Analyzing rising power from the perspective of soft power: A new look at China's rise to the status quo power

Journal of Contemporary China

Volumn 19, Issue 64, 2010, Pages 255-272

  Ding, Sheng ^a  

^a BLOOMSBURG UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

FOREIGN POLICY; GEOPOLITICS; INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS; POLITICAL POWER;

CHINA;

EID: 77649210689     PISSN: 10670564     EISSN: 14699400     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/10670560903444207     Document Type: Article

References (64)

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13. Gilpin's three questions are: (1) Will a state government support and follow the existing rules in international affairs such as interstate diplomacy, regional security institutions, and international economic institutions?; (2) Are state leaders satisfied with the existing distribution of power globally or regionally?; and (3) How does the leadership speak and act regarding the hierarchy of prestige. See Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 23-24.
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22. These three books are Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power (1990).
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36. According to Yongjing Zhang, Chinese scholars' academic engagement with the Western literature on international relations started in the early 1980s. In 1981, Chen Lemin published an article entitled 'A brief introduction to contemporary studies of IR in the West' ['Xiandai Xifang Guoji Guanxixue Jianjie'], International Studies [Guoji Wenti Yanjiu] 2, (1981), pp. 55-65.
37. In his essay, Chen offered a sweeping review of the state of the art of IR studies in the Anglo-American IR community up to the late 1970s, and noted the debates and contentions, theoretical as well as methodological, from idealism to behavioralism and introduced such analytical concepts as national interests and interdependence. See Yongjing Zhang, 'The "English school" in China: a travelogue of ideas and their diffusion', European Journal of International Relations 9(1), (2003), pp. 87-114.
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40. Quoted from Jiang Zemin's speech on the CCP's 80th anniversary ceremony held in Beijing on 1 July 2001.
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43. According to a 2008 public opinion survey conducted by The Chicago Council on Global Affairs and the East Asia Institute of South Korea, China's soft power in Asia ranks well below the United States.
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47. In the aftermath of the Tiananmen crackdown in 1989, China's top leader, Deng Xiaoping, propounded the famous 28-character instructions for handling Chinese foreign relations. They are: 'Calmly observe the situation; secure our footing; cope with changes with confidence; conceal capacities and bide our time; skillfully keep a low profile; avoid sticking hand out; be proactive'. See Deng Xiaoping, Deng Xiaoping Wenxuan III.
48. See Yong Deng, China's Struggle for Status: The Realignment of International Relations (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 42.
49. As to what kind of mentality China has in its current foreign policy-making process, there are some disagreements among China observers. For example, Medeiros and Fravel present the view that China has already overcome its long-held 'victim mentality' and started to adopt a 'great power mentality' instead. However, in the China-Japan diplomatic crisis that erupted in Spring 2005, there was widespread criticism that China cannot get rid of its 'victim mentality'.
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51. See Xuetong Yan, 'China's diplomacy: pursuing balance to reach harmony', People's Daily (Overseas Edition), (28 December 2005), p. 1.
52. The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence are: mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence.
53. See Robert Sutter, 'China's recent approach to Asia: seeking long term gains', NBR Analysis 13(1), (2002), pp. 13-37.
54. Some China observers believe that the Chinese government decision to eschew 'peaceful rise' in favor of 'peaceful development' was fundamentally a question of terminology and thus preserved China's strategy of reassuring other nations. See Bonnie S. Glaser and Evan S. Medeiros, 'The changing ecology of foreign policymaking in China: the ascension and demise of the theory of "peaceful rise"', China Quarterly 190, (June 2007), pp. 291-310.
55. See M. Taylor Fravel, Strong Borders, Secure Nation: Cooperation and Conflict in China's Territorial Disputes (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008).
56. President Hu made his five-point proposal at the opening ceremony of the Boao Forum for Asia (BFA) annual conference on 12 April 2008.
57. See David L. Shambaugh, 'China engages Asia: reshaping the regional order', International Security 29(3), (Winter 2004/5), pp. 64-99.
58. See the text of President Hu Jintao's speech at the opening ceremony of the Beijing Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation held on 4 November 2006.
59. See Geoff Murray, 'China plays a responsible role', China Daily, (25 January 2005).
60. See David C. Kang, China Rising: Peace, Power, and Order in East Asia (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), p. 72.
61. See Johnston, 'Is China a status quo power?', p. 12.
62. See White Paper: China's National Defense in 2008 (China's State Council Information Office, 20 January 2009).
63. See Bates Gill and Chin-hao Huang, 'China's expanding peacekeeping role: its significance and the policy implications', SIPRI Policy Brief, (February 2009).
64. See Avery Goldstein, 'Great expectations: interpreting China's arrival', International Security 22(3), (Winter 1997/98), pp. 36-73.