay in the introduction of cell phone service and voicemail).
140. See also Jerry A. Hausman & J. Gregory Sidak, Google and the Proper Antitrust Scrutiny of Orphan Books, 5 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 411 (2009) (applying the new-product framework to Google Book Search).
141. Stephen Labaton, Administration Plans to Strengthen Antitrust Rules, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 2009, at 1.
142. See, e.g., Don Clark & Jessica E. Vascellaro, Silicon Valley Girds for New Antitrust Regime, WALL ST. J., May 18, 2009, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124260263059528447.html.
143. FTC v. Whole Foods Market, Inc., 548 F.3d 1028, 1046 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (citing FTC v. PPG Indus., Inc., 798 F.2d 1500, 1503 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1986)).
144. We allude here to Karl Popper's theory that objective knowledge consists of conjectures that have survived empirical attempts to refute them
145. See KARL POPPER, OBJECTIVE KNOWLEDGE: AN EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH (Clarendon Press 1972)
146. As an epistemological matter, we regard the Popperian view of objective knowledge to comport with many of the seminal contributions on the theory of the firm that invoke processes of evolution or survivorship
147. See J. Gregory Sidak, Mr. Justice Nemo's Social Statics, 79 TEX. L. REV. 737 (2000).
148. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
149. Id. at 49.
150. Posner, Antitrust in the New Economy, supra note 14
151. Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 50 ("As an initial matter, we note that there is no consensus among commentators on the question of whether, and to what extent, current monopolization doctrine should be amended to account for competition in technologically dynamic markets characterized by network effects.").
152. Id. at 89-90.
153. Id. at 90-91.
154. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 534 U.S. 952 (2001) (denial of certiorari).
155. ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMMISSION, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 9 (Apr. 2007), available at http://www.amc.gov/report_recommendation/amc_final_report.pdf.
156. Id. at 11.
157. Barnett, supra note 104
158. Statement of the Department of Justice Antitrust Division on Its Decision to Close Its Investigation of XM Satellite Radio Holdings Inc.'s Merger with Sirius Satellite Radio Inc. (Mar. 24, 2008) [hereinafter Decision to Close Investigation].
159. Compare FTC v. Whole Foods Markets, Inc., 553 F.3d 869, 878, 886 (D.C. Cir. 2008), with id. at 893 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
160. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 5, § 1.0 (emphasis added).
161. Id. § 1.11 ("In considering the likely reaction of buyers to a price increase, the Agency will take into account all relevant evidence, including, but not limited to, the following: (1) evidence that buyers have shifted or have considered shifting purchases between products in response to relative changes in price or other competitive variables; (2) evidence that sellers base business decisions on the prospect of buyer substitution between products in response to relative changes in price or other competitive variables; (3) the influence of downstream competition faced by buyers in their output markets; and (4) the timing and costs of switching products.").
162. Id. § 1.0 ("Supply substitution factors-i.e., possible production responses-are considered elsewhere in the Guidelines in the identification of firms that participate in the relevant market and the analysis of entry.").
163. 15 U.S.C. § 18.
164. Decision to Close Investigation, supra note 122
165. See, e.g., Shelanski & Sidak, supra note 7, at 79-80.
166. The seminal paper is William F. Baxter, Bank Exchange of Transactional Paper: Legal and Economic Perspectives, 26 J.L. & ECON. 541 (1983).
167. See J. Gregory Sidak, A Consumer-Welfare Approach to Network Neutrality Regulation of the Internet, 2 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 349 (2006).
168. See, e.g., David S. Evans & Michael D. Noel, The Analysis of Mergers That Involve Multisided Platform Businesses, 4 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 663 (2008)
169. Elena Argentesi & Lapo Filistrucchi, Estimating Market Power in a Two-Sided Market: The Case of Newspapers, 22 J. APPLIED ECONOMETRICS 1247 (2007)
170. Dennis L. Weisman, Assessing Market Power: The Trade-Off between Market Concentration and Multi-Market Participation, 1 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 339 (2005).
171. 390 U.S. 145 (1968).
172. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
173. Christine A. Varney, Vigorous Antitrust Enforcement in This Challenging Era, Remarks as Prepared for the Center for American Progress (May 11, 2009), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/245711.htm.
174. See Farrell Malone & J. Gregory Sidak, Should Antitrust Consent Decrees Regulate Post-Merger Pricing? 3 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 471 (2007)
175. J. Gregory Sidak & Hal J. Singer, Evaluating Market Power with Two-Sided Demand and Preemptive Offers to Dissipate Monopoly Rent: Lessons for High-Technology Industries from the Antitrust Division's Approval of the XM-Sirius Satellite Radio Merger, 4 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 697 (2008).
176. In the Matter of Applications for Consent to the Transfer of Control of Licenses XM Satellite Radio Holdings, Inc., Transferor, to Sirius Satellite Radio Inc., Transferee, Memorandum Opinion and Order and Report and Order, 23 F.C.C.R. 12,384 (2008).