The thrill of victory: Measuring the incentive to win

Journal of Labor Economics

Volumn 28, Issue 1, 2010, Pages 87-112

  Coffey, Bentley ^a   Maloney, M T ^a  

^a CLEMSON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 77749322501     PISSN: 0734306X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/648318     Document Type: Article

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