The effects of the fraud and abuse enforcement program under the National Health Insurance program in Korea

Health Policy

Volumn 95, Issue 1, 2010, Pages 41-49

  Kang, HeeChung ^a   Hong, JaeSeok ^a   Lee, KwangSoo ^b   Kim, Sera ^a  

^a Health Insurance Review Agency   (South Korea)

^b Eulji University   (South Korea)

Author keywords

Cost control; Efficiency; Fraud; National Health Insurance

Indexed keywords

ADULT; ARTICLE; CALCULATION; COST CONTROL; FEMALE; FORGERY; GOVERNMENT; HEALTH CARE POLICY; HUMAN; INTERVIEW; KOREA; LAW ENFORCEMENT; MALE; NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE; OUTPATIENT CARE; PUNISHMENT;

ADULT; ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE; COST CONTROL; EFFICIENCY, ORGANIZATIONAL; FRAUD; HUMANS; INTERVIEWS AS TOPIC; KOREA; MIDDLE AGED; NATIONAL HEALTH PROGRAMS; QUESTIONNAIRES; REGRESSION ANALYSIS; SAMPLING STUDIES; UNIVERSAL COVERAGE;

EID: 77549088810     PISSN: 01688510     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.healthpol.2009.10.003     Document Type: Article

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